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2Abstract
This thesis attempts to describe the evolution of a single 
economic institution in Nigeria: The Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board. 
The Board was set up in 1947 in order to control the buying and 
selling of cocoa and to regulate the activities of cocoa traders and 
buying firms. Such a narrow focus is justified on the grounds that 
the development of cocoa marketing institutions in Nigeria epitomises 
an important aspect of the development of the Nigerian political 
economy between the 1930s and 1950s. When war broke out in 1939, the 
Ministry of Food assumed control over the external marketing trade of 
all major Nigerian export commodities, including cocoa. The respon­
sibility for the cocoa control scheme was subsequently transferred to 
the Colonial Office. Already in 1941, the Colonial Office and the 
West African governments, including the Nigerian government, began to 
discuss whether it would be desirable to continue or terminate
statutory marketing control after the war. The decision to establish
the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board was largely taken because the 
Colonial Office and the West African governments believed that 
statutory marketing provided a convenient administrative solution for 
the recurrent political conflicts in the 1930s cocoa trade. These 
conflicts revolved around the strained commercial relationship
between European trading firms and African traders and reached a 
climax in the West African 1937/38 cocoa hold-up crisis. The main 
argument in this thesis is that, at the end of the war, the colonial 
authorities, parts of the nationalist movement in Nigeria, and a 
number of smaller African and European trading firms came to the
conclusion that a return to the 1930s ’free trade’ regime and its 
conflicts would not suit their long-term political and economic 
interests. This implicit consensus allowed the Colonial Office to 
surmount strong opposition from American, British and West African 
trading interests against the scheme in the politically sensitive 
post-war period.
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9Chapter 1 
Introduction
The study of the origins and history of statutory cocoa 
marketing in Nigeria in the period from 1936 to 1947 is justified on 
three grounds: the war-time West African cocoa control board was a
model institution for the parastatals which mushroomed all over 
colonial West Africa, and especially in Nigeria, in the post-war 
period. In the late 1940s, for example, all major Nigerian agricul­
tural export commodities were marketed by statutory government 
agencies.1 Furthermore, statutory cocoa marketing institutions, like 
the cocoa marketing boards, were used to raise large amounts of 
government revenue in the post-war period.2 Finally, the establish­
ment of the post-war Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board was a cornerstone 
in the political development of Nigeria leading to increased p a r ­
ticipation of Africans in the management of their own affairs which 
resulted in the formal attainment of independence in 1960. The 
initial plan to set up a cocoa marketing board attracted strong 
political criticism from the nationalist movement which only subsided 
after the composition of the Executive Board of Directors was changed 
in order to allow for the representation of local political and 
economic interest groups.3
The origins and history of statutory cocoa marketing in West 
Africa, and in particular Nigeria, has already attracted the atten­
tion of a number of historians and economists in the last 40 years.4 
The most influential single study was undertaken under the auspices 
of the Colonial Office in the early 1950s. Even today, P.T. Bauer’s 
West African Trade. A Study of Competition. Oligopoly and Monopoly in 
a Changing Economy, published in 1954, is required reading for anyone 
interested in the subject.
There is a comparatively large body of source material in 
British and Nigerian official archives.6 In the relevant period, the
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Colonial Office published two major reports: Report of the Commission 
of Inquiry on the Marketing of West African Cocoa of September 1938 
and Report on Cocoa Control in West Africa. 1939-1943. and Statement 
of Future Policy of September 1944, and a White Paper: Statement on
the Future Marketing of West African Cocoa of November 1946 on the 
subject. A number of further reports were published by the Nigerian 
government.6 In addition, valuable material can be found in private 
archives of European trading firms which were involved in the West 
African cocoa trade.7
The secondary literature offers an array of explanations as 
to why statutory cocoa marketing boards came into being in West 
Africa. Nigerian historians like W. Oyemakinde and G.O. Olusanya have 
maintained that statutory marketing boards were, by and large, an 
instrument for the exploitation of Nigerian farmers by European 
mercantile companies and the colonial state.® Other historians, in 
particular A.G. Hopkins and R.W. Shenton, have asserted that statu­
tory marketing was a product of the performance of the world economy 
in the inter-war years and its crises, and that consequently the 
introduction of statutory marketing and its continuance after the 
Second World War should be seen as an attempt to rescue imperial 
capitalism.9 A similar, if somewhat narrower, interpretation was put 
forward by the political economists V.D. Wickizer and G. Williams, 
who have argued that the establishment of marketing boards was 
largely a result of the failure of the 1930s free trade regime and an 
attempt by the European trading firms to protect their dominant 
position in the trade.10 The political scientist C.E.F. Beer, 
however, has stressed the point that statutory marketing was a means 
to control the commercial profits of peasant producers,11 while the 
political economist B. Beckman has argued that statutory marketing 
came into being because of the close interaction between the colonial 
administration with British commercial interests and the ’over­
development’ of the colonial state in relation to the ’under-develop­
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ment’ of indigenous private capitalism.12 Finally, the economist P.T. 
Bauer, and the economic historians D.K. Fieldhouse and D.J. Morgan 
have suggested that statutory marketing was a war-time measure, whose 
continuation after the Second World War was largely due to the 
existence of strong self-perpetuating forces within the colonial 
administration.12
Despite the impressive amount of research on the evolution of 
statutory marketing institutions, there is no full-length historical 
study of the subject, which combines the use of British and Nigerian 
archives, as well as tries to capture both the local and the imperial 
perspectives. This thesis attempts to fill this gap. The research on 
the topic of this thesis was guided by the assumption that by working 
through the economic source material some new answers could be found 
to the basically political question of why the Nigerian government 
took over the control of the cocoa trade after the war. This metho­
dology could be loosely described as a political economy approach.
Because of the abundance of source material, the focus of this 
thesis was narrowed to the history of cocoa marketing institutions in 
the Lagos/Benin area of Nigeria in the period between 1936 and 1947. 
These reference points were chosen because the 1936/37 cocoa season 
was the last season before the outbreak of the Second World War in 
which African traders could freely participate in the trade. The cut­
off date 1947 is significant because the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing 
Board was established in that year.
This thesis consists of eight chapters each of which, apart 
from the introduction and the conclusion, highlights one particular 
theme in the history of statutory marketing in Nigeria. After the 
introductory chapter one, chapters two and three focus on the 
economic and then political, background of statutory marketing. They 
describe the evolution of the Nigerian cocoa industry and politics of 
the Nigerian cocoa trade. Chapter four analyses in some detail the 
origins of the 1937/38 conflict between African traders and European
12
trading firms in Nigeria, its course and its political aftermath. The 
introduction of statutory marketing in Nigeria and the initial 
reaction of African traders and cocoa farmers form the subjects of 
chapter five. The subsequent chapter examines the impact of the war 
effort on the administration of cocoa control in Nigeria and its 
consequences for the cocoa industry. Finally, chapter seven evaluates 
the political and economic factors which led to the establishment of 
the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board in 1947. This thesis ends with a 
short concluding chapter.
One major problem in this study was determining the precise 
impact of the Second World War on the history of statutory marketing. 
It can be safely assumed that without the impetus of the war, the 
establishment of produce control boards would have been, for politi­
cal reasons, exceedingly difficult. This, however, does not mean that 
the introduction of statutory marketing can be explained solely by 
war-time events. A review of the previous interpretations of the 
history of statutory marketing suggests that war-time changes were as 
much caused by developments which happened in the immediately 
preceding years as they were caused by the pressures and demands of 
the war itself. The judgement to what extent this thesis succeeds in 
disentangling in a satisfactory manner the multiplicity of these 
causal factors is left to the, it is to be hoped, benevolent reader.
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Chapter 2
The History of the Cocoa Industry: An Overview
Although the emphasis of this thesis lies more on the marketing 
of cocoa than on its production, an introductory chapter seems 
justified on the grounds that it was the growth of the cocoa industry 
and in particular its geographical expansion which - as it will be 
argued later - to some extent predisposed the way cocoa marketing 
developed in Nigeria.
Cocoa farming like any other agricultural activity, depends 
largely on natural conditions. In Nigeria that specific combination 
of rainfall, temperature and soil qualities which favours cocoa 
production can only be found in the south-western part of the 
country. The core area of cocoa farming can be visualised as kidney­
shaped and lies about 100 miles north-east of the country’s capital, 
Lagos. In the late 1930s this area belonged administratively to the 
Western Provinces of Nigeria. While most of the cocoa was produced in 
the Abeokuta, Oyo, Ondo and Ijebu Provinces, some cocoa was also 
produced in the northern parts of the Colony of Lagos.1
It is not known how many farm-households were engaged in cocoa 
farming at the end of the 1930s. According to a survey conducted in 
the early 1950s, their number probably did not exceed 200,000.2 
Compared to the number of the total population living in the cocoa 
producing area, which was estimated to be about 4.5 million at the 
time, this number looks rather small. Yet, the economic importance of 
cocoa farming for the regional economy was far larger than such a 
comparison suggests. To start with, even small cocoa farmers used 
substantial quantities of hired labour on their farms.3 Furthermore, 
the cash income of cocoa farmers was perhaps the most important 
source of demand for locally produced goods and services, and also 
for imported goods. In addition, cocoa farmers were taxed by local 
Native Administrations and the Nigerian government, and for both, the
16
revenue thus raised formed an important, though unquantifiable, part 
of their total tax revenue.4
The Growth of Cocoa Exports
Cocoa had been exported from Nigeria from as early as the mid- 
1880s, but it was not until after the First World War that cocoa 
gained a significant importance in the export statistics. After the 
war cocoa exports grew fairly rapidly, so that by the end of the 
1920s about 50,000 tons and by the end of the 1930s almost 100,000 
tons were being exported annually.
Table 1: Nigerian Cocoa: Seasonal Purchase Prices and Export Volumes 
1916/17 - 1947/48 (Lagos f.o.b. grade II)
Season £ Tons Season £ Tons
1916/17 23 15,442 (1917) 1932/33 17 71,900
1917/18 18 10,219 (1918) 1933/34 13 72,000
1918/19 20 25,711 (1919) 1934/35 15 72,300
1919/20 71 17,155 (1920) 1935/36 17 93,400
1920/21 20 17,944 (1921) 1936/37 38 101,700
1921/22 22 31,271 (1922) 1937/38 17 98,700
1922/23 24 34,600 1938/39 14 113,900
1923/24 18 34,100 1939/40 16.5 81,900
1924/25 28 40,000 1940/41 13.5 100,600
1925/26 31 41,400 1941/42 14.5 90,400
1926/27 54 45,600 1942/43 12.5 111,200
1927/28 48 45,500 1943/44 12.5 70,900
1928/29 36 52,800 1944/45 21.5 85,500
1929/30 30 54,500 1945/46 26 102,900
1930/31 19 51,600 1946/47 47.5 106,400
1931/32 18 58,300 1947/48 59 74,000
Sources: Prices: S. Berry. Cocoa, P.223 (1916-1922);
Colonial Reports (1920-1932);
PRO: 00 657/47. Report of the Department of 
Agriculture (1939/40), p.7 (1932-1939);
Nigerian Gazette (1939-1948).
Volumes: same as above, except 1939/40. For this season 
see NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S30, Reply by the Chief
Secretary to the Government to Question No.44 of 
4th March, 1940.
Note: Figures for export volumes from 1916/17 to 1921/22 are
referring to annual exports.
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The growth of cocoa exports was accompanied by a similar growth 
in export earnings, albeit at a very different pace. World market 
prices fluctuated violently throughout the period, and in the early 
1930s reached such unprecedented low levels (see table one), that in 
some years export earnings actually decreased, while export volumes 
increased.5 Despite these fluctuations, the value of cocoa exports in 
relation to the value of other exports from Nigeria increased in the 
1920s and 1930s, so that in 1937 the value of cocoa exports accounted 
for almost 19% of the value of all exports from Nigeria.8 In the same 
period Nigeria became one of the major world suppliers of cocoa, 
taking second place only after the Gold Coast (Ghana) in Africa and 
third place after Brazil on world scale. Together the Gold Coast and 
Nigeria supplied over half of the world cocoa in the 1936/7 to 1938/9 
period.7
The Spread of Cocoa Farming in Western Nigeria
The history of the spread of cocoa farming in western Nigeria 
has been told elsewhere and it is sufficient here to summarise its 
major themes.8
Although cocoa had been known in Nigeria for some time, it was 
only in the 1880s that it became commercially viable. It is said that 
the first successful ’cocoa farmers’ were Lagos traders who ventured 
from the palm oil trade into cocoa production as this particular 
trade had become unremunerative. Most of these early cocoa farms were 
established near Agege and Otta in the northern part of the Colony. 
Among these early ’cocoa farmers’ were well-known businessmen, such 
as C.C. Cole and J.K. Coker. The last named was also one of the 
founders of the African Church, a breakaway movement from the Church 
Missionary Society (C.M.S.).9
By the early 1890s farmers started to grow cocoa south of 
Ibadan and around Abeokuta. From there it spread to Ilesha in the 
late 1890s and to Ife in 1910. After the First World War cocoa was
18
introduced in Qndo Province and in the Ekiti area.10 Most of these 
early cocoa farms were planted in the vicinity of towns, but as 
suitable land became more scarce, farmers had to move away from the 
towns into previously uncultivated forest areas. The expansion of 
cocoa farming was thus not only a geographical movement defined by 
its outer boundaries, but also a movement within the geographical 
area known as the ’cocoa belt’. By the 1920s cocoa farms were 
established in all the major areas of the cocoa belt, but the spread 
of cocoa farming continued well into the 1960s.11
Before the First World War and during the war, cocoa acreage
expanded at a comparatively modest rate. After the war and par­
ticularly in the late 1920s the acreage newly planted with cocoa 
increased rapidly each year, reaching its peak just before the onset 
of the Depression in the early 1930s. During the Depression and the 
late 1930s the rate of expansion dropped. It seems that during the 
Second World War cocoa farming became increasingly less attractive, 
and the acreage newly planted with cocoa further decreased ac­
cordingly. Though in some areas, and particularly in the Ife and Qndo 
areas, the acreage under cocoa grew in the late the 1940s and during 
the 1950s, the overall rate of expansion remained at a comparatively 
low level during that period.128
From the above it appears that between 1900 and 1960 cocoa
farming was most attractive to farmers in the 1920s and 1930s. Cocoa
farmers moved into previously uncultivated forest areas and as 
distances to the major towns increased, thousands of new settlements 
of a more permanent character were established. It was also during 
this period that cocoa production showed its most marked increases. 
This had important consequences for the process of cocoa marketing. 
As I will show later the increased distances between the cocoa farms 
and the market centres opened new opportunities to local entre­
preneurs .
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The spread of cocoa farming had been aided by a number of 
interrelated developments. The occupation of western Nigeria by 
British forces in the early 1890s ended the continuing civil war 
between the various factions of the dominant ethnic group of the area 
as well as the widespread exaction of extortionate road tolls, which 
had probably prevented an earlier spread of cocoa farming in the 
area. Once it was ’pacified*, the colonial government embarked on in­
frastructural development. The initial expenditure involved in these 
undertakings was met partly by taxation, but the larger part of the 
expenditure was financed through loans, which the Nigerian government 
had raised on the London money market. The repayment of these loans 
later proved to be a very heavy burden on the Nigerian taxpayer. The 
most important project before the First World War was the building of 
a railway line, which reached Abeokuta in 1897 and Ibadan in 1901. 
After the war, the government in Lagos and the Native Administrations 
of the cocoa-producing areas concentrated most of their efforts on 
road building.13 In the beginning these were mostly feeder roads to 
the railway, but then roads which connected all the major towns in 
western Nigeria were increasingly built. By the end of the 1920s, 
Southern Nigeria possessed a comparatively we11-developed road 
network.14 This had important consequences for the development of 
cocoa farming in western Nigeria. The development of roads lowered 
transport costs and this made cocoa farming remunerative in areas in 
which the costs of moving produce by such means, as, for example head 
porterage, had made it previously unattractive.16 In addition, road 
building and the advent of cars and particularly of light trucks gave 
birth to a new group of Nigerian entrepreneurs. They combined trade 
and transport, and it was from this group of traders that some of the 
most successful cocoa traders emerged.
The spread of cocoa farming was also directly supported by the 
Nigerian government, though only in a very limited way.16 The 
Botanical Gardens in Ebute Meta had distributed a number of cocoa
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seedlings and had given advice free of cost since the late 1880s. A 
small ’model’ cocoa farm was also established in Ibadan in 1899.17 
The government was not, however, the main source of information about 
cocoa cultivation in western Nigeria. One source was the network of 
Christian teachers and missionaries, who according to one observer 
preached ’...the gospel of coffee, cocoa, cotton and work as well as 
the scripture...’18 and consequently some of the early cocoa farmers 
were members of Christian circles and societies. Another source were 
labourers, who had worked on the cocoa plantations in Agege and on 
cocoa farms elsewhere. When they returned to their home towns they 
brought with them the necessary basic knowledge about cocoa farming 
and perhaps cocoa seeds. A third source were traders, who saw the 
advantages cocoa farming could bring to farmers, and brought this 
knowledge back to their home towns.18
Yet, all this does not explain why farmers were able to move so 
quickly into cocoa farming and why, in particular, the late 1920s and 
early 1930s were the periods of its most rapid expansion. Here one 
has to turn to the micro-level of cocoa production. Generally 
speaking, as suitable land was relatively freely available until 
after the Second World War, even in the older cocoa-growing areas, 
the mobilisation of labour, its availability and price were the 
decisive factors which accounted for the expansion of the cocoa 
industry, apart from the level of cocoa prices. The immediate family 
was the most important source of labour used in the maintenance and 
expansion of cocoa farms, but hired labour (local or migrant, on a 
semi-permanent or casual basis) were also widely used. The attrac­
tiveness of cocoa farming was thus not only determined by the cocoa 
price, or the opportunity costs of producing cocoa, but also by the 
’production’ - costs in cocoa farming which are, in the main, labour 
costs.
Before the First World War and in the late 1920s high cocoa 
prices may have induced farmers to venture into cocoa farming, but in
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the 1930s the most important factor behind the expansion of cocoa 
farming was, according to S. Berry, not the cocoa price levels 
themselves, but the fact that price levels of other crops such as 
food crops and palm products had fallen at least as much as cocoa 
prices, and that labour costs had fallen as well.20 While the first 
made cocoa particularly attractive to farmers who had previously 
farmed other crops, the latter might have generally induced farmers 
to expand their cocoa holdings. In the 1940s and particularly during 
the war, labour costs seemed to have risen substantially, while at 
the same time cocoa farmers received very low prices for their 
produce. This ’net profit squeeze’ and the fact that gains from other 
income opportunities had increased during the war, are very likely 
the reason why farmers found cocoa far less attractive in the 1940s 
than in the 1930s.21
Income and Social Stratification
There is very little information available on the income and 
social stratification of cocoa farmers in the 1920s, 1930s and
1940s.22 For the 1950s, however, much more detailed information is 
available through the research done by R. Galletti, K.D.S. Baldwin 
and 1.0. Dina.23 As there are no indications that cocoa farming had 
completely changed between the 1930s and 1950s, their research 
findings regarding income and social stratification are relevant to 
this study. There is no space to review the social structure of the 
cocoa economy in any detail, but three features of that economy 
appear to be of special importance. Galletti, Baldwin and Dina found 
that land, income and economic opportunities were very unequally 
distributed, that cocoa farmers possessed a high degree of occupa­
tional mobility, and finally, that after cocoa farming, trade was 
the most important source of income to the cocoa-farming house­
holds. 24
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They reported that small farmers cultivating less than one and 
a quarter acres, were most numerous, held little of the total land 
under cocoa and produced only a small part of the cocoa exported, 
while the large farmers with farms of more than six acres produced 
more than half of the cocoa exported. In the sample survey which they 
undertook, just 5% of the families had nearly 29% of the total income 
of the sample group.26 They also reported that cocoa farmers combined 
different types of occupation and had thus different sources of
income at the same time.26 Other income than that from cocoa sales
included sales of other crops, such as kola nuts and sales of 
services, such as working as artisans or as labourers. The most 
important source of income other than sales of cocoa was trade and in 
particular the produce trade. Here they found two different types of
farmers - those who were comparatively poor and who had made very
little gains from their trading activities and those farmers who were 
rich and whose individual gains from trade exceeded the individual 
gains from other economic activities, including cocoa farming, of all 
farmers in the sample survey. This group of wealthy farmers are best 
described as farmer-traders. Together with other wealthy farmers, 
whose main sources of income were cocoa sales, they formed a distinct 
social sub-group within the rural communities, which one might 
loosely call nascent ’rural bourgeoisie’.27
The issue, to what extent these larger farmers formed a ’class’ 
in the Marxian sense, has been discussed recently in the secondary 
literature.28 This- is not a purely theoretical question, as some of 
the biggest farmers were also landowners with hundreds of tenants, 
employers of a substantial number of farm workers and finally 
money-lenders, who are said to have advanced substantial amounts of 
money to smaller farmers in the lean period of the cocoa season. In 
addition, some large farmers played an important part in the ’Anti- 
Pool’ movement at the end of the 1930s and 1940s.20
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The secondary literature does not provide any conclusive answer 
to the question, if this social group constituted a ’class’. S. 
Berry, for example, maintains that these large farmers ’...did not 
develop into a distinct class of rural land-owners...’30; her main 
argument being that, a distinct division of the society into 
land-owners and tenants or employers and employees had not taken 
place in western Nigeria as land had been relatively freely available 
to prospective cocoa farmers. Moreover, the survey done by Galletti, 
Baldwin and Dina suggests that at least by 1950/51 payments of rents 
or repayments of loans did not play any major role in the detailed 
accounts of the 187 sample survey families.
Others, like G. Williams, have argued that class divisions did 
not only develop on the lines of the ownership of productive resour­
ces (land, labour and capital) but also between groups of people 
’...whose differential command of particular skills and material 
resources leads to significant differences in life chances in so far 
as they are determined by the relation to a particular market.’31 He 
also argued that political action end political divisions centred for 
this reason not so much around the ownership of productive resources 
such as land, but around the stake which each group has in the 
economy. Society is thus divided, for example, between the large 
farmers and small farmers, and the substantial produce traders and 
the much smaller petty traders. Moveover, people move between oc­
cupations, being at one time in their lives traders, but later 
becoming cocoa farmers or vice versa. Thus the distinction between 
occupations tends to become blurred. Particularly at the upper levels 
of this rural society the categories of rich farmers, wealthy produce 
traders and here one should include the local political elite - the 
chiefs - ’...merge imperceptibly into one another.’32 If one looks at 
the biographies of some of the leading ’politicians’ at the time, one 
finds that nearly all of them at one time had been produce traders 
and transport entrepreneurs, had tried at smother time cocoa farming.
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and became in the end, for example, in the case of 0. Awolowo, 
Premier of the Western Region or in the case of Sir Adesoji Aderemi 
I, Qni of Ife, the highest sacral/political traditional authority in 
Yorubaland.88 These are not, of course, representative examples, but 
they show the relative homogeneity of the group of people which I
have mentioned earlier as nascent bourgeoisie. This nascent bour­
geoisie was the reservoir from which the nationalistic movement, as I 
will show later, drew its main support and to which nationalist
policies were directed.34
The Cocoa Consumers
Although cocoa has been known in Europe from the sixteenth
century, it was only in the nineteenth century that cocoa products 
ceased to be a luxury and became a household item. Since then, 
population growth and rising per capita income has assured an
ever-increasing demand for cocoa products.86 World net demand at the 
end of the 1930s amounted to almost 700,000 tons, of which 39% were 
consumed in the US, about 16% in the UK and about 40% in continental 
Europe, of which Germany and Austria together accounted for about 
21.5% of world consumption.38
Just before the Second World War per capita consumption of
chocolate and confectionery in the UK had reached about 7 1/2 oz per
week, and a thriving industry had developed to satisfy that demand.87 
The market leaders in the United Kingdom were Cadbury & Fry, followed
by Rowntree, and British Cocoa Mills. The degree of dominance of
Cadbury & Fry in the UK chocolate market can be gathered from the 
fact that, for example, in 1941 out of a total of 100,997 tons of 
West African cocoa to be distributed between the eighty-odd chocolate 
and confectionery manufacturers, Cadbury & Fry alone had a quota of 
47,535 tons.88 These quotas were based on pre-war consumption 
figures. A similar degree of concentration was prevalent in the US. 
The Nowell Commission reported that in 1937 the Hershey Chocolate
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Corporation consumed over ’100.000 tons’ of cocoa. In that year the 
total import of cocoa into the US amounted to 232.000 tons.3 9
The prices for raw cocoa which the manufacturers were prepared 
to pay varied enormously in the intei— war years. As these prices were 
the basis on which 'producer prices’ were calculated, it appears 
worthwhile to look into the reasons why these fluctuations occurred. 
Above all, it seems that cocoa prices are linked to the world trade 
cycle with its boom and gloom periods, e.g. in expectation of high 
chocolate sales or rising chocolate prices, manufacturers would 
increase their demand for raw cocoa, which in turn would drive up 
world cocoa prices.40 Yet, this does not explain the short term, even 
daily, fluctuations of the world cocoa prices.41 Some of these 
fluctuations in the 1920s and 1930s were certainly the result of 
speculative buying and selling operations by brokers and manufac­
turers, whose dealings were greatly assisted by the establishment of 
cocoa futures exchanges in New York and London in 1925 and in 1928, 
though these futures exchanges were originally designed to limit the 
risks of buyers and sellers in a market with particularly violent 
market fluctuations. At a more basic level, the fluctuations in the 
price were the result of a market situation in which a comparatively 
small over-supply or over-demand led to comparatively large price 
changes and in which supply and demand could not be forecast with any 
degree of reliability.42 In addition, cocoa manufacturers relied on a 
continuous supply of raw cocoa, as the time cocoa could be kept in 
warehouses was limited to about six months. When stocks were running 
low and in particular in strong boom periods, manufacturers were 
prepared to pay nearly any price for raw cocoa as long as they could 
get in possession of that cocoa to keep production going.43
Yet, the cocoa manufacturers were not as dependent on the world 
cocoa market and its fluctuations as it appears at first sight. 
Larger manufacturers signed long-term contracts with the trading
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firms for future deliveries of cocoa, thereby becoming less dependent 
on the spot market. Moreover, as manufacturers bought only part of 
their cocoa requirements at a time, their average purchase price in a 
given period would change far less than the prices between each 
transaction.
Wide fluctuations of cocoa prices in the international markets 
as well as in the local markets of the producing countries was one of 
the constituent features of the cocoa trade in the inter-war years. 
These fluctuations had important consequences for the marketing 
process of cocoa and were very much at the heart of the political 
controversies which cocoa marketing sparked off in the 1930s.
The Nigerian Cocoa Trade
The cocoa trade in Nigeria was shared out between four distinct 
types of traders. The first type was represented by the European 
trading firm. The second type was the African trader, who, although 
not a shipper of cocoa, controlled much of the trade in the interior. 
The third type were the Lebanese and Syrian traders who, by competing 
with the European trading firms, as well as with African traders, had 
found a niche for themselves in the cocoa trade. Finally, there were 
the Co-operative Cocoa Sales Societies and Unions. Though they were 
not privately owned trading firms, they should be included in the 
listing because the other traders or trading firms looked upon them 
as commercial competitors.
The European Trading Firms
The degree to which the European trading firms dominated the 
import and export trade of Nigeria is well documented and needs not 
to be reiterated in detail here.44 Twenty firms accounted for about 
90% of all Nigerian non-mineral exports, and for about 58% of all 
commercial merchandise imports in the late 1940s. They were also 
large employers, substantial contributors to government revenue and
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the capital they owned in Nigeria was estimated to amount to nearly a 
quarter of the total capital invested in Nigeria at the end of the 
1930s.46
With some notable exceptions, most of the firms were "mer­
chants”, selling goods and buying produce for resale at the same 
time. Selling goods and buying produce were not separate activities 
of the firms, but rather one operation, since ’...their business as 
buyers ... is largely carried on in order to assist them indirectly 
as importers.’48 Being a seller of goods and a buyer of produce at 
the same time offered considerable advantages to the firms. Firstly, 
it made operations cheaper, as a number of fixed overhead costs could 
be spread over a large turnover. Secondly, savings were achieved on 
money transfer charges. Merchants could ’pay’ for produce with goods, 
while acquiring their merchandise from the manufacturers with the 
proceeds of the produce sales.47 Finally, a two-way trade reinforces 
ties with customers, as the middlemen, who sold the produce to the 
firms were also the firms’ biggest merchandise customers. In general, 
the level of merchandise sales was dependent on the level of produce 
prices and in this respect merchants were interested in high produce 
prices, but as the Nowell Commission argued:
If, for exaaple, the alternative lay between paying 120 and 121 for cocoa, the 
■erchant fins would clearly not choose the higher price for the sake of creating 
an additional 11 of purchasing power, for at best only a part of this sua could 
be returned to thea in the shape of profits on aerchandise.48
It appears, therefore, that these trading firms tried to conduct 
their business as profitably as they could on their merchandise 
selling side, as well as on their produce buying side, though 
temporary losses on one side of the trade could be made good through 
profits on the other side of the trade and this strengthened their 
competitive position vis-a-vis sole importers or exporters.40
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Table 2: Shipment of Cocoa by European Firms, 1936/37 - 1938/39, in 
Tons and as Percentage Shares of Total Cocoa Exports
1936/37 1937/38 1938/39
Shipper Tons % Tons % Tons %
United Africa 35,202 37.35 27,734 31.75 37,842 33.23
Company Ltd.
G.B.Ollivant Ltd. 9,167 9.73 8,266 9.46 9,649 8.48
44,369 47.08 36,000 41.21 47,491 41.71
G.L.Gaiser 11,565 12.27 11,880 13.60 12,399 10.89
Cocoa
Manufacturers Ltd. 11,248 11.94 8,530 9.77 12,284 10.79
John Holt & Co.
(Liverpool) Ltd. 10,970 11.64 7,901 9.05 12,996 11.41
Paterson, Zochonis
and Co. 5,673 6.02 6,825 7.81 6,270 5.51
Compagnie Frangaise 
de L ’Afrique
Occidentals 3,519 3.73 3,902 4.47 4,216 3.70
C.Zard & Co. Ltd. 2,310 2.45 3,538 4.05 4,878 4.28
Union Trading
Company Ltd. 2,128 2.26 2,089 2.39 3,140 2.76
Witt & Busch Ltd. 1,192 1.26 1,714 1.96 3,039 2.67
London, Africa and
Overseas Ltd. _ _ _ _ 1,413 1.62 2,367 2.08
Societe Commerciale
del’Ouest Africain 179 0.19 1,375 1.57 2,086 1.83
The English and Scottish 
Joint Co-operative
Wholesale Society 742 0.79 998 1.14 383 0.34
99.63 98.64 97.97
Note: The United Africa Company and G.B.Ollivant were both owned by
Unilever (Mars, Extra-territorial Enterprises, p.57).
Source: CSO 26, file 36148, file S 30 Nigerian Legislative Council.
Reply by the Chief Secretary to Question No.44 of 4/3/1940.
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During the 1920s and 1930s the number of firms in the cocoa 
trade had steadily decreased. Some firms went out of business 
completely while others were taken over by their competitors, so that 
by the end of the 1930s just four firms accounted for over three- 
quarters of the total cocoa export trade, as table two shows.60
On the whole there were three reasons for this high degree of 
concentration. Firstly, in order to capture a sizeable proportion of 
the trade a firm needed considerable capital resources to conduct 
that trade. Secondly, cocoa was a risky business in the 1920s and 
1930s. While in some years profits had been high, in other years, 
particularly after the First World War, during the Depression and in 
1936/37, some firms had suffered great losses, and only firms with 
sufficient capital resources could survive this period. Finally, the 
fierce competition for tonnage between the European firms meant that
profit margins in some years were quite low.61
The firms adopted a number of strategies to increase their 
profits. These were basically expansionist strategies as only an 
increased market share would promise higher profits. If a firm could 
increase its tonnage or turnover by offering, for example, slightly 
higher produce buying-prices, firms’ profits tended to increase as 
more than compensatory savings were effected by decreasing unit
overhead costs.52 As Hancock has shown, unit buying costs tended to 
decrease dramatically with increasing tonnage, because overhead costs 
of the produce trade were so abnormally high in West Africa in 
relation to the volume of sales. The costs of the employment of 
European supervisory staff contributed to these high overheads.63 It 
appears that the desire to increase tonnage was also one of the 
reasons for the establishment of up-country buying stations.64 The 
move from the ports to the towns in the interior had been made
possible by improvements in the means of transport and communi­
cations, but had there not been the desire to reduce purchasing costs 
by cutting out the Lagos-based middlemen and to increase tonnage, it
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■ seems very unlikely that the firms would have burdened themselves 
with large buying organisations with their built-in financial risks 
and high costs.65 Finally, firms could expand their market share by 
the acquisition of competitors, and then integrating them into their 
existing buying network.50 The growth of the United Africa Company, 
which emerged at the end of the 1920s as the dominant firm in the 
import and export trade, is an example of this type of strategy.57
The expansionist strategy had its distinct disadvantages. In a 
limited market, the gains of one firm are the losses of another, and 
market shares were thus fiercely defended. In such a situation trade 
margins tend to be very small. There was, however, one principal 
alternative available to the firms. Firms concluded agreements with 
each other, which would give each firm a fixed share of the trade. In 
addition, the participants in such a ’pool’ would agree upon a 
specific trade margin and produce buying and merchandise selling 
prices.58 As these buying and selling agreements will be analysed in 
some depth in chapters three and four, it is sufficient here to point 
out that these agreements rarely worked over a period of time. By 
restricting competition these firms tried to raise the profit margins 
of the participating firms, but at the same time they necessarily 
raised the profitability of the whole trade, and that attracted 
newcomers. After some time these new competitors would then force the 
’Pool’-firms to abandon their price agreements as they were losing 
customers and trade to the newcomers, and consequently a new period 
of competitive buying and selling would ensue. Thus a peculiar cycle 
of competition and restriction developed in the 1920s and 1930s which 
ultimately came to an end when government control was instituted over 
the import and export trade at the outbreak of war in 1939.50
It is very difficult to come to any conclusions concerning the 
profitability of the trade. Above all there is a dearth of reliable 
data on all the major trading firms. There are, however, some data 
available for the United Africa Company. Between 1930 and 1937 this
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firm supposedly incurred losses on their cocoa trading account of 
£1,338,000, much of it in the 1936/37 season.00 On the other hand, 
the company declared net profits on their total operations, including 
cocoa buying, between April 1930 and September 1937 of £4,459,950 and 
it also appears that in the period from September 1935 to September 
1937 overall profits had been particularly high.01 Yet, these data 
are somewhat misleading, as it is not known what costs had been 
incurred, starting with general expenses, taxes and depreciation al­
lowances and ending with directors’ fees and emoluments for the 
provident fund.
If the United Africa Company is taken as being representative 
of the bigger European firms, some tentative conclusions seem to be 
valid. Firstly, the merchandise side of the firms was more profitable 
than the produce-buying side.02 Secondly, the produce trade in other 
commodities was probably more profitable than the cocoa trade in the 
1930s as all the other major export crops were already covered by 
market-sharing agreements before the famous 1937/38 cocoa buying 
agreements were concluded.03 Finally, it seems that it was this 
imbalance which reinforced the firm’s determination to work for a 
lasting market-sharing agreement in the cocoa trade at the end of the 
1930s.
The African Cocoa Traders
It is known that most of the cocoa which the European firms
exported before the Second World War was purchased from African 
traders (sometimes also called "brokers" or "middlemen")04 and not 
from cocoa farmers.06 Yet, what constitutes a cocoa trader is rather 
difficult to define. For the majority of cocoa traders, buying and 
selling of cocoa was probably just one economic activity amongst 
others and thus the distinction between cocoa traders and other
professions tended to get blurred. As I have mentioned earlier, there
were large- and small-scale farmer-traders, traders who combined
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cocoa trading with transport businesses, and traders, whose main 
business was to purchase palm kernels and to sell imported merchan­
dise, rather than to purchase cocoa.
Bearing these difficulties in mind, the internal cocoa trade 
system consisted of the following types of cocoa traders.8® Most 
numerous were the small itinerant traders (also called pan or basket 
buyers). They bought small parcels of cocoa from the farmers and 
brought them to the next village or town markets. Often these small 
traders were women and well known to the farmers, being either a 
relative or a member of the same community. In general, small traders 
had very little capital of their own and to carry out their trade 
they had to rely on advances given to them by bigger traders.
Next in the hierarchy of traders were the "scalemen". These 
traders were in charge of weighing machines, which because of their 
weight could not be carried around to the farms. They were mostly 
located in the bigger villages or at roadsides in the vicinity of 
major towns. They received cocoa from farmers and small traders and 
packed it into standardised units, usually a cocoa bag, weighing 
about 60kg to 65kg. Like the small traders, their trading capital 
resources were extremely limited.07
Before the cocoa ultimately reached the European trading firms, 
in most cases it passed through another layer of cocoa traders. These 
were either independent produce traders, commission buyers or the 
firms’ depot clerks, who bought cocoa on their own account and sold 
it afterwards to the trading firms. Depot clerks (also called factors 
or depot agents) received a small salary and also a commission on 
the tonnage they handled. They were often also sellers of merchandise 
and were required by the firms to provide security for the merchan­
dise which they had in stock and for the cash which was entrusted to 
them to buy produce. The position of the smaller commission buyers 
(also called agreemented buyers) was very much akin to that of the 
depot clerks and indeed the firms looked upon them as such, though
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they considered themselves more as independent traders. These 
commission buyers often worked from stores which were either rented 
or leased by their firms and were also supplied with the goods 
necessary to conduct their trade, such as scales, bags, twine and 
tarpaulin. The trading capital these commission buyers worked with 
was largely, though not completely, owned by the trading firms and 
thus they also had to provide security for the money entrusted to 
them. They too were paid according to the tonnage they handled, 
though their commission rates were usually higher than the rates 
depot clerks received. In addition, they were paid a retaining fee 
during the off season. Finally, at the top of the hierarchy of cocoa 
traders were the more independent produce brokers. The smaller 
independent cocoa traders were almost indistinguishable from the 
larger commission buyers, because a large part of their working 
capital was in fact provided by the firms, but the wealthy and most 
successful ones owned their own stores and in some cases their own 
transport businesses. Some of them also had substantial cocoa farms. 
They employed their own commission buyers and some of them maintained 
buying organisations very similar to those owned by the European 
trading firms. They partly operated with their own capital and 
received commission rates, which increased with the amount of cocoa 
they sold to the firms. These ’overriding* commissions far exceeded 
the commission rates other cocoa buyers received.
The commission rates were, however, only part of the income or 
profit cocoa traders gained. Cocoa traders could pocket the dif­
ference between the prices which they paid farmers or smaller traders 
for their produce and the prices which they received from the trading 
firms or, in the case of smaller traders, from cocoa buyers higher up 
in the hierarchy. This difference varied considerably between 
different areas of the cocoa belt and depended to a large extent on 
the degree of competition between cocoa buyers in these areas. There 
were, however, some other devices to increase price differences.
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Apart from outright abuses, such as using false weights, cocoa 
traders sometimes combined money-lending with produce trading. By 
borrowing money during the off-season, some farmers became tied to 
specific traders who were thus, in some cases, able to depress 
purchase prices artificially. As I will show later the evidence on 
the incidence of the combined activity of money-lending and produce 
trading is rather limited and in contrast, for example, to cocoa 
trading in the Gold Coast, has probably played no major role in the 
cocoa trade in Nigeria.
Finally, some of the biggest independent traders also exported 
cocoa. Though there had been numerous attempts by Africans to venture 
into that trade before the First World War and in the inter-war 
years, nearly all of them had been shortlived. This was mainly due to 
the crash after the First World War and to the Depression, but also 
as a result of fierce competition which they faced from the European 
trading firms and their business practices. At the end of the 1930s 
just a handful of traders mainioined business links with mainly 
British brokers and for example their total cocoa exports in 1938/39 
amounted to just 873 tons, but as I will show in chapter three, this 
is not an adequate measure of their strength vis-a-vis the European 
trading firms. A produce trader such as T.A. Odutola exported only 
250 tons of cocoa in the 1938/39 season, yet, his total seasonal 
turnover amounted to 4,000 to 5,000 tons.88 In the late 1930s he had 
built up his own buying organisation and largely financed his own 
trade, though he also received advances from one of the bigger 
European trading firms (John Holt & Co.).
The main local competitors to the African traders were not just 
the European trading firms, but also a relatively small number of 
traders of Greek and Lebanese (Syrian) origin who had come to 
Nigeria after the First World War. These traders kept a very low 
profile and thus very little is known about them.89 It is known,
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however, that most of them lived in Northern Nigeria, where they had 
captured a substantial share in the groundnut trade,70 though they 
could also be found in any part of Nigeria, trading primarily in 
imported merchandise. There were also some Greek and Lebanese traders 
who in the 1920s and 1930s had ventured in the palm produce and cocoa 
trade, such as S. Thomopulos, C.S. Mandrides, A. Flionis and C. Zard. 
Most of these traders were tied to specific trading firms, like, for 
example, S. Thomopulos to the United Africa Company, but at the end 
of the 1930s they had started to export cocoa on their own account. 
These exports amounted to about 900 tons in 1938/39, though their 
turnover was, as in the case of the African traders, far bigger than 
this number suggests.71 Like their African competitors, they combined 
produce trading with transport businesses.
African traders had mounted repeated campaigns against what 
they perceived as the ’Syrian threat’, especially against their 
incursions into the business areas, such as the small merchandise and 
produce trade, which the African traders regarded as their ’natural’ 
domain.72 These campaigns did not meet with much success before the 
Second World War. However, after the war, the colonial government 
became increasingly amenable to demands by African traders to 
restrict ’Syrian’ business activities.73
From the point of view of the European trading firms, there was 
not much difference between the African and the Syrian traders. At 
least in the 1920s and 1930s the hostility shown towards African 
traders was equally matched by a marked hostility towards Syrian 
traders. They both appeared to challenge the hegemony of the European 
trading firms in the export trade and even more so in the internal 
trade. Trade practices, such as the elimination of competition 
between the participants of the Buying Agreement of 1937/38, were 
directed against both the Syrian and African traders alike.
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The Co-operative Societies
Farmers’ associations for the marketing of cocoa had been 
founded even before the First World War,74 but probably because of 
the little cocoa which was exported at the time, these societies did 
not receive much attention from the government. This changed after 
1918, when the government, and in particular the Agricultural Depart­
ment, became involved in schemes to improve the quality of cocoa 
exported from Nigeria. It was, however, not until 1932 that the 
support of co-operative cocoa marketing societies was declared to be 
the official policy of the Agricultural Department. This was to some 
extent a reaction to the spectacular bankruptcy of the Ibadan Co­
operative Planters’ Association, a cocoa marketing society which con­
sisted largely of wealthy farraer-traders.76 In 1933 the Agricultural 
Department reorganised the cocoa marketing societies in the Ibadan 
area and in 1934 the Ibadan Co-operative Marketing Union was founded, 
which marketed cocoa centrally for its member societies. The super­
vision of the co-operative societies was strengthened by the promul­
gation of the Co-operative Societies Ordinance of 1935, which stipu­
lated that marketing and thrift societies had to register with the 
Agricultural Department and that detailed accounts of the societies’ 
transactions had to be kept. The Agricultural Department would then 
examine these accounts at least once a year. As the number of societ­
ies increased, it became necessary to create a special post of a 
Registrar of Co-operative Societies and in 1936 E.F.G.Haig was ap­
pointed.76 Haig was a staunch supporter of the ’co-operative move­
ment’ and it is partly due to his efforts that co-operatives achieved 
the importance they did in subsequent years.77
At the end of the 1930s about 9,000 cocoa farmers were in­
dividual members of over 100 cocoa marketing societies which seaso­
nally marketed about 5,000 tons of cocoa.78 Until the 1937/38 cocoa 
season, most of the societies’ cocoa was sold to the European firms 
by tender and the societies were usually able to secure for their
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members a premium over the price paid to other farmers of at least £1 
per ton. After paying a levy of 10s per ton to the society, the
member still had a net premium of at least 10s over the non-member.
\
The European firms paid this premium as they were able to economise 
on their own marketing expenses by buying large parcels of cocoa. 
Another reason was probably the desire to show the government that 
the firms supported its policies.70
Both the European firms and the African traders regarded the 
co-operative societies as their potential competitors. Though the 
actual turnover of the societies was comparatively small, the African 
traders, and to some extent the European firms, feared that the 
government would introduce measures which would enable the societies 
to capture an increasingly large share of the seasonal crop. This 
seems to be one of the reasons why African traders showed such 
remarkable hostility towards the co-operative societies.80 The 
position of the European firms was more subtle. They publicly 
supported government policy towards the co-operative societies81, but 
behind ’closed doors’ their attitude was rather different82 and 
closer to the position of the African traders.
The Cocoa Trade System
The cocoa marketing process can be visualised as a tributary 
system of a large river. Cocoa flows in small quantities from the 
widely dispersed farms to a smaller number of villages. From there it 
proceeds in increasing volume to the towns, and finally to the 
ports.83 Like a tributary system this is a seasonal process as most 
of the cocoa is usually sold in the four months between November and 
February.
As mentioned earlier, cocoa passes through various hands in 
this process.84 In the 1930s most of the farmers’ cocoa was sold to 
itinerant traders, who bought small quantities of cocoa and sold 
small amounts of merchandise. Some cocoa was also bought by wealthier
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farmers and farmei— traders or sold directly to the firms. The price 
which itinerant traders and farmer-traders paid for cocoa was fixed 
in relation to a given volume of cocoa, such as a basket or a tin 
can. According to the quantity purchased, the cocoa was then either 
sold to scalemen, who operated weighing machines in the bigger 
villages or at the roadside in the vicinity of larger towns, or to 
commission buyers and produce traders, who also operated weighing 
machines, but were located in the bigger towns and who mostly 
purchased larger quantities of cocoa. After being weighed, the cocoa 
would be packed into bags and stored. Transport was delayed until 
enough produce had been collected because traders wanted only 
fully-loaded lorries to leave their stores, thereby economising on 
freight costs. That was the reason why even at the up-stream end of 
the flow cocoa was stored in sizeable amounts. The cocoa purchased by 
scalemen was immediately resold to larger traders or to the firms’ 
depot clerks as normally they did not own storage or transport 
facilities. The commission buyers and produce traders then trans­
ported the cocoa to the produce-buying stores of the European firms, 
which were located in the bigger towns of western Nigeria such as 
Abeokuta, Ife, Ibadan, Ilesha and Ijebu-Ode or brought directly to 
the firms’ stores in Lagos. Most produce-buying stores were also mei—  
chandise-selling stores and thus on their return journeys the lorries 
often carried consumer goods back to the cocoa-producing areas.86 
Finally, in Lagos the cocoa was again stored until shipment to the UK 
and other destinations in Europe.
At each stage in the marketing process a different price was 
paid for the produce. The difference between the price at which cocoa 
changed hands on the farms and the world market price consisted 
essentially of marketing costs such as, for example, transport and 
general overhead costs; of the remuneration for the intermediaries 
involved and also of duties which the Nigerian government levied on 
the export trade and the British government on the import trade.
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Table 3: Average Monthly Cocoa Prices, Paid in Lagos, 1924/25-1939/40
(ex scale, grade II, £ per ton)
1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28
£ s d £ s d £ s d £ s d
Oct. 51 5 0
Nov. [Oct.1924 - Dec. 1926: no figures 50 10 0
Dec. available] 46 0 0
Jan. 60 0 0 47 0 0
Feb. 57 10 0 49 10 0
Mar. 61 14 4 49 0 0
1928/29 1929/30 1930/31 1931/32
£ s d £ s d £ s d £ s <
Oct. 38 11 7 32 10 0 20 15 0 17 1
Nov. 36 0 8 30 0 0 20 13 2 19 13
Dec. 35 7 5 32 0 0 18 15 8 18 8
Jan. 33 6 8 33 2 6 18 2 6 16 15 <
Feb. 37 8 4 32 5 0 17 0 0 15 15 i
Mar. 37 10 0 29 17 6 16 10 0 16 9
1932/33 1933/34 1934/35 1935/36
£ s d £ s d £ s d £ s d
Oct. 17 17 6 12 6 10 12 9 1 16 9 10
Nov. 17 16 0 12 1 7 13 6 11 16 6 1
Dec. 17 15 0 10 12 3 14 13 8 16 18 8
Jan. 16 9 9 12 9 9 16 14 4 17 13 2
Feb. 15 18 0 16 9 1 16 14 1 16 5 0
Mar. 15 18 0 16 17 11 16 1 11 18 5 0
1936/37 1937/38 1938/39 1939/40
£ s d £ s d £ s d £ s d
Oct. 30 10 2 19 16 6 15 0 11 15 6 5
Nov. 34 8 2 18 4 0 14 7 3 15 12 1
Dec. 42 5 2 15 5 6 13 12 6 16 2 6
Jan. 45 1 9 16 8 9 13 10 11 16 2 6
Feb. 38 2 2 16 10 6 13 8 6 16 2 6
Mar. 38 14 5 16 9 2 13 15 5 16 2 6
Source: PRO: 00 657/47 Administrative Reports 1939/40 
Department of Agriculture, p.7.
Rhodes House Library (Oxford), J.R. Mackie Papers, 
Vol.III, pp.39-42
Note: Price fixed by Ministry of Food since December 1939.
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The way in which cocoa was marketed by the European trading 
firms in the 1930s almost always followed the same pattern.86 Before 
the season started, the firms had to assess the current state of the 
world cocoa market and had to make a judgement about its future 
development. This was always highly speculative as world demand and 
supply could not be forecast with any degree of certainty and also 
purchases had to be conducted in a relatively short time, while sales 
had to be spread over a larger portion of the year.
The firms deducted a more or less fixed schedule of marketing 
expenses and a profit margin from the price they thought they would 
get for a given quantity of cocoa in the UK or elsewhere. This price 
was then cabled to the branch offices of the firms in Lagos and 
represented the maximum price local agents were allowed to pay.87 The 
marketing schedule consisted of a variety of different items, such as 
freight and shipping charges, the overhead costs of the firms on the 
coast as well as office expenses in the UK, interest on the capital 
used during the transactions, and residual costs, for example the 
costs of twill bags and twine. The schedule also contained an al­
lowance for the payment of commission to produce traders and smaller 
buyers. When the firms bought cocoa up-country another schedule was 
subtracted which mainly covered the transport costs between the 
up-country buying stores and the firms’ main stores in Lagos.88
In the 1930s, cocoa world market prices were particularly 
volatile and fluctuated during and between the seasons. The firms 
therefore had continuously to adjust local purchase prices to the 
changing world market prices.80 The firms’ headquarters in Europe 
thus daily and sometimes even more than once a day cabled new price 
limits to the branch offices in Lagos, which then relayed these price 
changes to the up-country buying stores. The local offices were 
always allowed to pay less than the cabled price limits, but as 
stated earlier competition between the firms kept purchase prices 
relatively close to the price limits set by the head office in
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Europe. In the season in which no market sharing agreement was in 
force, the price limits and thus local prices varied considerably 
between the firms and, in order to capture a sizeable proportion of 
the crop, firms had to watch carefully the prices offered by the 
other firms. Sometimes firms themselves did not set price limits but 
advised their local managers ’to follow competition’.
The price African traders received varied thus from day to day 
and between firms, which in turn made cocoa trading at the local 
level a highly speculative business. Though less formalised, African 
traders too had to budget for marketing costs, such as transport and,
in the case of the larger buyers, commission for scalemen and basket-
buyers. They also had to make a judgement about future price move­
ments. As it took days or even weeks to move produce from the farms 
to the next cocoa buying station, and between the purchase and the
sale, cocoa prices at the produce-buying store could have changed
greatly. Though produce buying might have been less competitive for 
African produce buyers than for their European counterparts, it 
appears that African traders on the whole could not substantially 
depress the purchase price. Village prices , particularly in the 
cocoa-producing areas in the vicinity of large towns, such as the 
cocoa-producing areas south and east of Ibadan, followed produce- 
store prices. In areas further away from towns, however, it seems 
likely that a lesser degree of competition allowed produce traders to 
pay prices which lay much below the prices offered at the firms’ 
produce-buying stores.9 0
The Flow of Credit
The flow of produce from the farms to the ports was matched by 
an equal and opposite flow of money, credit and goods. Money and 
goods were primarily used for the payment of produce. Credit, 
however, made the movement of produce feasible.
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Most produce traders did not have sufficient capital resources 
to buy produce in sizeable amounts. The firms thus gave advances to 
traders against the promise of future deliveries. Basically the firms 
offered credit because they could not get produce otherwise and an 
extension of the firms’ buying organi sat ions into every village in 
the cocoa-producing areas was not considered commercially viable.91 
The United Africa Company, for example, thus purchased about 85% of 
its cocoa by means of advances.92 The bulk of the advances were made 
interest free during the crop season. Most traders received rela­
tively small advances in August, just before the beginning of the 
crop season; advances then increased and reached their height during 
December; then advances decreased so that by March most traders no 
longer had any debt outstanding with the firms.93 The time for which 
advances were given was variable, ranging from days to months and 
averaged about three weeks. A trader therefore could renew his 
advance a number of times and as often as he returned cocoa to the 
firms’ buying stores. On the average produce traders turned over 
their advances three to five times during a season.94 The sum of all 
advances did not equal the value of the crop purchased during a 
season as traders used their own resources alongside the firms’ 
money, the amounts of which are unfortunately unknown. The amount 
which was necessary to move the crop from the farms to the port 
should not, however, be over-estimated. In the Gold Coast, for 
example, in which trading conditions were very similar to those of 
western Nigeria, it was thought that a capital outlay of £300,000 
would be sufficient in the late 1930s to move a crop more than twice 
the size of the Nigerian crop from the farms to the produce-buying 
stations of the European firms.95 The firms demanded some form of 
security for their advances, which was provided by the deposit of 
either cash and valuables or by deposits of deeds of buildings and 
in some cases of land if the trader had property in the Colony, where 
British property law was applicable.98 Most common, however, were
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guarantees of sureties of standing, though it was usually very 
difficult to make sureties pay when a trader defaulted on his
advances. The size of the advance depended not only on the security 
provided: performance in previous seasons as much as the personal
relationship between the branch manager of the firm and the larger 
African traders determined the amount of money advanced. The terms on 
which advances were handed out to traders were usually fixed in 
written agreements. These agreements specified the amount of money 
advanced, the remuneration which traders would receive, and sometimes 
certain items which traders needed to conduct their businesses such 
as bags and twine. The agreement usually also specified the price at 
which cocoa would be bought. Yet, apparently the European trading 
firms were not able to force their buyers to accept agreements which 
would also specify when produce had to be delivered after the advance 
had been handed out, nor a clause that cocoa buyers had to declare 
their stocks, when a price change occurred. This gave even the
traders who were tied to specific firms and received a monthly salary 
a large measure of de facto independence, of which they made 
increasing use in the second half of the 1930s, as will be shown
further down.
The way in which cocoa traders worked in the Gold Coast was
very similar to that in Nigeria. Therefore, in the absence of any 
direct evidence from Nigeria, it is justified to give one example 
from Nsawam in the Gold Coast to illustrate how the trade worked.97 
The broker in question had a cash deposit with John Holt & Co. On 1st 
September, 1936 his security amounted to £23. He then received an 
advance from John Holt & Co. and started buying. Until 31st March, 
1937 he had bought 217 tons of cocoa on the firm’s account and in 
addition 50 tons on his own account, thus selling all in all 267 tons 
to the firm. He bought cocoa at an average price of £36 18s 3d and
resold at £38 13s 3d. He thus made a gross profit of about £467 on
the difference between the buying and selling price. In addition, he
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received a commission of 15s per ton, which gave him another £200. 
Thus his gross profit amounted to £667 at the end of the season on a 
turnover of £10,322. 88 This might have been an exceptional season and 
an exceptional case, it shows however, that a relatively small 
security with a firm did not prevent traders from achieving quite a 
substantial turnover; that at least this particular trader apparently 
had considerable resources of his own and finally, that produce 
buying in some cases was a very profitable undertaking.
As stated above, most of the larger traders did not buy produce 
from the farmers themselves but purchased cocoa from smaller buyers. 
As most of these smaller buyers too did not have sufficient resour­
ces, they received advances from the larger buyers. Most of the 
advances were made during the season, but also a sizeable part during 
off season. Most of these advances were probably made from the larger 
traders’ own capital resources as the firms usually did not hand out 
substantial advances before the season had started. Advances from 
larger to smaller buyers were guaranteed by some form of security, 
which could be the usufruct of the smaller buyers’ own cocoa farms or 
sureties of local standing.98 The relationship between larger traders 
and smaller buyers was probably not just an economic one. By accep­
ting advances from a trader, who was usually also an important member 
of the local community and more often than not also a traditional 
titleholder (Chief), the smaller buyer became a client, who owed his 
patron some form of political allegiance. This probably gave the 
relationship between the bigger traders and smaller buyers a cohe­
rence which was absent in the relationship between the larger traders 
and the European trading firms. This in turn probably provided an 
additional security for the advances made to smaller buyers. Some­
times these advances were interest-bearing and in these cases produce 
buying became indistinguishable from money-lending.
Advances received from larger traders were either used by 
smaller buyers to purchase cocoa directly from farmers or were
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re-lent to the smallest category of traders, the itinerant bas- 
ket-buyers. In the 1930s most of the cocoa was bought during the 
season, but a substantial, if unknown, part was bought in advance of 
the cocoa season.100 Smaller traders and basket-buyers advanced money 
to farmers in the off-season mainly in order to secure the farmers’ 
crop, thereby increasing their volume of trade and commission. Hie 
larger farmers particularly needed money to pay wages to labourers 
engaged in the maintenance of the cocoa farms during the off-season, 
but some money was also borrowed in order to establish new cocoa 
farms. In addition, farmers borrowed money, when extraordinary 
expenses had to be paid. Most of these advances were repaid either in 
cash or in kind after the cocoa had been harvested. Only some of 
these advances and particularly the ones which were repaid in kind 
were ”interest" bearing, insofar as in the latter case the value of 
the cocoa received by traders in order to redeem the loan far 
exceeded the value of the loan. In these cases there was no clear 
distinction between produce-buying and money-lending.
The evidence on the degree of indebtedness of cocoa farmers in 
the 1930s and 1940s is inconclusive.101 It is known, however, that 
farmers received loans not only from traders, but also from wealthy 
farmers and from money-lenders. Interest rates and repayment periods 
were variable, ranging from zero interest to over 500%, and from 40 
days to indefinite. 102 Sometimes neither interest rates nor repayment 
periods were fixed in the loan agreements. Instead a farmer would 
promise to repay lcwt of cocoa for each £1 borrowed some time in the 
future. Sureties for advances were given in various forms. Most 
common was probably the pledge of the usufruct of a cocoa farm, but 
sometimes the cocoa trees themselves were offered as a guarantee for 
the advance. In some cases the advance and the interest on it was 
paid in labour as sons of the debtor had to work on the farms of the 
creditor to redeem the loan. Yet, it is not known how many farmers 
were indebted and, in particular, how many farmers were indebted to
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produce traders in Nigeria in the 1930s and 1940s and that makes any 
judgment on the degree of indebtedness of cocoa farmers to produce 
buyers exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.103 Research in the 
early 1950s, however, suggests that the degree of indebtedness had 
probably been over-estimated by officials in the 1930s.104
It has been repeatedly suggested in the secondary literature 
that the firms ultimately financed the advances which farmers 
received.105 On the basis of the available evidence this statement 
has to be qualified. Most farmers borrowed against the future 
delivery of cocoa a considerable time before the actual buying by the 
firms started. Yet, the firms handed out most of their advances 
during the season after buying had started and tried to close the 
accounts with cocoa traders when actual cocoa buying had subsided.10® 
It appears therefore that a large part of the off-season advances to
cocoa farmers were financed from the cocoa traders’ own capital
resources. Moreover, there is some evidence which shows that the
largest portion of the debt held by cocoa farmers was long-term
loans, borrowed by wealthier farmers from money-lenders at high 
interest rates.107 For these reasons it seems very unlikely that the 
trading firms’ advance system had caused the indebtedness of cocoa 
farmers.
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Chapter 3 
The Politics of the Cocoa Trade
The establishment of statutory produce control at the outbreak 
of the war in 1939 and its continuation after the war cannot properly 
be explained without touching on the events of 1937/38. Yet, events 
were in themselves the result of earlier events. These were the 
recurrent trade depressions, the commercial policies of the trading 
firms, and the reaction of African traders and, to a much lesser 
extent, of the colonial government to these events.
The Impact of Trade Depressions
The first depression in the produce trade, including the cocoa 
trade, after the First World War occurred in 1920/21. During the war, 
trading conditions had been very unfavourable to African traders. 
Shipping was restricted and the European firms were largely able to 
exclude Africans from the trade by skillfully manipulating available 
shipping space. Thus the African traders were prevented from gaining 
any benefit from the demise of German trading at the beginning of the 
war and of the development of high price differentials between local 
and world market prices at the end of the war. For this reason, 
however, trade was on the whole exceptionally profitable for the 
European firms during this period.1
The shipping situation changed in 1918 when, in the aftermath 
of the entry of the U.S.A. into the war, shipping space became more 
freely available to African traders. Owing to the rapidly increasing 
world cocoa prices, trade differentials seemed to have remained very 
high and trade prospects in general looked very promising.
In the 1920/21 season, the post-war boom reached its peak and 
cocoa changed hands for more than £82 per ton in Ibadan in mid-sea­
son. In the previous season only a quarter of this price had been 
paid.2 Most African traders and indeed the European trading firms
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expected that cocoa prices would stay at this level. Consequently, 
for some time, large amounts of money were invested in the forward 
purchase of cocoa or stocks of merchandise. Yet, at the end of the 
season cocoa prices tumbled to £28 per ton in Ibadan, and decreased 
even further in the next season. Other commodity prices fell too and 
traders generally found themselves in a situation of being either in 
possession of produce for which they had paid a much higher price 
than the current price or in possession of merchandise for which 
there was no effective demand, so that merchandise prices had to be 
substantially reduced in order to clear stock. This involved heavy 
losses and most traders had to write off a significant part of their 
trading capital or went bankrupt. Even relatively successful traders, 
for instance the Ibadan merchant S. Agbaje, experienced severe 
difficulties in keeping their businesses afloat.3 Some of the larger 
European trading firms suffered during the slump. On the whole,
however, their ability to sustain losses was much stronger than that 
of their African counterparts.4 By contrast, many African firms (and 
a number of smaller European firms) went out of business or were sold 
to the surviving firms. This was a drastic setback for the African
firms and traders and it took them years to rebuild their businesses.
Meanwhile ’...the confident independent businessmen of 1919/20 were
back at their desks and canteens in 1921 working as clerks and agents 
for the now completely dominating European survivors.’8
The second slump in the inter-war years occurred in 1929. This 
was the starting point of a depression, which lasted in effect until 
1935. The most prominent victim of the slump was the African and 
Eastern Trade Corporation, which was effectively taken over by Lever 
Brothers Ltd. which merged its subsidiary, the Niger Company Ltd. , 
with the A. & E.T.C. into the United Africa Company Ltd. Another 
victim of the depression was G.B. Ollivants which went quietly into 
liquidation in 1933. The firm continued to trade under its own name, 
but was now owned by Unilever Ltd. , a company which was jointly owned
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by the Union Margarine N.V. and Lever Brothers Ltd.® The African 
traders suffered perhaps less during this depression than their 
European rivals. It appears that they had become more cautious after 
the slump of 1920/21.7 Another possible reason for the apparent lack 
of distress for African traders was that by the early 1930s there 
were no large Lagos-based traders left in the cocoa trade. Traders 
were located elsewhere, exported only very little cocoa on their own 
account and were thus less exposed to sudden price falls.
The slump of 1920/21 and the depression of 1929/1935 hastened 
the process of concentration in the export trade. This process is 
exemplified by the growth of the United Africa Company, which by the 
mid-1930s controlled about half of the Nigerian import and export 
trade, including the cocoa trade.® The African traders deeply 
resented the emergence of such large "combines". For them it sym­
bolised a development in which they became increasingly restricted in 
their own business activities. Yet, this was not so much the result 
of the concentration process in the export trade, but rather the 
result of the firms’ commercial policies towards their African 
competitors in the internal trade.
The Commercial Strategies of the European Trading Firms
It appears that the firms adopted three main strategies to 
increase the profitability of their produce-trading operations. These 
were the expansion of their buying networks up-country, the replace­
ment of independent traders by commission buyers, and finally the 
collusion of buying agreements. There were also some other minor 
strategies such as the internal reorganisation which firms effected 
during the depression, but none of these had such an important impact 
on the African traders.
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The Up-country Advance
The first European stores were opened in the interior of 
western Nigeria in the 1870s. It was not, however, until the 1890s 
that the up-country advance of the European firms really got under 
way.® This move was the result of a number of inter-related events 
and interests. The most important event was that the colonial govern­
ment assumed political control of the interior in the 1890s. This was 
a necessary pre-condition for the up-country advance, at least in the 
case of south-western Nigeria.10 At the time, the firms were seeking 
new trade opportunities. As in the previous two decades, competition 
in the trade, as well as a depression in produce prices, had cut pro­
fit margins. They reckoned that the increase in turnover, which an 
up-country advance would bring, would make trade more profitable.11 
By advancing up-country, the firms also hoped to circumvent the 
coastal African traders, who until then had controlled much of the 
trade with the interior, to the firms’ disadvantage.12
The up-country move of the firms was facilitated by the 
development of the infrastructure in southern Nigeria and by the 
emergence of new means of transport. In the 1870s stern-wheeled 
steamboats started to travel up the Niger on a regular basis19, while 
the building of the railway in the 1890s, and a later the building of 
roads and the use of motor cars and lorries, particularly after the 
First World War, opened up most towns in western Nigeria to the 
f i rms.14
The first store opened in Ibadan in 1899. Just seven years 
later their number had increased to twenty-four.16 This was followed 
by the establishment of stores in other western Nigerian towns, for 
example in Qyo in 1907 and Oshogbo in 1909. In addition, the European 
banks set up branches in the interior, for instance, the Bank of 
British West Africa opened its first branch office in Ibadan in 1910. 
Thus at the outbreak of war in 1914, merchandise-retail stores and 
produce-buying stations were firmly established in most towns of
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western Nigeria. In addition, produce-buying stations had been set up 
by the cocoa-manufacturing firm Rowntree in a number of villages in 
the vicinity of Ibadan.1® Rowntree built these ’pioneer curing 
stations’ in order to spread information about the proper fermenta­
tion of cocoa more effectively than they thought they could do from 
their produce stores in Ibadan. Cocoa manufacturers generally had a 
special interest in particularly well-prepared cocoa as only this 
type of cocoa could be used in the production of high-quality 
chocolate. After the war these buying stations were taken over by a 
firm with the name Cocoa Manufacturers Ltd., whose largest share­
holder was Cadbury Brothers Ltd., the leading cocoa-manufacturing 
firm at the time. In contrast to those buying stations owned by other 
European firms, these stations did not stock any merchandise, but 
insofar as Cocoa Manufacturers Ltd. purchased cocoa from farmers who 
had not participated in the fermentation improvement scheme and also 
resold considerable quantities of cocoa to other cocoa manufacturers, 
there was not much difference between these buying stores and those 
owned by other European firms.
One result of the up-country move of the European trading firms 
was the demise of the coastal-based African traders as trade increa­
singly by-passed them.17 Traders who before 1900 had built up 
substantial firms in Lagos and in other coastal towns, found that 
they were no longer able to continue their middlemen role and were 
thus slowly driven out of the trade.18 Though they also tried to open 
stores in up-country towns, they could not compete successfully with 
the European firms and had to close them down after a relatively 
short time.19
It seems that during the 1920s and early 1930s the firms 
consolidated their position in the towns, though the actual number of 
buying stations in some towns may have decreased as a result of 
internal economies in the wake of the amalgamation of firms in 
response to the stringencies imposed by the depression. In the
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mid-1980s, however, the firms started to move into the villages.20 
Earlier attempts in 1930 and 1934 had been abortive, but by 1936 six 
firms had set up about twenty buying stations in outlying markets and 
villages in the Ibadan Division alone, and a further advance was 
planned.21 At this point the Ibadan Native Authority intervened by 
refusing to sanction the lease of land on which the firms intended to 
build produce-buying stores. Though conclusive evidence is missing on 
this point, it seems that many Ibadan Chiefs saw their trading
interests threatened by the advance of European trading firms into 
outlying villages. Until then the firms had only built buying 
stations on land for which such a sanction was not necessary.22
The advance of the firms into the villages was largely due to
intense competition in the mid-1980s for a share in the crop. But
there was another reason for this advance. By moving buying stations 
to outlying markets and villages, the firms would be able to drive 
the larger independent produce traders out of the market. Hiis they 
would achieve by manipulating the cocoa purchase prices in the 
villages relative to those in the towns. If they paid higher prices 
in the outlying markets than in the towns, the operations of the 
independent produce traders would become less profitable and they 
would thus be forced to leave the trade.23
In a report on cocoa marketing in the Ibadan Division, the
Assistant District Officer, R.L.V. Wilkes, stated that, ’The expor­
ting firms deny that they habitually give higher prices in outlying
markets than in Ibadan.......Evidence on this point is not entirely
conclusive and it is possible that the exporting firms are encoura­
ging in this way the small commission man against the independent 
middlemen with whom they have no wish to deal. ’24 Given that sort of 
evidence is always very difficult to get and that the report had been 
very carefully worded, this statement seems to suggest that there was 
indeed a very strong possibility that the firms indulged in such 
business practices.26 Moving buying stations into villages and
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outlying markets would also prevent traders from under— paying farmers 
in these markets, so it is not surprising that this provoked strong 
resistance from the African traders.
The Replacement of the Independent Produce Trader
The establishment of buying stations in villages and outlying 
markets was only one way in which the European firms tried to gain 
control over the larger independent produce traders. Since the early 
1930s the number of commission buyers which the firms employed had 
increased.2® This was partly due to the expansion of the cocoa 
industry itself but is also partly explained by the firms’ commercial 
policy.
There was never any shortage of smaller traders who were
anxious to enter the cocoa trade, as they usually had only to provide 
two suitable guarantors and a little capital to make the initial 
deposit in order to become a firm’s commission buyer. In the 1930s
the firms were taking on smaller traders in increasing numbers,
/
offering them relatively liberal credit facilities and generous 
commission agreements.27 This gave commission buyers a considerable 
advantage over larger independent traders, who had no access to such 
resources. Consequently, larger independent produce traders were 
increasingly replaced by smaller commission buyers as the main source 
of the firms’ cocoa supplies.
This policy was not entirely successful. The larger traders
survived, because the firms still purchased cocoa from them as it was 
ultimately more economical for the firms to buy cocoa in large 
parcels from produce traders than small amounts through their own 
buying organisations from their commission buyers.2® The competition 
between the firms for such large parcels of cocoa enabled the produce 
traders in some years to extract higher commission rates from the 
firms. Moreover, as it seems very likely that some produce traders 
purchased cocoa in markets in which strong competition from commis­
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sion buyers or other traders was absent, their position was at least 
not immediately threatened by the increase in the number of commis­
sion buyers.
It is also arguable that this policy was to some extent 
counter-productive. The replacement of independent produce traders by 
commission buyers and the increase in the number of the latter meant 
that the firms had to provide additional capital resources in order 
to finance the trading operations of their new commission buyers. 
This obviously increased the risks which the European firms were 
running by financing the trade because a number of commission buyers 
would default on the debt they owed to the firms or would speculate 
with the firms’ advances against the firms.20
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that while the firms 
were pursuing such strategies, the cocoa industry itself expanded. 
Higher volumes of trade and in particular a wider catchment area 
meant that the dependency of the firms on intermediaries in the 1930s 
actually increased. Thus in the second half of the 1930s a situation 
developed in which African traders felt that their position was 
increasingly under threat, while at the same time their number and 
their strength vis-a-vis the European trading firms actually in­
creased .
Agreements between European Trading Firms
’’Understandings", "pools" and "agreements" were, at least since 
the 1870s, an integral part of the merchandise and produce trade in 
West Africa.30 All these agreements aimed at reducing or eliminating 
the competition between firms. This suggests a certain degree of 
uniformity, and many writers on the subject have treated them as if 
they were very similar to each other.31 A closer look at these 
agreements, however, reveals a bewildering array. Thus by treating 
them as uniform, the implicit historical dimension of these agree­
ments tends to get lost. This is immediately evident if one compares
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informal agreements, which before the First World War were frequently 
concluded between the local representatives of firms covering only 
relatively small areas, and the highly sophisticated formal agree­
ments of the 1930s, which managing directors of the leading firms 
worked out and often personally signed, covering whole crops or 
certain merchandise articles widely traded in West Africa at the 
time.32
Apart from the 1937/38 cocoa buying agreement, comparatively 
little is known about these agreements. For example the Merchandise 
Agreement has never been published, though in terms of turnover it 
was certainly more important to the firms than the cocoa buying 
agreement of 1937/38.88 For reason of brevity, I will concentrate in 
what follows on the 1933 cocoa and palm produce agreement and the 
1936 merchandise agreement, which had the most profound impact on 
trade in southern Nigeria in the 1930s.84 The 1937/38 buying agree­
ment will be specifically reviewed in the next chapter.
The 1933 Cocoa Agreement
This agreement between the United Africa Company, G.B. Ol­
livant,35 John Holt & Co., Paterson Zochonis, and the Corapagnie 
Frangaise de l’Afrique Occidentale covered cocoa, palm oil, and palm 
kernel exports from Nigeria, the Cameroons8® and Sierra Leone.37 It 
was effective from 3rd July 1933 for an unspecified period.38
How, then, would the agreement operate? The participating firms
formed an Executive Committee in the U.K. which cabled maximum
purchase price limits to one of the firms in one of the so-called
Pool Areas. In Nigeria there were six areas, i.e. Lagos, Warri, New
Calabar (Owerri Province), Port Harcourt, Opobo and Calabar (Calabar
\
and Ogoja Province). These firms were then supposed to relay im­
mediately these new prices to the up-country buying stations. In 
return the firms cabled their weekly purchases back to the Committee 
in the U.K. Every thirteen weeks in the case of palm kernels and palm
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oil and every four weeks in the case of cocoa, the Committee would 
determine the amount of produce which firms would hand over to one 
another in order to keep actual purchases in line with the shares in 
the Pool purchases to which the firms had agreed in advance.
The purpose of the Pool was, above all, to enhance the profita­
bility of the trade to the firms. In a memorandum sent to the local
agents of John Holt & Co. in Nigeria and the Cameroons, the director
of the Administrative Department of John Holt & Co. stated:
The Principals have come together in a spirit of helpful co-operation with one 
another to achieve the maximum of benefits for each of the Agreements. This 
good-will is to be extended in Africa. The important objective of the Pool is to 
secure a collective trade of the Pool to the Pool, and that done, to wake a 
reasonable profit for each and all of us from our produce business. There is to 
be no waste of effort and money in unnecessary bickering in Africa. Khat watters, 
and what alone watters, is that the Pool as a body shall do the collective 
naxiauw trade at a reasonable profit.39
The profit margins which the firms hoped to gain were not prede­
termined. Local agents were encouraged to buy as cheaply as possible, 
the only limit being competition from firms which operated outside 
the Pool. The memorandum reads on this point as follows:
In non-cowpetitive Areas, if the "Cownittee* is satisfied at any time that a 
reasonable margin can be safely made by buying under limit, they are authorised 
and encouraged to make that margin. This can most frequently and successfully be 
done by withholding the issue of limit changes upwards on a market rise when, in 
the opinion of the "Committee” trade would not be affected at all if the rise 
were not circulated. 40
Thus, on a rising market, the local representative of the partici­
pating firms were encouraged to withhold the price rise from produ­
cers as long as such a policy would not effect the volume of pur­
chases .
The principal outside competitor of the Pool was the Societe 
Commerciale de l’Ouest Africain. They had refused to join the Pool as 
they did not consider the purchase in Nigeria large enough to make it 
worthwhile to them to agree to the share the other firms were
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offering to them. Thus the agreement specified that local agents 
might exceed price limits in the areas in which S.C.O.A. was active, 
if they were by competition forced to do so in order to prevent 
S.C.O.A. carrying out their stated intention of increasing their pur­
chases at the expense of the other firms.41
In contrast to the 1937/38 Agreement, the 1933 Agreement had 
comparatively little to say on policy towards African traders. It 
merely mentioned that forward purchases should not be tolerated any 
longer. The memorandum states that,
It is recognised that this is an evil which has grown considerably in recent 
tiwes [iy eiphasis]. It is agreed that the Pool as at present constituted is 
strong enough to stop it altogether and it is an instruction of the Howe 
Couittee that you take steps at once, in co-operation, to arrange your business 
so that every custower of the pool is paid for his produce at the limit ruling on 
the day on which he sells and delivers it, and at no other rate. Clerks must not 
be allowed to declare as their buyings any produce which is not actually 
visible.42
This quotation suggests that in the early 1930s the firms were 
gradually losing control over their commission buyers and produce 
clerks: They received advances from the firms and used part of this 
money to purchase produce. Yet, they were not delivering it im­
mediately to the firms’ produce stores. Instead they speculated on a 
price rise which would allow them to pocket the difference and this 
gave them an extra profit over and above the commission they received 
from the firms. Alternatively, in the case of falling prices, they 
would claim that they had paid for all the produce in their posses­
sion the previously ruling higher price, but had not been able to 
deliver it. As the firms were not able to ascertain what prices their 
buyers had actually paid, some produce was bought at the current 
lower prices and the firms would be charged for expenses the buyers 
had not actually incurred. It was therefore of paramount interest to 
the firms to make sure that in the event of price drops, buyers were 
not allowed to ’...declare as their buyings any produce which was not 
actually visible...’ at that time.43
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The Agreement of 1933 lasted, as far as cocoa was concerned, 
until 1935 and in the buying season of 1935/36 competitive buying 
resumed.44 As we will see in the discussion of the 1937/38 cocoa 
buying Agreement, the speculation by commission buyers with firms’ 
advances against the firms resumed too. It might be sufficient here 
to point out that one of the most important aims of the 1937/38 
buying agreement was to prevent this kind of speculation.
The 1936 Merchandise Agreement
Though this Agreement did not concern the produce trade in 
Nigeria, it is reviewed here because most of the African independent 
produce traders dealt in merchandise articles as well, and its impact 
on trading conditions in Nigeria was probably as profound as the 
produce buying agreements. There are also some hints that the protest 
movement which sprang up in 1938 in connection with the cocoa buying 
agreement, was to some extent fuelled by frustration about the 
restrictions which the Merchandise Agreement imposed upon the African 
traders.
The agreement was reached on 30th November 1936 between the 
following firms:
The United Africa Company Limited
John Holt & Co. (Liverpool) Limited
Compagnie Frangaise de l’Afrique Occidentale
Societe Commerciale de l’Ouest Africain
G.B. Ollivant Limited
Paterson, Zochonis & Company Limited
Deutsche Westafrikanische Handelsgesellschaft
Dekage, Handels-Aktiengesellschaft
G.L. Gaiser
Witt & Busch
It took effect from 1st December, 1936 and was supposed to last for 
four years.45 Its purpose was to assure the participating firms a
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’fixed and unalterable’ share in the Pools’ sales of a number of 
merchandise articles at agreed uniform minimum prices. These shares 
approximated very closely to the position which the participants had 
been in before the introduction of the Agreement in each of the 
commodities covered. These were beverages such as beer, gin and 
whisky; household articles like bread, flour, matches, salt, sugar, 
rice and tobacco; and building materials, like corrugated iron sheets 
and cement. It did not, however, cover cotton goods, which were among 
the most important merchandise articles in this period.48 But the 
Agreement states that ’ ... it is the wish of all concerned that the 
parties should take advantage of meetings to establish saner selling 
policies’ for commodities other than those covered by the agree­
ment,47 and this is very likely to have influenced their prices.
The agreement was operated by local area committees in Lagos, 
Kano, Jos, Sapele, Port Harcourt, Qnitsha, Calabar and Opobo. These 
area committees would then in turn be supervised by the ’’London 
Committee”, which was to be staffed by employees of the participating 
firms. The local area committees were supposed to furnish the London 
Committee regularly with a detailed list of the articles which the 
member firms sold in Nigeria, including the quantity of each item 
sold. These lists were then added up at the end of each financial 
year, multiplied with the agreed wholesale prices and the thus 
computed revenue distributed between the firms, according to the 
share to which the firms had agreed in advance. Eventual differences 
between sales and the share would then be equalised; that is to say, 
firms whose sales exceeded their share were obliged to pay over the 
difference to the firms whose sales figures showed a corresponding 
def icit.
The agreement did not specify any profit margin, but left it to 
the area committees to agree on the ’lowest price at which any 
company may sell wholesale’. This meant that firms were allowed to 
charge customers higher prices if the lack of competition from firms
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outside the Agreement warranted such higher prices. Such "premiums" 
could be pocketed directly by the firms as they were not included in 
the final settlement.
The ultimate purpose was not, however, just ’...to bring back 
selling prices to a more remunerative level...’48 as the Agreement 
states. The participating firms also saw in the Agreement a medium 
through which the development of the colony would be stimulated, 
though it is debatable to what extent they really believed in this. 
Nevertheless, this quotation offers a rare glimpse of how the firms 
perceived their role in the colonies. The agreement reads as follows:
In aaking this Agreement, the Beabers have been influenced also by a desire to 
put the Nigerian business on a sound and satisfactory basis, believing that the 
colony cannot prosper unless it holds out soae woderate reward for enterprise and 
the investment of capital, and without such reward the native population cannot 
expect to benefit by the continual expansion of European capital invested in the 
colony for his service. All the established trading companies recognise the 
responsibility which rests upon thea in Baking certain that the requirenents of 
the African in staple coaaodities are available at fair and reasonable prices. 43
The Agreement only mentions African traders in passing. It 
states that the minimum wholesale prices would not be ’...subject to 
any discount, rebate or allowance whatsoever.’50 It seems that, as in 
the case of produce buying, competition for services of African 
traders meant that wholesale prices had sometimes been lowered con­
siderably in order to induce traders to patronise a particular firm. 
Thus by playing off one firm against the other, African traders were 
able to obtain prices which would sometimes allow them to undercut 
the firms’ retail store prices. They still made profits on these 
transactions as their costs were usually lower than those of the 
European firms and they were often satisfied with smaller profit 
margins.51 The effect of the Agreement with regard to the African 
trader was thus that they would lose some of their profits. These 
would be transferred to the firms since the general price level and
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profit margins were then only determined by the competition between 
the firms operating inside and outside the Agreement.
Peter Bauer has asserted that import agreements between firms 
were only effective to some extent as they did not prevent the growth 
of outside competition and were sometimes broken by participating 
firms.52 Their effectiveness improved however when, at the outbreak 
of war in 1939, a general merchandise agreement, covering all 
merchandise imports into Nigeria, was reached between all the British 
and French firms operating in Nigeria at the time.53 It lasted until 
1947 and was replaced by an "understanding" that the firms would not 
resume competitive selling and would not increase their merchandise 
sales at the expense of the other firms.54
The Politics of the European Trading Firms
In the U.K. and Nigeria the firms were usually represented 
either by individual firms or by trade organisations. The most 
powerful among the latter was the Association of West African 
Merchants.55 A.W.A.M., as it was known, was not a corporate body, and 
did not employ a secretary until 1941.58 It was rather a loose 
association, founded in 1916 to assist the government in the prosecu­
tion of the war effort57 and its membership consisted of a handful of 
large British firms. After 1938 other European firms were admitted as 
full members of the Association whose main function in the inter-war 
years was to provide a forum for the firms in which trade matters, 
such as prospective produce buying and merchandise agreements, were 
discussed. This is why the Association was frequently identified with 
pools and agreements, though its scope was much wider.58 In this 
period the Association consisted of a number of produce sub-commit­
tees in the U.K. and of area committees in West Africa. In Nigeria 
there were three local area committees (Kano, Calabar and Lagos) and 
in the 1930s their membership closely corresponded with that of the 
local Chambers of Commerce. This is of some importance as the
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Governor nominated the Commercial Members of the Legislative Council 
from these bodies.69 This gave the Association of West African 
Merchants arguably a measure of influence on the decisions of the 
Legislative Council.60
There were, however, other channels of communication available 
to the firms than just their trade associations. Leading represen­
tatives of firms frequently had direct contact with high-ranking 
officials in the Colonial Office. It is important to recognize that 
these channels of communication existed, as they were not available 
in this form to other groups involved in the marketing of West 
African produce or in the import trade. However, the fact that such 
contacts frequently occurred is no direct proof for the suggestion 
that the Colonial Office was unduly influenced by the commercial 
f irms.81
Politics, in the sense of party politics or participation in 
political movements, was generally very much left to the individual 
firms or their leading representatives82 and it appears that even 
Commercial Members on the Legislative Council sat there in their 
personal capacity rather than as representatives of the Association 
of West African Merchants.83 Though the firms restricted the active 
representation of their interests to the relatively narrow confines 
of trade matters, it cannot be concluded that they were apolitical. 
Above all, because of their dominant role in colonial economies, 
their actions and policies affected a large number of people, and 
thus were political issues as the crisis of 1937/38 has shown.
The Response of the African Traders
African traders were not just victims of developments outside 
their control. They tried to defend and, where possible, to enlarge 
their commercial interests as much as the European firms did. They 
were, however, in a very disadvantaged position. They had relatively 
few resources at their command and they were numerous, which made the
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organisation of their interests much more difficult. This they made 
good to some extent by using political institutions such as Native 
Authorities and political movements like the National Congress of 
British West Africa, Nigerian National Democratic Party and Nigerian 
Youth Movement as a means of defending their interests, which enabled 
them to improved their position vis-a-vis the European trading firms. 
In the economic sphere they tried to advance their interests by 
collaborating in shipping and banking schemes, although these schemes 
met with limited success. In what follows I will look first into 
these schemes and then review major political disputes in which 
African traders played a prominent part. This is followed by an 
examination of the development of the nationalist movement in Nigeria 
and of the role which traders played in it.
Shipping Schemes
After the end of the First World War, some African traders 
tried on several occasions to circumvent the European trading firms 
by exporting cocoa directly to overseas markets.®4 These schemes were 
generally short-lived and unsuccessful. Yet, they are important for 
two reasons. Firstly, if they had been successful, this would have 
meant that the European firms would no longer have been able to 
conclude comprehensive buying agreements and, probably, that they 
would have faced such strong local competition in the long run that 
they would have had to leave the export trade to local traders. This 
did not happen, as most of these schemes came to nothing because of 
internal division, petty corruption and perhaps the general inexpe­
rience of their protagonists. The firms, however, took them seriously 
and this strongly influenced their policies.®5 Secondly, it is inte­
resting to note that at one point or another a number of Nigerians 
who later became known as nationalist politicians were involved in 
these schemes.
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The first scheme in Nigeria was probably initiated by Duse 
Mohammed Ali. In 1920 he travelled to Nigeria, visiting Lagos, 
Abeokuta, Ibadan and Oyo. In Ibadan he met A. Obisesan, who was then 
a cocoa trader,00 I.B. Akinyele, who later became the highest-ranking 
chief in Ibadan,07 and S. Agbaje, then probably the largest African 
trader and richest man in Ibadan.00 Duse Mohammed Ali succeeded in 
convincing Ibadan traders and some rich farmers to give sureties for 
him for some £30,000, though in the end the scheme was not realised 
for some unknown reason. This was not the first undertaking by Duse 
Mohammed Ali. Before the First World War he had probably shipped 
cocoa from the Gold Coast. This was not his last scheme, but it seems 
that it was the only one which had impressed local traders. Duse 
himself was an ardent "Pan-Africanist" who had wide-ranging contacts 
in West Africa and in the U.S.09 After most of his schemes had 
failed, in 1933 he founded a newspaper called The Comet, published in 
Lagos. He edited the paper until 1945, when it was taken over by N. 
Azikiwe’s West African Pilot.70 It also seems very likely that about 
1920 an American scheme under the leadership of M. Garvey and his 
Universal Negro Improvement Society was discussed in Lagos. Garvey 
proposed to set up a shipping line, the Black Star Line, which would 
offer competition to the European lines by shipping produce directly 
from West Africa to the U.S. The Lagos branch of the Society was run 
by the young journalist E.S. Ikoli, who later became a leading figure 
in the Nigerian Youth Movement.71 Though there is no firm evidence, 
it seems very likely that E.S. Ikoli was influenced by the Garveyite 
movement, and that the idea of establishing direct trade links 
between African traders and American black businessmen was current in 
Lagos at the time.
The next scheme was even more ambitious. In the second half of 
the 1920s and early 1930s, the Ghanaian businessman W. Tete-Ansa 
established a number of trading companies and also a bank in the Gold 
Coast and in Nigeria. The most important firm was the West African
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Co-operative Producers’ Ltd., which had close links with Tete-Ansa’s 
banking venture, the Industrial and Commercial Bank Ltd.72 The West 
African Co-operative Producers’ Ltd. was incorporated in the Gold 
Coast in 1925 and in Nigeria in 1928. Though the company had autho­
rised capital of £250,000, only some £3,000 was subscribed and even 
less paid up. This did not prevent the company from making contracts 
over the delivery of produce with a number of Nigerian traders and 
’’Farmers’ Associations”78, and for some time the company seemed to 
have flourished. Its Board of Directors consisted of a number of 
Ghanaian and Nigerian businessmen, some of whom became prominent 
figures in the nationalist movement. The Nigerian directors were D.T. 
Sasegbon, C.C. Adeniyi-Jones, T.A. Doherty and J.C. Vaughan.74 The 
company survived until 1930 or 1931, when, because of internal 
irregularities, it was forced to close down.75 In subsequent years 
Tete-Ansa tried to set up similar companies, but none of them gained 
such importance as the West African Producers’ Ltd.78
A prominent victim of the failure of the West African Pro­
ducers’ Ltd. was the Ibadan Co-operative Planters’ Association, which 
lost some £11,000.77 The Association had shipped some 3,000 tons of 
cocoa directly to the U.S. through the West African Producers’ Ltd., 
but it seems that it never received full payment.7 * Somewhat contrary 
to its title, the Association was actually run by produce traders. 
These were I.B. Akinyele, J.C. Aboderin, A. Obisesan and A.B. Akin- 
loye.70 The last-named was the secretary of the Association, who in 
1931 had embezzled about £18,000 from the proceeds of sales and 
subsequently served a four year prison sentence for the misappro­
priation of money. The failure of the West African Co-operative 
Producers ’ Ltd. and the scandal surrounding A.B. Akinloye ’ s ac­
tivities cost the Association very dearly, not least because it lost 
its reputation amongst cocoa farmers, who quite understandably 
insisted thereafter on cash payments instead of handing over produce 
against a promise of future payment. The failure of the Association
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also prompted the government to intervene, and co-operative cocoa 
marketing societies were put under the supervision of Agricultural 
Officers. Three years after the failure of the Association, the 
Ibadan Co-operative Cocoa (later Produce) Marketing Union came into 
being. Its first President was A. Obisesan.80
During the second half of the 1930s, leading members of the 
Nigerian Youth Movement were frequently involved in produce-buying 
businesses and import and export companies. One such firm was the New 
Africa Company. It was set up in 1938 by the produce trader Peter 
Eket Inyang Udo, after his previous enterprises (such as the Ibibio 
Trading Company) had failed. The company had a very prominent Board 
of Directors, which included several leading nationalists of the 
time, such as N. Azikiwe, O.A. Alakija, J.Mbadiwe, and H.O. Davies. 
The General Manager of the company was S. Akinsanya.81 Very little is 
known about this company, and it might have existed only for a very 
short time, but it is telling that precisely at the time when the 
Nigerian Youth Movement, to which all of the Companies’ Directors 
belonged, was campaigning against the Agreement firms, leading 
members of that movement set up a company with the intention of 
breaking the firms’ monopoly in the produce export trade.
The Banking Schemes
The banking schemes were more successful. As stated above, the 
capital resources which African traders could command were much 
smaller them those of European firms. Africans generally believed 
that without equal capital resources, they would never be able to 
compete successfully with the European firms and so they turned to 
British-owned banks for credit. But they found that the banks’ 
attitude towards them was less than helpful.82 Complaints about the 
practices of British-owned banks were voiced as early as 1912,83 but 
it was not until 1928 that an indigenous bank was established. This
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was the Industrial and Commercial Bank Ltd., a company which Tete—  
Ansa had acquired in London in 1924 and which was registered in 
Nigeria in 1928.
After the bank experienced difficulties in the early 1930s, 
some Nigerian businessmen who had been active in Tete-Ansa’s other 
companies established the Nigerian Mercantile Bank in 1931. Its 
Directors were Dr.A. Maya, T.A. Doherty and H.A. Subair; its Chairman 
was C.C. Adeniyi-Jones. 84 This bank only survived until 1936 and it 
seems that it did very little business. Three years earlier, however, 
in April, the Directors of the Mercantile Bank established another 
banking venture. This was the National Bank of Nigeria Ltd. Its 
Directors were the aforementioned T.A. Doherty and Dr. A. Maja, and 
the traders A.L. Johnson and A. Adesigbin. H.A. Subair became General 
Manager of the bank, a post he occupied until 1951.86 The bank’s
activities were initially rather limited, but by acquiring new
depositors and, perhaps equally importantly, acquiring new share­
holders like M. Bank-Anthony, a wealthy import merchant, and N. 
Azikiwe in 1938, its business slowly increased.80
The National Bank of Nigeria Ltd. was established explicitly to 
support African traders in their efforts to recapture some of the 
ground they had lost to the European trading firms. For example, Dr. 
A. Maja said in a speech to the shareholders of the bank at its first 
General Annual Meeting on 20th July 1934:
Desperate disease, they say requires desperate cure; and is not our condition 
today desperate enough to stimulate desperate efforts? Tiie was when educated
African traded side by side Kith European lerchants on the Karina, and il­
literate traders held SHay along Balogun Street. Time Mas Nhen Africans Here
heads of Government Departments __  Unless Me mean to deceive ourselves, me must
admit that me have lost ground and are losing daily. Ought Me not to make some 
efforts to retrieve our position? And horn best can Me do that by co-operative and 
organised efforts? This, ladies and gentlemen, is the motive, the pomerful 
motive, behind the momentous decision to open another native bank.87
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Local Conflicts: The Ibadan Example
In the report which the Nowell Commission of Inquiry on the 
Marketing of West African Cocoa presented in 1938, the issue of local 
political conflicts with the firms was only mentioned in one sen­
tence, perhaps because the Commission felt that these conflicts lay 
outside the Commission’s terms of reference.88 Local issues, however, 
were regarded by the African traders as equally important as buying 
agreements. For example, a memorandum written in late 1938 by the 
Secretary of the Nigerian Produce Traders Union, stated that ’...the 
whole trouble at present could be removed if trading firms would 
honestly and truly withdraw the buying agreement effectively, . . . 
confine their produce trading activities to important trading centers 
... [and] leave the Districts and the producers alone.’89
The view that local issues were as important as national issues 
is supported by the fact that African traders, and particularly the 
larger ones, were often themselves heavily involved in local poli­
tics. One might even argue that to some extent political power and 
economic success depended on each other. Political power seems to 
have been used, for example, in some cases in Ibadan to obtain cocoa 
from subordinate farmers at prices much below the current market 
prices, while payments in connection with the acquisition of titles 
were often derived from produce buying activities.90 This does not 
mean that all Ibadan chiefs were produce traders or that all produce 
traders eventually crowned their careers with chieftaincy titles. 
Yet, there was a distinct overlap between these groups, which gave 
traders a particularly strong position in local politics, as the 
Ibadan example shows.
The conflict in question started in about 1930, when some 
European firms made representations to extend their produce-buying 
operations into the outlying markets of Ibadan. Yet, the firms were 
forced to withdraw when it became clear that local opposition was 
very strong. This opposition was lead by the Bale of Ibadan01
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Okunola, who himself, respectively his family, had extensive trading 
interests. The opposition even gained support from the Senior
Resident of Qyo Province, Ross. He was an particularly conservative
administrative officer and thus probably resented the changes which 
the advance of the European firms into the villages inevitably would 
bring.82
The next attempt occurred in 1934, when the United Africa 
Company tried to set up some buying stations in outlying markets. The 
Bale and his Council sent a strongly-worded petition to the district 
officer in Ibadan, pointing out '...that the opening of new markets 
is another attempt to eliminate the middlemen from the market.’93 
Similarly, the African Commercial Union, which seems to have been the 
only existing trade association of the Ibadan traders, sent a 
petition to the Resident of Oyo Province. It was signed by S. Agbaje 
(President) and twenty-seven other Ibadan traders.94 Apparently, 
these letters were not written in vain as the United Africa Company 
closed down their buying stations in the outlying markets soon after.
The issue came to the fore again in 1936 when the Ibadan Native 
Authority refused to grant approval for leases of land in outlying 
markets to the European firms. Prior to 1936 firms had set up a
limited number of buying stations, either on land for which such
approval was not necessary, or circumvented the provision that such 
approval was necessary by indirectly obtaining leases through the
employment of an African trader on a salary or commission basis who
would then own or hire such stores.95
In addition, the Ibadan Native Traders Union sent a petition to 
the Senior Resident of Oyo Province in October 1936, in which the 
Union protested 1...against the move of the European firms to compete 
in the Native Traders 'reserve' as their entry into the back places
of trade would spell disaster and ... consequent ruin ....,0e In the
petition the Union claimed to have over one thousand members and to 
employ a staff of seventy 'inspectors’ who would look after its
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interests. The Petition itself was signed by S. Agbaje (President) 
and by another prominent Ibadan trader, A.O. Johnson (Honorary 
Secretary).
A further submission by the Union in January 1937 argued that 
their conflict with the firms was not only about economic oppor­
tunities, but also the question of what should be considered as 
"just”.07 The Union argued that
In our ancient Custoiary Law, divisions of labour Mas at the root of the African 
idea of what the eaployaent of sen and woaen slwuld be in the Coaaunity (sic). It 
is laid down as the first axioa of our philosophy on this question that aoaen are 
fundamentally different froa if not inferior to aen in natters physical, eno- 
tional and intellectual; and in consideration of this the aoaen’s share in the 
output of aggregate labour in the conaunity are (sic) regulated as regards 
quantity and quality in confornity with these differences.
It was in this nay that wonen happened to acquire nonopoly over certain trades to
the exclusion of any possible coapetition by aen and vice versa __  Froa
econoaic point of viea, the aaterial results froa this natural division of labour 
was that no un-eaploysent aas to be found in those days. In like Banner there 
should be a division in produce trade between European Firns and African Hid- 
dleaen.,8
This argument impressed neither the District Officer, who 
conducted an inquiry into the whole issue, nor the firms. The latter 
demanded that they ’...should be free to lease and rent land and/or 
stores wherever we desire or require’99 and the District Officer 
recommended that Native Authority should grant approval for leases 
for short periods of time, albeit with a clause which would prohibit 
the firms from selling merchandise goods in these places.100
This was, however, not the end of the issue. In late 1937 the 
Olubadan and his Council wrote another petition to the Resident of 
Oyo Province, again protesting against the ’...concerted move by the 
European firms to establish [buying stations] in all bush markets and 
eliminate the African middlemen....’101 By then the political situa­
tion had greatly changed, as the European firms had earlier in the
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year concluded the 1937/38 Buying Agreement.102 This political change 
is also reflected in the wording of the petition. The Olubadan states 
that,
Apart froa the planting, buying and reselling of cocoa, there is no other 
Horthahile industry in the country. The great bulk of the people are produce 
buyers; these aen will be ruined if the Capitalist (sic) firas are supported.
There is no longer aNo Ban’s Land* to which these aen can go and fara.103
This quotation is of particular interest. Above all it shows 
the success of the nationalist campaign against the European firms 
which was at its height around the same time. It is telling that the 
Olubadan uses a phrase in the petition ("capitalist firms") which at 
that time could only be found in nationalist publications. Further­
more, it offers a glimpse into one of the wider issues behind the 
petition. Apparently land had become scarce in the vicinity of 
Ibadan and some people had difficulty in finding the means to support 
themselves. They had thus become ’unemployed’ and the Olubadan was 
anxious that a further advance of the firms would close income 
opportunities in trade to these men.
Trade Associations
It was not until the late 1930s that associations developed in 
which larger cocoa traders organised themselves on a nationwide 
basis.104 Before this smaller traders organised themselves in trade 
guilds such as the Parakoyi associations in Egbaland, or in local 
associations like the Ibadan Native Produce Buyers Association.105 In 
fact the Nigerian Producer Traders Union (NPTU), which later played 
such an important role in the conflict with the European firms in 
1937 and 1938, was only set up in August or September of 1937, deve­
loping from an amalgamation of the Ijebu Ode Produce Traders Union 
and the Ibadan Native Traders Union.106 Its first president was 
S. Akinsanya. It appears that the Union as such was only active for a 
relatively short time. During the very early part of the war, leading 
members of the Union were appointed to government committees. After
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that the Union seems not to have played any significant role in the 
public arena, but it is noteworthy that some of its functions were 
later taken over by the Ibadan Produce Traders Union (subsequently 
also called Nigerian Produce Buyers Union).107
In 1941, however, an association was founded in order to 
represent the interests of larger traders vis-a-vis the government. 
This was the Nigerian Association of African Importers and Exporters 
(NAAIE). Its founding members, S.O. Gbadamosi and I. Williams, were 
engaged in the import rather than export trade,108 but later export 
merchants, such as T.A. Odutola, who had previously been active in 
the NPTU, became members of the Association.100 The Association’s 
organising secretary during the war and in the early post-war years 
was S. Daramola. Towards the end of the 1940s leading members of the 
Association also became members of the newly-established Lagos 
Chamber of Commerce, and by the early 1950s the Association was 
defunct.110
It was also during the war that another pressure group emerged 
in which traders had a large measure of influence. This was the 
Farmers Committee of British West Africa (FCBWA) . In 1945 this group 
sent a delegation to London to demand higher produce prices and the 
deregulation of the cocoa market. Its history will be outlined in 
chapter seven of this thesis.
Trading Interests in Party Politics
The history of party politics in Nigeria before the Second 
World War has been well described by various authors111 and needs 
only be outlined here very briefly. Party politics developed in 
Nigeria in response to the constitutional reforms introduced by 
Governor Clifford in the wake of the First World War. This gave 
Nigerian interests a very limited measure of elective representation 
in the Lagos Town Council and the Legislative Council. The Clifford 
Constitution of 1922 remained in force in its essential form until
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1947 when it was replaced by a constitution which granted a wider 
franchise and also made room for a representative government, though 
this reform fell far short of the demands by the now mature natio­
nalist movement. However, in the inter-war years the election for the 
Lagos Town Council and for the Legislative Council provided the 
framework in which party politics developed.
But there was much more to these parties than their immediate 
purpose - the contest of elections - suggests. They were the cradle 
of the nationalist movement112 in Nigeria and, more specifically, the 
parties were places in which most of the 'politicians’, who later 
took over the government from the British, served their political 
apprenticeship.
In these parties, trading interests were strongly represented: 
not only were leading party members import or export merchants, but 
the parties themselves made demands or drew up programmes which 
directly represented or appealed to traders. Indeed, one might even 
argue that these parties looked upon traders as one of their main 
constituencies. This peculiar mixture of party politics, nationalism 
(even in its most rudimentary form) and trading interests, proved to 
be politically very potent.
'Grievances’ and the Nationalist Movement
Shortly after the Second World War, Obafemi Awolowo - one of 
the leading nationalists at the time - wrote that ’...the fire of 
nationalism cannot burn without fuel - and grievances (real or 
imaginary) are the readiest fuel.’113 The connection between nationa­
lism and grievances is not, however, immediately obvious and begs the 
question why grievances played such an important role. I would argue 
that in the context of the colonial economy114 of the 1920s and 1930s 
the word 'grievances’ did not just describe a feeling of having ex­
perienced injustice, but had a far wider meaning. First, it entailed 
that the place which individuals or groups of people actually
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occupied in the colonial economy was far below the expectations which 
they had; and secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, a recog­
nition that the obstacles in the way towards the desired advancement 
were themselves a result of the concrete order of the colonial 
economy.115 Examples of these obstacles have already been given, the 
demise of the Lagos-based merchants, the replacement of the more 
independent produce traders by smaller produce buyers and the 
frequent market-sharing agreements between the leading European 
trading firms. To this one should add the numerous other restrictions 
which Africans had to face, for example, in government employment and 
in employment with the firms where they were usually barred from 
higher-level posts.
Movements developed in which members of those professions118 
which were most significantly affected by these restrictions came 
together with the intention of achieving reform of the colonial 
economy and of the political system by which it was maintained.117 
When, however, it subsequently became clear that demands for moderate 
reform had no chance of success and restrictions would remain in 
place or would even intensify, the aim of the nationalist movement 
changed from demands for greater participation in the colonial 
government to demands for the replacement of this government. In this 
perspective, the aim of the attainment of self-government was thus to 
some extent a means to better the situation of the individuals and 
the groups of people whose aspirations had largely remained unful­
filled under early colonial rule.
The Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP)
The NNDP was established in 1923. It emerged in response to 
constitutional reforms in the previous year which gave a small number 
of Lagosians and Calabaris limited elective representation on the 
Nigerian Legislative Council. The roots of the NNDP, however, lay in 
the Lagos branch of a pan-West-African movement, the National
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Congress of British West Africa, which had been most active in Lagos 
between 1919 and 1922. Not only were there many personal continuities 
- J.E. Shyngle, for example, who was the co-founder of the NNDP and 
had accompanied the FCBWA delegation to London in 1920 - but also the 
programmatic ideas of both associations were almost identical. These 
were mainly demands for constitutional reforms, the extension of 
educational facilities and changes in the career structure in the 
civil service, although some room was also given to economic con­
cerns. This was very likely to have been due to the influence of a 
number of African entrepreneurs, such as J.H. Doherty,118 S.H. 
Pearce, D. Taylor and W. Tete-Ansa, who were members or associates of 
both organisations. Certain proposals which later became much more 
widespread were first seen here, such as the demand for the tighte­
ning of immigration laws, particularly in regard to the immigration 
of ’Syrians’ or ’Lebanese’ who started to emerge as competitors in 
the Lagos retail trade; a recommendation to set up a ’British West 
African Co-operative Association’, which would offer shipping and 
banking facilities to African traders; and finally, the strongly-ex­
pressed conviction that the African entrepreneur, and in particular 
the African trader, did not occupy the place within the economy which 
was rightfully due to him. There is, however, little evidence which 
suggests that African entrepreneurs at the time advocated large-scale 
intervention from the government. It seems that though they strongly 
resented the restrictions imposed upon African traders by the 
European trading and shipping firms, they only demanded a return to 
’...free and fair trade in Nigeria and equal treatment of native 
traders and producers.’119
During the second half of the 1920s and early 1930s, the NNDP 
became increasingly parochial and conservative in its outlook. This 
was probably due to the fact that most of its leading members 
belonged to the established Lagos elite, which had very little 
interest in radical reform of the colonial economy. In addition, the
88
NNDP responded neither to the hardship which the depression imposed 
upon the Nigerian populace, nor to restrictions which the European 
trading firms imposed upon the African produce traders and smaller 
middlemen. However, in the mid-1930s a new movement or party emerged 
which was able to challenge successfully the supremacy of the NNDP in 
the elections of 1938 and whose programme, at least at the close of 
the 1930s, was far more radical than that advocated by the NNDP.
The Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM)
The predecessor of the Nigerian Youth Movement appeared in 
public for the first time in 1934. The ’Lagos Youth Movement’, as it 
was then called, was founded in the wake of conflict over the status 
of the Yaba Higher College of Education by Dr.J.C. Vaughan, E. Ikoli,
H.O. Davies and S. Akinsanya. Two years later it changed its name 
into the Nigerian Youth Movement. The original founders were not new 
to politics. Dr. J.C. Vaughan and E. Ikoli had been members of the 
'Union of Young Nigerians’ in the 1920s, an association which had 
been founded to oppose H. Macaulay’s authoritarian style of leader­
ship within the NNDP, while S. Akinsanya had been a member of one of 
the many literary and debating societies in Lagos at that time.120
The original programme of the Lagos Youth Movement did not 
radically challenge colonial rule. For example, the ’Booklet on the 
Constitution and Rules of the Lagos Youth Movement’ of 1935 lists as 
one of the principal aims of the movement, ’...to seek by consti­
tutional means the bestowal of the rights of British citizenship in 
its full measure on the people.’121 One should not make too much of 
this, as party programmes in this early stage of the development of 
the Movement were generally written for single occasions and probably 
did not reflect the true convictions and intentions of their authors. 
Nevertheless, it is significant that the attainment of self­
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government was not the original platform on which the NYM campaigned 
in order to win wider support.
Moreover, it seems that on occasion the Movement even stressed 
its loyalty to the British Crown. For instance, 0. Alakija, a 
prominent member of the NYM, accused H. Macaulay (NNDP) in the West 
African Pilot, in September 1938, of 1...promoting the ill-feelings 
between His Majesty’s Youth Movement and His Majesty’s European 
subjects in a most wicked and satanic manner.’122 Yet, the Movement’s 
main slogan during the 1938 Legislative Council election campaign was 
’’Nigeria for the Nigerians" and in the NYM newspapers articles 
appeared which stressed the Movement’s devotion to the nationalist 
cause. In particular, the Movement stressed the role it had played in 
the anti-pool agitation in late 1937 and early 1938 and charged that 
the NNDP had done very little to defend farmers and traders from the 
machinations of the ’Pool’.123
Despite its considerable shortcomings in terms of ideological 
homogeneity and despite the fact that it had only relatively recently 
entered the Nigerian political scene as a fully-fledged organisation, 
the Movement was able to capture three out of four seats at the Lagos 
Town Council elections in June 1938 and the three Lagos seats in the 
Legislative Council elections in October 1938. The franchise in these 
elections was very limited, however, as only adult male Lagos resi­
dents whose property oi* income exceeded a certain minimum threshold 
were allowed to vote.124 Thus, for example, only 908 voters were 
entered in the electoral list of the 1938 Lagos Town Council elec­
tions, though many eligible voters might have decided beforehand not 
to take part in this election for fear of having to pay taxes 
afterwards, and so did not register with the electoral office. Only 
about 5% of the people living in the Lagos municipal area voted.125
The low number of people who actually voted for the NYM in 1938 
is not a good measure of public support enjoyed by the NYM in Lagos 
and elsewhere. In areas outside Lagos, this support was particularly
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noticeable in the towns in the cocoa-growing areas of western 
Nigeria, but it was also evident in other towns in southern Nigeria 
and in some towns in the northern part of the country.12® One could 
even argue that the success of the NYM in 1938 was at least partly 
due to its early organisational efforts outside the Colony, as it 
provided the NYM with the powerful argument that it, and not the 
NNDP, truly represented the national interest. The emergence of local 
branches of the NYM in western Nigeria was, however, also very impor­
tant for a different reason. The existence of these local branches 
made it impossible for the government and trading firms to dismiss 
the intervention of the NYM into the conflict between the African 
traders and the European trading firms in late 1937 and early 1938 as 
completely insubstantial and unwarranted; and this fact to some 
extent explains why - as we shall see later - in the aftermath of 
this intervention, statutory marketing seems to have been such an 
attractive option for the colonial government.
The setting up of branches of the NYM in western Nigeria was 
probably largely due to the activities of S. Akinsanya, the ’Bulldog 
of the Movement’ as one newspaper called him.127 Not only was he the 
organising secretary of the Nigerian Produce Traders Union (NPTU) in 
1937 and 1938, but he was also the president of another union: the 
Nigerian Motor Transport Union (NMTU) which he co-founded in 1932. If 
one compares the little that is known about the actual membership of 
the NYM in western Nigeria with what is known about the membership of 
these unions, one is struck by the apparent partial identity. Thus in 
Ibadan (0. Awolowo, S. Agbaje, D.A. Agbaje, A.O. Johnson), Abeokuta 
(D.F.G. Adekunle), Ilesha (J.O. Fadahunsi), and Ijebu-Ode (T.A. Odu- 
tola) leading local supporters or branch officers of the NYM were 
also the representatives or at least leading members of the NPTU128 
and in some cases (T.A. Odutola, 0. Awolowo) also of the NMTU.128
It therefore seems arguable that the NYM, as far as western 
Nigeria was concerned, did not develop from scratch. It built on an
91
existing network of produce traders and transport entrepreneurs, 
which either in the case of the NMTU was already established and had 
been active in the national political arena130 or, in the case of the 
NPTU, had been in existence for some time in the form of local 
produce traders’ associations, such as the Ibadan Native Produce 
Traders Union or the Ijebu-Ode Produce Traders Union. Moreover, as 
many of the members of these Unions were the local "Big Men", the 
influence of the NYM went far beyond the narrow confines of elitist 
Lagos politics. For example, one leading member of the Ibadan section 
of the NPTU was Bello Abasi, who was the son of Olubadan Okunola, 
while another leading member of the section, S. Agbaje, was not only 
a former nominated member of the Nigerian Legislative Council, but 
also a prominent member of the Ibadan Progressive Union, which played 
an important role in Ibadan politics at the time.181
The partial identity of the group of large produce traders and 
transporters with one section of the Nigerian Youth Movement was, 
however, important for the political development of Nigeria for two 
other reasons. First, it seems that the NYM anti-pool campaign in 
late 1937 and early 1938 was serious - as far as the trading firms 
and the government was concerned - precisely because of this iden­
tity. This is the impression one gets from reading reports on the 
political situation in Nigeria in 1938, which the local manager of 
one of the leading European trading firms wrote in that year.132 It 
is thus, perhaps, this partial identity which gave the protest 
movement of 1938 its specific clout. Secondly, it is clear, that the 
traders’ section together with other business sections such as the 
National Bank of Nigeria associates138 within the NYM, were able to 
influence substantially the contents of the Nigerian Youth Charter, 
the party programme which the NYM published in April 1938, just after 
the campaign against the European firms and their trading practices 
had come to an end.13 4
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One could argue that although party programmes mattered 
relatively little in this phase in the political development of 
political parties in Nigeria, it was nonetheless on this programme 
that the NYM won both the Lagos Town Council elections and the 
Legislative Council elections in June and October 1938. Furthermore, 
it seems that this programme enjoyed a remarkable longevity. Thus 0. 
Awolowo wrote in 1946 that the Charter was at that time still 
’unrevised’.18 6
The actual manifesto was probably written by H.O. Davies, the 
Secretary of the NYM in 1938. 188 Essentially it consisted of two 
parts: the first labelled "Political Charter", while the second was 
named "Economic Charter". The Political Charter of the NYM stated 
that its main goal was to ’ . . .obtain complete autonomy within the 
British Empire...' and ’...complete independence in the local manage­
ment of our affairs.’187 In the Economic Charter, there are various 
elements of analysis, concrete demands and ideas, some of which were 
directly related to the situation of traders within the colonial 
economy.
In the Economic Charter the NYM described the ’...original 
Nigerian economic system as being in the process of disintegration 
and the Nigerian as still adjusting to the new system.’188 The most 
pressing problems at the time for Nigerian traders and businessmen in 
general were seen as insufficient capital, no access to bank credit, 
lack of opportunity to study modern business methods and organisa­
tion, and finally as having no recourse against the trading practices 
of the European firms.
Apart from pledging its support for African entrepreneurs in 
very general terms,130 the NYM declared its full support for in­
digenous banking institutions (i.e. the National Bank of Nigeria) and 
proposed the establishment of a Five Year Economic Plan. This plan 
was basically a recommendation to NYM members to set up thrift
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societies in order to raise capital for investment in privately-owned 
Nigerian firms.
With regard to the trading situation in Nigeria at the time, 
the NYM stated that
Ke pledge ourselves to demand for our people opportunities equal to those enjoyed
by foreigners ___ In fact we Mill urge on the Government to protect our people
against unequal competition, if necessary by legislation [my emphasis]. The aim 
of ours is coterminous Nith the avoued principle of trusteeship that where our 
interests clash with those of foreigners in this country, it is the duty of 
government to see that our prevail.140
It also repeatedly re-affirmed its opposition to the ’...ruinous 
practice by foreign firms of squeezing out the retail traders by 
invasion of their markets’; to ’...unfair competition and a monopoly 
for big business interests’; and to ’...all forms of privilege in 
business whether in the sale of foreign products or in the purchase 
of local commodities.’141
The Charter also mentions the eventual establishment of mar­
keting boards. After having declared its support for the development 
of co-operative societies142 and agricultural banks, the NYM stated 
that
until the co-operative systems are centralised into marketing boards functioning 
in a produce exchange, it is a duty for the movement to Match the interests of 
our farmers and to obtain a fair price for their efforts.143
As the meaning of the term ’’marketing board functioning in a produce 
exchange”144 was not spelled out anywhere in the document, the 
significance of this is difficult to assess. It seems to mean that 
the NYM favoured the idea that co-operatives should form the basis of 
some sort of central marketing scheme or central selling organi­
sation, but beyond such a statement any interpretation of the schemes 
seems to be rather speculative, especially as the role of produce 
traders in the scheme was not made clear, and thus perhaps not much 
weight should be given to it.
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In comparison to the 1934 NYM party programme and the political 
and economic ideas earlier proto-nationalist movements expressed, the 
Youth Charter of 1938 indicated a fundamental change in political 
attitudes. In the Charter the NYM for the first time officially 
stated that its ultimate goal was the attainment of self-government, 
while in the economic sphere it demanded such large-scale government 
intervention that, had it been carried, it would have meant a partial 
restructuring of the colonial economy. Government intervention was 
thereby understood not as being a desirable aim in itself but rather 
as a means to support the emerging entrepreneurial classes in Nigeria 
in general and the produce traders in particular.
A.G. Hopkins has argued that this radicalisation occurred 
largely in response to the trade depression of the early 1930s and 
the subsequent hardship this depression imposed upon the Nigerian
economy, and to the failure of government to react positively or
adequately to this crisis.145 It also seems arguable, however, that 
this radicalisation was moreover, at least to some extent, a result 
of the trading practices of the European firms in as much as they 
tried to undermine the economic position of African traders in the 
pre-Second World War marketing system.146
At this point it seems appropriate to review briefly the main 
result of the examination of the involvement of traders in politics.
I have argued that traders went into politics in order to defend
their economic interests and if possible better their economic
position. It seems that at the local level this strategy was success­
ful in some cases, as the Ibadan example has shown. Then I tried to 
demonstrate why and how traders became increasingly involved in 
nationalist politics. Here I have argued that while their initial 
participation in early nationalist politics may have been sporadic 
and inconsequential, by the mid-1930s traders and their representa­
tives formed an integral part of the nationalist movement itself.
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One purpose of the examination of the role of traders in 
politics was to illuminate the kind of leverage produce traders could 
use in their conflicts with the European trading firms and later in 
conflicts with the colonial government. As I will argue in subsequent 
parts of this thesis in more depth, it was this political leverage 
which was very much at the back of the minds of the managers of the 
European trading firms and government officials alike when decisions 
were made which directly affected the position of produce traders in 
the marketing system, as for example at the outbreak of war in 1939.
Government Policy
In what follows I will review those aspects of government 
policy which directly influenced the cocoa trade and will omit other 
aspects of government policy which less directly influenced the cocoa 
trade. They are mentioned elsewhere in this thesis.
It seems that apart from the previously-mentioned policy of 
giving some support to the co-operative cocoa marketing societies, 
the introduction of a comprehensive system of produce inspection and 
produce grading was the government’s main intervention into the cocoa 
trade. From 1911 any consignment of cocoa from Nigeria had to carry 
a government seal, which indicated that this consignment had been 
inspected by government officials and graded according to certain 
standards. It also indicated the firm which originally assembled that 
particular consignment of produce. Produce grading stations were 
subsequently established in all major towns and also in some bigger 
villages in the cocoa growing areas in western Nigeria.147
The main purpose of the scheme was to give American and British 
manufacturers some measure of certainty about the quality of Nigerian 
cocoa. It was hoped that this would increase the attractiveness of 
Nigerian cocoa in the international markets. It is difficult to come 
to any conclusion about the merits of this scheme. In the short term 
it seems that the main beneficiaries of the scheme were the European
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trading firms and some large African traders, in as much as part of 
their previous buying costs, such as the costs of employment of 
experienced personnel, were now paid for by the government.
The cautious support for co-operative marketing societies and 
the introduction of a produce inspection scheme were the major ini­
tiatives the government undertook in the inter-war years. As these 
initiatives did not change the relationship between the major 
participants in the cocoa trade, Margery Perham’s famous description 
of the role which the government had played in the economy in the 
1930s as one of a ’...somewhat inattentive umpire...’148, while the 
different economic interest groups played out their game, seems 
particularly accurate with regard to the cocoa trade.
It is open to question, however, if the government played the 
role of an "umpire’* willingly. In the 1930s there had been repeated 
discussions about reform of cocoa marketing in Nigeria, particularly 
after the events of 1937/38, but it seems that proposals in that 
direction failed, not least because the Nigerian government itself 
could not afford such a scheme, given the precarious state of its 
finances, and the Imperial Treasury refused to accept the financial 
liabilities such schemes would have involved.149 It is thus arguable 
that if the resources had been available, the colonial government 
might have attempted to reform the cocoa marketing system. This is 
not just mere speculation. As will be shown in chapter five, it was 
the availability of resources which strongly influenced the colonial 
and imperial government decision to continue the war-time produce 
control scheme after the war itself had ended.
There was also one government scheme which, if it had suc­
ceeded, would have changed the pattern of trade in Nigeria. This does 
not invalidate the general notion of the government as a "somewhat 
inattentive umpire" as this seems to be true for most of the 1930s. 
It only shows that the government was not completely inactive as far 
as the cocoa trade was concerned.
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In late 1938, the Nigerian government, apparently without prior 
knowledge of the Colonial Office in London, approached American 
manufacturers through U.S. government channels, with an invitation to 
consider direct purchasing from West Africa, and in particular from 
Nigeria.160 This invitation was accepted by a small, hitherto rela­
tively unknown firm of Rockwood & Co. , an agent of the leading 
American cocoa manufacturer at the time, the giant Hershey Chocolate 
Corporation.161 Rockwood made it known to the government that it was 
particularly interested in high-quality cocoa and that it intended to 
buy up to 20,000 tons of cocoa in the approaching 1939/40 season. To 
this end the firm made the necessary banking arrangements and even 
printed leaflets in English and in Yoruba to make its intention known 
to farmers and traders alike. It also conducted negotiations with the 
Registrar of Co-operative Societies about the delivery of large 
parcels of co-operative cocoa, promising to pay £3 to £4 more per ton 
of cocoa than its competitors would offer.162 This intention was also 
made known to co-operative leaders.168
In the end the scheme came to nothing. When war broke out in 
September 1939, all exports of cocoa were banned except under 
licence. Although the colonial government had issued one licence for 
the export of 1,000 tons to Rockwood for direct export to the U.S. 
and a second licence for 5,000 tons was already approved in principle 
in early September 1939, later these licenses were revoked as 
American firms purchasing cocoa directly from Nigeria did not fit 
into the design of the cocoa control scheme, whose details were 
finalised at the time.164 This prompted the American embassy to write 
a strongly-worded memorandum to the Foreign Office, in which it 
objected to this decision, pointing out, among other things, that the 
effect of this decision would be only ’...to strengthen the monopoly 
control of the entrenched interests and to close the West African 
trade to American participation ,...’166 But this initiative did not 
meet with any success.
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The reasons why the government thought it necessary to exclude 
Rockwood & Co. from buying cocoa in Nigeria will be examined in 
chapter five of this thesis; here it is sufficient to point out that 
apparently there was a division of interest between the colonial 
government and the European trading firms at the close of the 1930s. 
The government seems to have tried to keep a check on the activities 
of the European trading firms by inviting American firms. Thus, for 
example, the Assistant Financial Secretary in the Nigerian Secre­
tariat minuted after the decision was made to revoke the export 
licenses of Rockwood & Co. that
... Government mould, I think, welcome outside competition in the cocoa industry 
and if there was no control scheme we should be only too pleased to grant them 
export licenses to the United States of America.1SB
The ’Rockwood’ episode shows that by the end of the 1930s the 
Nigerian government apparently was no longer following a strict 
non-interventionist policy with regard to the cocoa trade.
. In this Chapter I reviewed the major policies and economic and 
political strategies of the main participants in the cocoa trade in 
the inter-war years. These were: the up-country advance of European 
trading firms, their attempts to restrict competition in trade as 
well as to replace the independent African trader; the response of 
the African traders to this strategy (politically and otherwise); and 
finally the ’laissez faire’ policy of the colonial government. In 
this review the crucial conflict between the African traders and the 
European trading firms of 1937/38 was largely omitted. This conflict, 
its origins and its aftermath will be the topic of the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
The 1937/38 Conflict and Its Aftermath
In the previous chapter I outlined the major themes in the 
political and economic history of cocoa marketing in Nigeria since
the First World War. In this chapter I want to deal in more detail
with problems of the cocoa industry in the second half of the 1930s, 
which centred largely around a conflict between Nigerian produce 
traders and buyers on one hand and the European trading firms on the 
other. Such an analysis is justified by the fact that it was the 
precariousness of the cocoa industry that inspired the colonial 
government to embark on certain new policies during the war.
The immediate cause of the conflict was an agreement concluded 
by European trading firms in November 1937 in order to eliminate 
'harmful competition and the abuses hitherto associated with cocoa- 
buying in Nigeria'.1 In what follows I will first examine the reasons 
why the firms came to such an agreement and then review the ensuing 
conflict. The last part of the chapter will be devoted to the after- 
math of the conflict.
The Background to the 1937 Cocoa Buying Agreement
The 1930s were a difficult time for trade. The severe trade
depression in the first half of the decade had badly hit the merchan­
dise and produce trade and it was only in the second half of the 
1930s that produce prices and the value of imports and exports slowly 
recovered to previous levels. Apart from the general state of depres­
sion, it seems that increased intensity of competition between firms 
reduced the firm’s profit margins, particularly those from their 
cocoa-buying operations, in Nigeria. The precise profit margins of 
the firms are unknown. However, it is possible to show that profit 
margins in the 1930s must have been much smaller than profit margins 
in the 1920s, since the difference between the Lagos purchase price
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and the Liverpool selling price was considerably lower in the later 
period.2 The same argument can be applied to the firms’ cocoa trading 
operations in the Gold Coast.3
It seems that this development was largely due to the expan­
sion of the cocoa industry. This expansion had two dimensions: one 
was a sharp increase in the volume of exports, while the other 
dimension concerned the extension of the cocoa producing area. During 
the 1930s, cocoa trees which had been planted further afield from the 
firms’ buying stores and railway stations became productive. The 
firms followed this movement by gradually extending their buying 
network, which led to a marked increase in their overhead costs. The 
answer to this development was a general increase in the level of 
competition between the firms, since, as one local agent of John Holt 
& Co. put it:
As our buying stations went further afield, nearer to the producer, the increased 
overhead expenses had to be covered by increased tonnage.4
’Increased tonnage’ could, however, only be secured by paying higher 
commission rates or higher produce prices, and thus it seems that in 
the 1930s there was some kind of self-perpetuating process at work, 
where higher overhead costs induced a higher level of competition, 
while a higher level of competition led, via the extension of the 
buying network and the increase in buying costs, to generally higher 
overhead costs.
The expansion of the cocoa industry also gave rise to a new 
type of intermediary. These were produce traders who were able to 
combine their produce buying businesses with transport enter­
prises.5 Though this development was already noticeable in the early 
1920s, when the first produce traders bought lorries to transport 
their purchases to the firms’ buying stations, it was only in the 
1930s that this development made itself felt in the produce trade, 
probably because of the improvement and extension of the road
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network. Thus during the 1930s the tonnage that was taken to Lagos, 
for example by road, steadily increased. This increase was partly due 
to the increase in the volume of trade itself, but it seems it was 
also due to the geographical extension of the cocoa-producing areas. 
Thus in towns like Ilesha and Ijebu-Ode, which wefe located further 
away from the railway and whose importance as cocoa-buying centres 
had increased in the 1930s, a large proportion of the crop was 
transported directly to Lagos instead of being brought to the nearest 
railway station.®
The size of African transport businesses in aggregate is not 
known but there is evidence which suggests that the 1930s saw the 
emergence of a new type of African entrepreneur. When, for example, 
the Assistant District Officer of the Ibadan Division made an inquiry 
into cocoa marketing in that division, he remarked, inter alia, that 
the larger local middlemen ’...in almost all cases own motor trans­
port.’7 Moreover, almost all of the leading produce traders in 
south-western Nigeria had owned transport businesses. Thus in the 
1930s, in Ibadan for example, transport and produce-buying businesses 
were owned bj^  S. Agbaje, A.O. Makanjuola, and the Syrian A.K. Zard, 
while in Ilesha J.O. Fadahunsi and in Ijebu-Ode T.A. Odutola main­
tained their own lorry parks.8
The fact that these businesses survived the difficult times of 
the 1930s, despite the depression and competition from European 
trading firms, was largely a result of the way they operated and 
their better knowledge of local conditions. They were generally more 
flexible and worked on profit margins substantially lower than those 
of the European firms. They were also low cost operators, in that 
they did not have to pay relatively high wages to European supei—  
visory staff.9 Moreover, European employees were also more expensive, 
inasmuch as a substantial number of them were always on leave or ill. 
For example, the firm of John Holt & Co. held a ’reserve for relief’
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in 1937 of twenty-nine ( ! ) employees to enable only some ninety-six 
European supervisory staff to conduct its business in Nigeria.10
The emergence of independent produce buying and transport 
entrepreneurs had a number of effects on the trading operations of 
the European firms. They lost their former control over evacuation 
routes, and produce traders were now able to offer parcels of produce 
to different firms. This in turn led to an increase in commission 
rates as produce traders could now play off the firms against each 
other. But even more importantly, it seems that produce traders were 
increasingly able to compete successfully with the firms’ own buying 
organisations. Despite their dislike of larger, independent produce 
traders, the firms regularly bought substantial amounts of cocoa from 
larger produce traders. They found bulk purchasing quite attractive 
because it lowered their overall buying costs. This was, it seems, 
the reason why they occasionally offered substantial ’overriding’ 
commissions to certain produce traders, since they knew that they 
could save an equal amount or even more on their own buying costs. At 
the same time, these produce traders were able to compete success­
fully with the firms’ agents in local markets by offering higher 
produce prices as their cost of operation was lower them those of the 
firms’ network maintained in the cocoa producing areas. This again, 
it seems, raised the overall level of competition.11
This raises the question why these produce traders did not 
venture into the export market, if they were such relatively success­
ful entrepreneurs. The usual explanation is that they lacked capital, 
skills and could not compete with the big European firms which, by 
their volume of trade, were able to effect considerable economies of 
scale.12 It seems, however, that there were other reasons. First, 
the differences between the world market and the local purchase price 
of cocoa in the 1930s were much lower than in the 1920s and thus 
export cocoa did not offer particularly high rewards. Secondly, it is 
arguable that dependent cocoa buying, i.e. cocoa buying with advances
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from the firms, was more profitable than independent cocoa buying.13 
Some of these produce traders owned substantial amounts of capital 
but they did not choose to employ it in the produce trade as probably 
other, more profitable, income-generating investment opportunities 
were available to them, such as money-lending. Finally, there is some 
evidence that suggests that the intermediary role itself was more 
profitable than exporting ventures. For example, T.A. Odutola was the 
biggest supplier of cocoa to the firm of John Holt & Co. and his 
deliveries to this firm alone exceeded 1,200 tons in each of the 
1937/38 and 1938/39 cocoa seasons.14 At the same time he exported 
only 250 tons of cocoa on his own behalf in the 1938/39 cocoa sea­
son . 18
Even if T.A. Odutola had lacked capital of his own, there were 
facilities, albeit costly, available in Nigeria at the time which 
would have enabled him to export his total seasonal purchases. These 
facilities included London brokers who were willing to arrange credit 
in Nigeria.16 There was also the possibility to "hypothecate” cocoa. 
This was a device which allowed produce traders to borrow money from 
the banks on the production of a receipt from a shipping agent for 
cocoa already delivered to the shipping agent’s warehouses. In such 
cases no additional collateral was necessary, although the sum of 
money lent by the banks was considerably lower than the value of the 
cocoa in the shipping agent’s warehouse.
It is very likely that such facilities were open to traders 
like T.A. Odutola and they chose not to export but rather to sell 
most of their seasonal purchases to the European trading firms. 
Despite the fact that commission rates for intermediaries had 
declined in consequence of the 1937 Buying Agreement in the late 
1930s, it appears that, at least for some produce traders, internal 
marketing was at least as financially rewarding as ’breaking’ into 
the export trade. In addition, produce traders were at the time 
probably also not prepared to risk the little capital they had in the
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export trade, even if it perhaps sometimes offered high rewards when 
sure return could be obtained in the internal trade.
Incidentally, the existence of these larger produce traders 
made it impossible for the firms to lower purchase prices in Nigeria 
substantially below world market prices for a long time. It seems 
that they had tried this in the groundnut trade, but it had prompted 
local competitors to take over a substantial portion of the export 
trade.17
However, it seems that the emergence of a new type of inter­
mediary, as well as the expansion of the cocoa industry and the 
extension of the road network in south-western Nigeria, generally 
raised the level of competition. One outward sign of this development 
was the steady rise in monetary and non-monetary inducements to sell 
cocoa to particular firms. In a memorandum written by one of the 
trading firms in defence of the Buying Agreement of 1937, it is 
stated that,
Intense competition between the merchants for cocoa tonnage has, in the past, 
resulted in competitive bidding for the services of middlemen with connexions in 
vide areas, and mho were thereby in a position to offer attractive tonnage. 
Inducements to secure the tonnage offered by brokers have taken many forms among 
which may be enumerated here cash advances, commissions, allowances for the loss 
in weight 18
Though it is impossible to pinpoint precisely what kind of 
inducement cost the firms incurred in their buying operations, but it 
seems that in general non-monetary inducements were finaneially more 
harmful to the firms than monetary ones. As already mentioned in the 
previous chapter, competition induced the firms to extend larger and 
larger amounts of credit in the form of advances to their commission 
buyers. This was, apart from the increase in the credit risk, finan­
cially not too injurious to the firms. Yet, competition forced the 
firms to allow their buying agents extending periods between the 
declaration of purchases and the actual delivery of these purchases
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to the firms’ produce stores.10 Though this practice seems to have 
not been completely new to the trade,20 it appears that it became 
more widespread in the 1930s. This opened up new income opportunities 
to commission buyers which far exceeded the income derived from 
commission rates since they could now speculate successfully against 
the trading firms without any risk.
If the market looked bullish, produce buyers would purchase 
cocoa with the firms' advances and hold it until a price rise oc­
curred, thus pocketing the difference. The firms naturally tried to 
insist on the terms of the previously-concluded buying contract, but 
commission buyers could, for example, evade the firms’ claim by 
pretending not to have bought any cocoa and transferring the actual 
stock bought to other buying agents who would then sell this at the 
current higher price to their principals. As one firm’s local 
representative put it: ’We as a company were forced to accept ...
[these] declarations or lose the tonnage to competitors who would 
accept large declarations.’31
In cases where the market looked more bearish, commission 
agents would not buy cocoa immediately but would wait for a price 
fall. The whole system was described by a District Agent of John Holt 
& Co. in Ibadan as follows:
The pernicious practice of declarations which has grown up through the compe­
tition between the firas to obtain tonnage, allowed buyers to ’declare’ tonnage 
bought at the higher price on a fall price, the purchases so declared not 
actually being delivered at the price change but being delivered at various 
periods afterwards.22
This opened the door to the practice which was considered by firms as 
one of the prime "abuses" of the trade. Because commission buyers 
could deliver produce a considerable time after they had ’declared’ 
the amount in their possession, commission buyers were induced 
habitually to over-declare their purchases and actually buy the 
difference at the current lower price, which of course gave them an
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extra profit. The commission buyers were, in effect, operating a 
highly sophisticated futures cocoa market, in which the inherent risk 
was shifted squarely onto the firms. This particularly incensed the 
firms which did not object to the practice where produce traders were 
doing it with their own capital, but were highly irritated when 
commission buyers used for this practice the firms’ advances.23
The firms were to some extent forced to accept these declara­
tions since, if they only paid the current lower price for cocoa 
delivered, they ran the risk of ruining their own ’honest’ buying 
agents, for which the payment of the current lower prices would mean 
a clear loss. This in turn would endanger the credit which the firms 
had advanced to the buying agents. It was, in the words of the 
District Agent of John Holt & Co. in Lagos, the somewhat unpleasant 
choice 'between losing money on cocoa or losing money outstanding’ 
and ’between overstepping Produce Department’s [price] limits and 
losing credit'.24
This raises the question why the firms extended their produce 
buying networks and expanded the volume of credit to commission 
buyers in circumstances which were clearly unfavourable to them. The 
Nowell Commission argued that this was largely due to the competition 
between the firms themselves which forced them to adopt this policy 
and that the purpose of the Buying Agreement of 1937 was consequently 
an attempt to eliminate such competition.25 Yet, one wonders if the 
firms really had no other policy options like, for example, the one 
which the Nigerian Director of Agriculture had suggested. He argued 
that instead of concluding a buying agreement, all that was needed 
was an agreement between the firms that ’...no cash advances should 
be made and that the produce trade should be converted solely to one 
of cash on delivery.’26 This, he argued, would make it impossible for 
commission buyers to speculate against the firms. Regarding the 
extension of the firms’ buying network, it seems equally sensible to 
argue that all that was needed was an agreement between the firms to
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preserve the status quo or even to reduce the existing network. Why 
then did the firms not choose this option? So far as a policy which 
would limit the firms’ buying networks was concerned, it seems that 
they feared that under the circumstances prevalent at the end of the 
1930s, control of outlying markets and especially of newly-developing 
markets in areas which had only fairly recently come into production 
would be placed into the hands of larger produce traders,2 7 and this, 
from the firms’ point of view, had to be avoided.
In the matter of the implementation of cash-delivery policy, 
the argument is somewhat more complicated. In a reply to a letter 
from the District Agent in Accra, which suggested such a course,28 
the Director of the Administrative Department of John Holt & Co. 
Ltd., argued that:
If the native cocoa dealers of the Gold Coast can in fact finance the cocoa crop 
without credit facilities, how long do you think the exporting houses can rewain 
in business without paying forever a higher price on the Gold Coast than the 
African shipper can get on the hote warket. A direct shipper can hypothecate his 
cocoa shipaents through the Bank. In the long run does not it cone down to this - 
that the exporting houses have got to choose between paying wore on the Gold 
Coast than the average hone warket, ... or alternatively financing the warketing 
of the crop, in the hope of getting a substantial proportion of tied custowers, 
and being able to buy at a rather lower price, than they would have to pay if all 
the cocoa were free cocoa.28
Though clearly this letter was written with the Gold Coast situation 
in mind, it seems that this argument is also valid for Nigeria, in 
that the marketing system in both countries in this respect was very 
similar.
It seems, therefore, that it was not only ’competition* between 
the firms which induced them to embark on policies which were in the 
short run clearly to their detriment; long-term considerations, such 
as a certain amount of apprehension about the emergence of the new 
type of middleman, also guided the firms’ policies. If this argument 
is valid, then the conventional interpretation of the advance system 
as it existed at the end of the 1930s and of the Buying Agreement of
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1937, needs some amendment. Concerning the interpretation of the
advance system, the view that it mainly existed because of the
’absence of a local capitalist class’30 with sufficient capital 
resources has to be turned upside down: it existed because of the
presence of a local capitalist class, even if this class existed at
that time only in very small numbers. With regard to the 1937 Buying 
Agreement, it seems that it came about not only as a means to elimi­
nate the competition between the firms, but also to limit the 
damaging effects of a financial system which the firms maintained in 
order to keep their dominant position in West African trade.
In the following two sections of this chapter we will see what 
prompted the firms to conclude a buying agreement in 1937. Then the 
Agreement itself will be examined.
The 1936/37 Debacle
In the early phase of the 1936/37 season, prospects looked 
quite bright. Prices had improved since the last season, and there 
was heavy demand for cocoa from European and, particularly, from 
American manufacturers, who expected a marked increase in chocolate 
consumption in 1937. There was, however, great uncertainty about the 
size of the forthcoming crop and some manufacturers, and also some 
speculators, started to invest heavily in cocoa stocks, expecting 
that in 1937 world demand would considerably outstrip world supply, 
thus speculating on a further price rise. This induced the trading 
firms in Nigeria and Ghana to embark on somewhat feverish competition 
for tonnage. While prices in the early part of the season were, 
according to the forecasts, still rising, the outward sign of strong 
competition, already mentioned in the previous chapter, began to 
appear. It seems that a previously-concluded ’gentleman’s agreement’ 
between the firms broke down and commission rates, advances, etc. 
began to rise. The United Africa Company and Cocoa Manufacturers Ltd. 
in particular were engaged in such fierce competition that smaller
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firms considered it unwise to follow their example. ’Obviously’, the 
Director of John Holt & Co. commented, ’we cannot join in a fight 
between ’’giants” ’ . 8 1
By December 1936 the Lagos price of cocoa exceeded £42 per ton. 
Such prices had not been paid since 1928 and to contemporary obser­
vers they must have appeared as the end of the long depression in 
produce prices between these years; in the same month in the previous 
year, for example, prices had not even reached £17 per ton.32 
Equally, commission rates, advances and allowances of all sorts 
increased, and traders, as well as cocoa farmers, enjoyed a brisk and 
profitable season.
Apparently cocoa trading was so attractive that the activities 
of ’...every farmer and trader in Ibadan and Ife [were diverted] to 
cocoa, to the exclusion of other crops.’83 Moreover, high cocoa 
prices, according to one observer, ’relieved the majority of cocoa 
farmers from debt’.84 As regards the profitability of the trade to 
produce traders, we have the evidence of 0. Awolowo, who wrote in his 
autobiography:
The 1936-7 season witnessed the best cocoa boon for aany years  Business was
brisk all around and it was all too easy to aake aoney. As a Batter of fact, I 
aade enough profit during the season to pay ay associates their capital and 
shares of profit in full, and to enable ae with strict econoay, to proceed to the 
United Kingdoa to study law.35
Since there are no reasons to believe that Awolowo was a particularly 
gifted businessman, this quotation shows what size of income produce 
traders could derive from trading activities in exceptionally 
favourable circumstances.
The boom did not last. In early January 1937, American manufac­
turers realised that the crop would be far larger than expected and 
that the prospects for increased consumption had been seen in too 
rosy a light. Prices began to fall. Although selling prices for cocoa
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in the international markets stayed high for another two to three 
months, local prices tumbled.36 Thus, for example, the price at which 
cocoa changed hands in Ibadan dropped from over £47 on 19th January, 
1937 to £38 on 27th January, 1937, a fall of almost 20%! 37
Local prices started to fall earlier than world market spot 
prices because at this point of the season, trading firms did not buy 
to fulfil already existing contracts, but bought substantial quan­
tities of produce in order to be able to sell later in the year. It 
seems that the managers of the produce departments of leading 
European firms in January shared a very dim view of the prospects of 
the development of cocoa prices. This view was eventually proved to 
be accurate as cocoa prices in the international markets steadily and 
steeply declined from March 1937.38
The sudden decline in cocoa prices had two effects on the
firms’ profit margins. It seems that at the end of the main season in
March 1937 they were in possession of considerable quantities of 
cocoa, some of which they knew could only be sold at a loss because 
of the future price prospects. This as such was not unusual in West 
African trade, as firms habitually held significant quantities of 
cocoa at the end of the main season, and in the particular season
their gamble about future price movements had turned out to be rather
disadvantageous to the firms, while apparently in others this kind of 
speculation had been quite rewarding. For example, at the end of the 
1935/36 cocoa season, the firms had in their possession some 106,000 
tons of cocoa for which they had not found a buyer, but as prices 
improved during 1936 it is unlikely that they sold this quantity at a 
loss. But still, the 46,000 tons which they held at the end of the 
1936/37 main season represented a substantial loss to the firms, and 
particularly to the United Africa Company which alone had some 29,000 
tons for which they had paid more than it would eventually realise on 
the world market.30
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However, part of this loss was not just the result of a 
misjudgment about future price movements. It seems that the firms 
tried to decrease local purchase prices in expectation of future 
lower prices. At this point the previously mentioned "overdeclara­
tions" came into play. When the firms announced continuously lower 
purchase prices during the course of January and February 1937, they 
were flooded with declarations.40 Some of these declarations might 
have been genuine, but it is very likely that a substantial number of 
produce traders overdeclared their purchases. This led to a situation 
in which the firms were unable to buy cocoa at the ruling current 
price because they were outbid by their own commission buyers who 
bought cocoa at higher prices in order to fill the gap between their 
earlier actual purchases and the declared tonnage.41 In this way the 
firms’ agents sometimes paid purchase prices which in a given period 
were on average higher than they were allowed by the limits the 
firms’ headquarters had cabled to them, and thus occasionally ’...the 
average price paid locally by all the competing firms ... [had] been 
higher than the corresponding price in the American and European 
market’.4 2
It is impossible to find out whether the firms would have made 
a profit on their produce-buying operations if they had been able 
significantly to depress local prices below those paid in January and 
February 1937, or if the loss of the firms in that season was mainly 
a result of a collective misjudgment about future price movements. In 
the event they made these losses and this led the firms to look for a 
remedy for what they regarded as abuses in the trade.
The 1937 Buying Agreement
According to R.J. Southall, negotiations about a buying 
agreement between the major firms in the cocoa trade started in 
January 1937.43 Though this early attempt to conclude an agreement
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did not meet with success, it seems that it prepared the ground for 
subsequent negotiations. Thus in June 1937 the major hurdle to an 
agreement was overcome, which was the desired participation of the 
manufacturing firm of Cadbury. This was achieved by a special 
arrangement between the United Africa Company and Cadbury regarding 
its supplies44 and a special clause in the agreement that Cadbury, in 
contrast to the other participating firms, could withdraw from the 
Agreement after one year, if dissatisfied, while the other firms had 
no such facility and were legally bound to the Agreement for four 
years.46 The negotiations between the firms were so successful that 
in the end only two firms with offices in London did not sign the 
Agreement. These were the English & Scottish Co-operative Wholesale 
Society and the Syrian firm of C. Zard, both whose share in the West 
African cocoa trade was rather small, so that it did not matter too 
much to the signatories.46
Though the legally binding agreement was not signed until 10th 
November, 1937, a Letter of Instruction was sent to the local agents 
of the participating firms in Nigeria and the Gold Coast on 18 Sep­
tember 1937.47 It informed local agents that the firms had concluded 
a buying agreement, how it would work and what practical consequences 
it would have for buying operations in West Africa.
According to the Letter of Instruction, the firms agreed to 
eliminate competition by fixing the share in the crop which the 
participating firms were allowed to purchase in the forthcoming 
1937/38 season. These shares were based on the relative performance 
of the firms in the previous two seasons (1935/36 and 1936/37). Table 
four shows how they were distributed between the members of the 
’Pool’48:
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Table 4: The 1937 Agreement Buying Quotas 
(in percent)
Main Crop Light Crop
Cocoa Manufacturers Ltd. 13.50 -
Compagnie Frangaise de l’Afrique Occidentale 4.40 2.32
G.L. Gaiser 12.38 16.32
John Holt & Co. (Liverpool) Ltd. 12.05 12.39
G.B. Ollivant Ltd. 8.68 15.22
Paterson, Zochonis & Co. Ltd. 6.30 5.62
Societe Coramerciale de l’Ouest Africain 2.10 -
The United Africa Company Ltd. 34.53 44.10
Union Trading Company Ltd. 3.06 1.03
Witt & Busch 3.00 3.00
Source: Holt Papers. Mss. Afr. s825, file 535(1). Letter of 
Instruction, 18 Sept. 1937.
Thus depending on the relative size of the main crop, i.e. 
October to March purchases, and the intermediate or light crop, i.e. 
April to September purchases, the United Africa Company and the other 
subsidiary of the Unilever Group, G.B. Ollivant, accounted for about 
45% of the agreement firms’ total purchases, as the light crop 
usually came to less than one-tenth of the main crop. Its nearest 
rival, Cocoa Manufacturers, had a share of some 13%. This again 
highlights the dominant position the United Africa Company occupied 
in the Nigerian cocoa trade.4 9
These shares were ’...fixed and immutable during the continuance 
of the scheme...’,60 which ran from 1st October, 1937 to 30th 
September, 1941. It was almost impossible for individual members to 
withdraw from the Agreement before its expiry in September 1941. The 
only exception was Cocoa Manufacturers Ltd., which was allowed to 
withdraw earlier in case the firm was dissatisfied with the working 
of the Agreement. This clause had been inserted in order to overcome 
to initial reluctance of Cocoa Manufacturers Ltd. to join the Agree­
ment which could only be terminated when seven out of its ten members 
wished to do so. This, as it will be shown later, had some important 
consequences when the members of the Agreement were faced with the
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loss of European customers at the outbreak of war in 1939.
In order to keep actual purchases in line with the pre-fixed 
shares, the members of the Agreement consented to a somewhat cumbei—  
some equalisation procedure which included weekly returns to a 
committee in London and a monthly settlement of accounts during the 
cocoa buying season. One feature of this procedure was that it made 
sure that members had no interest in overbuying their share. In the 
event that firms overbought, the Agreement stipulated that they had 
to hand over their excess tonnage to the firms which had underbought, 
but would receive a price for their excess tonnage which would not 
cover their buying costs.61 This is the reason that this type of 
buying agreement was later called a ’penalty pool’.
The whole scheme was supervised by a General Committee in 
London, whose main tasks were administering the computation of 
handovers and determining the prices to be paid to traders and produ­
cers at the port of shipment. This price was usually cabled to Lagos 
once a day. It was based on either the actual market price of cocoa, 
i.e. the price at which cocoa changed hands on the sp>ot or the next 
shipment from Lagos and Accra, or on terminal market price, i.e. for 
shipments three or six months ahead. In the event that in the 
terminal markets of London and New York, cocoa was sold at con­
siderably lower or higher prices, this price determined buying prices 
in Nigeria; if, however, the differential between actual market 
prices and terminal market prices was rather narrow, the actual 
market price formed the base price. To arrive at the pxxrt of shipment 
price a schedule of marketing costs was deducted from this base. This 
schedule included Nigerian exp>ort taxes, genuine marketing costs, 
such as shipping and insurance, and a margin for profits. Local 
agents were thus only in a very limited way involved in the actual 
running of the scheme. This was quite deliberate for the agreement 
stated that: ’It is the intention to op>erate the agreement as much as
possible from Europe’.62
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The committee consisted of J.W. Knight, a director of the United 
Africa Company and J. Cadbury of Cadbury Bros. Ltd. Each of them 
nominated a representative. These were N. Edwards of Cadbury Bros. 
Ltd. and E.C. Tansley, head of the cocoa department of UAC. The 
latter was doing the day-to-day work of the scheme while Edwards 
probably had more of a controlling function.63 Thus, through buying 
to predetermined shares and fixing a standard purchase price, compe­
tition between the firms was completely removed from the cocoa trade.
The removal of competition as such did not improve the balance 
sheets of the trading firms. This could only be achieved through a 
number of specific means. How then did the firms increase their 
profit margins? Basically there were three options open to them and 
probably each was used. First, they could take a ’pessimistic* view 
about the future movement of the cocoa price in the international 
markets. Even if the person with the responsibility of determining 
the base price was ’entirely scrupulous’ and had ’absolute fairness 
of mind’,64 it seems unlikely that this person would err on the 
"right" side, from the Nigerian point of view, for any prolonged 
period and pay higher prices locally than subsequently the state of 
the world market warranted, without incurring the wrath of his 
superiors; while if he were erring on the "wrong” side and as long as 
no new entrants into the trade would appear as competitors to the 
firms, the person in charge could be sure of his superiors’ grati­
tude .
There is, however, no evidence that prices were manipulated in 
this way, partly because after the introduction of the Agreement, 
they seem to have been largely based on spot market prices and not on 
terminal market prices, probably because in the context of the 
political aftermath, it would have been extremely foolish to manipu­
late buying prices in this way.66
The second way in which the margin between the buying price in 
Nigeria and the selling price could be enlarged was to introduce a
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’generous’ marketing cost schedule. This schedule consisted of 
sixteen separate cost and profit items, like cost of ocean shipping,
headoffice expenses in London and Liverpool, the cost of borrowing
capital from the banks, as well as local costs, such as inspection 
fees and the cost, which the firms incurred in maintaining a produce 
buying network. This schedule was deducted from the ruling world 
market price to arrive at a standard ex-scale port of shipment 
purchase price. The difference between the European reference price 
(c.i.f. Hamburg) and the port of shipment price (Lagos) was fixed at 
£7 8s 7d per ton. The value of some cost items depended on the ruling 
world market price of cocoa, like, for example, the cost of financing 
the working capital which was required to move the crop. The schedule
was thus based on a north European port of shipment selling price of
£35 and for each £1 rise or fall, 16d was subtracted or added. The 
schedule also included one item which seems to represent pure profit. 
This was the item "Head Office Commission" which was fixed at 1% on 
the selling price.68 Many authors on the subject have stated that the 
schedule was far too generous, and that the profit item was only part
of the overall profits. It has been suggested that in particular the
item "cost establishment charges" of 15s per ton, which included, for 
example the cost of housing for the firms’ local representatives and 
their salaries, was fixed on the high side.67
Yet, it seems that probably all items of the 1937/38 schedule
were fixed at a premium since the schedule which the firm of John 
Holt & Co. had compiled ’for use against severe competition’68 in the 
previous season of 1936/37 had amounted to only £5 5s per ton, 
despite the fact that world market prices were much higher in that 
season.60 The difference between the 1936/37 and 1937/38 schedule 
comes to £2 2s 7d per ton. This suggests that the profits which the 
firms had made in the 1937/38 cocoa season were much larger than the 
Nowell Commission had assumed.80 It reported that in the 1937/38 
cocoa season the profit margin had come to only about 5s per ton.81
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Finally the firms agreed on a number of measures aimed at a 
reduction of buying costs. As the firms bought most of their cocoa 
from produce traders and buyers, these measures were necessarily 
designed in the first place to squeeze the profit margins of the 
intermediaries and, secondly, to a lesser extent, to reduce the 
prices cocoa farmers received.82 This was achieved by stipulating 
that commission payments should not exceed 10s per ton and that 
commissions should be deducted from the standard ex-scale buying 
price. This measure meant that the firms’ produce clerks could offer 
a higher price in local markets than the commission buyers in the 
vicinity of buying stations and that payments of overriding commis­
sion or commission payments on a sliding scale, that is, a commission 
which increased pro rata with the volume delivered, were ruled out. 
Furthermore, the signatories agreed not to offer employment to buyers 
of another member without prior consultation of that member and also 
not to act as an agent for Nigerian produce traders. The local
representatives of the firms were also instructed to eliminate 
practices such as ’forward contracts’ and the ’acceptance of declara­
tions on a fall in price of the quantity of a buyer’s or broker’s 
normal delivery capacity and at the expired price’.83 In fact, the 
firms agreed to limit a declaration on a fall in price to one-sixth 
of the buyers’ previous six-day reports,84 thus making it almost
impossible for produce traders and buyers to speculate with the 
firms’ money against the firms. Finally, the agreement contained a 
clause which disallowed the members of the Agreement to pay a premium 
for co-operative cocoa.85
Judged from its pre-history and from the text of the Agreement
alone, the firms seem to have been trying to achieve several aims at
the same time. The Agreement shifted a large part of the commercial 
risk involved in cocoa buying from the firms to their customers, i.e. 
the traders. The schedule of marketing costs and thus the margin of 
profit was increased, but not, apparently, to an excessive degree.
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Finally the agreement tried to limit the commercial opportunities of 
the Nigerian produce traders and buyers in the cocoa trade. In that 
sense one might call it a multi-purpose agreement.
The only safeguard for traders and producers was that, in case 
of blatant ’misuse’ of the Agreement, outside competitors would 
emerge in the trade. The larger the difference between the local 
purchase price and the world market price, the more attractive the 
trade would become for American and British trading firms and 
specifically to Nigerian-owned trading firms, which had not been sig­
natories to the Agreement. It seems that the firms themselves were 
quite aware that this possibility existed and that they reacted by 
adjusting their policy accordingly. From the firms’ point of view, it 
did not make sense to restrict competition for commission buyers, 
while at the same time pursuing a policy which would attract outside 
competitors to the trade. In the words of one of the directors of a 
firm which participated in the Agreement, ’There would have been no 
advantage in insuring against one form of suicide by committing an­
other ’.ee It seems, therefore, that the firms tried to increase the 
profitability of the cocoa trade only to an extent which ensured that 
no new competitors would be attracted to the trade or existing com­
petitors, such as the Nigerian produce traders, would gain the 
impression that venturing into the export market would offer con­
siderably higher reward than the internal market.
The Conflict
It is convenient to divide the course of the conflict into two 
separate periods, according to who was involved in the conflict. 
Nigeria was concerned with the discussions between September and 
November 1937 and these discussions were held largely within govern­
ment circles. Only from December 1937 did the wider public take part 
in these discussions, which, as we will see, changed the course of 
the conflict.
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The first reports about the Agreement appeared in the British 
press in early September 1937 and in journals which were widely 
available in West Africa in the second half of September 1937.87 
These reports seem to have prompted the firms to take the initiative. 
’Rather than’, wrote one of the directors of John Holt & Co. ’that 
false impressions of what the Cocoa Pool is should be gathered in
official circles, it was thought wise to take the Government com­
pletely into the confidence of the Pool’.88 This is a somewhat 
problematic statement, as neither was the government taken completely 
into confidence, nor could one argue that the action was directed 
only at informing the government about the Agreement, but it might be 
accurate insofar as the firms tried to head off the predictable
criticism of the Agreement by informing the government.89 However, 
the firms asked the Colonial Office for a meeting, held on 24th
September, 1937. At this meeting, at which J. Cadbury and F. Samuel 
represented the firms, and the Under-Secretary of State, Sir Cecil 
Bottomly, G. Clauson and C.G. Eastwood from the 00 were present, the 
firms’ representatives informed the Colonial Office in broad terms 
about the Agreement and asked the Colonial Office to advise the 
governments of the Gold Coast and Nigeria to support the Agreement by 
making information available to District Officers who would then be 
able to answer eventual questions regarding the Agreement. Although 
the officials present at the meeting were aware that the Agreement 
could give rise to difficulties in the Gold Coast and in Nigeria, 
they apparently promised their support.70 They also asked for a copy 
of the Agreement. Four days later the Colonial Office received a copy 
of the Gold Coast Letter of Instruction, though not a copy of the 
Agreement between the firms, nor the text of the Nigerian Letter of 
Instruction or the schedule of marketing costs.71
On the basis of this information the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies sent a despatch on 7th October, 1937 to the Governors of the 
Gold Coast and Nigeria, in which he outlined the Agreement (only the
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Governor of the Gold Coast received a copy of the Letter of Instruc­
tion at this time) and indicated that he favoured the scheme.72 He 
also suggested that the Governors should send a circular to District 
Officers in order to inform them about the existence and the essen­
tial features of the Agreement.
It seems that the Governor of Nigeria did not think that the 
matter needed his immediate attention as it took him more than six 
weeks to reply to the despatch. When he did so on 25th November, 
1937, Governor Bourdillon somewhat ambiguously stated his support for 
the scheme. Though he was apparently aware that the effect of the 
scheme might lead to a reduction of trader and producer incomes, he 
thought that long-term advantages would outweigh short-term disad­
vantages. 7 3 On the day he sent his reply to the Secretary of State, 
he directed the Chief Secretary to send a circular to District
Officers in order to inform them about the existence of the Agree­
ment . 7 4
This circular makes interesting reading since it shows how the 
Nigerian government perceived the Agreement and its main objectives. 
Apart from giving a broad outline about how the scheme would work, 
the Governor wrote:
To avoid aisapprehensions as to the object of the agreement the firas have stated 
that the intensive coapetition between firas had in the past led to various
practices which resulted in the reauneration of brokers and aiddleaen in excess 
of the value of the services rendered by thea. The object of the agreeaent is to 
eliainate undue coapetition and the excessive reauneration of the aiddleaen 
caused thereby and to induce healthier conditions into the aarket. There is no 
desire on their part to reduce the returns of the growers.75
Thus at the end of November 1937 the Governor of Nigeria
supported the Agreement, albeit cautiously. Two months later however, 
in January 1937, the Governor changed his mind. He then strongly 
criticised the Agreement and also the firms themselves. What ap­
parently made the Governor change his mind is the subject of the
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following section of this chapter. At the end of that section, 
Bourdillon’s new position will be reviewed in some detail.
The Nigerian Protest Movement
The movement which emerged in Nigeria in order to force the 
firms to withdraw the Agreement consisted of three different groups. 
The first group opposed the Agreement on principle. They saw it 
either as a violation of the current doctrine of ’free trade* or the 
doctrine of ‘trusteeship’ which the colonial government allegedly 
abandoned by not protecting the Nigerian traders from the machi­
nations of the ’combine’. The second group were the produce traders 
and buyers. The third group supported the protest movement, not so 
much because it was directly economically hit by the Agreement, but 
rather because of the circumstances in which the Agreement was 
introduced, i.e. the severe depression in the trade in 1938 for which 
the firms were - largely mistakenly - blamed.
In order to explain why these groups opposed the Agreement one 
has, however, not only to look at the Agreement and the Letter of 
Instruction, but also at how the Agreement worked in practice and at 
what precisely were the circumstances under which the Agreement was 
introduced.
The Agreement at Work
In as much as one can gather from the internal correspondence 
between firms’ representatives in Nigeria and between representatives 
in Nigeria and the Gold Coast, the local agents of the firms executed 
the Agreement according to plan,78 coupled with a certain amount of 
emotional satisfaction. Thus, for example, the District Agent of John 
Holt & Co. wrote to the ’Qndo Ventures’:
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Kith regard to declarations you will have trouble uith your buyer at first, so
Mill other f i n s   He have non the opportunity of educating these buyers to
get the cocoa in froa the bush day by day, get it graded and shipped __  Do not
uorry if your buying drop Mhile you are educating the buyers, it is quite likely 
that soae of the pool firas Mill not be so rigid as Me intend to be, but if so 
they Mill soon see the error of their Mays.77
The idea of the firms’ managers to ’educate’ the middlemen 
appears in retrospect to be rather odd. As has been argued at the 
beginning of this chapter, the development of the market had reached 
a point at which the position of the firms had become increasingly 
tenuous and the Agreement between the firms was ultimately an 
exercise to consolidate their position. To argue, as firms apparently 
did, that the Agreement had some ’educational’ benefits, even if it 
just meant in the sense of ’corrective’ seems to reveal a surprising 
amount of conceit.78
One of the first measures the senior representatives of the 
firms undertook seems to have been to regain control of their 
outlying buying stations. In rather drastic words79 the local 
'ventures’ were told that the main office in Lagos would not accept 
cocoa at prices higher than those cabled to them. The firms also 
stopped paying a premium for co-operative cocoa,80 reduced commission 
payments to the standard rate of 10s per ton,81 limited cash advances 
to the commission buyers’ tangible security,82 and probably also 
dismissed a number of produce buyers.83
Yet, the main thrust of the Agreement - as far as one can judge 
from the internal correspondence of one of the firms (John Holt & 
Co.) - was directed against the practice of traders and buyers to 
’over’-declare their purchases on a falling market. This subject 
almost completely dominated their correspondence, as the following 
quotation from a letter from the District Agent, Lagos to the 
District Agent, Accra, shows:
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Non the trouble here is, Ne as a pool Nant to staap out abuses __  Today Ne
refuse to accept declarations and price drops and refuse our buyers the right to 
store up cocoa against us, Naiting for a price advance before reporting it as a 
purchase. Our buyers have no legitimate kick, they are employees paid to do a 
job, i.e. buy produce and report each day Nhat they have bought at that day’s 
price. To the middlemen and free sellers me have said "Me mill buy just mhat you 
can deliver each day at that day’s ’price’", mhich means they can no longer make
’formard contracts’, ’declarations’ __  They have to take the loss if they buy
’high’ and the price drops before they can deliver it. For the first time in 
produce history they are called upon to take their oun risk in buying and 
marketing ... THEY DO NOT LIKE IT [sic].84
The implementation of the Agreement was only one of the reasons 
the protest movement in Nigeria gained comparatively widespread 
popular support. There were clearly other factors at work, including 
a severe trade depression which occurred at the same time.
Since the end of the previous season, produce prices had 
steadily declined and when, at the opening of the 1937/38 season, the 
first cocoa reached the market in October 1937, it changed hands in 
Lagos for only about half the price it had in the previous season. 
Produce prices declined even further during the season and in 
December 1937 reached a seasonal low of about £15 per ton, while just 
two months earlier over £20 per ton was paid for grade II cocoa.86 
Despite an improvement in prices during the course of January and 
February 1938, it is unlikely that many farmers could take advantage 
of this improvement since usually 60% of the crop was sold by 
December.
The decline in prices had different effects on traders, farmers 
and the firms. There are some hints that the firms themselves did not 
expect such a decline in prices. At least John Holt & Co. had, in 
expectation of higher produce prices, stocked considerable amounts of 
merchandise which they now feared could only be sold at a loss.8®
The situation for the traders was even more uncomfortable. They 
had advanced money to their sub-buyers or had already bought cocoa 
with the firms’ advances at the beginning of the season and were now 
unable to recoup their outlay. Previously part of that loss was borne
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by the firms but, owing to the implementation of the Agreement, only 
one-sixth of the previous six days’ purchases could be declared as 
having been bought at the former higher prices. Thus many traders 
were faced with a partial loss of their own trading capital in cases 
where they used their own money, or they were faced with the loss of 
the deposits they had with the firms in cases where they used the 
f i rms’ advances.8 7
The loss suffered by Nigerian traders in the 1937/38 season is 
well documented in Awolowo’s biography. After he had made substantial 
profits in the previous season, he decided not to proceed to study 
law in Britain but,
decided to stay in business until the 1937/38 cocoa season _ _ _  Hany produce
buyers including lyself speculated heavily and in very high spirits in prepara­
tion of the 1937/38 season. The forecasts for the season proved all wrong; there 
was a big slunp, and I not only lost everything but becaie also indebted to the 
fins for who* I bought produce. 88
Finally, cocoa farmers, and in particular the larger farmers, 
experienced severe difficulties. It seems that they were not only hit 
by low produce prices but by an even more severe decline in ’net
profits’ since production costs, mainly the cost of employing wage
labour, which had shown a rapid advance in the previous season, 
remained high.80 The Resident (Qndo) reported in April 1938, for 
example, that: ’A certain amount of hardship has been caused in Qndo
Division to the producer in a fairly large way of business. He finds 
himself unable to pay his labourers'. The Resident also remarked that 
in his opinion opposition to the Pool had been shown ’only by the 
large producer who is usually 50% a middleman as well’.00 Moreover, 
real incomes seem to have declined even more, owing to the fact that 
the cost of living was considerably higher in 1938 than in 1936, 
though slightly lower than in 1937.01 Lastly, there were some 
attempts in the late 1930s by Native Authorities to re-impose some 
form of income tax on cocoa farmers in Qyo Province. These taxes had
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not been collected for some time, but in the 1936/37 season the 
Ibadan Native Administration, for example, instructed cocoa farmers 
to pay Is per 100 cocoa trees in bearing. Though this levy was 
reported to have been halved in the following season, the fact that 
they collected it presented an additional loss of net income for the 
cocoa farmers.9 2
Thus in the 1937/38 season the standard of living of cocoa 
farmers greatly declined. This is demonstrated in a petition from the 
Ibadan Co-operative Cocoa Marketing Union to the Governor of Nigeria 
in February 1938:
At present he [the cocoa farier] cannot send his children to school and pay their 
fees early, ... [and] his tax ... is a burden upon hi*. The upkeep of the very 
far* which is the source of his living is very difficult.53
This, of course, is circumstantial evidence for the reasons why 
in late 1937 a movement sprang up in Nigeria which found support in 
parts of the population which hitherto had been largely outside the 
realms of ’politics’. In the absence of any other evidence to the 
contrary, however, it seems not unreasonable to conclude that the 
coincidence of the depression in the cocoa trade with the imple­
mentation of the Buying Agreement, to some extent explains why the 
latter drew so much criticism and also to some extent why the 
sectional interests of produce traders became the focus of a national 
campaign. How and by whom that campaign was conducted and how 
widespread its support was will be seen in the next part of this 
chapter.
The Campaign (Dec. 1937 - Jem. 1938)
While reports in the British press prompted the firms to take 
the initiative and inform the Government about the Agreement, the 
same press reports, and also probably some deliberate leaks from one 
of the agreement firms94, inspired leaders of public opinion in West 
Africa, including the infant nationalist press, and leaders of
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farmers’ and traders’ unions, to organise opposition against the 
implementation of the Agreement. During the course of the conflict 
this developed into more fundamental opposition to colonial govern­
ments in the Gold Coast and in Nigeria.
At this point in the narrative, it is no longer possible to 
separate developments in Nigeria from those which occurred in the 
Gold Coast as they influenced and reinforced each other. Since in 
Nigeria not much happened until early December 1937, events in the 
Gold Coast in October and November 1937 require mentioning. It is 
very likely that certain aspects of the movement which developed in 
the Gold Coast, served as a model for the movement which the leaders 
of the traders’ union and the Nigerian Youth Movement hoped to 
organise in Nigeria.96
The first articles which informed cocoa farmers about the 
existence of the Agreement and suggested, as a response, a general 
refusal to sell cocoa to the European trading firms until the 
Agreement was withdrawn, appeared in the Gold Coast press in October 
1937. At the end of that month and in the beginning of the next 
month, mass meetings were held in towns in the centre of the cocoa 
producing areas, in which the participants agreed to boycott the 
European trading firms, i.e. to not sell cocoa to the firms and not
to purchase merchandise goods which were not vital from the com­
panies’ stores. This boycott was almost completely effective from 
mid-November 1937. Despite many attempts by the firms and also by the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies9® to convince farmers and traders 
to sell cocoa to the firms, the boycott lasted almost six months,
until in April 1938 a ’truce’ was negotiated by a Royal Commission 
which the Secretary of State for the Colonies had appointed as a 
means to dissolve the crisis.97
In contrast to the Gold Coast, it took much longer in Nigeria
for a reaction to the implementation of the Agreement to emerge.
Although the Nigerian press carried a number of articles on the
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Agreement in October and November 1937, it was not until about mid- 
December that the opposition begem to marshall their forces.®8
On 11 December, the Nigerian Produce Traders’ Union wrote a 
letter to the Gold Coast Farmers’ Association in which they expressed 
their intention of visiting the Gold Coast in January 1938 and the 
hope that both organisations would co-operate in their fight against 
the agreement. Three days later the Union wrote a second letter to 
the Chief Secretary to the Government and asked for the opportunity 
to discuss the matter of trade policies of the firms with the 
Governor of Nigeria, Bourdillon.88
The Governor of Nigeria invited all the groups he thought were 
involved in the conflict to a "round table discussion" on 29th 
December, 1937. The list of people at the meeting is almost a 'who’s 
who’ of the cocoa trade in Nigeria at the time. Thus for the NPTU 
S. Akinsanya appeared as its spokesman while D.F.G. Adekunle (Abeoku- 
ta), A.O. Johnson (Ibadan), Alhaji A.R.A. Smith (Ilesha and Ife), 
T.A. Odutola (Ijebu-Ode and Epe), and A. Odunsi (Lagos) represented 
the Union’s local branches. For the agreement firms, the most senior 
agents of the United Africa Company (R.M. Williams), John Holt & Co. 
(J.F. Winter), Cocoa Manufacturers Ltd. (P.H. Soper), and the 
Compagnie Frangaise de l’Afrique Occidentale (A. Esnee) took part in 
the discussion. On the government side, apart from Governor Bour­
dillon, no less them five officials were present. These were the
Chief Secretary to the Government (J.A. Maybin) , the Financial
Secretary (H.L. Bayles), the Director of Agriculture (Captain
J.R. Mackie), the Assistant Director of Agriculture, Southern 
Provinces (Dr. G. Bryce) and the Superintending Inspector of Produce, 
Lagos, (E. McL. Watson). In addition a number of observers were 
invited. These were F.W. Jones from the Co-operative Wholesale 
Society, E.O. Moore (First Lagos Member of the Legislative Council), 
N.D. Qyerinde (Member for Qyo Division of the Legislative Council)
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and the leading journalists at the time, H. Macaulay (Lagos Daily 
News), C.A. Titcombe (Nigerian Daily Times) and N. Azikiwe (West 
African Pilot).1°0
The list of people who were invited to the meeting is almost as 
interesting as the list of people who were not invited. Thus there 
were no farmers’ representatives nor members of that class of people 
who were usually supposed to speak for farmers in the cocoa-producing 
areas, such as, for example, the Qni of Ife or the Olubadan of 
Ibadan. This is in striking contrast to the situation in the Gold 
Coast, where discussions were largely held with the representatives 
of the farmers’ union and with local Chiefs, such as Sir Nana Ofori 
Atta or the Ashanti king, the Asantehene Prempeh II.101
The meeting itself was largely unsuccessful. The firms merely 
reiterated what they had said before in public, pointing to the 
statement published in the Gold Coast press on 14th December, i.e. 
that the sole purpose of the Agreement was to eliminate ’abuses’ in 
the trade. They even tried to convince the other participants in the 
discussion that the Agreement was not a ’Pool’ and that there was ’no 
limitation of the tonnage which any firm was permitted to buy’.102 
This was - to say the least - a misrepresentation of facts, since the 
Agreements’ ’handing-over’ procedure precisely limited the tonnage 
each firm could buy.
The Governor of Nigeria seems to have confined himself to a 
number of introductory remarks in which he strongly emphasised the 
neutrality of the colonial governments in the Gold Coast and Nigeria 
and of the Colonial Office in London in the matter. He made the point 
that the Nigerian government had not been asked to approve the 
Agreement and that ’it had merely been told of something which had 
already been decided ....’108 He justified his decision to approve 
the suggestion of the firms that a Colonial Office representative 
should attend the meetings of the London Committee of the agreement
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firms by saying that in his view such a representative would not be a 
participant in the Agreement but merely an observer.
To this argument the spokesman of the NPTU, S. Akinsanya replied 
that acceptance of the firms1 suggestion would mean that the Govern­
ment gave the Agreement moral support. He then stated why the NPTU 
opposed the Agreement: it would limit the tonnage of cocoa the firms 
bought in Nigeria, and it would also limit the price farmers and 
traders would receive for the cocoa beans. He argued that the agree­
ment would create a monopoly, which would drive produce traders out 
of the market. As regards 'abuses1 he said that a buying agreement 
was not necessary to check dishonest practices of produce traders 
because the law could see to that.10 4
There was a heated exchange between S. Akinsanya and the UAC 
representative, R.M. Williams about the existence of the clause which 
permitted Cadbury Ltd. to withdraw from the Agreement earlier than 
other participants. The firms categorically denied the existence of 
this clause, while the NPTU, knowledgeable of at least part of the 
text of the Agreement, insisted that this clause was part of it, as 
indeed it was. This part of the discussion was very embarrassing to 
the firms as they felt they had been caught 'lying1. One wonders what 
the government made of this, since the NPTU was obviously better 
informed than the Nigerian government which only later - on the 20th 
January, 1938 - received a full copy of the Agreement.106
Even if the meeting on 29th December, 1937 had no practical 
results, there are some indications that the NPTU and S. Akinsanya in 
particular were very much impressed by the way in which the Governor 
had handled it. Though it is easy to overstate the argument,106
S . Akinsanya later wrote that,
... if his Excellency the Governor had failed to give the ready and Milling 
hearing Mhich he gave to the people's complaints and the sympathetic attitude 
shoMn at the meeting me had uith him on the 29th December 1937... perhaps there
mould have been greater panic in Nigeria than there mas in the Gold Coast.10T
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It looks, therefore, as if opposition to the Agreement in 
Nigeria in 1937 was rather weak and was largely upheld by produce 
traders and their organisations, the Nigerian Youth Movement and the 
Nigerian press. This changed to some extent in January 1938, when a 
delegation of the NPTU (S. Akinsanya, N.P. Fale and A.O. Johnson) 
and, most significantly, the President of the Ibadan Co-operative 
Marketing Union, A. Obisesan, visited the Gold Coast. They arrived in 
Accra to take part in the ’Joint Economic Conference by Paramount 
Chiefs of the Gold Coast, British Mandated Togoland and Nigerian 
Delegation’ on 17th January.108 At the conference the Nigerian 
delegation and its Gold Coast counterparts seem to have had some 
disagreement about the central purpose of the conference. While 
speakers like Sir Nana Ofori Atta and Kwame Ayew, both very much 
central figures in the Gold Coast anti-pool movement, mainly com­
plained about Lagosian produce traders selling cocoa despite the 
hold-up of the European trading firms, which must have been embai—  
rassing to the NPTU representatives, the Nigerian delegation stressed 
the political dimension of the meeting.10® S. Akinsanya even referred 
to the at the time largely defunct National Congress of British West 
Africa. He argued that the Congress had fought for political goals 
while now would be the time to fight for economic goals on a West 
African basis. He also expressed his profound regret about the fact 
that Nigerian traders were apparently breaking the hold-up in the 
Gold Coast.
The outcome of the second public meeting of the conference on 
the 18th January, 1938 was a resolution which reaffirmed the deter­
mination by Gold Coast and Nigerian farmers and traders to work 
together for the withdrawal of the Agreement.11° The assembly 
resolved that a ’Joint Central Board of Control’ under the direction 
of farmers’ and produce traders’ representatives should be set up in 
the Gold Coast and in Nigeria.111
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Before leaving Accra, the Nigerian delegation had a further 
number of private meetings with leaders of the Gold Coast hold-up 
movement. It also met influential Lagosian traders, probably in 
response to demands from the leaders of the Gold Cost and Ashanti 
Farmers' Union. The Nigerian delegation returned to Lagos on 19th 
January, 1938.
Three days later a reception was held in Glover Hall, Lagos, to 
welcome the delegation which according to one newspaper report was 
attended by over 3,000 people.112 The Chairman was Dr. K.A. Abayomi, 
who had just become President of the Nigerian Youth Movement after 
the death of its co-founder, J.C. Vaughan. Almost all 'officers’ of 
the Movement were present at the meeting. According to a belated 
report in the weekly journal West Africa of 5th March, 1938, the main 
speakers at the meeting were, apart from Dr. Abayomi, E. Ikoli, 
N. Azikiwe, H.O. Davies and Dr.A. Maja. The Assembly carried a 
resolution, proposed by Maja, which expressed its ’...determination 
to oppose the buying agreement by all peaceful means...’ and called 
upon 'The Imperial and Colonial Governments to seek the dissolution 
of the pool and the cancellation of the agreement.’113
At this point in the narrative it is perhaps appropriate to 
return briefly to the discussion between the Governor of Nigeria and 
the Colonial Office in London about the situation in Nigeria as 
regards the political ’fall-out’ of the Agreement, since it was 
precisely at the end of January 1938 that the Governor of Nigeria, B. 
Bourdillon, significantly revised his position towards the agreement 
and the policies of the Colonial Office.
The Immediate Political Effects of the Protest Movement
In early 1938 the Nigerian Government significantly changed its 
position towards the Agreement and this move, together with a similar 
move by the Gold Coast government, forced the Colonial Office in 
London to rethink its policies. Since this episode is well re­
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searched,114 it is sufficient to outline the causes which led to this 
development.
During January 1938 the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
tried repeatedly to convince the Governors of Nigeria and the Gold 
Coast to come out in support of the Agreement. This for various 
reasons they refused to do, not least because they feared that such 
action would endanger the position of ’neutrality’ which they were 
anxious to preserve. They argued that any action which would appear 
to take sides with the firms would do nothing to alleviate the crisis 
but would draw the government into the conflict. Criticism which had 
hitherto been directed towards the firms would then be directed 
towards the government.
They in turn suggested that the firms should publish the text of 
the Agreement as a means of defusing any misapprehension which cocoa 
farmers and traders might have. This the firms refused, arguing that 
the publication of the Agreement, and in particular the publication 
of the schedule of marketing costs, would give competitors an unfair 
advantage.116
Since the farmers and traders in the Gold Coast showed no 
inclination to resume the sale of cocoa to the firms until the 
agreement was withdrawn, a deadlock developed, which increasingly 
threatened to impair the Gold Coast economy.116 Simultaneously 
opposition towards the Agreement developed into opposition to the 
government and, on 28th January, 1938, the Gold Coast government 
suggested to the Secretary of State for the Colonies to appoint a 
Royal Commission to look into the marketing structure of West African 
cocoa.117
In Nigeria no such deadlock developed, because no hold-up 
occurred. In this aspect, the situation in Nigeria was far less grave 
than in the Gold Coast. Nevertheless it seems that the change in the 
Nigerian Government’s views ultimately convinced the Colonial Office, 
including the Secretary of State, that more was required than the
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publication of articles in the Gold Coast press to resolve the 
problem.
On 29th January, 1938 the Governor of Nigeria sent a telegram to 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies in which he categorically 
stated that he would under no circumstances advise farmers to sell 
cocoa in the event of a hold-up in Nigeria. Most significantly, he 
also wrote that he would withdraw his previous decision to agree to 
the presence of a Colonial Office representative at meetings of the 
London Committee of the agreement firms, thus signalling that he 
himself no longer believed in the benefits of the Buying Agreement to 
Nigerian farmers. The Governor of Nigeria now also demanded the 
appointment of a Royal Commission.118 Two days later, on 1st Februa­
ry, 1938, the Secretary of State gave in and his decision was offici­
ally announced in Parliament on 14th February.110
In a despatch to the Secretary of State, the Governor of Nigeria 
later explained why he had changed his mind. His main argument was 
that when he had agreed to the presence of a Colonial Office repre­
sentative on the London Committee, he had seen the problem solely 
from a Nigerian point of view. Since then, however, events in the 
Gold Coast which he had not foreseen, had not gone unnoticed in 
Nigeria. The repercussions of the events in the Gold Coast, in 
particular on the politically more aware part of the Nigerian 
population, now forced him to change his position.120 This is clearly 
a reference to the fact that - as we have seen - in early January 
1938 the protest movement in Nigeria began to broaden its base, 
involving not only produce traders, but also co-operative leaders and 
the most active political group at the time, the Nigerian Youth 
Movement.
The Campaign (Feb. - March 1938)
At the beginning of February, leaders of the Nigerian Youth 
Movement121 had another meeting with the Governor of Nigeria and a
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number of high-ranking officials. According to a report in West 
Africa. the initiative to discuss the Agreement had come from the 
Nigerian Youth Movement which wanted to convey to the government its 
demand that the Colonial Office representative should be withdrawn 
from the London Committee and that a commission of enquiry should be 
appointed. The Governor seems to have responded to these demands by 
saying that he had already advised the Colonial Office to withdraw 
its representative. He is also reported to have said that he thought 
that a commission of enquiry was hardly necessary at that moment.122
It appears that this meeting again had no practical results.
Yet, it shows that a polarisation between the government and main 
protagonists of the protest movement as had happened in the Gold 
Coast did not occur in Nigeria. This was certainly partly due to the 
relative weakness of the Nigerian protest movement, but also reflec­
ted different styles in the management of the crisis by the Governors
of the Gold Coast and Nigeria. It seems that Governor Bourdillon
engaged the leaders of the protest movement in continuous dialogue, 
with the effect that a radicalisation of the protest movement in 
Nigeria was successfully preempted.123
After the announcement of the appointment of a Royal Commission 
in mid-February 1938, the Nigerian Produce Traders’ Union and the
Nigerian Youth Movement changed their policies. While until February 
1938 the main demand of these groups was simply the withdrawal of the 
Buying Agreement, after February 1938 they became more ambitious in 
their aims.
In March 1938, S. Akinsanya (NPTU/NYM) , E. Ikoli (NYM) and 
M. Bank-Anthony (Lagos retail merchant, associated with the NYM) 
travelled through the cocoa producing areas of southern Nigeria on 
what the Nigerian Youth Movement called a ’Special Mission Tour’.124 
According to an advance notice sent to all the District Offices of 
the areas concerned, the mission intended to leave Lagos on 3rd March 
and then visit Abeokuta, Ibadan, Ilesha, Ife, Akure, Ondo, Ijebu-Ode,
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and Shagamu.126 Its official purpose was ’to study conditions in the 
Cocoa producing areas in view of appointment of Commission to enquire 
Cocoa marketing’.126
The purpose of this tour was, however, much wider than the study 
of cocoa marketing. It seems that the special mission called on local 
notables, such as D.T. Sasegbon (Agege) and the farmers’ union in 
order to get their support for the protest movement in general, and 
for the Nigerian Youth Movement in particular.127 Thus, for example, 
after their visit to Ondo the Ado-Ekiti Farmers’ Associations sub­
mitted a petition to the Resident (Ondo Division) protesting against 
the firms’ Buying Agreement,128 while after their visit to Shagamu a 
local branch of the Nigerian Youth Movement was set up.128
There were two other aims which the members of the mission hoped 
to achieve: the foundation of a ’Central Farmers’ Organisation’ and
the establishment of a ’Million Shillings Fund’.180 Though both 
undertakings seem to have come to nothing, at the time they attracted 
a certain amount of attention. Thus the Registrar of Co-operative 
Societies wrote a long letter to the Chief Secretary in which he
emphasised that he considered the establishment of a ’Central
Farmers’ Organisation’ a ’most undesirable development’. As regards 
the ’Million Shillings Fund’, he proposed that ’farmers should be 
warned not to subscribe money’ to the fund.131 Further, at least one 
of the European trading firms was quite alarmed about the ’Million 
Shillings Fund' since the purpose of such a fund was in his opinion 
to finance, in the event of a hold-up, the purchase of cocoa from 
farmers who were forced to sell cocoa for want of cash.182
The essential features of the protest movement in Nigeria in 
1937/38 were a press campaign, a trip to the Gold Coast, a number of 
meetings with the Governor, and a ’mission tour’ through the main 
cocoa-producing areas in south-western Nigeria. This does not seem to
be very much. But one is tempted to ask why the conflict in Nigeria
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had such importance, and whether the Nigerian movement was just an 
off-shoot of the movement in the Gold Coast?
In order to answer this question the differences between the 
Gold Coast movement and the Nigerian movement must be examined, which 
largely reflected differences in the economy and society. Thus, for 
example, in the Gold Coast the chiefs widely supported the protest 
movement or were even part of the movement,133 while in Nigeria such 
support was negligible.184 Moreover, due to a higher degree of 
specialisation, household incomes from the sale of cocoa were higher 
in the Gold Coast than in Nigeria. These higher incomes probably made 
it easier to embark on a more radical course in the fight against the 
Agreement, since they enabled farmers to sustain a hold-up economi­
cally.135 Conversely, the higher degree of diversification in Nigeria 
probably mitigated the impact of rapidly falling cocoa prices on 
household incomes, probably one of the reasons there was not such 
widespread dissatisfaction among cocoa farmers. Finally, there was no 
historical tradition of hold-ups in Nigeria which could have served 
as a precedent to the events of 1937/38.136 These are only examples, 
since an in-depth comparison lies outside the focus of this thesis, 
but they illuminate the argument that the Nigerian protest movement 
has to be seen in its own light and not just as an off-shoot of the 
Gold Coast movement.
The reasons the firms and the government took the Nigerian 
movement seriously was most likely because of its dynamic and 
considerable potential. To start with, the firms and the colonial 
government were completely surprised by the strength of the movement 
in Nigeria and its apparent radicalisation and politicisation during 
the course of the conflict,137 which also revealed to them that their 
knowledge of the Nigerian cocoa industry and political scene was 
rather limited.138 The firms and the government apprehensively noted 
the apparent overlap between the leadership of the Nigerian Produce 
Traders’ Union, the Nigerian Motor Transport Union and the Nigerian
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Youth Movement.138 Both feared that S. Akinsanya would be able to 
convince the members of the Motor Transport Union to come out in 
support of the Traders' Union and organise a strike like the one the 
Union had organised in early 1937.140 This, it was argued, would open 
up the possibility of some sort of ’General Strike*. Thus for example
the District Agent (Lagos) of John Holt & Co. wrote in February 1938:
I aa convinced that there will be no general cocoa hold-up in this country to 
which the faruers would acquiesce. The real danger lies in this, Akinsanya way 
call a strike of the Nigerian Transport Union and even have the following to call 
out other unions which will involve a Railway stoppage and a Custows Labour
stoppage - he will secure the support of the Nigerian Youth Kovewent which way
act as the entire Hoveaents Police (sic) and intiwidate people desirous of 
trading with firws in one way or another.141
Even if the local agent of John Holt & Co. sometimes was
inclined to overestimate the capabilities of the Nigerian Youth
Movement, he was on other occasions an astute observer of political 
developments. He repeatedly stressed the point, for example, that the 
Nigerian Youth Movement was different from previous political 
movements in Nigeria and that this fact would have unforeseeable
consequences. He argued that
... hitherto one of the weaknesses of political organisations in Nigeria has been 
the tribal and racial and religious dislike in existence and consequently
agitation of any sort has been local and easily suppressed. The introduction of 
the Nigerian Youth Hovewent has helped to eliminate all these difficulties to a
large degree _ _ _  The wovewent is helped considerably when it can find a coiwon
enewy which leaves race and tribe outside the issue and it is for this reason 
that I now say we cannot predict how far the agitation way go and how effectively 
it can organise a boycott of any kind.14*
With regard to the role of the Nigerian press, and the West 
African Pilot in particular, the District Agent wrote that
Akinsanya ... is backed by a news journal which is gaining a following because of 
its agitatory tone, which to the ignotant (sic) appears to be authoritative, the 
Nest African Pilot. Had the wovewent not got this press, the whole thing would 
have collapsed and been forgotten in Nigeria by now.143
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Behind thei all is the Editor of the Hest African Pilot - Kr Knaidi (sic)
Azikiwe, H. A., H.Sc. etc. - who was turfed out of the Gold Coast. He is another 
’Ghandi' (sic), he is giving courage to people like Akinsanya (the Nigerian Motor 
Union and the Produce Traders Union) and non has roped in the Nigerian Youth 
Hoveient which is really a powerful organisation numerically.144
This quotattion shows that contemporaries were not only aware of 
the links between produce traders, the nationalist movement and the 
press, but also how strongly the firms reacted to the appearance of 
these links.
There was also a number of other factors which probably con­
tributed to the sense of uncertainty which emerged after 1938. One 
was the participation of farmers’ associations146 and other groups in 
the conflict, which signalled that the protest movement was not 
solely a produce traders’ affair. There was at least one petition 
from an Ondo Farmers’ Representative Union,146 while other associa­
tions such as the Agege Planters’ Union and the Egba Farmers’ Asso­
ciation publicly declared their opposition to the ’Pool’.147
The Ibadan Co-operative Marketing Union, the biggest farmers’ 
association at the time, also seems to have played an active part in 
the protest movement. Not only was its president, A. Obisesan, one of 
the four official delegates who went to Accra in January 1938, but he 
also wrote a strongly-worded petition to the Governor of Nigeria. 
Though A. Obisesan was initially very reluctant to do so, since he 
would run the risk of falling out with the Registrar of Co-operative 
Societies, E.F.G. Haig who had strongly advised him against such 
action,148 demands from local farmers seem to have prevailed at last.
Obisesan argued quite convincingly that he saw no reason why 
farmers should suffer from an agreement which allegedly was designed 
to curb the activities of ’dishonest’ middlemen.140 He also expressed 
the apparently widely-held view that current low produce prices were 
a result of the amalgamation of the firms into ’combines' and
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mentions this specifically in connection with the United Africa 
Company, which he argued was able to dictate produce prices, as well 
as merchandise sales prices. Finally, he made the point that since 
wages and merchandise prices had stayed high in 1938 after their rise 
in the previous season, the real standard of living in the current 
season had declined even more than the low produce prices would 
indicate. These arguments were not taken seriously however, and the 
Ibadan Co-operative Marketing Union received only a rather patro­
nising letter from the Chief Secretary to the Government.160
Another factor was the spread of the protest movement into other 
trades, particularly into the palm produce trade. It seems that in 
early 1938 farmers and traders in the south eastern part of Nigeria 
began to organise opposition to the palm produce agreement. In March 
1938 the Resident Owerri Province reported that local farmers had 
demanded that the terms of reference of the Cocoa Commission should 
be extended to palm produce and expressed the opinion that this 
demand was ’inspired by the events in the Gold Coast’.161
The agitation for an inquiry into the palm produce trade was 
followed by a partial hold-up of produce in Warri, Benin and Ondo 
between August and November 1938162 and in December 1938 farmers in 
Owerri Province even ceased to pay taxes. Demonstrations were also 
held, since the Secretary Southern Provinces reported that at one 
point it became ’necessary to disperse an armed mob of 3,000 men’. 
Explaining the reason for the development of this protest, he wrote 
that in his view the underlying cause of these demonstrations was 
that farmers and traders opposed the system of fixed prices and 
believed that the government was in league with the firms.163 Thus in 
the palm produce industry, a similar movement to that in the cocoa 
industry was about to develop.
This protest movement seems to have lasted for a relatively 
short time and its longei— term impact was probably very limited. Its 
emergence, however, in a sense vindicated the firms’ stubbornly-pui—
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sued policy of not yielding to pressures to withdraw the agreement or 
publish its contents. There are numerous references in the internal 
correspondence of at ieast one member of the ’Pool’ to the danger of 
a further spread of the protest if the Agreement was withdrawn. For 
example the District Agent (Lagos) of John Holt & Co. urged his 
superiors in Liverpool that
The Pool iust not be broken up - if it is, attacks will be Bade on every other 
Pool and agreement until these 'red organisations* control the entire situation, 
dictating policy to merchants and Government alike, threatening trouble at every 
refusal of their t e n s __
I cannot too strongly emphasise that the Pool must not go ... it must fight on. I 
am convinced that if me lose this fight ... then it aill be the end of all Pools, 
all genuine co-operation out here; it will destroy the morale of the Europeans 
responsible for co-operation and operating Pools.154
When this letter was written (January 1938), farmers and traders 
in the palm oil industry had probably already started to organise 
opposition to the Agreement. Their protest would certainly have 
received a great boost if the firms had withdrawn the Agreement under 
the pressure from cocoa traders and farmers alone. In the conflict of 
1937/38 there was more at stake than the position of the European 
trading firms and their profits in the cocoa trade. A complete 
victory of the Nigerian cocoa traders would have created a precedent 
for other trades in which European trading firms had a similar 
position and employed the same business strategies, such as the palm 
produce, groundnut and merchandise trade. From this point of view, 
the tactics which the firms adopted were not so much stubborn 
obstinacy as a skewed calculation about the likely consequences of 
any other course of action.
In short, the significance of the Nigerian protest movement was 
not that it posed a threat to the economic interests of the European 
trading firms or a political threat to the colonial government, since 
there was no hold-up nor large-scale riots, but that the protest 
movement contained the potential for such a threat.155 The protest
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movement of 1937/38 created an atmosphere of uncertainty about the 
political consequences of the firm’s business strategies, as well as 
about the effects economic hardship would have in political terms on 
farmers in southern Nigeria. In particular the firms, and indeed the 
government, could no longer assume that opposition to their policies 
would only be sporadic and localised; they had now to reckon with a 
wide-ranging alliance of various opposition groups, whose real 
strength they were unable to fathom.166 This was arguably the most 
important effect of the crisis of 1937/38 in Nigeria and it strongly 
influenced the policies the colonial government embarked on in sub­
sequent years.
The Termination of the Conflict and its Aftermath
The Royal Commission, which the Secretary of State had appointed 
in late February 1938, arrived in Accra on 23rd March, 1938. It was 
headed by W. Nowell, a former Director of the East African Research 
Station and consisted of two further members (R.S. Thompson and 
L.M. Irving) and a Secretary (E. Melville).167
The Commission essentially had two assignments: to inquire into
the marketing of West African cocoa in order to find the causes which 
had led to the conflict in the cocoa industry; the other, more 
immediate, assignment was to negotiate a solution to the ongoing 
conflict, a task which proved to be exceedingly difficult.168
The main problem was how to overcome the deadlock, because when 
the Commission arrived in the Gold Coast, farmers and traders were 
still by and large refusing to sell cocoa to the trading firms or to 
buy merchandise goods from the firms’ retail shops, while the 
agreement firms were still determined not to yield to the demands for 
a dissolution of the ’Pool’.
The Nowell Commission became convinced, after hearing their 
first witnesses, that the hold-up would not be terminated without a 
formal undertaking by the firms to withdraw the Agreement and that
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there was no prospect that the farmers and traders would change their 
minds on this issue in the immediate future. They therefore urged the 
firms to reconsider their position and to agree to a proposal for a 
compromise by which the firms would temporarily suspend the Agreement 
in order to end the hold-up in the Gold Coast and to give the 
Commission time to make its inquiries. This proposal was flatly 
refused. Instead the firms came up with a counter— proposal. They 
would only agree to a temporary suspension of the ’Pool1 on condition 
that the ’orderly marketing’ of the 1937/38 crop would be guaranteed 
by statutory export control which would prevent the resumption of 
competitive buying between the firms in the Gold Coast.150
Though the Commission itself did not favour such a solution, 
pressure from the Colonial Office, which seems to have been inte­
rested in a speedy end to the crisis on whatever conditions, prompted 
the Commission to have informal discussions with the leaders of the 
hold-up movement, who informally gave their consent to the propo­
sal.100 Accordingly, on 13th April, 1938, the Gold Coast Legislative 
Council, after some discussion, passed a Cocoa (Control of Exporta­
tion) Ordinance. The Ordinance prohibited the export of cocoa except 
under licence until 31st October, 1938. These licences covered a 
fixed amount of cocoa in a given period, 94% of which was distributed 
between existing shippers according to their export performance in 
the previous two seasons. The remaining 6% (or 2,000 tons, whichever 
was higher) was left to the Governor for distribution at his discre­
tion to newcomers, and African shippers in particular.
The passing of this ordinance, however, did not immediately lead 
to the end of the conflict, since the firms had not yet formally 
agreed to suspend the Agreement. Negotiations so far had only been 
conducted by the United Africa Company and Cadbury Brothers Ltd. and, 
in order to make the arrangement effective, the consent of the other 
agreement firms was needed. They met on 24th April, 1938 and passed a 
resolution to that effect. Four days later, on 28th April, the Gold
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Cost government publicly announced that a ’truce’ had been concluded 
between the parties, and farmers and traders should resume selling 
cocoa to the trading firms. However, when farmers, traders and 
certain firms found out how the ’truce’ actually operated, it became 
the object of fierce criticism,181 which included a petition from 
’Twenty Paramount Chiefs’ of the Gold Coast on 13th May, 1938. In 
this petition the Chiefs deplored, among other things, that compe­
tition in the cocoa trade had become extinct.182
The obviously one-sided solution of the conflict in favour of 
the firms was also recognised by the Nowell Commission, which later 
stated in its Report that
Ke are not convinced that this [the export licence systea] was technically the 
only practicable basis of export control. It was open to the grave objection 
that, in effect, it not only continued with statutory sanction the sharing of 
purchases aaong the Agreeaent firas, which was the essential feature of the
Buying Agreeaent, but also precluded any developaent of independent coape- 
tition.163
In the negotiations over a solution to the conflict, Nigerian
interests or the Nigerian government, for obvious reasons played only
a very minor role. One effect, however, was that on the same day that
the truce was announced in the Gold Coast, the Governor of Nigeria
disclosed that he had received a declaration from the agreement
firms. It read:
In consequence of the suspension of the Gold Coast Cocoa Agreeaent froa the 28 
April till 30 Septeaber 1938 we the undersigned have decided to suspend the
Nigerian Cocoa Agreeaent for a siailar period.164
There is no direct reason which would explain why the firms made 
this declaration, but one could speculate that they felt that without
such a declaration the protest movement in Nigeria would argue that
Nigerian farmers and traders would be treated unfairly in comparison 
to the Gold Coast farmers and traders, and that a new debate about 
the Agreement would resuscitate protest in Nigeria, which at the time 
was already dying down. Moreover, one could argue that since most of
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the main cocoa crop was already marketed in February 1938, this 
declaration did not materially effect the firms’ cocoa-buying 
operations, and could in these circumstances only improve the firms’ 
public standing.ieB
The news of the suspension of the ’Pool’ was strongly welcomed 
by produce traders and farmers in Nigeria and was attributed, at 
least partly, to the activities of the Nigerian Produce Traders’ 
Union and the Nigerian Youth Movement. This, as I have argued 
earlier, greatly enhanced the Movement’s public standing and provided 
the NYM with the argument that they and not their political rivals in 
the forthcoming Lagos Town Council and Legislative Council elections, 
the Nigerian National Democratic Party, would ’truly’ represent 
Nigerian interests.
However, as far as the cocoa trade was concerned, opposition to 
the firms calmed down after the announcement of the suspension of the 
Agreement, though this was probably also due to the fact that the 
cocoa season was almost over and problems in the cocoa trade were 
attracting increasingly less attention. It appears as if the Nigerian 
Produce Traders’ Union and the Nigerian Youth Movement adjourned 
their campaign until the beginning of the next cocoa season a couple 
of months ahead. They now concentrated their efforts on organising 
their evidence to the Nowell Commission.
The Nowell Commission, its Investigation and Report
The Commission stayed in Nigeria for less than a fortnight, 
returning to London on 7th May, 1938. It collected evidence from the 
colonial government officials, representatives of agreement firms and 
from a number of farmers’ associations and traders’ organisations.166 
It also heard witnesses from the Nigerian Youth Movement, but, in 
contrast to the Gold Coast where the Commission had meetings with 
Asante and other chiefs, there was no formal session with the chiefs 
in Yorubaland.18 7
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The Nowell Commission heard evidence from traders and firms in 
Nigeria, the Gold Coast and the United Kingdom. While the traders 
maintained that the ’Pool is nothing short of a monopoly designed to 
control prices for the benefit of the interested firms and the 
disadvantage of the producers and others interested in the cocoa 
trade’168 and therefore ’oppression of the gravest kind*169, the 
firms repeated their view that the purpose of the Agreement was to 
rid the trade of ’abuses’ and bring ’sanity’ to it.170
Whatever the weight of the evidence from each side, there were 
two factors that guaranteed that the firms’ evidence, and thus their 
view, would to some extent prevail. Being an interest group of only a 
handful of firms they could, and did, effectively orchestrate their 
evidence. ’All evidence is vetted ...’ wrote, for example, one of 
the directors of John Holt & Co. to the local Agent in Lagos.171 
This co-ordination of evidence was organised by a sub-committee of 
the General Committee of the agreement firms in London,172 while in 
Nigeria and in the Gold Coast two representatives of the Committee 
oversaw the evidence which was to be submitted to the Commission.
It is difficult to measure with any precision the effect this 
orchestration of evidence had on the Commission, but together with 
the second advantage the firms had over produce traders - the fact 
that the Commission relied for much of its information on the firms 
themselves - it is possible that the firms were able at least to some 
extent to manipulate the Commission and thus the outcome of the 
investigation. There was, for example, the question if and to what 
extent the schedule of marketing costs which the firms used after the 
introduction of the Agreement, and in particular the item ’coast 
establishment charges’ in the schedule, was different from the 
schedule the firms had used in the previous season under the con­
ditions of free competition. Since the marketing schedule represented 
the difference between the world market price of cocoa and the price
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farmers and traders received in the Gold Coast and Nigeria, the 
answer to this question was crucial in the Commission’s verdict on 
the merits of the Agreement. The Commission reported that it was 
informed by the firms that
the lowest figures for establishment charges which were actively charged against 
cocoa purchases in the books of any of the firns concerned for the 1936/37 season 
were adopted for inclusion in the schedule.173
In the light of the evidence presented earlier in this chapter about 
the difference in the marketing schedule the firm of John Holt & Co. 
used in the 1936/37 season and the schedule the same firm used in the 
following season as part of the Pool, the contention by the firms 
that ’only the lowest figures* were used in the Agreement schedule, 
appears to be a deliberate misrepresentation.174
Despite the efforts of the agreement firms to influence the 
outcome of the investigation, they could not prevent the Commission 
from reaching the conclusion that a continuation of the Agreement was 
’undesirable’ and that the Agreement itself should be ’in any 
circumstances ... ultimately withdrawn’.176 The Commission considered 
the Agreement unfair to produce traders and farmers inasmuch as it 
suppressed competitive buying. Moreover, the Commission criticised 
the method of price fixing which the Agreement contained. It argued 
that, since the firms’ selling operations would influence - ’whether 
they desire to do so or not’ - the price of cocoa in the world mar­
kets, to base the fixing of the local purchase price on the world 
market price was in principle unsatisfactory. It also objected to the 
provision in the Agreement that profit margins were to be fixed by 
the firms themselves.170
However, the Commission exonerated the firms from having caused 
the conflict. Instead the Commission argued that it was primarily the 
condition of West African trade which had compelled the firms to try 
to seek redress in the formation of a buying pool, and however inap­
propriate the Agreement might have been, the blame should be squarely
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put on these conditions. The Commission accepted the firms’ con­
tention that trade had been unremunerative to them in the 1930s and 
argued that this had been caused by the firms’ intensive competition 
for tonnage and the services of produce traders and buyers, which had 
frequently increased purchase and marketing costs of cocoa in West 
Africa beyond the value the cocoa would generate on immediate sale in 
the international market.177 In short, the Commission agreed with the 
firms’ assertion that there was a need for reform of cocoa marketing 
in West Africa, but it rejected the type of reform the firms had 
tried to bring about through the implementation of the Agreement.178
The Commission also addressed the question of what type of 
reform should be undertaken. Matters, the Commission argued, could
not be left as they were, since there was a danger the firms would
|
just re-implement the Agreement, if nothing were changed in the
i
j condition which had prompted the firms to form a Pool in the first
i
i  place, and that might easily cause a new hold-up and another ’dis-
i  location of economic life’.170
t 
j
As regards the Gold Coast, the Commission recommended that all 
cocoa farmers should be organised in a statutory marketing associa­
tion, whose activities would be supervised by a Board of Directors 
consisting of farmers’ representatives, official representatives and 
one or two co-opted members. This association was supposed to sell 
cocoa on behalf of the farmers either to firms established in the 
Gold Coast, including newcomers, or directly to manufacturers through 
brokers in London and New York.18 0
It is interesting to note with respect to arguments advanced 
later, what the Commission did not recommend. The proposed scheme 
neither contained the idea that purchase prices should be fixed for a 
longer period than two or three weeks nor that the firms should 
receive fixed export quotas. There was, in particular, no proposition 
to ’break the direct link between the producers’ price and world 
market prices’,181 since the Commission recommended that the proposed
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association ’should be free ... to ship directly to world mar­
kets. 1182
However, the Commission estimated how much the proposed scheme 
would cost. It calculated that an initial capital outlay of £300,000 
would be necessary, while annual costs of the scheme would amount to 
about £250,000, which should be financed by grants or loans from the 
Government or from the Colonial Development Fund.188
With regard to Nigeria, the recommendations of the Commission 
were less far reaching, in that it considered marketing reform in 
Nigeria ’not so urgent as to require the adoption of compulsory
measures .. . .*184 Instead it proposed to expand the already existing 
co-operative cocoa marketing societies voluntarily, which should be 
supported by the government.186 The Commission also recommended a 
number of accompanying measures, such as the setting up of agri­
cultural credit schemes, the regular inspection of weights and
measures of produce traders, the licensing of produce buyers and 
buying stations and the regular publication of world market prices 
locally on noticeboards fixed to produce stores, post offices and 
administrative buildings.18®
Like the Gold Coast recommendations, the Nigerian proposals did 
not contain any clause which favoured seasonally-fixed produce prices 
or export quotas. On the contrary, the Commission said that the 
government should set up a special export agency for co-operative 
cocoa marketing societies to enable them to sell their produce
directly on the world market without any statutory restrictions as 
regards quantity or price.187
The Reception of the Report
The Report of the Commission was published simultaneously in the 
Gold Coast, Nigeria and the United Kingdom on 24th October, 1938. The 
Nigerian Government even took care to make the essential conclusions 
of the Report known to a wider audience, issuing a special number of
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the Nigerian Gazette the following day which summarised the Commis­
sion’s findings.188
The Commission’s recommendation that the firms should withdraw 
the Agreement was received in Nigeria, according to one observer, 
with a ’feeling of pleasure amongst all’.180 This satisfaction was 
apparently shared by cocoa farmers, who expected that after the 
publication of the Report, produce prices would start to rise.100
As regards the other main recommendation of the Commission, the 
voluntary expansion of co-operative marketing societies, the reac­
tions by the farmers seem to have been largely indifferent.101 This 
was certainly not the attitude of produce traders and their organi­
sations. While they naturally particularly welcomed the demand of the 
Commission for the abolition of the Pool, they seem to have equally 
! strongly resented any plans for large-scale government support for
i
co-operative marketing societies. This attitude was particularly
i
noticeable in Abeokuta where traders were said to have ’oppose[d] to 
the utmost the establishment of a cocoa export agency and buying
j through co-operative societies’.102 There were similar reports from
t
| Ilesha and Ijebu-Ode, but not from Ibadan, where the local branch of
| the NPTU had chosen not to make any comment on the recommendations of
j the Commission.103
|
The report from the Acting Resident of Ijebu Province is in this 
respect especially revealing, since it mentions some of the reasons 
behind the opposition to the recommendation to adopt a co-operative 
marketing system. The Acting Resident stated that
The local aiddleaen, although glad that the comission recomends the withdrawal 
of the Agreeaent, resent the criticisa levelled against thea as a class and would 
be very definitely hostile to any atteapt, however gradual it aay be, to dislodge 
thea froa their position in the aarketing process 1,4
The Nigerian Produce Traders ’ Union appears to have held a very 
similar view. In a memorandum, entitled ’Produce Buying Agreements’, 
the Union’s President, S. Akinsanya, at first argued, after having
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expressed his profound satisfaction with the Commission’s recommenda­
tion as regards the Buying Agreement, that it would now be up to the 
government to act upon it. He also asked the government to inves­
tigate other agreements, and in particular the Merchandise Agreement. 
Concerning the proposal to develop co-operative societies, he did not 
directly state his opposition, but pointed out that ’a simpler method 
rather than a complicated one can be adopted and peace in trade be 
restored’ and argued that
... the whole trouble at present could be rewoved if trading firws would honestly 
and truly withdraw the buying agreements effectively and leave the produce aarket 
void of unsavoury wanipulation, confine their produce trading activities to 
iiportant trading centres, such as Lagos, Abeokuta, Ibadan, Ilesha and Ijebuode 
(sic) etc. and leave the districts and producers alone -- ’19S
This quotation suggests that produce traders regarded the Buying 
Agreement not as a single incident, but rather as an element in the 
whole range of activities or policies in which the firms were seen to 
be engaged in order to limit produce traders’ commercial advance. 
This supports one of the central arguments in this thesis that the 
protest movement of 1937/38 was not a single-issue movement.
The Nigerian Youth Movement’s protest against plans to streng­
then the co-operative movement in Nigeria was probably more explicit 
than the protest from any other group. This is somewhat surprising, 
since it was likely to offend the leaders of the co-operative 
movement and A. Obisesan in particular, with whom the movement had 
previously wrorked.19 8
When giving evidence to the Committee which the Governor had 
appointed to examine the recommendations of the Commission, the 
representative of the Nigerian Youth Movement, E. Ikoli, was reported 
to have said
... that the farwer did not benefit in any way by selling through the co-opera­
tive warketing societies which ... [the Nigerian Youth Kovewent] feared were 
created with the sole object of facilitating the buying of cocoa by European 
firws and suppressing cowpetition by eliminating the African brokers.197
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The only genuine support for the recommendations of the Commis­
sion appears to have come from the Ondo Farmers’ Representative Union 
and from the Ibadan Co-operative Cocoa Marketing Union (IOCMU).108 
Interestingly the ICCMU also suggested that ’Chiefs must be educated 
to realise the benefits of the Co-operative Movement, because if the 
latter is to become an institution of the people the support of the 
natural rulers is indispensable’.190 This was probably an allusion to 
the fact that a number of Ibadan Chiefs had a strong interest in the 
cocoa trade and were thus inclined to use their position to obstruct 
the development of co-operative marketing societies.200
The reaction of the firms to the Commission’s recommendation was 
divided. Officially the firms took the position that they would 
welcome the plan to develop co-operative marketing societies on the 
basis that their development was gradual and voluntary. With respect 
to the recommendation to set up an export agency for co-operative 
cocoa, they argued that this was disadvantageous to the co-operative 
movement, since it would cost money and the firms were anyway paying 
the highest possible price!201 Unofficially, however, they opposed 
both recommendations, but chose to keep quiet about it, because they 
were anxious not to run the risk of incurring even more political 
opposition than they were already facing after having lost the 
argument about the Buying Agreement. They trusted that the opposition 
of produce traders would be sufficient to deter the government from 
implementing any major scheme, whom they would, if possible, en­
courage and support.2 ° 2
The reception of the Report in government circles ranged from 
half-hearted acceptance to outright hostility. The Nigerian govern­
ment , though agreeing in principle to the main recommendations of the 
Nowell Commission, seems to have been most concerned about the speed 
with which these recommendations should be implemented. Regarding, 
for example, the recommendation to develop co-operative societies, 
the Governor, as well as the Director of Agriculture and the Regi­
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strar of Co-operative Societies, argued strongly that such a develop­
ment should be gradual, voluntary and, above all, not too rapid.203
The reception of the Report in the Colonial Office was even less 
positive. Apart from a general belief that most of the Coiranission* s 
recommendations were ’impractical*,204 in particular the proposals to 
organise farmers in the Gold Coast into a marketing co-operative on a 
statutory basis and to set up an export agency for co-operative cocoa 
marketing societies in Nigeria, there was apparently no political 
will to provide the necessary finance for the schemes.206 Moreover,
there were grave doubts as to whether co-operative principles would 
offer a solution to the problems of the West African cocoa industry. 
As regards the Commission’s idea that co-operative marketing so­
cieties could help to relieve the indebtedness of farmers, one
official in a rare display of frankness minuted
... in the conditions which exist in wost of the backward colonies, where the 
native inhabitants by instinct and breeding are incapable of drawing the distinc­
tion between wine and thine and were in a long tradition of indebtedness, it has 
been found to be iwpossible to provide credit ... with any success.208
This might not be representative, but since the official who wrote 
this minute (E. Melville) later played an important role in the 
administration of the wai— time cocoa control schemes and in the 
framing of the post-war marketing policy, his manifest attitude
towards Africans in general and his view about their ability to 
organise themselves in particular have a wider significance.
Given the hostile reception to the recommendations of the Nowell 
Commission, there was very little prospect in 1938 that these
recommendations would ever be realised. This argument is also 
supported by a number of press articles which appeared at the time. 
Thus, for example, a letter was published in West Africa, in which 
the author (’A Trader’) stated, with obvious satisfaction, that ’it 
is [now] confidently asserted that the report is as dead as the 
proverbial mutton’.207
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This was not, however, the end of the Nowell Report, since in 
both the Gold Coast and Nigeria local committees were appointed 
specifically to examine the recommendations of the Commission, which 
will be reviewed briefly in the next section of this chapter.
The Kelly Committee
The appointment of the Kelly Committee in March 1939 was largely 
a consequence of the previous appointment of a similar committee in 
December 1938 in the Gold Coast, where the government had thought it 
advisable to regain the initiative after the publication of the 
Report of the Nowell Commission.208 The Nigerian government saw the 
situation differently, and it was only after it received a letter 
from the Secretary of State for the Colonies in February 1939 in 
which he suggested the appointment of such a commission that the 
government decided to follow the Gold Coast example.209
Initially, the Nigerian Committee consisted of only three 
governmental members, the Resident (Qyo Province) E.J.G. Kelly, the 
Director of Agriculture J.R. Mackie and the local Senior Manager of 
the Bank of British West Africa D.D. Gibb. Their appointment was 
officially announced in a Legislative Council meeting on 15th March, 
1939.210 Contrary to the government’s expectation, these appointments 
were not well received by the African members of the Legislative 
Council. Three days after the announcement 0. Alakija, who had been a 
member of the Legislative Council since 1933 and had been re-elected 
to the Council in 1938 as a candidate for the Nigerian Youth Move­
ment, saw the Chief Secretary in order to express the Movement’s 
dissatisfaction with the composition of the Committee, because it 
would not include any African representatives. He also suggested that
S. Akinsanya should be appointed as a full Committee member.211 The 
latter demand was refused, and instead the government appointed the 
barrister E.O. Moore to the Committee. The Nigerian Youth Movement 
considered this solution inadequate and made further representations
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to the government, pointing out that E.O. Moore had very little 
understanding of business matters and of the cocoa industry in 
particular,212 though it was probably also the fact that E.O. Moore 
was a prominent member of the Nigerian National Democratic Party and, 
moreover, known for his conservative views which prompted the 
Nigerian Youth Movement to oppose his appointment. However, in a 
meeting with the Governor, the representatives of the Movement,
H.S.A. Thomas, S. Akinsanya and E. Ikoli, came up with the proposal 
to appoint in addition to E.O. Moore the Chairman of the Agege 
Farmers’ Union and ’prominent cocoa farmer’, D.T. Sasegbon.218 The 
Governor agreed to this demand and thus finally in April 1939 the 
Committee could begin its work.214
The dispute about the composition of the Committee would be 
insignificant were it not for the fact that its outcome was regarded 
as a political victory for the Nigerian Youth Movement. The episode 
reveals how the Nigerian Government responded to demands from the 
nationalists. This was also noticed by a number of Nigerian newspa­
pers, one of which, for example, wrote that
These new appointments to supplement the original unpopular personnel are proofs 
positive that the Nigerian government is amenable to public opinion in the true 
spirit of democracy.215
This episode indicates that there was a slight shift in government 
policy or attitude in 1938/39. The Nigerian government began to take 
the nationalist movement seriously, at least inasmuch as economic 
policy was concerned, and this was arguably the result of both the 
campaign of 1937/38 and the success of the Nigerian Youth Movement in 
the 1938 Legislative Council elections.
The task of the Kelly Committee was to find out what ’action 
should be taken to give effect to such of the Commission’s proposals 
as appear to be practical and advisable’.218 During its inves­
tigations, the Committee thus heard a substantial number of wit­
nesses, including colonial officials, representatives from the
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trading firms and from farmers’ associations, and delegates from the 
Nigerian Youth Movement and from the Nigerian Produce Traders’ 
Union.217 The evidence which the Committee collected, however, was 
not very different from the public statement which the various groups 
had made after the publication of the Nowell Report, and need not, 
therefore, be examined here in detail.
The Kelly Committee finished its work on 30th May, 1939 and 
largely endorsed the recommendations of the Nowell Commission. Yet, 
at the same time it had strong reservations about the extent and the 
speed with which these recommendations should be implemented. While 
the Nowell Commission had recommended the wholesale adoption of a 
co-operating marketing system, the Committee doubted that a rapid 
development of co-operatives would be possible and that co-operative 
marketing societies would ’ever handle the bulk of the cocoa 
crop’.218 They concluded that the development of the co-operatives 
was desirable, but it should be gradual and strictly voluntary, and 
for this reason produce traders and buyers would have to perform a 
useful role in the marketing of cocoa for many years to come. In 
practical terms, the Committee suggested the establishment of a 
separate Co-operative Department since the administrative officers 
hitherto concerned with co-operative matters, such as the Registrar 
of Co-operative Societies, had been part of the Chief Secretary’s 
office. The Committee also recommended that the staff of this new 
department should be enlarged.
With respect to the recommendation to set up an export agency, 
the Committee took the view that such an agency would be expensive 
and cumbersome to administer, and that there was insufficient need 
for such an agency. Instead, the Committee proposed that the govern­
ment should employ a special Marketing Officer, whose duties would be 
to advise co-operative societies and African traders over direct 
export possibilities. In addition, the Marketing Officer would be 
charged with the task of distributing information about marketing
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costs, produce prices and market prospects for cocoa and other 
crops.210
There was one recommendation of the Kelly Committee which went 
further than the corresponding recommendation of the Nowell Commis­
sion. While the latter had suggested that the government should 
generally support credit and thrift societies, the Committee came to 
the conclusion that a Co-operative Bank was needed, which under the 
direction of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies should provide 
loans to farmers in order to alleviate their inter-harvest cash flow 
problems and relieve them of indebtedness.220 The Committee also 
strongly supported the recommendation of the Nowell Commission that 
the government should spend more money on research and suggested in 
this respect that a detailed land survey of cocoa—producing areas 
should receive highest priority. These were the four recommendations 
of the Committee which, if realised, would have involved increased 
government expenditure. In addition, the Committee produced a list of 
recommendations which would have only required new legislation, such 
as statutory control of weights and measures, the licensing of 
produce traders and buying stations, and the compulsory display of 
prices outside produce stores.221
The Nigerian government strongly endorsed the recommendations of 
the Kelly Committee in principle,222 but when it came to the point of 
transferring recommendations into reality, the initial support faded 
away. Thus, none of the legislative actions which the Committee had 
proposed were actually undertaken, and as regards the other recom­
mendations, there was no political will to overcome the perennial 
argument of colonial Finance Secretaries that there was no money 
available for such projects.228
The Nigerian Government instead asked the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies for permission to apply for a grant of some £44,000 from 
the Colonial Development Fund.224 Almost a month later, on 23rd 
August, 1939, the Nigerian government received an answer from the
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Secretary of State, in which he explained that it was not possible to 
make a decision on the matter since he had not yet consulted the 
trading firms on the Committee’s Report, but expressed his hope that 
a decision would soon be made, probably in early October 1939.226
The outbreak of war in September 1939 necessarily changed the 
situation and caused some further delay. In December 1939 the Secre­
tary of State gave his consent to the recommendation to employ a 
Marketing Officer, whose responsibilities were enlarged to assist in 
the development of Nigeria’s self-sufficiency in essential food­
stuffs, which at the time was one of the major policies the Nigerian 
government had been advised to pursue by the United Kingdom govern­
ment in order to support the British war effort.22®
Concerning the other central recommendation of the Committee to 
further the development of co-operative marketing societies and to 
establish a Co-operative Bank, the Secretary of State seven months 
later came to the conclusion that under the prevailing circumstances 
no positive decision could be made. In a letter to the Governor of 
Nigeria of 31st July, 1940, he argued that:
Expenditure of Imperial funds on Colonial Development can now only be justified 
on projects of first importance and urgency, and I feel sure that you mill agree 
mith me that in the present circumstances in the cocoa trade in Nigeria financial 
assistance for the co-operative movement cannot be regarded as coming into that 
category.227
The phrase ’present circumstances in the cocoa trade in Nigeria’ 
was probably an allusion to the fact that the United Kingdom govern­
ment had to provide some extra money to make good the losses which 
the government cocoa control scheme had incurred in its first year of 
operation, 2 2 8 and the argument was perhaps that it was in these 
circumstances too much to ask the United Kingdom government for 
further assistance. At least this was the position of an Assistant 
Secretary in the Colonial Office, E. Melville, who maintained in a 
Minute that
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The cocoa industry in Nigeria is now a definite liability to His Majesty's 
Government and the policy henceforth must be to arrange the purchase and sale of 
Nigerian crops with least possible loss to His Majesty’s Government. In deter­
mining 'least possible loss' one must, of course, bear in mind the political 
importance of maintaining a certain level of cash income to cocoa producers, but 
the present is clearly not the time to expand the organisation of the cocoa 
industry in such a may as to increase rather than diminish the expense of 
handling the crop.***
Thus the outbreak of war seems largely to have wrecked, for the 
time being, the plans to achieve even the few reforms the Kelly 
Committee had proposed: all that was obtained was the appointment of 
a Marketing Officer and even his time was not completely devoted to 
the co-operative societies or African exporters and was instead taken 
up by other matters, such as the marketing of foodstuffs and dis­
tribution of imported goods.280
In this respect one cannot but conclude that the protest 
movement of 1937/38 and the ensuing investigation of the Nowell 
Commission and the Kelly Committee were largely unsuccessful and had 
almost no immediate practical consequences.281 As I have argued 
earlier, this does not, however, mean that the protest of 1937/38 had 
no political consequences, one of which will be discussed in the next 
chapter.
There remains the question whether the protest movement of 
1937/38 and the Nowell Commission were successful in compelling the 
trading firms to completely abandon the 1937 Buying Agreement. The 
firms had declared publicly in April 1938 that they would merely 
suspend the Buying Agreement until 30th September, 1938. Hence the 
last section of this chapter will address the question of what was 
most likely to be the policy of the firms in the 1938/39 cocoa 
season.
’Unofficial* Arrangements between the European Trading Firms
On the 1st September, 1938 Colonial Office officials and 
representatives of the trading firms met to discuss future marketing
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arrangements.232 The background to these discussions was that the 
Nowell Commission Report was not ready for publication before the 
beginning of the 1938/39 cocoa season. The question was therefore how 
cocoa should be marketed in the forthcoming season. The Governor of 
the Gold Coast had urged the Secretary of State for the Colonies not 
to agree to the continuation of export legislation on the grounds 
that such a policy would probably provoke political turmoil in the 
Gold Coast, while the Governor of Nigeria had emphatically argued for 
a continuation of the suspension of the Agreement. 2 3 8 The purpose of 
the meeting with the firms on the 1st September, 1938 was to ascer­
tain how they approached the question.
In the discussion, one of the Directors of the United Africa 
Company, F. Samuel, told officials that a clandestine arrangement 
between the firms had been in operation for several months and that 
the firms would under no circumstances return to the condition of 
free competition. However, he asked
whether it would help if the agreement continued in force but the overt signs of 
it were rewoved; for instance the share out of cocoa could take place on this 
side rather than in Africa and even, if necessary, the firws could arrange that 
the prices offered by the representatives of the various firws in Africa should 
nor always be identical. They could give all the appearance of competition... al­
though they were not prepared to give the agreement up altogether, they were 
quite prepared to camouflage it in any way.234
In the subsequent discussion on this proposal
...it was suggested that it would help a good deal if the offending legal 
document could be removed even though there were some temporary arrangement 
between the firms, provided that the natives were not given any grounds for 
thinking that they had been in any way deceived.235
The outcome of the discussion was that the firms agreed that the 
1937 Buying Agreement should be further suspended until the firms had 
time to consider the Nowell Commission Report and that in the 
meantime the firms would co-operate with each other in the purchase 
of the West African cocoa crop. The Colonial Office was also told by
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the firms that ’in the event of the Agreement becoming again opera­
tive, its provisions shall be retroactive as from 30th September, 
1938.’286 Consequently, local agents of one of the participating 
firms (John Holt & Co. ) was told in mid-September 1938 that ’Your 
policy should ... be to organise as though there were a Pool . . . . *237 
The Nowell Commission Report was published on the 24th October, 
1938, and in retrospect one should have expected a declaration of the 
firms some time later about their intentions as regards the Buying 
Agreement. Yet, there was no such declaration and the question 
remains what the most likely policy of the trading firms after the 
publication of the Nowell Commission Report was.
There are a number of reports from Nigeria, including one from 
the Nigerian Produce Traders’ Union, which allege that the firms were 
operating an arrangement of one sort or another at the end of 1938, 
but apparently the mere suspicion that the firms were operating a 
pool was not enough to prompt either the government or the produce 
traders to formally protest against ’unofficial’ arrangements or to 
campaign for the realisation of the Nowell Commission’s recommenda­
tion to withdraw the Buying Agreement.238
Yet, there is indeed some evidence from the firms’ internal cor­
respondence that suggests that at least a clandestine arrangement was
in force in 1938/39. Thus, for example, the District Agent (Accra) of
John Holt & Co. was informed by his principals
that there is a substantial measure of co-operation in cocoa and, that, though 
the Pool Arrangement is suspended it is, in fact, suspended so far as the Coast 
alone is concerned. For your strictly private information ... Members ex­
perimented last season with a modified form of co-operation. Each Member under­
took to control, by means of limits, his buying to share and there was a frequent 
and regular exchange of information as to everybody’s limits, buying, and the
coast of his cocoa _  It was an experiment to see if a Pool could be operated
entirely at this end, under which each firm on the cost had a very large measure
of liberty of action and under which there was a semblance of competition in 
Africa so as not to exacerbate local feeling. It was an astonishingly successful 
experiment 239
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From the above it is evident that in the 1938/39 cocoa season, 
a ’modified form of co-operation’ existed between the firms. It is, 
however, less clear what was meant by ’co-operation’. There are only 
two possibilities: either the firms had continued to suspend the 1937 
Buying Agreement and instead co-operated with each other as if they 
had not suspended the Agreement2 40 or they had re-introduced the 
Buying Agreement and were operating it clandestinely from the London 
end. If the latter is true, the firms would have accomplished the 
remarkable feat of deceiving not only colonial governments, farmers 
and produce traders, but also their own local agents in West Africa.
There is some incidental evidence which suggests that the firms 
had indeed chosen the latter course, i.e. that there existed a 
legally binding document, in which the firms committed themselves 
only to purchase a predetermined share of the seasonal cocoa crop. 
The difference between ’co-operation’ and a full agreement is that 
participants in an agreement could be charged with a breach of the 
agreement in the courts, which provided the necessary cohesion to the 
Pool, while in the case of an 'unofficial arrangement’, such action 
was not open to aggrieved parties.
The first piece of evidence is a letter from John Holt to the 
Directors of the United Africa Company from May 1938 in which he
agreed to a suggestion to extend the ’Cadbury-Clause ’ in the 1937
Agreement for another year.241 The original clause had allowed
Cadbury to quit the Pool, if the firm wished to do so on 30th
September, 1938. The option to terminate the 1937 Agreement was now 
extended to 30th September, 1939.
The second piece of evidence is the way the firms reacted to the 
introduction of statutory control in November 1939. Local agents of 
John Holt & Co. were informed that statutory control would not alter 
existing arrangements. ’In practice’, they were told, ’at all events, 
the cocoa agreement will remain ....’242
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Lastly, there are the minutes of a meeting of the British and 
French firms which signed the 1937 Buying Agreement, held in Liver­
pool in July 1944:
The Chairaan [F. Saiuel] said that the purchasing, shipping and disposal of all 
Nigerian Cocoa had been assuaed by the Ministry of Food in 1939 and subsequently 
by the Nest African Produce Control Board, and that consequently it aas desired 
to record that the Agreeaent for the dividing of cocoa purchased in Nigeria, 
including all the Cocoa noraally shipped through Calabar eaanating froa the 
British Mandated Territory of the Caaeroons, by all the signatories to the 
Agreeaent dated 10th Noveaber 1937 terainated on the date in 1939 on ahich the 
Ministry of Food assuaed control. The Chairaan’s proposal was duly seconded and 
carried unaniaously.243
Leaving the question aside for the time being why the firms 
desired to record this motion in July 1944,244 this document indi­
cates that at least in the early part of the 1939/40 cocoa season the
1937 Agreement was in force, since it makes no sense to convene a 
special meting in 1944 in order to carry a motion that in retrospect 
the 1937 Agreement terminated in November 1939, if it was not in 
operation at the time.
Taking all the evidence together, the most likely course of 
events is that the firms revived the 1937 Agreement in the autumn of
1938 and that they kept this fact secret from the public and even 
from their own buying agents in West Africa. This policy seemed to 
have worked quite well until the outbreak of the Second World War, 
which necessitated a change in that policy.
As regards the question to what extent the protest movement of 
1937/38 and the ensuing investigations of the Nowell Commission and 
the Kelly Committee had any concrete effect, the answer must be that 
in the short term it was marginal and of little consequence. Poli­
tically, however, the effect of the 1937/38 protest movement was far 
greater. It contributed, as we have seen, to the development of a 
distinct nationalist programme or ’ideology*. This development seems 
also to have been noticed by the Nigerian government which reacted to 
it, though in a very small way, by trying to accommodate some demands
184
from nationalist leaders. The main conflict between the firms and the 
African traders, however, remained unsolved for the time being.
The account of the pre-history of the introduction of statutory 
marketing in Nigeria so far largely is a history of the conflict 
between Nigerian produce traders and buyers and the European trading 
firms. Government necessarily did not loom large in this account 
since it did not intervene directly into the marketing process, at 
least as far as Nigeria was concerned, and was only involved in the 
conflict to the extent that it had to cope with its political 
fall-out. However, the role of government changed dramatically with 
the introduction of statutory control in 1939. Thus in the succeeding 
chapters of this thesis, much more attention will be paid to govern­
ment policy and its motives.
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Chapter 5
The Introduction of Statutory Cocoa Marketing
The introduction of produce control was part of the much wider 
transformation which the Nigerian economy experienced during the 
Second World War.1 However, since this transformation lies outside 
the focus of this study, many aspects of it will only receive a 
passing reference, though many of them merit studies of their own. 2 
This chapter is divided into four parts. First, the arguments 
which the European trading firms, the Ministry of Food and the 
Colonial Office made in favour of a government purchase scheme will 
be reviewed. The role of the trading firms in the negotiations about 
the basic structure of the scheme and its finer details will be 
discussed at some length. In the last section the effects of the 
introduction of statutory marketing and the politics of produce 
control in Nigeria and Britain in the 1939/40 season will be de­
scribed in some detail.
The Arguments in Favour of Control
In reviewing the reasons why statutory control was introduced 
in the first months of the Second World War the interests of the 
European trading firms must be distinguished from those of the 
Nigerian and British government.
Both the European trading firms and the United Kingdom govern­
ment faced to some extent the same problem. Apart from the actual 
hostilities which the outbreak of war eventually caused, the declara­
tion of war between Germany and Britain meant that economic relations 
between the two powers were severed. Since Germany was a large 
importer of goods and raw materials which Britain and its Colonies 
produced, the outbreak of war caused considerable dislocation in 
economic life. The cocoa trade, and thus Nigeria and the Gold Coast, 
were particularly badly hit, since both countries supplied about half
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of the world’s cocoa in the 1930s, while at the same time the German 
market consumed about one-fifth of the world’s supply, a large part 
of which came fi’om West Africa.3
The Firms* Point of View
The firms had not made any contingency plans for that event, so 
that when war broke out the sudden loss of the entire German market 
created dire problems. As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, 
the firms customarily bought substantial quantities of cocoa for 
which they had no immediate buyer. They usually also bought the 
entire West African cocoa crop. Since a large chunk of the market now 
became inaccessible, this policy entailed the danger of buying more 
cocoa than the firms would be able to sell and would have involved 
the likely risk of suffering substantial losses, which the firms were 
naturally reluctant to assume.4 From this perspective, it is undei—  
standable that the firms’ first reaction to the outbreak of war was 
to slow down their cocoa purchases in West Africa.6
The alternative was to buy only part of the crop and leave the 
rest in the hands of producers and indigenous traders. But this 
strategy was also fraught with risks. In the event, an oversupply of 
cocoa would drive local prices down. Though the cocoa trade itself 
might have been extremely profitable to the firms, since the margin 
between local purchase prices and selling prices would widen, a 
decline in local prices would reduce purchasing power and this would 
hit the merchandise trade, especially since a large amount of 
merchandise had already been shipped to the Gold Coast and Nigeria in 
anticipation of the approaching cocoa season.®
Finally, there was the problem of the 1937 Buying Agreement. By 
signing the Agreement the firms had committed themselves to buy not 
more nor less them a fixed percentage of the pool’s overall pui— 
chases. In 1939 the larger firms, and in particular the United Africa 
Company, were forced by the Agreement to take on more cocoa than they
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thought they were able to sell. In a letter to the senior local 
agents of the firm, one manager of John Holt & Co. (D.L. Rawlings) 
describes the situation as follows:
To give you an indication as to hou serious the situation Mas, it Mas until 
recently, quite problematical uhether the Imperial Treasury Mould approve of this 
Government transaction [i.e. the cocoa control scheme]. The U.A.C. mere so 
alarmed at the prospect before the cocoa trade that they told the pool that, 
unless the Government Control scheme Mere launched quickly they, the U. A.C.,
Mould have to move the abandonment of the cocoa agreement because they could not 
face the liability of having to buy their pool share of cocoa at their omn risk.
He had arrived at the extraordinary position mhere the biggest shareholder in the 
cocoa pool Mas gravely disquieted because his pool share Mas too big.7
Given these prospects, it is not surprising that the United 
Africa Company was the first to approach the Colonial Office and 
suggest that government should purchase the entire West African cocoa 
crop, and relieve the firms from commercial risks relating to cocoa 
marketing which the war was likely to cause.®
It can be argued that it was a letter of 8th September, 1939
from A.R.I. Mellor, a member of the Board of Directors of the United 
Africa Company, to G.L.M. Clauson, the Head of the Economic Depart­
ment of the Colonial Office at the time, which started the discussion 
about the government assuming control of the cocoa trade. The memo­
randum attached to that letter raised for the first time the idea 
that it would be in the interest of government to purchase the entire
West African cocoa crop. It also included several arguments as to why
government should do so, many of which later became the official 
government position.9 They will be discussed later in this chapter.
When government finally decided to assume control of cocoa in 
November 1939, this news was enthusiastically welcomed by the firms. 
One Director of John Holt & Co. wrote that ’The hope... has... now 
been fulfilled’10, while the weekly journal West Africa, usually very 
well informed on the opinion of the firms, though not always taking 
their side, ran headlines like ’West African Cocoa Crop Purchased by 
British Government: Great Benefit to Producers and Merchants’.11
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It is not suggested here that the decision by the government to 
purchase the West African cocoa crop in 1939 was just a response to 
the demands made by West African merchants. It is, however, sig­
nificant that the decision was in accord with the short-term inte­
rests of the firms, for whom the scheme seems to have presented 
almost the only way to avert serious losses.
The Government Point of View
The Colonial Office expected that two factors would cause a 
dramatic fall in cocoa purchase prices in West Africa. One was the 
loss of the German market, so that cocoa production in West Africa 
would far exceed the demand from mainly British and American manufac­
turers. The other was the limitation of shipping facilities which the 
war was likely to impose on West African trade. As regards the 
latter, the Colonial Office believed that a repetition of the World 
War One experience was imminent. 12 When the lack of shipping had 
created a bottleneck, British manufacturers had strongly competed for 
the limited supply which was available so that part of the West 
African crop had rotted away in warehouses and on cocoa trees. The 
huge margin which consequently developed between the Lagos price and 
the Liverpool price of cocoa had assured some of the firms’ exces­
sively high profits.13 At the same time, the low purchase price of 
cocoa and other export crops like palm produce, together with a 
general shortage of imported consumer goods, had created considerable 
political difficulties for the Nigerian government.14
It was thus thought that if nothing was done political discon­
tent would re-emerge, especially since, as the Colonial Office argued
...in recent years the question of what is a fair price for cocoa has become the 
subject of bitter controversy, culminating in a wide-spread hold-up of the Gold
Coast cocoa crop during the 1937/38 cocoa season A slump in cocoa would
produce serious discontent and might even lead to an outbreak of trouble which is 
of course essential to avoid at a time like this.15
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Moreover, low produce prices would reduce government revenue 
from customs receipts, which again would have serious political 
consequences. The revenue derived from cocoa exports in Nigeria was 
estimated to be about £900,00018 and the Nigerian government could 
not afford to lose even part of this sum without being subsequently 
forced to make cuts in vital services.17 Nigeria had at the time 
almost no reserves and its administration was run on a shoe-string 
budget. Thus if government revenue was reduced through the loss of 
customs revenue, the Governor would be forced to increase taxation, 
which was seen, in combination with substantially reduced incomes 
caused by a fall in produce prices for the lack of customers or the 
lack of shipping, as a recipe for political turmoil. Thus the British 
government had to step in and it was even argued that from the 
standpoint of the British taxpayer, there was not much difference 
between bailing out the Nigerian cocoa producer or bailing out the 
Nigerian government, since in both cases the Treasury had to foot the 
bill. 18
Furthermore, it was argued that the establishment of a control 
scheme would be commercially advantageous to the United Kingdom. If 
government fixed purchase prices in West Africa at a higher level 
than they were expected to fall, neutral countries - in particular 
the United States - would have to pay these higher prices for their 
cocoa imports. Thus foreign exchange earnings would increase, if the 
same volume of sales was maintained. Since the United Kingdom and the 
countries whose trade was conducted in Sterling were likely to have a 
substantial balance of payments deficit during the war with those 
countries which conducted their trade in Dollars, this argument held 
some weight.19
The establishment of a comprehensive system of price control 
was relatively easy to achieve. All that was needed was to fix a 
maximum price for colonial imports in the United Kingdom and prohibit 
the export of such goods to other destinations. Local prices would
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then also be fixed, since the trading firms would only be allowed to 
subtract their normal purchase costs from the United Kingdom price to 
arrive at the port of shipment price in West Africa.20
Such a system was, for example, in operation for the palm 
produce trade. But it was not considered to be satisfactory for cocoa 
where fixed local export prices would not guarantee that the whole 
crop would be purchased. A large part of the crop was usually sold to 
neutral countries and to the United States in particular, on whose 
purchase prices the British government at least at this stage of the 
war had no influence. It was therefore argued,
The apparent danger of a limited control...is that if the local pegged price were 
too high there would be no inducement for shippers to purchase cocoa for the 
United States market and producers mould be left to discontinue producing or to 
carry large stocks. If on the other hand the Kern York price remained above the 
parity of the United Kingdom pegged price, shippers mould obtain the full benefit 
of the Dollar premium.21
This argument has to be evaluated against the background of the 
most likely evolution of prices in the United Kingdom and in the 
United States. The premium which trading firms obtained in the U.S. 
market at the time22 was likely to increase and become permanent, 
since the British government was determined to keep prices down in 
the United Kingdom, not least because it wanted to encourage cocoa 
consumption and to protect British consumers from high price rises. 
’The fixed price’ the Governor of Nigeria was informed, ’could 
clearly not be so high as that current in New York. ’28
If, however, the United Kingdom price remained permanently 
below the New York price, trading firms with U.S. customers would 
obtain excessively large profits. Such profits, it was argued, 
belonged to the government and not to the trading firms, for they 
were not the result of the commercial acumen of the trading firms but 
of government pricing policy. Consequently a more elaborate system of 
control, as, for example, in the case of palm produce, was necessary.
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The Colonial Office therefore proposed that government should 
purchase the entire West African cocoa crop and employ the trading 
firms as its agents. In that capacity the firms would only receive a 
commission and would have to surrender all eventual trading profits 
to the government.2 4 Such a system would also ensure that no cocoa 
would remain unsold in West Africa, which in effect meant that 
government, instead of the trading firms, would shoulder the commer­
cial risks of the West African cocoa trade during the war.
It could be argued that the question of who was rightfully 
entitled to the war-time profits in the U.S. market was only a minor 
aspect in the discussions about the control scheme. But it seems that 
the argument held some weight. There was, for example, the case of 
the American firm Rockwood & Co. which had come to Nigeria at the 
’unofficial’ invitation of the government in 1938 to purchase cocoa 
on behalf of American manufacturers and the Hershey Corporation in 
particular.25 Rockwood was about to start buying cocoa in October 
1939 when its export licenses, which the firm had received in the 
previous month, were revoked. This decision was probably welcomed by 
the European firms which dominated the Nigerian market at the time 
and who saw in Rockwood an unwelcome competitor. However, the 
decision to revoke these licenses seems not to have been a result of 
lobbying by the trading firms, but was taken because the Colonial 
Office feared that Rockwood would pay higher prices in Nigeria than 
it was thought desirable and still secure a large part of the New 
York premium.28 This argument is supported by further evidence. There 
was a long discussion in a later state of the war about the question 
of whether the cocoa control scheme should be extended to other 
crops, such as palm kernels. In 1941 British trading firms began to 
export palm kernels to the United States, where much higher prices 
were paid than in the United Kingdom. Again, the argument about 
’unjust profits’ emerged and consequently produce control was
extended to include palm kernels.27
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The argument about "unjust profits" also raised the question as 
to who was ultimately entitled to them. The Colonial Office and the 
Ministry of Food argued that these profits should be shared between 
the United Kingdom government and the West African governments, the 
latter in the proportion of produce delivered.28 It was not made 
clear what share the West African governments would receive, but in 
any case there was no discussion at this time29 about returning such 
profits to cocoa producers, to whom - one should think - they 
rightfully belonged.
The reason why the Colonial Office thought it would be desira­
ble for the United Kingdom government to purchase the West African 
cocoa crop can be summarised as follows: It was thought that some 
form of control was necessary, since in its absence political 
difficulties would arise in West Africa and certain commercial 
advantages would be lost. When it came to the question of what kind 
of control should be established, it was clear that a system like 
that established for the palm produce trade was not sufficient, 
because of the danger that part of the West African cocoa crop would 
not be bought by the trading firms. Moreover, there was the likeli­
hood that some firms would obtain excessively large profits in the 
markets which were not controlled by the United Kingdom government. 
The system which was consequently proposed was designed to make good 
the disadvantages which would result from a limited form of control. 
The best solution was thought to be a government purchase scheme, 
whereby government would essentially assume the role of a statutory 
trading firm.80
There was thus a convergence of the arguments for an extended 
system of produce control between the trading firms and the govern­
ment. It was obviously in both parties’ interest to come to an 
arrangement, and in the next section of this chapter we will see how 
the details of the scheme worked out.
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The Negotiations in London
In the discussions about the eventual purchase scheme, histori­
cal precedents were hardly mentioned. The export legislation which 
the Gold Coast government had enacted in the wake of the hold-up in 
1938 had provided some experience, it was said, but it was not 
specified what precisely that experience was.31 Without a "model" 
many details of the scheme were thus settled in various discussions 
between the trading firms and the British government. This makes it 
necessary to describe the kind of institutional framework in which 
these discussions were held.
The Institutional Role of the Firms
It was decided early on that the Ministry of Food would be 
responsible for the administration of the cocoa control scheme. It 
was claimed that since the Ministry of Food was charged with the bulk 
purchase of cocoa and its sale and allocation between British manu­
facturing companies, it would not make sense to have a separate West 
African cocoa purchase scheme run by a different government depart­
ment. The Ministry of Food somewhat reluctantly accepted this argu­
ment . 3 2
The Ministry of Food had no previous experience in the ad­
ministration of cocoa purchase schemes and relied therefore on the 
firms for much of its technical advice. Thus, on the 12th September 
the ’U.K. Advisory Committee’ was set up, whose main function was to 
work out the distribution of supplies between United Kingdom manufac­
turers. 3 3 It consisted of the various parties involved in the pre-war 
British domestic cocoa trade. J. Cadbury, for example, sat on the
Committee to represent the interests of manufacturers, while E.C. 
Tansley from the United Africa Company appeared for the West African 
merchants. Other members were R.E. Hurlston (Elder Dempster Lines)
and F.E. Williams (English and Scottish Co-operative Wholesale 
Society).
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As regards the purchase of cocoa in West Africa, a somewhat 
different approach was chosen. Here the Ministry of Food did not 
constitute an advisory committee but seems to have contacted the 
Association of West African Merchants1 Cocoa (Nigeria Section) Sub­
committee’84, which had been formed in September 1939 to represent 
the interests of the firms engaged in the Nigerian cocoa trade at the 
time. It consisted of E. Deresse (Compagnie Frangaise de l’Afrique 
Noire), A.V. Iredale (Cocoa Manufacturers Ltd.), John Holt jr. (John 
Holt & Co.), F. Samuel and E.C. Tansley (both United Africa Company), 
all of whom had been leading members of the ’London Committee’ of the 
1937 cocoa pool, which shows a remarkable degree of personal con­
tinuity. 3 6
The Ministry of Food recognised the ’Cocoa (Nigeria Section) 
Sub-committee’ as the legitimate representative of the interests of 
the British firms engaged in the Nigerian cocoa trade. This led to a 
number of complications since not all such firms were members of the 
Association of West African Merchants. Thus a number of smaller 
independent cocoa brokers were excluded from the discussions about 
the future arrangement in the marketing of Nigerian cocoa, while a 
special compromise had to be found for the small but influential 
English and Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society, which was given 
extra representation in the meetings between the Ministry of Food, 
the Colonial Office and the Association of West African Merchants. 
These gatherings later became known as the meetings of the ’West 
Africa Committee’.36
The official status of the 'West Africa Committee’ was of a 
somewhat dubious nature, since it had no statutory backing unlike, 
for example, the ’U.K. Advisory Committee’. There were no official 
appointments, press releases and such like, but it had a secretary 
and its minutes were meticulously kept.37 It was arguably in this 
committee that the most important decisions were made about the 
future arrangements in the Nigerian war-time cocoa trade.38
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The ’West Africa Committee’ met several times during October, 
November and December 1939, until it was merged with the ’U.K. Ad­
visory Committee' in January 1940 to form the ’Advisory Committee on 
Raw Cocoa’30. This new committee had over 20 members, including 
representatives from trading firms, smaller brokers, cocoa manufac­
turers and unions, such as L.A. Pearmaine of the Transport and 
General Workers Union and W.W.T. Barnett of the National Union of 
Distributive and Allied Workers.40 West African cocoa producers and 
cocoa traders had no direct representation on the committee, but it 
was assumed that the Colonial Office would look after their inte­
rests. In any case the new committee had only very little influence, 
since most of the more important structural details of the scheme had 
already been previously worked out in the negotiations between the 
Association of West African Merchants and the Ministry of Food.
J. Cadbury and E.C. Tansley were not members of the new 
’Advisory Committee on Raw Cocoa’. Earlier, in November 1939, they 
had become Ministry of Food executives and occupied the posts of 
Cocoa Controller and Deputy Cocoa Controller respectively, where they 
were responsible for the supervision and administration of the 
government cocoa purchase scheme.41 In that capacity they were also 
the official representatives of the Ministry of Food in negotiations 
and discussions with other government departments, such as the Board 
of Trade and the Ministry of Shipping, with the trading firms and the 
'Advisory Committee on Raw Cocoa'.
Thus, insofar as their institutional role was concerned, the 
position of the Association of West African Merchants - in effect, 
the 1937 agreement firms - within the control machinery was extremely 
strong. They had managed to exclude other British interests, such as 
independent cocoa brokers, from participating in the early discus­
sions about the West African cocoa purchase scheme, while two of its 
leading members, J. Cadbury and E.C. Tansley were employed, though 
not paid,42 by the Ministry of Food to run the scheme itself.
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Yet, this was not the only reason why the Ministry of Food and 
the Colonial Office were in a relatively weak position vis a vis the 
firms as I will argue in the next section of this chapter.
The 1939 ’Deal*
It seems that the strong position of the firms in the negotia­
tions with the Ministry of Food and Colonial Office officials was the 
result of the eagerness of the latter to secure the co-operation of 
the firms in the actual running of the control scheme. One aspect of 
this co-operation, as already mentioned, was of a technical nature, 
since neither the Ministry of Food nor the Colonial Office had any 
previous experience in the administration of large scale overseas 
purchase schemes. Arguably, the most important aspect of this co­
operation , however, was f inaneial.4 3
In the previous section of this chapter it was explained why
the Colonial Office favoured a scheme for the purchase of the entire
West African cocoa crop. But such a scheme also had some distinct
disadvantages, notably that complete government control would cost 
millions of pounds of Treasury money. Under the circumstances
prevailing in September 1939 such an amount was not likely to be 
forthcoming and a different solution therefore had to be found. The 
Colonial Office argued that,
Provided the co-operation of shippers could he obtained - and there is reason to 
believe that this would be readily given - the proposed scheae would not involve 
the purchase of the whole crop by the United Kingdoa Governaent. Shippers would 
continue to finance cocoa purchases as previously and aake sales in approved 
aarkeis iR co operation with the United Kingdoa Cocoa Controller. Governaent 
finance would he required only a) to aake good any losses on sales to aarkets 
other than the United Kingdoa, and b) to take over surplus stocks at the end of 
the season.*4
The co-operation of the firms thus had its price. If the firms 
were to provide the necessary finance to run the scheme, government 
would purchase cocoa only through the Association of West African
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Merchants, which would be allowed to share out the crop amongst its
member firms. As some sort of collateral, government would ensure, by
statutory export regulations (export quotas), that member firms would 
not ship more cocoa from Nigeria during the season than their pre­
determined share or quota allowed them to do and that non-member,
mostly Nigerian, firms were unable to wreck that arrangement.
It seems that there was no formal agreement between the 
government and the firms about this aspect of the scheme, but there 
is some evidence which suggests that at least an understanding of 
this sort existed. Thus, for example, when the Governor of Nigeria 
complained about the rigidity of the scheme as regards the position 
of exporters who were not members of the Association of West African 
Merchants, he was told by the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
that,
...I appreciate that political difficulties Bay arise over allocation of the crop 
between buyers. In order to liiit Government's financial obligations it is essen­
tial that existing trade organisations should be used to the full.45
The understanding between the firms and the government was, 
from the government’s point of view, a compromise between the wish to 
control the cocoa trade and the need to accommodate the interests of 
the firms in order to execute such control.40 This at least would 
explain why the structure of the eventual scheme contained such a 
curious mixture of private and governmental elements: while govern­
ment was to purchase the cocoa crop, fix seasonal minimum prices and 
direct sales to United Kingdom and overseas customers, the firms were 
to effect actual purchases, provide the finance for the scheme and 
share out the bulk of the crop. As regards the financial results of 
the scheme, the firms would only receive remuneration for their 
services, while government would shoulder the commercial risks 
involved in the trade, which meant that it would be liable for any 
losses and entitled to any profits the scheme might produce.47
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It is important to notice that this understanding was reached 
very early in September 1939 and that neither the Nigerian government 
nor the Nigerian exporters and produce traders (or commission buyers) 
had any say in it. Later, when they became involved in the nego­
tiations about the fine details of the scheme, it seems that it was 
too late for their opposition to effect any significant changes in 
the basic structure, though - as we will see in the next section of 
this chapter - minor alterations were achieved.
The Finer Details of the Scheme
After the Colonial Office, the Ministry of Food and the firms 
had reached an agreement about how the scheme should be run in 
principle, prolonged negotiations started about the finer details. 
These concerned roughly four areas. There was the question of what 
export quotas should be allocated to the Nigerian, British, French 
and Dutch firms which had been involved in the pre-war cocoa trade. 
Then the control authority had to decide what remuneration its 
various agents should receive for their services and what price 
producers would be paid for their produce. Finally, there was the 
question of what, if any, specific arrangements should be made for 
the purchase of cocoa from co-operative cocoa marketing societies.
The Quota-question
There is some evidence which suggests that so far as the 
determination of export quotas for the European firms was concerned, 
government left it to the Association of West African Merchants to 
share out their total seasonal shipments amongst themselves.48 The 
firms just informed government about the actual distribution of the 
crop and that, it seems, was the end of the matter.49
Part of the government probably realised that its power to 
control the firms was, without a fully fledged government purchase 
scheme, rather limited. For example a Director of John Holt & Co.
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could write to the District Agent of the firm in Lagos when the 
scheme was still under discussion:
Tor your own inforwation, whatever way be the shipping quotas allotted to each 
individual exporter of cocoa, what will in fact happen is that as between ie«bers 
of the Cocoa Pool, the share will rewain intact.50
It was perhaps felt that it was more practical to leave the 
determination of the export quotas to the Association of West African 
Merchants.
The fixing of the quotas was not an easy task. Not all firms 
which had previously participated in the West African cocoa trade 
were members of the Association of West African Merchants. These 
firms, the English and Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society and 
the Greek firm of A.G. Leventis, could not be legitimately excluded 
from the scheme just for this reason. They were thus coaxed, if not 
forced, into becoming temporary members of the Association. They 
joined the wai— time pool in late 1939.51 Then there was the problem 
of what should be done with the 1937 pool share of enemy firms (the 
German firm G.L. Gaiser) or with the pool share of firms which were 
suspected of having German chocolate manufacturers (the Dutch firm 
Witt & Busch) as their main customers. The solution the Association 
came up with was rather simple: Their shares were eliminated and dis­
tributed between the remaining Pool members.62
The combined purchases of Witt & Busch and G.L. Gaiser amounted 
to about 14% of the Nigerian cocoa exports63 and it is perhaps not 
too far-fetched to suppose that the remaining firms were rather 
pleased to take over the German and Dutch quota, since that increased 
their business in Nigeria substantially. Thus, for example, the 
United Africa Company alone, which in 1937/38 and 1938/39 had shipped 
about 32% of the Nigerian crop, could raise its market share to about 
38% in 1939/40.64 A full listing of each share is reproduced below in 
table 4.66
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Table 5: Nigerian Cocoa Export Quotas for European Trading Firms in 
1939/40 (as percentage of total European shipments)
United Africa Company Ltd. ! 38.07%
G.B. Ollivant Ltd. ! 9.94%
Compagnie Frangaise de L ’Afrique Occidentale ! 4.55%
Societe Commerciale de 1’Quest Africain ! 2.08%
Union Trading Company Ltd. ! 3.12%
Cocoa Manufacturers Ltd. ! 13.35%
John Holt & Co. ! 13.02%
Paterson, Zochonis and Co. Ltd. ! 6.73%
C. Zard ! 5.70%
E. & S. Co-operative Wholesale Society ! .93%
London, Africa and Overseas Ltd. ! 2.51%
Source: NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S 28. Letter from E. Melville to C.C. 
Wooley, 25 April 1940.
Note: The tonnage quotas (2,600 tons or less than 2.5% of the
Nigerian crop as it turned out) of African exporters were 
listed separately.
The fact that the Association of West African Merchants in 
effect determined their own purchase shares was later masked by the 
invention of an official formula for the division of the bulk of the 
crop between the European trading firms. It read:
Each Group "A“ Shipper [i.e. aeaber fins of the Association] will during the 
period 1st September 1939 to 30th September 1940, buy an awount of cocoa avai­
lable for purchase by Group "A" Shippers, which in relation to the purchases of 
all Group “AB Shippers during the sawe period bears the sawe proportion as his 
aggregate purchases of cocoa over the three crop years 1936/7 to 1938/9 bears to 
the aggregate purchases of all Group "A’ Shippers over the saie period.56
This formula was supposed to express the principle that no firm
or individual should illegitimately gain or suffer from government
intervent ion. Thus the position of each participant in the cocoa and 
other markets would be ’frozen’ for the duration of the war. This was 
called the ’standstill policy’.57
However, the formula, which appears to be a practical example
of that principle, was in reality something rather different. Since
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1937/38 the firms’ purchases were controlled by the 1937 Cocoa 
Agreement and the distribution of the crop which that Agreement 
specified was largely based on the purchases of the firms in the 
1936/37 season. Thus the formula above was in effect an official re­
cognition of the 1937 Buying Agreement. This explains why the Admini­
strative Department of John Holt & Co. could inform its local Agent 
in Lagos in January 1940 that
...both in the Gold Coast and Nigeria, our Governaent quota percentage and our
Pool percentage are the saae thing. This siaplifies Batters enoraously.SB
Yet, the Association was not given a completely free rein. The 
Colonial Office argued that ’for political reasons, it would be 
necessary to allocate part of the purchases to non-European (chiefly 
African) buyers’.60 As has been shown in the previous chapter, there 
existed a small but influential group of Nigerian produce traders 
(and a rather larger group in the Gold Coast) who - before the war- 
had exported cocoa on their own account, and it was thought that 
their elimination from the war-time cocoa trade would, especially in 
the light of the events of 1937/38, create trouble for the govern­
ment . 6 0
Thus a second category of exporters was invented, who were 
called the ”B" Shippers. The firms which fell into this category, 
were, unlike the "A" Shippers, not real exporters. It was argued that 
i t would be almost impossible to properly supervise the business 
activities of such firms, not least, because their headquarters lay 
outside the United Kingdom. These firms were therefore only employed 
as agents of the Ministry of Food up to the f.o.b. point (port of 
shipment), where their parcels of cocoa were taken over by either 
United Kingdom based brokers or by "A” Shippers, both of whom could 
be more easily controlled by the relevant government bodies.61 Since 
Nigerian based firms had neither any influence over what happened to
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their parcels of cocoa beyond the f.o.b. point or any option to make 
any sales on their own except to U.K.-based brokers or to the "A" 
Shippers, they were not real exporters in the same sense as the "A" 
Shippers.
Discussions about the export quotas of such firms were long and 
at times rather acrimonious.®2 Initially, the Colonial Office and the 
Ministry of Food had proposed that the ’standstill formula’ should 
also be applied to the "B” Shippers, but it seems that they changed 
their mind when it was pointed out that this formula would produce 
rather unsatisfactory quotas for the "B" Shippers. Some of them, like 
S. Thomopulos had only recently entered the cocoa trade and a quota 
computed on the basis of average shipments in the three cocoa seasons 
between 1936/37 and 1938/39 would have yielded for some firms a quota 
which would have been far below their actual 1938/39 shipments. In 
the end a formula was found which took these considerations into 
account. It read:
Each Group "B" Shipper trill buy a fixed quantity of cocoa equal to the tonnage 
shipped by hia during 1938/39 crop year plus his proportionate share of eneay 
purchases.K3
In the 1938/39 cocoa season the total shipments of Nigerian- 
based exporters amounted to 2,091 tons.84 To this figure the Ministry 
of Food and the Colonial Office added what they thought would be a 
proportionate share of enemy purchase and, after consultation with 
the Association of West African Merchants in December 1939 and the 
Nigerian government, authorised the latter to issue export licences 
for up to 2,500 tons, the distribution of which among individual 
'exporters’ is shown in table 5.06
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Table 6: Nigerian Cocoa Export Quotas for Nigerian Based Firms
in 1939/40.
[name/proprietor/location of headquarter/tonnage]
Nigerian:
United Development Trading Company 596
(A.O. Makanjuola/Ibadan)
Anglo-Nigerian Trading Corporation 326
(E . Dada/Lagos)
Odutola Brothers 270
( -dto-/Ijebu-Ode)
African Industrial Shipping & Importing Company 54
(Rev. D.Q. Arthur/Lagos)
Nigerian Produce Farmers Association 28
(J.A. Cole (manager)/Abeokuta)
Lebanese/Greek:
S. Thomopulos 776
( -dto-/Lagos)
Flionis Brothers 408
( -dto-/Qndo)
C.S. Mandrides 28
( -dto-/Benin City)
British:
W.E. Griffith & Co. 14
( -dto-/Nwaniba via Uyo)
Total 2,500
tons
tons
tons
tons
tons
tons
tons
tons
tons
tons
Source: NAI:lb MinAgric 1, file 17980 Vol.I. Letter from G.F.T. Colby 
(Cocoa Controller) to all Shippers, 13 Dec. 1939.
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The consultations with the firms were largely held during 
November and early December 1939 in the ’West Africa Committee’. The 
minutes of the committee reveal that apart from minor changes, the 
Ministry of Food and the Colonial Office accepted almost every 
proposal the Association of West African Merchants put forward.®8 The 
only opposition seems to have come occasionally from J. Cadbury, who 
attended these meetings in his capacity as ’director-designate’ of 
the future ’Colonial Empire Cocoa Control’, as the scheme was later 
officially called. Yet, his opposition was not too vigorous and 
almost invariably faltered when the Colonial Office officials 
indicated that they would support the claims of the European trading 
firms as they repeatedly did.07
The second set of discussions was held between the governments 
of the Gold Coast and Nigeria, and the Colonial Office. Here again 
one finds that the Colonial Office almost always sided with the 
firms, which was particularly noticeable in the question of the 
treatment of the "B" Shippers. Thus, for example, the issue of the 
apportionment of the German quota between the member firms of the 
Association of West African Merchants and the Nigerian-based cocoa 
exporters particularly incensed the Nigerian government, which in the 
end had almost to be forced to abandon its opposition to this aspect 
of the scheme as will be shown later.
This somewhat hostile attitude towards the claims of Nigerian- 
based firms and more sympathetic attitude towards the claims the 
European trading firms was largely caused by the Colonial Office’s 
anxiety that the firms would deny the scheme their technical and 
financial support if the Colonial Office thwarted their requests. 
There were, however, also other, less obvious, reasons for this 
attitude. As D. Meredith has recently shown, Colonial Office offi­
cials were excessively ideologically biased with respect to Nigerian 
exporters and to the role they played within their societies.88 Thus, 
f0 2 ' example, the Assistant Secretary, G.L.M. Clauson put on record:
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I hope that the concessions to the aBa Shippers will be kept within the swallest 
possible dimension for two reasons. The first is a natural objection to being 
blackmailed. The second is that I am much opposed to the creation or rather 
strengthening of a saall capitalist class of Africans with incomes out of all 
proportion to the income of their fellow countrymen. Capitalists are, in ay view, 
essential to society, but we have found by experience in this country that 
capitalists ought not to be too few or individually rich. The position in Vest 
Africa is approaching that in pre-war Russia with a very saall relatively rich 
class and a proletariat. He know what happened in Russia and we do not want 
history to repeat itself.83
This was an extreme but certainly not untypical view within the 
Colonial Office. There are other minutes in which Nigerian exporters 
are classified as being ’selfish rogues, only anxious to exploit the 
African farmers’70 who were ’unfortunately ...literate and vocal and 
have the ears not only of the chiefs, but also of the press’ (em­
phasis added).71 Incidentally, these quotations arguably again reveal 
to what extent the Colonial Office was rattled by the events of 
1937/38 to which these comments seem to be a reference.72
Finally, there was the argument that the establishment of a 
government purchase scheme would enable Nigerian exporters to 
increase their market share at the expense of the European trading 
firms, if their exports were not fixed at the pre-war level.73 The 
Colonial Office assumed that if Nigerian and European firms received 
the same commission rates from government for their services, 
Nigerian firms would be placed in a more competitive position, since 
their businesses were run on much lower overheads. This would enable 
them to pay higher prices for produce than the European firms 
profitably could and thus their market share would be bound to 
increase over time. This had to be avoided and since it was obviously 
politically inopportune to pay different commission rates for the 
same services to Nigerian and European firms, the only way to stop 
the advance of the Nigerian firms would be to fix quotas for the 
volume of their exports.
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The three reasons why the Colonial Office so strongly favoured 
the adoption of ’standstill policy’ were thus, firstly and perhaps 
most importantly, a marked interest in obtaining the co-operation of 
the firms; secondly, a heavy ideological bias against Nigerian 
exporters, and thirdly, a more general regard for the position of 
European (British) firms vis-a-vis local competitors in colonial 
markets. These arguments were not readily accepted by the Nigerian 
government, and in the next section of this chapter its point of view 
will be more thoroughly investigated.
The Dispute over the Quota System
Initially, the Nigerian government had strongly welcomed the 
idea of setting up a cocoa purchase scheme but, when it subsequently 
became increasingly involved in the finer details of the scheme, its 
attitude became more and more critical. This was particularly noti­
ceable in the discussion about the quota system.74
The Governor of Nigeria argued that to fix seasonal export 
quotas would mean the elimination of any competition in the cocoa 
trade and he was very concerned what effects this would have on the 
position of independent produce traders vis-a-vis the European firms. 
He was, however, not so much concerned about the position of the ”B" 
Shippers, since their numbers were small and their position secure, 
if limited, in scope. In a telegram to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies the Governor also expressed his anxiety about what he 
thought would be the likely political consequences of the imposition 
of the quota system. He wrote on the 25th November, 1939 that
In the cocoa industry there is a considerable body of swall firws who in the past 
have not shipped. They are not widdle wen (sic) in direct touch with producers 
but are better described as cowwission wen (sic). Their activities have consisted 
of purchasing cocoa frow the widdle wen (sic) and bag it and sale to the highest 
bidder awong the large firws in parcels ready for shipwent. Firws waintain that
such cowsissioR wen are parasites and speculators but I cannot agree You will
appreciate readily that the schete as drafted will eliwinate such cowwission wen
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froi the trade...and Mill deprive the* of their leans of livelihood in so far as 
cocoa is concerned__
Such conission len (sic) are largely Syrian. There are also a nuiber of Africans 
in the saie position and the Nigerian produce traders union (sic) a uell 
organised and vocal African body which Mas proiinent in the Cocoa Pool (sic) 
agitation writes in this connection "There Mill reiain no doubt in our linds that 
advantage is being taken of present Mar conditions to iipose unreasonable 
hardship on large section of our coiiunity".
You Mill appreciate that if the control scheie is to put out of business the 
above important section of the industry... there lay be acute political difficul­
ties. Indeed I can think of no greater potential cause of discontent.75
The Governor of Nigeria objected especially to the ’standstill 
policy’ , arguing that . he saw no reason why under a government 
purchase scheme competitive buying should completely cease in 
Nigeria, since it was both in the interests of the producer and the 
efficiency of the industry as a whole that it should be continued. 
Against these interests, other interests, such as those of the 
European trading firms, had to take second place.78 He was also not 
prepared to overlook the fact that the consequences of that policy 
(foremost, the likely elimination of the independent produce traders 
or ’’commission men”) were - in his phrase - 'scarcely consistent’ 
with the policy’s avowed principle.77
The Governor of Nigeria had also tried to gain some influence 
in how the system would work eventually in practice. He had assumed 
that he would have the power to control the purchases of African and 
European shippers and in this capacity he would be able to allocate 
some part of the seasonal purchase at his discretion. He thus asked 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies to confer on him the right to 
fix export quotas for about 12% of seasonal purchases. This he argued 
was a reasonable amount, since the quota for German and Cameroonian 
firms whose exports had ceased, had amounted to about 15% in the 
1938/39 cocoa season. In this connection, he proposed that coopera­
tive marketing societies should receive a substantial part of that 
allocation and would thus become exporters in their own right.78 This 
proposal was refused.
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The Governor then even undertook a last-minute attempt to
convince the Secretary of State for the Colonies to abolish the quota 
system. He stated that, as far as Nigeria was concerned, he believed 
’that the interests of the producers, co-operative societies and all 
Africans concerned in the trade would be best served if this elabo­
rate scheme were abandoned and if the Food Controller merely under­
took to purchase all Nigerian cocoa at fixed prices with a premium 
for Grade I cocoa.. .. ’ .79 It was, however, already too late to stop 
the scheme.
The negotiations, including to what extent the Governor of
Nigeria would be allowed to control purchases of all shippers and 
allocate export quotas at his discretion, dragged on for a conside­
rable period.80 This caused some confusion in the early months of
control, for the Nigerian government assumed that it was to issue 
monthly export licenses to the "A" and ”B” Shippers in Nigeria. The 
former, however, thought that they were to receive their instructions 
from their London headquarters and thus did little to comply with the 
directives from the Nigerian government. In the end, the view of the
Colonial Office that the responsibility for the control of the
purchases of the "A" and "B” Shippers should rest with the authori­
ties in London prevailed.81
While the dispute lasted, the Governor became more and more 
incensed by the treatment he received from the Colonial Office and by 
the policy it pursued, the ulterior motives of which he apparently 
deeply mistrusted. Thus, for example, he wrote to the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies in February 1940 that,
I cannot see that this aeasure [the distribution of the ex-Ger«an quota] Mould
have afforded any reasonable grounds for cosplaints to the exporting fir*s, and I
cannot refrain froi expressing the opinion that in this respect, as in others 
(notably in the excessive aiount of guaranteed profit) His Majesty’s Government 
have had altogether too tender a regard for the susceptibilities of the British 
firas. This opinion, which I fear that I have reiterated ad nauseai and aliost to 
the point of insubordination, is fully shared by all ly advisers.82
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The standstill and quota policy of the Colonial Office was 
obviously unpopular with the Nigerian government. The question of how 
this had effected the long-term policy of the Colonial Office will be 
examined in chapter seven. At this point, however, it seems necessary 
to review in more detail what the Governor meant by his reference to 
the other controversial aspects of the purchase scheme.
The Dispute over the Expenses and Profits of the European Firms
Since the Ministry of Food was to employ Nigerian and European 
firms as its agents, it had to determine how much it would pay for 
their services. The Ministry of Food distinguished between paying for 
what it thought would be the actual expenses these firms would incur 
in their buying operations and paying an agreed amount of remunera­
tion for their services. In addition, the Ministry of Food fixed the
amount of money independent produce traders and commission buyers
were to receive from those firms.
As regards the exporting firms, the Ministry of Food differen­
tiated between European ("A" Shippers) and Nigerian-based firms 
("B" Shippers). For each class of exporter the Ministry fixed a 
different schedule of marketing costs, including an amount of money 
which represented profits or remuneration.83
The Ministry of Food relied for the actual determination of the 
costs of the marketing of cocoa in Nigeria and between Nigerian and 
British ports almost entirely on information from the Association of 
West African Merchants.84 The Association supplied the Ministry with 
a schedule of marketing costs for the two classes of exporters which 
the latter, after making some minute changes, accepted without much 
discussion. There were no consultations with representatives of the 
Nigerian-based firms, nor was it ever explained why it was necessary 
to set up two different schedules of marketing costs for European- 
and Nigerian-based firms for exactly the same kind of services 
rendered to the Ministry.
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These schedules consisted of some fifteen odd different items. 
Most of the items in the two schedules were identical, since both "A” 
and "B" Shippers had to pay the same money for the same services and 
goods, like bags, harbour dues and government inspection fees, but 
five items were fixed at different rates according to the status of 
the exporter. These were the coast overheads, allowance for the costs 
of remittance, head office overheads, remuneration, and interest on 
the capital used during the buying operation.
It is impossible to compare the item ’interest’ in the two 
schedules, since different interest rates were paid for different 
maximum periods of time.86 However, the other four items in the two 
schedules had specific values or were expressed as percentages of 
known figures, which allows us to estimate their value and makes a 
comparison possible.
With regard to the item ’coast establishment charges’, "A” 
Shippers received 17s 9d per ton, while ”B'* Shippers were paid only 
8s 9d per ton. The difference of 9s per ton between the two sums was 
supposed to represent the higher costs European firms incurred on 
their buying operations in Nigeria. A closer look at the composition 
of the item ’coast establishment charges’ reveals that these higher 
costs almost entirely consisted of expenses which the firms incurred 
in order to attract and maintain a European work force, such as 
better housing ("bungalows"), passages to and from Nigeria, medical 
expenses, and, above all, European salaries and furlough pay.86
The item ’remuneration’ was also differently fixed according to 
the status of the exporter. Thus European firms received 4.5 % on all 
sale proceeds credited to the Ministry of Food, while Nigerian- based 
firms received only 2.5 % on the local purchase price. "B" Shippers 
had to employ British brokers in order to effect overseas sales. The 
remuneration for the services of these brokers (1.5 % on sales
credited to the Ministry of Food) has therefore to be added to 
compare the remuneration for "A" and "B" Shippers. Given the local
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Ministry of Food purchase price of £21 5s 5d per ton (producer price 
plus expenses of the "B" Shippers) , and the expected British and 
overseas sales prices of £25 per ton, it is possible to work out the 
proxy difference in the remuneration of "A" and "B" Shippers. It 
amounted at least to 4s 4d per ton.87
There were two other items which the European firms were 
allowed to debit the Ministry of Food. There were no such items in 
the "B" Shipper schedule. These were an allowance for the costs of 
remittance of capital used in the buying operations (2s) per ton and 
an allowance for costs of maintaining a head office in Britain (5s) 
per ton.8 8
Taken together the differences in the values for these items 
add up to about £1 Os 4d per ton. There was - in as much it is known 
- no opposition against the introduction of two different schedules. 
Instead criticism concentrated on the percentage of the Ministry of 
Food sales European shippers received as remuneration and on the 
value of the item overhead charges. This criticism was repeatedly 
voiced by the Governor of Nigeria respectively by his chief ad­
visers80. It was also later frequently stated by various authors on 
the subject, such as P.T. Bauer and J. Mars90, that the schedule for 
remuneration and coast establishment charges was far too generous. 
Yet, these authors offer very little evidence for their contentions 
and one is left with the question to what extent their criticism was 
really justified.
One way to find an answer to that question seems to be to
compare the schedule of marketing costs the firms had used in the
1937 Cocoa Agreement with the schedule of marketing costs the 
Ministry of Food used in the 1939/40 cocoa season. A comparison of 
certain items in the two schedules seems to suggest that indeed
certain costs were inflated in order to increase the profits of the
European firms. Thus the item ’coast overhead charges’ which had been 
valued in the 1937 Agreement at 15s per ton was now in 1939/40 valued
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at 17s 9d.01 Most pronounced was, however, the increase in the
remuneration or profits of the firms. Whereas in 1937 the firms had 
been content with a profit margin of 5s Id per ton92 - or about 1% of 
the expected sales prices, this margin was fixed by the Ministry of 
Food at 4.5 % of the sales prices. Thus under statutory control the 
profit margin of the European firms involved in the Nigerian cocoa 
trade at the time seems to have increased by at least 450% since the 
sales prices in the 1939/40 season turned out to be higher than those 
current in the 1937/38 season.93 As the volume of trade for both 
seasons is known, it also seems possible to estimate the approximate 
absolute value of this increase. In the 1937/38 season the par­
ticipants in the Cocoa Agreement apparently allowed themselves a 
composite profit of about £25,000 on their cocoa buying operations. 
Two years later, the composite profits of the MA" Shippers seem to 
have increased to at least £85,000°4.
The rate of remuneration and value for the various items in the 
marketing schedule were frequently changed in subsequent seasons, 
because the Ministry of Food and the Colonial Office later reoi—  
ganised the scheme95. There is not enough space to analyse all these 
changes in detail but, on the strength of the evidence, it seems that 
when the scheme was introduced the firms had advanced their own 
material interests to an extent, that, in retrospect, the charge of 
’war-time profiteering’ appears to be justified.
The dispute between the Governor of Nigeria and the Colonial 
Office over the rate of remuneration which the Ministry of Food had 
set-for the firms, was influenced moreover by the way the Ministry 
treated other participants in the Nigerian cocoa trade. As already 
mentioned the Ministry of Food determined the rate of remuneration 
which independent produce traders and commission buyers were to 
receive from the firms. The controversial point here was that 
remuneration or ’’brokerage" (5s) per ton and the allowance for 
marketing expenses (2s 6d) per ton, such as bagging, were included in
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the local ex-scale buying prices.06 This provision created some
considerable hardship for this class of traders and was seen by the 
Governor of Nigeria as a particularly unfair aspect of the purchase 
scheme.0 7
In Ibadan, for example, unbagged cocoa was purchased in 1939/40 
at the local buying stations of the firms at £15 7s 6d per ton.98 
Since brokerage was included in the buying price, the firms were not 
required to pay any remuneration for the services independent produce 
traders and commission buyers rendered to them. Instead independent 
produce traders and commission buyers were credited in the books of 
the firms with a fictitious lower purchase price of £15 2s 6d per ton 
and the difference between these two prices of 5s per ton was
supposed to represent remuneration for their services.09 Consequent­
ly, produce traders and commission buyers found it very difficult to 
do any business in the vicinity of the Ibadan buying stations, since 
there were no economic reasons why farmers should sell their produce 
to them at the lower price, if they could get a higher price around 
the corner at the firms’ buying stations.109
Thus, in the 1939/40 season many independent traders and
commission buyers stopped buying cocoa altogether, while those who 
remained in business were forced to relocate their trading activities 
in areas outside the ambit of the official buying stations.101 Yet, 
this move was not necessarily disadvantageous to all of these
traders. Prices were fixed only at buying stations and no attempt was 
made by the government to control the transactions between produce 
traders, commission buyers and the farmers in outlying villages.102 
Some traders, especially those who had access to transport facilities 
or even owned their own lorries, found their new position highly 
rewarding, since they could purchase cocoa in some, especially 
outlying, villages at a much lower price than the price they would 
receive at the nearest buying station.103
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Nevertheless, the provision that brokerage should be included 
in the ex-scale buying prices led to the demise of a substantial 
number of independent produce traders and commission buyers, and it 
was for this reason that the Governor of Nigeria so vehemently 
opposed the way in which the Ministry of Food was treating the firms. 
He argued that it would be unfair, as well as politically dangerous, 
if the Ministry of Food set up a scheme which apparently safeguarded 
the interests of the European firms while the interests of other 
participants in the trade, especially those of the smaller indepen­
dent produce traders and commission buyers were wilfully neglec­
ted.104 This theme re-emerged, as we will see in the next section of 
this chapter, in the context of another dispute the Governor of 
Nigeria had with the Colonial Office, which concerned the way the 
Ministry of Food dealt with the problem of the role of co-operative 
marketing societies within the scheme.
The Dispute over the Marketing of Co-operative Cocoa
In discussions about the details of the scheme, the Association 
of West African Merchants proposed that cocoa sold to the firms by 
co-operative marketing societies should be treated in the same way as 
cocoa sold to the firms by independent produce traders and commission 
buyers, i.e. that they should only receive the gazetted minimum price 
less 5s brokerage.106
Before the imposition of control, co-operative marketing
societies had usually sold cocoa to the firms in large parcels by
tender which enabled them to obtain a premium of about 20s on the
current price. This was partly a recognition of the fact that co­
operative marketing societies produced exceptionally well-fermented 
and clean (Grade I) cocoa, but was also a result of competition 
between the firms for larger parcels of cocoa. The European firms 
achieved certain economies of scale on bulk purchases, and were
prepared to pass on part of these savings to the co-operative
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marketing societies. These larger parcels of cocoa were moreover 
purchased on a cash and carry basis. This enabled the firms to avoid 
financial risks, for instance bad debts, which the more widespread 
advance system usually entailed.108
Under the control system, co-operative societies no longer 
received such a premium. This would have hit co-operative societies 
very hard for under the previous system the premium had both provided 
an incentive for farmers to join, as well as provided the means to 
maintain such societies.107 Consequently the government of Nigeria 
came up with a plan which would have made the marketing of co­
operative cocoa more profitable to the societies. The Governor argued 
that co-operative societies should be elevated to "B" Shipper status, 
which would ensure their financial survival and perhaps further 
growth. As a practical measure he proposed that the co-operative 
marketing societies should receive a substantial part of the ex- 
German (G.L. Gaiser) quota, the availability of which would provide a 
’golden opportunity’ to further develop the co-operative marketing 
movement in Nigeria. He pointed out that the established firms had no 
reason for complaint since their interests would not be prejudiced by 
such a policy.108
The firms saw that matter rather differently. In a meeting 
between the firms and the government a representative of the Associa­
tion of West African Merchants confessed that he was ’shocked1 by the 
proposal, while another maintained that co-operative societies did 
not merit special treatment, since they were anyway ’merely a 
collection of middlemen’.100
These objections seem to have impressed the Colonial Office and 
Ministry of Food representatives, since it was decided not to proceed 
with the plan. The Colonial Office argued that although in principal 
it favoured the further development of co-operative marketing socie­
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ties in Nigeria in peace-time, the outbreak of war had now completely 
changed the situation.110 Moreover, the Colonial Office put forward 
the more practical argument that if co-operative societies were to 
receive a quota, how then could claims for a quota from other 
interested parties be convincingly repudiated, such as from the 
American firm Rockwood & Co. or from independent middlemen, who had 
not previously shipped cocoa? Finally, the Colonial Office indicated 
that in as far as the allocation to co-operative societies of a quota 
would involve increased government spending, the Imperial Treasury 
would strongly object to such plans.111
Nevertheless, the Colonial Office and the Ministry of Food seem 
to have accepted that the purchase scheme as it was would seriously 
impair the position of co-operative marketing societies. The firms 
were therefore pressed to make special arrangements for the purchase 
of cocoa from these societies.112 After much haggling they agreed to 
pay out of their own pockets a premium of 12s 6d per ton for such 
cocoa. This sum was thought to be the minimum requirement to finan­
cially maintain the societies during the war.113
In the first three war-time cocoa seasons the firms financed 
co-operative marketing societies in Nigeria, until in 1942 they 
decided to discontinue the payment of this subsidy.114 In this 
connection it is noteworthy that the Cocoa Controller later minuted 
that he
never liked the preaiua Mainly because the firis try to Make out that the co­
operative societies are living on their charity whereas in fact of course nothing 
is further froi the truth. The co-operative preiiua is really a sop to keep the 
societies quiet and to prevent thea froa agitating to becoae exporters.115
The Nigerian government was moreover ’extremely dis­
appointed’116 about the decision not to allow the Governor to 
allocate an export quota to co-operative societies, for it ran 
contrary to the policy of the Nigerian government to support their 
development. In a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
Governor Bourdillon argued that,
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For sowe years past we have been preaching to the cocoa farmers the doctrine that 
the co-operative wovewent provides his one hope of salvation, and that a steady 
increase of that wovewent is the best, if not the only wethod of ensuring that he 
gets the best possible price for his cocoa. If we are now compelled to tell hiw 
that as a result of a schewe for which His Majesty’s Government are entirely 
responsible, we must discourage the formation of new societies or the growth of 
old ones, what conclusion can he draw, except that either the wovewent is not all 
that we have represented it to be, or that our desire to secure hiw the best 
possible price for his produce is not as keen as it was?117
As it happened in the case of the disputes about the quota 
allocation and the remuneration of intermediaries, the Nigerian 
government was unable to achieve any change in the policy the 
Colonial Office thought appropriate for dealing with the co-operative 
societies. Again, the Nigerian government blamed the Colonial Office 
for being unduly biased towards the interests of the European trading 
firms to the detriment of Nigerian interests.118 However, in mid-1940 
the Nigerian government decided that in the circumstances it would be 
rather futile to pursue the argument any further, and this laid the 
issue - at least for the time being - to rest.110
The Determination of the Purchase Price
The least controversial issue of the purchase scheme was the 
fixing of the purchase prices in the Gold Coast and Nigeria. In the 
latter the Ministry of Food, after consultation with the Colonial 
Office and the Governor of Nigeria, fixed the price at £16 10s per 
ton for grade II cocoa purchased in Lagos. The better fermented and 
cleaner grade I cocoa received a premium of 10s and was thus pui— 
chased at £17. These prices formed the basis for those paid at about 
100 up-country buying stations, which the local Cocoa Controller 
determined by deducting a sum from the Lagos prices, which he thought 
would cover transport expenses. Thus grade II cocoa was purchased in 
Ibadan, about 80 miles north of Lagos, at £15 10s per ton, whereas in
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Abeokuta, only about 50 miles away from Lagos, cocoa of the same 
grade was sold at £16 per ton in the 1939/40 cocoa season.120
The price the Ministry of Food paid in 1939/40 compares 
favourably with the prices cocoa farmers had received in the previous 
season, when the Lagos price of grade II cocoa had not exceeded on 
average £14 12s per ton, but compares unfavourably with the prices
farmers had received in the mid-1930s, when prices had been con­
siderably higher. Thus in the three cocoa seasons between 1934 and 
1937, for example, the firms had paid on average about £23 per ton 
for grade II cocoa in Lagos, about a third more than the price the 
Ministry of Food was prepared to pay in the current season.121
Why then was the price fixed at £16 10s per ton? It seems that 
this was a compromise between conflicting interests. On the one hand, 
it was argued that cocoa production should remain ’reasonably remune­
rative’ to farmers in West Africa and that they should receive a 
’fair price’.122 It was also pointed out that purchase prices should 
be related to import prices. Since the latter were expected to rise 
substantially in the near future, purchase prices should be increased 
over the current level in order to safeguard the real income of cocoa 
farmers.12 3
On the other hand, it was argued that the purchase price should 
not be too high so as to discourage consumption in the United Kingdom 
and the United States in particular, to which sales ’would have to be 
stimulated as far as possible’.124
It was also very early clear that the purchase price of cocoa 
would have to be relatively low in the future in order to reduce the 
demand for imported merchandise goods on which it was said a large 
part of the income generated by export crop sales was spent. There 
is, however, no evidence that this argument played a major role in 
the determination of the 1939/40 purchase price, probably because in
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the early months of the war what became later known as the ’war 
effort’ had not assumed such an importance.126
However, the price which the Ministry of Food and the Colonial 
Office fixed in the end was arguably not inspired by concern for the 
well-being of West African cocoa producers or concern for the state 
of the British economy, but was largely a result of plain commercial 
considerations. It was expected that part of the crop would be 
unsaleable. Thus the purchase price was fixed below the current world 
free market price in order to accumulate a surplus in the early part 
of the season which could be used to cushion possible losses in the 
later part of the season.12®
From a solely commercial point of view this policy was probably 
justified, but it opened the door to a much more aggressive pricing 
policy which the control authorities thought necessary to pursue 
during and after the war. Once the principle was established that it 
would be legitimate for statutory bodies to accumulate surpluses from 
their trading operations, the determination of produce prices became 
prone to influence, more by the real or imaginative economic exigen­
cies of the day, rather than by considerations about the well-being 
of cocoa farmers or by considerations about the future development of 
the cocoa industry.
In the preceding paragraphs of this chapter an attempt was made 
to describe in some detail the reasoning behind the introduction of 
the cocoa purchase scheme. Nigerian produce traders, commission 
buyers and cocoa farmers obviously had different perspectives on the 
whole affair. Though there had been reports in British newspapers on 
plans to introduce a cocoa purchase scheme, it seems not unreasonable 
to assume that most of them only learnt of the scheme by a special 
edition of the Nigerian Gazette. published on the 14th November, 
1939. It read:
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The Colonial Office announces that His Majesty’s Government have undertaken, as a 
Mar Measure to purchase the Nhole 1939-40 crop of B. N. A. cocoa. The price paid to 
producers mill be fixed for the nhole season on the basis of ...116 10s for 
Nigeria F. A. Q. [grade II] cocoa, ex-scale port of shipment. The crop will be 
handled by European and other shippers already established in the trade. Mho mill 
act as agent for Government and Mill be paid an agreed remuneration for their
services A moratorium on cocoa sale and purchase has been declared in the Gold
Coast and Nigeria as from today in order that necessary arrangements may be made 
by the Colonial Governments. These arrangements Mill include the setting up of a 
local control organisation 117
The moratorium lasted for ten days. At last, after almost three 
months of intense discussion between the Ministry of Food, the 
Colonial Office, the European trading firms, and colonial governments 
in West Africa, the scheme came into being on the 24th November, 
1939.128 The outcome of these discussions show that the European 
firms almost invariably won the argument, while colonial governments 
had relatively little say in the actual design of the scheme. The 
latter had initially welcomed the scheme, but became increasingly 
critical of certain aspects of it. This, as we will see in the next 
chapter, was one of the reasons why the Colonial Office thought it 
necessary to reorganise the scheme. Here, however, the narrative will 
be continued with a description of what kind of inunediate effects the 
imposition of control had and how Nigerian produce traders, commis­
sion buyers and cocoa farmers and the Nigerian public reacted to it.
Statutory Marketing in Practice; Its Effects and Policies
The short-term impact of the scheme was considerably less 
dramatic than the Governor had envisaged. For the great majority of 
cocoa farmers and even smaller produce buyers, especially those who 
the firms directly employed permanently and, having no capital on 
their own, received small advances from the firms, very little 
changed. Produce prices were displayed outside cocoa buying stations 
as before and business seems to have gone as usual, except that local
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storekeepers, instead of receiving their daily cable informing them 
at which maximum purchase price they were allowed to buy produce on 
that day, now were told that the price prevailing on the 24th 
November, 1939 would be applicable throughout the season.120
For one group of intermediaries, however, the imposition of 
control proved to be immediately inimical to their interests. These 
were more independent produce traders and larger commission buyers 
who with some capital of their own were not so closely tied to the 
firms. The larger of them had received substantial advances from the 
firms, but had not yet ventured (and if, only occasionally) into the 
export market, because it was too risky and their capital basis too 
small to sustain eventual heavy losses. Anyway, commission buying 
sometimes offered, as we have seen, large rewards.
It was believed at the time that the total purchases of the 
class of independent produce traders amounted to about 15,000 
tons130, but this calculation probably underestimates their impor­
tance since it is known that just one of them (T.A. Odutola) had a 
seasonal turnover of 4,000 to 5,000 tons, and there were others in 
this league, especially Ibadan traders like A.K. Zard and I.B. 
Ogun.131
Most of the produce traders and larger commission buyers were 
now forced to relocate the centre of their businesses away from the 
buying stations of the European firms, since price differentials in 
their vicinity were too low to enable them to survive as cocoa 
traders. Some immediately sustained heavy losses, for they could not 
recuperate advances they had handed out to their own sub-buyers. Some 
former independent produce traders were even forced to sell their 
quota excess tonnage at a loss to the European firms in order to 
recover at least part of their capital outlay.132 Many traders - the 
erstwhile independent produce traders and the larger commission 
buyers - therefore went out of business, while those who stayed in
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the trade became tightly controlled by the firms.183 This development
was aided by the firms who at the same time lowered commission rates
to about a quarter of their pre-war value and also considerably
reduced the amount of money they advanced to their buyers.134 The 
Senior District Officer in Ibadan, for example, noted that ’there had 
been a very marked reduction of credit to Africans by the trading 
firms since the war started.’136 It is therefore not surprising that 
in the early war years many produce traders and commission buyers 
went out of business.136
The elimination of the independent produce traders and larger 
commission buyers was arguably one of the aims the European firms had 
in mind when they gave their support to the purchase scheme. The
local agent of John Holt & Co. in Lagos reported, for example, almost 
triumphantly in December 1939 that
The Syrians are non find themselves driven out of the market, as me wanted them 
to be....137
From an economic point of view the position of the Syrians in 
the marketing process was not much different from that of their 
African competitors. It is therefore not unreasonable to assume that 
when the local agent used the expression ’Syrians’ he also meant
other independent produce traders.
The firms also hoped to achieve a complete reorganisation of 
their buying methods. In a circular to all buying stations of the
firm in Lagos District the local agent of John Holt & Co. explained
what he thought would be the effect of the control scheme:
The possibilities are that the scheme Mill result in more producers and small 
cocoa traders coming direct to the firms’ stores where salaried Central and Depot 
Buyers are employed thus drawing in the full all-in price. It is quite likely 
that a large number of consolidated commission buyers will disappear altoge­
ther. .. and or organisation will change from a large number of consolidated 
commission buyers to a small limited number of Salaried Depot Buyers and a goodly
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nuaber of saall secured credit custoaers It is in the reala of possibility
that Ventures which today have as aany as 60 buyers will in the near future 
operate with only three well secured large salaried depot buyers as the firas own 
direct staff, but with all the rest converted into ordinary produce credit 
custoaers operating within their security and Baking for reauneration what they 
can between the point in the bush where they buy and our scale.130
Though the effect of the imposition of the control scheme was 
not as striking as this agent envisaged, there is some evidence that 
the firms were indeed able to put their intentions partly into prac­
tice . 1 80
The immediate reaction of larger produce traders was to try to 
escape the grip of the firms and apply for export licences and 
quotas. There were a whole host of traders (S. Agbaje, A.O. Makan- 
juola, I.B. Ogun and A.K. Zard) for example, who wrote petitions to 
that effect or went to see the Secretary of the Western Provinces in 
order to put forward their demands.140 All these applications were 
refused on the ground that none of these traders had exported cocoa 
in the previous three years and was thus not entitled to a quota. Any 
other decision was categorically ruled out, for allocating a quota to 
such traders, it was argued, would have meant a violation of the 
revered ’standstill’ principle.141
Thus these traders had to reorganise their own firms, if they 
wanted to stay in business at all.142 Some ventured into other trades 
like the foodstuff trade, while others went further afield from the 
buying stations in order to purchase cocoa at remunerative prices. In 
this they succeeded since the lower degree of competition in many 
outlying villages allowed these traders to pay considerably lower 
purchase prices them were offered at the official buying stations.143
Government, it seems, deliberately refrained from controlling 
such prices in outlying villages. The Cocoa Controller argued that 
the rigid enforcement of minimum price ’would eliminate large numbers 
of middlemen and might even lead to trouble. I therefore consider
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that it would be best to leave things as they are although it is 
recognised that there are loopholes’.144 He also made clear that he 
himself was, when the scheme was put into operation, not too insis­
tent that the loopholes in the scheme were being blocked at once and 
stated that in his opinion ’the middlemen were let down lightly’.145
It seems therefore that at least some produce traders and 
commission buyers were far less financially hit by the scheme than 
either they themselves, the firms and the Nigerian government had 
expected, though they certainly experienced a reduction in their 
economic opportunities. They were also helped by a number of factors 
which mitigated the impact of the scheme and thus ensured their 
economic survival. Produce traders, who had access to transport 
facilities or even owned their own lorries, could obtain some profits 
by transporting cocoa from one buying station to another since 
official transport rates for various buying stations were very 
generously fixed.14 6
Moreover, many members of the European supervisory staff in 
government and private employment left Nigeria in the early months of 
the war in order to join the armed forces,147 while many Syrians, 
presumably some of them produce traders, also felt that they should 
return to their home countries,148 and this very likely opened up new 
opportunities, including those in the cocoa trade. Finally, some 
produce traders, especially those the firms were interested in 
retaining as principal suppliers, were able to extract additional 
remuneration from the firms.140
Thus the immediate impact of the scheme was a mixed one. It 
seemed to have produced considerable hardship for many produce 
traders and commission buyers, yet some of them were able to use the 
loopholes in the system to their advantage. Smaller buyers and the 
majority of cocoa farmers were in 1939/40 only marginally, if at all, 
aggrieved by the scheme. This was arguably one of the reasons why the
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introduction of the purchase scheme met comparatively little public 
reaction as we will see in the next section of this chapter.
Public Reactions
It is a truism to state that the reception of government 
policies does not depend only on the policies itself, but also on the 
way these policies are put forward, as well on the circumstances in 
which these policies are introduced. The establishment of produce 
control was, in this respect, no exception.
The politically articulate part of the Nigerian populace, as 
many writers on the period have shown, reacted to the news of the
outbreak of war with a genuine and spontaneous show of loyalty to the
British government.150 Though this loyalty was probably partly 
fuelled by enlightened self-interests, there is enough evidence to 
show that many Nigerians had very little doubt which side they should 
support in the war.151 Since criticism of the government was in those 
circumstances likely to be seen as unpatriotic, it is reasonable to 
assume that protest against the introduction of produce control was 
toned down or even avoided. There were, for example, petitions in the 
early part of the war in which the writers declared that they would 
not ’pursue the matter [demands for higher produce prices] in the
present state of affairs, but they wish ...to beg to state that the
question would be re-opened immediately after the war’.152
Another factor which may have influenced the way in which the 
purchase scheme was perceived in Nigeria was the unprecedented amount 
of information and propaganda the Nigerian government and the 
Colonial Office disseminated at the beginning of the war. For 
example, leaflets were printed in the local vernacular of the main 
ethnic groups in Nigeria (Hausa, Yoruba and Ibo), speeches were 
broadcast on the wireless, and articles published in all the main 
Nigerian newspapers and in British papers, which were relatively
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widely read at the time, such as the weekly journal West Africa.153 
Finally, there were public speeches by the Governor, the most 
important one being at an Emergency Session of the Nigerian Legisla­
tive Council on the 4th December, 1939.
The purpose of these activities was to encourage the Nigerian 
public to contribute voluntarily and freely to the war effort, as 
well as to prepare the Nigerian populace for further government 
measures and the hardship the war was expected to bring. The propaga­
tion of the necessity and advantages of produce control was part of 
that exercise. As regards the war effort, the Nigerian populace was 
told that their main contribution would lie in the mobilisation of 
financial and natural resources for the prosecution of the war.154 At 
the same time Nigerians were warned that the war would bring con­
siderable hardship, i.e. that imports had to be cut down to the
barest minimum and that the prices of imported goods would rise in 
the near future; that government would raise the level of taxation, 
but would not embark on new development schemes during the war and 
only complete existing projects.155 Concerning the imposition of 
control, the Nigerian government laid strong emphasis on the ad­
vantages the scheme would have for cocoa farmers. It painted a very 
gloomy picture of what would have happened if the Imperial government 
had not decided to purchase the Nigerian cocoa crop and underlined 
that the control authorities in London expected that it would be very 
unlikely that the scheme would generate any profits, while it was
almost certain that losses would be eventually incurred.156
The presentation of produce control as an integral part of the 
war effort and, moreover, as an act of extreme generosity, which the 
Imperial government would afford the West African cocoa producers, 
contained an element of political whitewash. As early as September 
1939 the Secretary of State for the Colonies had given detailed 
advice as to how the scheme should be presented to the public in
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order to forestall criticism.167 This advice was apparently followed 
since the Governor of Nigeria wrote, after the announcement of the 
scheme, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that,
...the Cocoa announceaent has been worded so as to lay aaxiaua possible stress on 
the assistance His Majesty’s Governaent’s are giving to producers and I hope that 
propaganda on these lines aill prevent the Union [i.e. the Nigerian Produce 
Traders Union] froa stirring up discontent aaong producers theaselves.150
A further measure to inspire confidence in the scheme was an 
invitation to the Nigerian Produce Traders Union to take part in the 
set-up of the scheme, as well as a meeting between the Union and the 
Governor of Nigeria to discuss problems arising from the imposition 
of produce control. The idea to establish a local committee of 
African and European firms’ representatives to advise the Cocoa 
Controller in his work came originally from the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies.168 Consequently, the Nigerian government begem to 
look out for ’suitable’ Africans. Several persons were put forward, 
but in the end the choice fell on A. Obisesan, the president of the 
Ibadem Co-operative Marketing Union, and T.A. Odutola, a wealthy 
Ijebu-Ode produce trader.1®8 The former was supposed to represent the 
interests of co-operative farmers and cocoa farmers in general, while 
the latter, being a prominent member of the Nigerian Produce Traders 
Union, as well as of the Nigerian Motor Transport Union, was supposed 
to represent the interests of the middlemen. However, T.A. Odutola 
did not become a member of the ’Cocoa Advisory Committee’ as it was 
later called. The Nigerian Produce Traders Union, which had been 
approached to nominate Odutola, instead put forward its president S. 
Akinsanya. 1 ®1 Thus one of the most vocal critics of the government 
and of the European firms at the time became an official member of a 
statutory committee.
Further members of the Cocoa Advisory Committee were the Cocoa 
Controller G.F.T. Colby, the directors of the Produce Inspection
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Department E. McL. Watson, the Registrar of Co-operative societies
E.F.G. Haig, and one Syrian representative (P.M. Sellers). The 
committee met twice on the 18th and 23rd November, 1939 in order to 
fix transport differentials between buying stations and the port of 
shipment brokerage rates, as well as to agree on the allocation of 
quotas to small shippers.162
Despite the relatively wide responsibilities of the committee, 
discussions between the members about contentious issues were very 
brief. The minutes of the committee meetings reveal that the majority 
of government and firms’ representatives seem to have agreed in 
advance on such vital issues as the size of the "B” Shipper quotas 
and local brokerage rates.163 Proposals from S. Akinsanya to discuss 
higher transport and brokerage rates or higher purchase prices were 
almost invariably voted down. The committee also declined to examine 
the position of produce traders and commission buyers in the scheme 
by arguing that the scheme would not ’interfere with the internal 
organisation of trade within Nigeria beyond prescribing minimum pri­
ces’ ,164 though this was obviously not the case. In the end, the 
committee, apart from fixing transport differentials, largely 
confirmed what had been decided earlier in London.
This treatment caused S. Akinsanya to write a strongly worded 
protest letter on behalf of the Nigerian Produce Traders’ Union to 
the Chief Secretary of the Government, pointing out that there would 
be no doubt that ’advantage is being taken of the present War (sic) 
condition to impose unreasonable hardship on a large section of our 
Community (sic)’.166 In addition, he asked for an interview with the 
Governor.
This demand was taken up very swiftly, and on the 25th Novem­
ber, 1939 the Governor received a deputation of the Union, consisting 
of its local representatives T.A. Odutola and J. Aderigbe (Ijebu- 
Ode), I.B. Ogun and A.O. Johnson (Ibadan), A. Odunsi (Lagos), and its
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President S. Akinsanya.1°° There ai'e two versions of what was said at 
that meeting. According to the official version, S. Akinsanya’s main 
criticism was that the Cocoa Control Scheme had been worked out and 
introduced without any reference to the Nigerians engaged in the 
cocoa industry and that the functions of the Cocoa Advisory Committee 
had been too limited. The Governor is reported to have promised the 
Union to make representations to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies that cocoa traders who previously had not shipped cocoa 
would be deprived of their business by the scheme.1®7 According to 
the version which the Nigerian Produce Traders Union published after 
the event, the Governor was far more sympathetic to the situation of 
produce traders and commission buyers. He was reported to have 
assured them that the cocoa control scheme was purely a war-time 
measure and that all current restrictions were bound to be removed 
after the war. It was also reported that the Governor had raised the 
question of how the Union thought the farmers would benefit if the 
price was fixed in the United Kingdom, and the local market was left 
free for competition to which S. Akinsanya had answered that 
...there will be competition, and every buying organisation was 
bound to be making efforts to get as many tons as possible, and in 
the process price was bound to be raised higher in one place or 
another to the benefit of the farmers (sic).’168
When the control scheme was introduced in November 1939 there
was thus comparatively intense contact between the Nigerian Produce 
Traders’ Union and the government. Although these contacts did not
result in any direct measures to relieve the hardship the scheme was
likely to cause, they assisted in mollifying criticism of the 
purchase scheme. This seems to be the second reason why the introduc­
tion of the scheme was such a relatively smooth affair in terms of 
meeting public discontent.
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The government measure which stirred Nigerian cocoa farmers and 
traders most profoundly at the time was the destruction of some
10,000 tons of cocoa in the later part of the 1939/40 cocoa seas­
on.169 As early as January 1940, barely two months after the scheme 
was launched, the Nigerian government and the authorities in London, 
started talks on what should eventually be done with surplus 
cocoa.170 As it turned out, previous calculations about prospective 
sales had been rather optimistic. First, manufacturers in the United 
Kingdom bought far less cocoa than expected, mainly it seems because 
they had not received sufficient sugar allocations to turn raw cocoa 
into chocolate. Moreover, manufacturers at the time had a several 
months supply of cocoa in stock and were not interested in further 
deliveries.171 Secondly, and most likely more importantly, the 
Ministry of Shipping’s allocation of freight space for the transport 
of cocoa from West Africa to the United Kingdom and the United States 
turned out to be far too small.
The Ministry argued that other United Kingdom imports such as 
palm kernels were far more important and would therefore receive 
shipping priority.172 Meanwhile more and more traditional outlets of 
West African cocoa supplies became closed due to the war, including 
France, the U.S.S.R., the Netherlands, Belgium and the Scandinavian 
countries, so that by the end of March 1940 it was believed that 
government would be left at the end of the season with almost 160,000 
tons of unsaleable cocoa or a loss of some two million to three 
million pounds on their hands.173 Though the situation slightly eased 
in the following months, the Ministry of Food, after consultations 
with other Ministries, decided at the end of May 1940 to destroy 
excess quantities of cocoa.174
This decision coincided with the beginning of the harvest of 
light crop cocoa in Nigeria. The Nigerian government therefore 
notified the public that from 30th May cocoa would be no longer
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purchased for export but for destruction and that the purchase price 
for such cocoa would be lowered by £6 to £10 per ton.178
The actual destruction proved to be more difficult them 
expected. In order to prevent the spread of diseases, excess cocoa 
had to be dumped into the sea, in inaccessible swamps, into the Niger 
at Jebba or burnt.176 The United Africa Company even offered to sell 
to those West African governments concerned a specially constructed 
cocoa bean shredder.17 7
However, in the end the amount of cocoa which had to be 
destroyed turned out to be far less than originally anticipated. 
Sales to the United States improved, and freight space to the United 
Kingdom became more readily available. It was thus necessary to 
destroy all in all "only" some 10,000 tons of Nigerian cocoa, a large 
part of which was sub-standard. 17 8 Thus the loss at the end of the 
season to the United Kingdom Exchequer from the purchase and subse­
quent resale of West African cocoa amounted to ’only’ £208,548, of 
which some £61,800 probably represented losses sustained in Nige­
ria . 17 0
One political side effect of the destruction of part of the 
1939/40 cocoa crop was that it considerably strengthened the position 
of the Nigerian government in the dispute it had with Nigerian 
produce traders, commission buyers and cocoa farmers over the 
purchase scheme. The authorities in London, as well as the Nigerian 
government, were aware of this factor and tried to get the maximum 
political benefit out of it. In March 1940, for example, the Colonial 
Office official responsible for the cocoa scheme, E. Melville, 
minuted that,
I think the announcement [of the destruction of cocoa] should be made by the 
local Governments indicating that the decision to destroy is theirs and explai­
ning the circumstances which made it necessary. This explanation will be valuable 
in two respects: 1) it will tend to strengthen the American market, and 2) it 
will provide a practical demonstration to the West Africans that their produce is
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not indispensable to the war effort: That, on the contrary, there is far too such 
cocoa being produced and therefore the prices which they are being paid and the 
guarantee to purchase the whole crop in the first year of the war has been a very 
generous and expensive gesture by His Majesty’s Government.180
Consequently, the announcement which informed the public that 
part of the Nigerian crop would be purchased for destruction was 
worded in such a way so as to lay maximum stress on the benevolent 
attitude of the government. It read:
The public will understand that although His Hajesty’s Government will purchase 
the light crop they will be unable to take delivery and dispose of it; in spite 
of this fact, however, and with the sole object of preventing hardship to Hest 
African cocoa producers. His Hajesty’s Government propose to purchase the whole 
light crop and spend further money on its destruction. But for their action it 
can be no doubt that cocoa farmers would have been left with a considerable 
quantity of unmarketable cocoa on their hands, and the Nigerian government feels 
sure that the generosity of His Hajesty’s Government will be fully appreciated by 
all concerned in the cocoa industry.181
There were thus four factors which probably influenced the way 
the Nigerian public and in particular produce traders, commission 
buyers and cocoa farmers perceived the i m p o s i t i o n  of produce control. 
It was presented as part of the war effort, as well as a project 
which government would have abandoned if concern for the well-being 
of West African cocoa farmers had not been stronger. Furthermore, 
direct contacts between the Nigerian government and the Nigerian 
Produce Traders’ Union helped to smooth the actual introduction of 
the scheme. Finally, as mentioned in the previous section of this 
chapter, the immediate effect of the scheme itself was probably only 
felt by a relatively small number of larger produce traders and 
commission buyers. This helps to explain why the scheme was, despite 
its unpalatable features, fairly well received by the Nigerian public 
and that criticism came only from a small group of middlemen, some 
cocoa farmers, and their most intimate political allies.182
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Cocoa farmers in general were probably not too displeased with 
the scheme. Though it was not intended, the fixing of a seasonal 
purchase price removed much of the uncertainty which had previously 
marked the dealings between cocoa farmers and produce traders and 
commission buyers. The scheme offered security to many cocoa farmers 
and protected them against the exploitative practices of some produce 
traders and commission buyers who had previously deliberately misled 
cocoa farmers about current cocoa prices. The fixing of purchase 
prices at about 100 buying stations throughout the cocoa growing area 
thus made it more difficult for produce traders and commission buyers 
to deceive farmers. Some cocoa farmers were therefore probably ini­
tially positively impressed by the scheme.188
However, it was ultimately the public destruction of cocoa in 
Nigeria at the end of the 1939/40 cocoa season, which convinced cocoa 
farmers, traders and a large part of the public of the supposedly
benevolent intentions of the government. The fact that government
purchased cocoa and subsequently destroyed it left a deep impression 
on a wide range of people, including the nationalist movement which 
in one of its newspapers strongly applauded the ’philantrophic’ 
attitude of the government.184 But perhaps more important were the 
reactions from local Chiefs and the populace in general. Thus, for 
example, the titular political and religious head of all Yoruba
Chiefs at the time, the Oni of Ife, was reported to have said that
’Nobody is so foolish as not to see the Europeans buying cocoa and 
burning it without thinking of what might may likely happen [without 
the purchase scheme]’.186
Two other quotations illustrate the argument. They are both 
rather long, but they capture very accurately the sentiment which 
prevailed at the time. The Senior District Officer, Ibadan Division, 
wrote in March 1941:
2G7
The predominant spirit that I have encountered was been one of profound gratitude
to Government for purchasing the cocoa crop for the second year in succession -
When the idea of burning last years’ light crop Mas first mooted someone said to 
me 'The Yoruba Mill never understand that; he Mill think it lunacy to pay good 
money for a thing and then burn it". He uas Mrong. A fern days ago I Mas discuss­
ing the economic situation mith a large meeting in Odeomu and the Bale of that 
toMn said, that uhat really impressed them all Mas the sure proof of government’s 
love for them, in that though much of the cocoa mas a dead loss, Mitness the 
burning of it, they [Government] mere prepared to pay a good market price for it 
so that "their children" should not suffer. In other Hords the burning of the 
light crop Mas the final and incontrovertible proof of Government’s bona fide in 
native eyes. No disgruntled ’bush buyer’ could Nhisper that Government Mas 
certainly buying the crop but at a poor price and making a large profit on re­
sale elseuhere. The farmer Mho had been seen Mith his OMn eyes the beans for 
Nhich he had been paid hard cash literally ’going up in smoke’ Mas and is proof 
against the possibility of such propaganda.18®
And a resolution which the Ibadan Council passed on the 30th 
September, 1940, part of which was subsequently transmitted to the
Secretary of State for the Colonies, reads:
The appreciative feelings of the entire native population of Ibadan Nhose 
economic salvation the purchase scheme makes sure Mere expressed to you by the 
Olubadan when amongst other things he said: "You are beloved and affectionate 
husband: no other man can love us as You and no earthly pouer can seduce us from 
You, and even before the death itself can so it mill have to struggle a great 
deal." Me must assume that from all me knom this generosity of the Government has 
no equal in any land, and Mill serve to strengthen our loyal devotion to the God­
fearing British Government.18T
There were other similar resolutions, and again and again the 
burning of light crop cocoa is cited as an example of the generosity
of the government.18 8 Given what people were told by the government
and even more importantly, what they could see at the time, it is 
hardly surprising that the attitude of the majority of the Nigerian 
farmers and traders was one of gratitude and certainly not one of 
criticism. This may well be the reason why critical voices found no 
resonance and that there was no common interest between cocoa farmers
and traders to protest against the scheme ’as they did at the time of
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the Cocoa Agreement’, as the Governor of Nigeria wrote in February 
1940.189
The voices of dissent were thus subdued and emerged only 
infrequently and on special occasions, for example in Legislative 
Council Debates. On 6th March, 1940 H.S.A. Thomas, the third elected 
Lagos member of the Legislative Council, argued that there would be 
’a general feeling that the trading methods of the European firms 
leave the African trader or middlemen very little on which to 
live.. . ’ . 190 Such sentiments can also be found in petitions written 
at the time, for example one by A. Ogden, who wrote that ’Opposition 
is evident against Black people gaining any strength, by being kept 
down, and poor, by White Control (sic).’191
Further criticism was directed against low produce prices. In 
April 1940 the Ibadan Co-operative Marketing Union passed a resolu­
tion in which it was stated that the government purchase price was 
inadequate, especially in view of the fact that prices of imported 
goods had steeply risen since the beginning of the war. Higher cocoa 
purchase prices, it was argued, would assist farmers ’to pay their 
labour bill, taxes, train their children and pay their other legiti­
mate dues’ .19 2
It appears therefore that insofar as Nigeria was concerned 
criticism of the scheme in 1939/40 was rather limited and on the 
whole ineffectual. Politically the scheme had been a great success 
since no strong opposition emerged,193 but the Governor was aware 
that this condition would probably not be permanent. He argued that
As control progressed the feeling grew locally that, although the Cocoa Control 
scheme was initiated Mith a view of protecting the Mest African cocoa producer, 
the influence of the exporting firms became so strong in implementing the scheme 
that the primary object mas to some extend obscured, and the interests of the 
firms became paramount.1,8
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Thus one of the minor aims of the imposition of control was not
achieved. Though the scheme had probably prevented a rapid fall of
cocoa prices in Nigeria at the beginning of the war and thus fore­
stalled political difficulties, the imposition had not succeeded in 
laying to rest the widespread suspicion of the European firms which 
already existed before the outbreak of war. This political problem
apparently persisted with the added component that in as much as
government was responsible for the purchase scheme, criticism 
directed against the firms automatically became criticism directed 
against the government. This had important long-term consequences, as 
we will see in the next chapter, since the anxiety about possible 
political difficulties was one of the reasons why the purchase scheme 
was reorganised in 1942.
This section on the immediate reaction to the imposition of 
produce control concludes with a brief review how the scheme was 
received by the West African Students’ Union in London. Though 
neither directly connected with the economic interests of cocoa 
farmers nor produce traders, their view probably accurately reflected 
the views held in nationalist circles in Nigeria, since these groups 
to a large extent overlapped.196
The West African Students’ Union wrote two memoranda during 
1939/40, one of which was entirely devoted to the question of price 
control in Nigeria, while the other dealt more with political 
questions, but included topics such as the desirability of the 
provision of credit to African entrepreneurs and the role of the 
European firms in Nigeria.198 Both memoranda were published in the 
weekly journal West Africa197 and caused such a debate that the 
Colonial Office in one case even decided also to have published its 
reply to one of the memoranda.19 8
The criticism of the first memorandum, titled ’Price Control 
and the Standard of Living in West Africa’, focused almost exclu­
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sively on the question of the price cocoa farmers should receive for 
their produce. The authors argued that the prices of imported mer­
chandise and, in particular, the price of cotton goods had steeply 
risen since the beginning of the war and that the purchase prices had 
been fixed at a comparatively low level. Thus the standard of living 
of cocoa farmers had considerably declined. This would have many 
undesirable consequences, such as cuts in social services, increased 
incidence of crime, as well as severe difficulties in the collection 
of taxes.19 9
The memorandum also contained a criticism of the way eventual profits 
of the scheme would be returned to West Africa, which in retrospect 
was an almost prophetic criticism of future developments. The authors 
of the memorandum argued that
It is inequitable to call upon one section of the population, naaely the cocoa 
growers to pay their extra-ordinary war tax on behalf of the rest of the popula­
tion. It is a tax because the share of the profits on sales Nhich is returned to 
the colonial adainistration Mill not go into the pockets of those to whoa it 
belongs, but will be used to aeet the deficit in the public revenue.*#0
Finally, the memorandum criticised the appointment of persons 
as Cocoa Controllers, respectively as Deputy Cocoa Controller, in the 
United Kingdom who had a vested interest in the Nigerian cocoa trade. 
These appointments, it was stated, were not likely to inspire any 
confidence in the scheme.201 In this connection it is note-worthy 
that the Colonial Office strongly defended the impartiality of J. 
Cadbury and E.C. Tansley. One Colonial Office official even wrote: 
’As it often happens with just men, both Cadbury and Tansley have 
tended to be rather severe upon the established shippers as a whole, 
and, in particular, upon the firms with which they are connected than 
strict equity demands’.202 But, as Peter Bauer has argued, ’even 
public spirited advisers are likely to be influenced by subconscious 
considerations of the interests of the firms they represent, which
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are all too plausibly equated with the general interest...’,208 
especially if such advisers are still on the payroll of the firms 
they are supposed to control, and have to think about their position 
within the firms once control had been removed.204
The second memorandum dealt mainly with political questions, 
such as adult suffrage, the role of the Native Administration in the 
future political development of the West African colonies and 
representation of African interests on the Executive and Legislative 
Council. However, the second memorandum also commented upon how the 
West African Students’ Union regarded the European trading firms. It 
stated that:
...the weubers of the West African Student’s Union, viewing with deep concern the 
increase of European and other foreign [i.e. Syrian] cowbines’ stranglehold on 
the economic life of the inhabitants of West Africa, strongly condewn this 
cowaercial aalady and huably call the Government to introduce appropriate 
legislation to protect the interests of the African traders and faraers.205
It is impossible to assess what precise impact these memoranda 
had, but the wording, as well as the content, suggest that there
existed a strong continuity between political thinking expressed
during the cocoa crisis of 1938 and the political thinking which now
emerged.
It is, in retrospect, somewhat surprising that the most active 
movement during the cocoa crises in 1938 - the Nigerian Youth
Movement - seems not to have exploited the introduction of produce 
control to make their views more widely known. Though individual 
members of the Movement, such as A . Awolowo, wrote memoranda at the 
time which dealt amongst other topics with produce control,206 the 
Movement itself was apparently incapable of developing a coherent 
policy. This was probably due to the internal problems of the 
Nigerian Youth Movement, which in 1940 were already boiling and 
culminated one year later in the leadership crisis of 1941, which
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split the movement and almost completely paralysed it for a large 
part of the war.207 Another reason was probably that by 1940 the 
Nigerian Youth Movement had become a more respectable and less 
radical organisation. There was, for example, in September 1940 a 
’Representative Council’ meeting of the Nigerian Youth Movement, 
which, according to its programme, was addressed by the Governor of 
Nigeria, Bernard Bourdillon, as well as by the Director of Agricul­
ture, J.R. Mackie.208 In this meeting the issue of produce control 
did not, it seems, receive much attention.
Thus political reactions to the imposition of produce control 
and the way it worked during its first operational season were mixed. 
There was criticism, but that criticism appears to have been more 
than balanced by genuine praise for the scheme, most likely because 
in the eyes of the public there was not much difference between the 
design of the scheme and how it worked in practice. Though the 
destruction of cocoa was not envisaged when the scheme was set up, it 
appeared as part of the same system and thus considerably legitimised 
it for many observers. However, political reactions to the imposition 
of produce control and to the way it worked during the 1939/40 cocoa 
season were not limited to West Africa. Thus, in the last section of 
this chapter I will briefly discuss, what political effects produce 
control and its actual working had on the control authorities in 
London.
Political Repercussions in Britain
The imposition of produce control and the price which the 
Ministry of Food paid to West African cocoa farmers, as well as the 
decision to destroy part of the 1939/40 crop, received notable 
critical attention in the British press20® and in the House of 
Commons, especially by members of the Labour Party210 who even
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sometimes went to the Colonial Office to have discussions about 
these issues with the responsible officials in charge of the cocoa 
scheme.211
There were two distinct political questions to which the 
Ministry of Food and the Colonial Office had to find answers. One was 
how to avoid in the future parliamentary criticism of the destruction 
of a foodstuff in West Africa, which at the same time was rationed in 
the United Kingdom. The other was how to assure the continuation of a 
scheme which had proved to be a drain on government resources, since 
the season had closed with an overall loss to the Treasury of 
£208,548 of which £61,800 was incurred on buying operations in 
Nigeria.212 The answer that was found was to establish the West 
African Cocoa Control Board.
In April and May 1940, when it became clear that part of the 
1939/40 cocoa crop would be unmarketable, the Ministry of Food became 
increasingly uneasy about having the responsibility for the purchase 
scheme. The Ministry of Food rightly expected criticism in Parlia­
ment, as well as from other government departments, on the decision 
to destroy cocoa.213 For motives not entirely clear, the Colonial 
Office decided to help the Ministry of Food by making arrangements so 
that the decision to destroy cocoa would be announced locally and 
that the responsibility for organising and supervising destruction 
would rest with the West African governments.214 This explains why, 
although the formal decision to destroy cocoa was taken by the 
authorities in London on 29th May, 1940, the official announcement 
published by the West African governments was worded the following 
day so as to give the impression that the destruction of cocoa was a 
West African affair.215
The crucial interdepartmental meeting on the 29th May, 1940 was 
not only concerned with the destruction of cocoa. It also discussed 
the long-term future of the scheme, since it was assumed that the
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destruction of cocoa would have to be repeated in future seasons as 
long as supplies vastly exceeded demand and shipping facilities. This 
problem prompted the Treasury representative at the meeting, G.F. 
Peaker, to intervene, by asking who would be responsible for the 
scheme in the next seasons, what in this connection could have only 
meant the question of who was going to bear the brunt of clearly un­
popular political decisions. At this point in the discussion, the 
representative of the Colonial Office, E. Melville, came up with an 
outline for a new scheme which he had obviously prepared in advance 
of the meeting. He argued that there would be no political alterna­
tive to continuing the scheme in the 1940/41 season.210 He then 
proposed that the Ministry should effectively be divested of its 
responsibility for the scheme by limiting its role to buying the 
United Kingdom requirements. The responsibility for foreign sales of 
West African cocoa should, however, rest with Cocoa Control in 
London, which would act as an agent for the West African governments. 
The total estimated receipts on the sales in the United Kingdom and 
overseas would then be pooled for the purpose of fixing the price to
the farmers in West Africa on the basis of the size of the marketable
crop. He then made clear in what respect the future scheme would be 
different from the one in operation. He argued that,
...as the financial responsibility Mould still fall in the last analysis on the 
United Kingdom Treasury, the scheae outlined Mas not really fundaaentally 
different froa the present scheae of control except in tao particulars. In the 
first place the price paid to groaers Mould not be based on "a fair return" but 
on the estiaated sale value of the estiaated crop; in the second place, Mhile the 
aachinery of control Mould reaain broadly as at present, the political respon­
sibility Mould be shifted froa the Ministry of Food.217
As we will see in the next chapter the proposal from E.
Melville was, apart from minor changes, broadly accepted. Here it is
probably sufficient to emphasise that the origin of the institutio­
nalisation of produce control, i.e. the establishment of the West
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African Produce Control Board in September 1940, had its origins in 
the political discomfort of the Ministry of Food and that one purpose 
of the new scheme was to prevent a repetition of the occurrence of 
further financial losses to His Majesty’s Treasury.218 This was a 
significant departure from earlier official assurances that the sole
purpose of the scheme would be to protect the interests of West
African cocoa farmers.
This chapter aims to answer two questions: What were the
reasons for the establishment of statutory marketing in 1939 and what
were the political repercussions of this policy? It has been shown 
that the long-term interests of the European trading firms to 
preserve their dominant position in West African cocoa trade 
coincided with the short-term interests of the government to prevent 
a recurrence of political trouble similar to that which occurred in 
the Gold Coast and Nigeria in 1937 and 1938. In addition, the govern­
ment was interested in reaping the economic benefits the scheme 
appeared to offer. Yet, the government was dependent on the firms’ 
help in setting up and running the scheme. This explains why the 
firms were able to make their interests almost invariably prevail 
over others in the Nigerian cocoa trade, notably the interests of the 
keenest competitors in that trade, the Nigerian-based firms. In that 
respect the imposition of produce control was a remarkable success, 
since the European firms managed to transform their clandestine 
buying agreement into an official one with statutory backing. In 
addition, they were apparently able to inflate their profits on cocoa 
buying operations in Nigeria. Yet, at the same time the government 
got a foothold in the trade. This had important long-term conse­
quences, since already at the end of the 1939/40 season the govern­
ment began to use the marketing system in furtherance of its own 
political and economic interests. These developments were made 
possible by the absence of any major popular protest movement in
276
Nigeria or, for that matter, in West Africa. Politically active 
produce traders could not muster the sort of support they had 
previously received, partly because only some of them were directly 
hit by the system and partly because farmers had no obvious reasons 
for rejecting a system which apparently guaranteed their incomes. In 
this respect the destruction of part of the 1939/40 cocoa crop proved 
to be of utmost political importance, although nobody seriously 
thought that it would become eventually necessary, when the scheme 
was set up.
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Tansley, 1 Dec. 1939 and to E. Melville, 2 Dec. 1939. See also PRO:
CO 852, file 525/4. Colonial Office memorandum ’West African Produce 
Control Board’, Oct. 1943. There it is stated that ’With the disrup­
tion of normal trade, at the outbreak of war, it was arranged after 
consultation between the merchants and the Ministry of Food [ "on the 
initiative of the A.W.A.M." deleted in original draft] that the 
handling of exports should be divided as nearly as possible in
accordance with pre-war performance.’ It is noteworthy that cocoa 
exports quotas were introduced in the Gold Coast, Nigeria, the
Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Cameroons, and the Free French colonies.
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50. Holt Papers, Mss. Afr. s825, file 535(11). Letter from Ad­
ministrative Department of John Holt & Co. to DA Lagos, n.d. (Novem­
ber 1939.
51. A.G. Leventis had started baying cocoa on his own in the Gold 
Coast in 1937 after having pursued a successful career with G.B. 
Ollivant, whose General Manager he was until that year. It was only 
after the war that he established himself in Nigeria. Leventis also 
became a member of the Association of West African Merchants. See his 
correspondence with the Colonial Office in PRO: 00 852, file 318/9. 
See also PRO: 00 852, file 630/4. Memorandum ’British Colonial
Exports, 1939-1945’ by F.V. Meyer, August 1946, p.20 and Southall, 
’Cadbury on the Gold Coast’, p. 456. The most prominent Nigerian 
example for how African and Syrian firms were forced to join the 
Association of West African Merchants in order to obtain export 
licenses was the case of the firm of S. Raccah which had achieved a 
remarkable growth in the pre-war years, exporting about onequarter of 
the Kano groundnut crop. For more details on the Raccah case see PRO: 
00 852, file 253/3, file 253/4 and file 253/5.
52. Holt Papers. Mss. Afr. s825, file 535(11). Letter from Ad­
ministrative Department of John Holt & Co. to DA Lagos, n.d. (Novem­
ber 1939.
53. NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S30. Nigerian Legislative Council: Reply 
by the Chief Seer. to Question No. 44 on 4 March 1940. See chapter 
two, table 2.
54. Ibid. and NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S28. Letter from E. Melville to 
C.C. Wooley, 25 April 1940. The figures for the individual quotas of 
firms were frequently changed in the first months of the war. Thus, 
for example, the Dutch firm of Witt & Busch was officially allocated 
a "paper” quota by the Colonial Office, though the firm was not 
allowed to export Nigerian cocoa to the Netherlands and for this 
reason was largely defunct. Nevertheless, the firm was kept in the 
official tables for a considerable period of time, probably because 
it was thought politically inopportune to ’’officially'* exclude a firm 
from the Nigerian cocoa trade which was located in a country (the 
Netherlands) which was on friendly terms with Britain.
55. The figures in table 4 are the number which officials used in the 
actual administration of the scheme, for example for the purpose of 
issuing export licenses. For slightly different figures, see PRO: MAF 
75/31. Ministry of Food, ’Colonial Empire Cocoa: Scheme of Control, 
3rd Revise’, 16 Feb. 1940 and PRO: 00 852, file 256/3. Letter from 
N.V. Deane (UAC) to E.C. Tansley, 1 Dec. 1939. For the "official"
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the Colonies to the Governor of Nigeria, 2 Dec. 1939. Cf. J. Mars,
’Extra - Territorial Enterprises’, in: M. Perham, Economics of a
Tropical Dependency. Vol.II, (London 1948), p.56.
The situation in the Gold Coast seems to have been less confusing in 
this respect, where the 1939/40 crop distributed between European 
firms, excluding shipments by African exporters (28,000 tons or 11.4% 
of the expected crop), was as follows: W. Bartholomew & Co. Ltd. 
(1.33%), Busi & Stephenson Ltd. (4.00%), Cadbury and Fry (Accra) Ltd. 
(15.58%), Compagnie Frangaise de l’Afrique Occidentale (8.29%), E. &
S. Co-operative Wholesale Society (5.00%), John Holt & Co. Ltd.
(3.68%), A.G. Leventis and Co. Ltd. (3.21%), J. Lyons and Co. Ltd.
(3.78%), Paterson, Zochonis and Co. (1.85%), Societe Commerciale de 
l’Ouest Africain (2.66%), Union Trading Company Ltd. (4.03%), United 
Africa Company Ltd. (33.74%), G.B. Ollivant Ltd. (10.25%), Swiss 
African Trading Company Ltd. (2.60%). For these figures see PRO: MAF
75/31. Ministry of Food, ’Colonial Empire Cocoa: Scheme of Control,
3rd Revise’, 16 Feb. 1940. Note that the Unilever Group (United 
Africa Company, G.B. Ollivant and Swiss African Trading Company) was 
thus guaranteed a total market share of about 47% of all Nigerian
cocoa exports and 41% of all cocoa exports from the Gold Coast. Since
the Gold Coast cocoa crop was about twice the Nigerian crop, the 
group’s West African market share amounted to about 43%.
56. PRO: MAF 75/31. Ministry of Food, ’Colonial Empire Cocoa: Scheme 
of Control, 3rd Revise*, 16 Feb. 1940.
57. NAI: NL/FI. Nigerian Legislative Council. Address by Governor B. 
Bourdillon, 4 Dec. 1939. See also Report on Cocoa Control in West 
Africa. 1939-1943, and Statement of Future Policy, Cmd.6554 of Sept. 
1944, (London 1944), p.7.
58. Holt Papers, Mss. Afr. s825, file 535(11). Letter from Admi­
nistrative Department of John Holt & Co. to DA Lagos, 3 Jan. 1940.
59. PRO: 00 852, file 256/1. Colonial Office memorandum, ’Cocoa
Control’, 18 Sept. 1939.
60. The idea of dividing exporters into two classes seems to have 
come from J. Cadbury. See PRO: CO 852, file 256/2. Letter from J. 
Cadbury to E. Melville, 25 Sept. 1939.
61. The Colonial Office argued that the direction of sales of 
Nigerian based firms to manufacturers in the U.K. and overseas and 
the subsequent audit of their accounts by a London-based authority 
would be difficult, if not impossible. It was also argued that the
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firms of "B" Shippers were not subject to the Companies’ Ordinance of 
1939 and therefore not liable to pay Excess Profit Tax on profits 
which exceeded a fixed maximum ceiling. See NAI: Qyo Prof 2/1, file C 
234. Letter from the Seer, of State for the Colonies to the Officer 
Administering the Government of Nigeria, 22 Nov. 1939. See also PRO: 
CO 852, file 630/14. Memorandum ’British Colonial Exports, 1939-1945’ 
by F.V. Meyer, August 1946, p.20.
62. See below in this chapter the section on the position of the 
Nigerian government regarding the quota question.
63. PRO: MAF 7531. Ministry of Food, ’Colonial Empire Cocoa: Scheme 
of Control, 3rd Revise’, 16 Feb. 1940.
64. NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S 30. Nigerian Legislative Council, 
’Reply by the CS to Question No. 44’ , 4 March 1940.
65. The allocation of quotas to "B” Shippers was much more difficult
in the Gold Coast than in Nigeria. Over 90 firms and individuals had
exported cocoa (from as little as 8 tons to as much as several
thousand tons) in the 1938/39 cocoa season from the Gold Coast and
were, therefore, entitled to a quota. Total exports of ”B” Shippers
amounted to 27,887 tons in 1938/39. In the following season these
firms received a combined quota of 28,556 tons which was later
increased to 31,065 tons, much to the annoyance of the Association of 
West African Merchants. The main problem in the distribution of ”B” 
Shipper quotas was that some firms had, or claimed to have, made 
contracts with overseas buyers which they were legally bound to 
fulfill. These firms argued that such contracts should be counted as 
part of their eventual quota. There was, for example, the case of the
African and Dominion Trading Company Ltd. which was the selling
agency for the Gold Coast and Ashanti Farmers’ Union. The General 
Manager of the company was J.B. Danquah, the later co-founder and 
leader of the United Gold Coast Convention, while the moving spirit 
behind the Gold Coast and Ashanti Farmers Union was Nana Sir Ofori 
Atta, who had played a prominent role in the 1937/38 cocoa hold-up 
movement. Despite the fact that the firm had already made substantial 
preparation for the fulfillment of a contract for the delivery of 
some 23,000 tons of cocoa (!) to a Canadian customer, the Colonial 
Office refused to accept the claim on rather, it seems, thin grounds. 
This stirred up considerable political discontent at the time. See 
NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S 57. Copy of a letter from the Governor of 
the Gold Coast Arnold Hodson to the Seer, of State for the Colonies, 
8 March 1940. In this connection it is noteworthy, that the man who 
had negotiated the contract in Canada was very likely W. Tete-Ansa, 
who was the representative of the Gold Coast and Ashanti Farmers’
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Union and of the Africa and Dominion Trading Company Ltd. in Toronto 
at the time. See I. Duf field, ’Pan-African ism, Rational or Irration­
al. Review Article’, Journal of African History. XVIII(1977)4, p.603. 
For the whole correspondence on the African and Dominion Trading 
Company Ltd. see various letters from J.B. Danquah and others in PRO: 
00 852, file 317/8.
The situation in Nigeria was less complicated. There, only relatively 
small parcels of cocoa had been contracted before the imposition of 
the quota system. This, however, did not deter the Association of 
West African Merchants to fight for each and every ton of ”B” Shipper 
cocoa. The Greek firm S. Thomopulos had, for example, concluded a 
contract for the delivery of 100 tons to a U.K. customer and after 
long and protracted discussions his claim to an additional quota was 
refused by the authorities in London. The decision was revised later 
in the season, and Thomopulos’ quota in the 1939/40 crop year was 
increased to 876 tons. The combined quota of all ”B" Shippers in 
Nigeria in the 1939/40 season was therefore 2,600 tons. See various 
letters by S. Thomopulos and other in NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S26.
66. Bauer, West African Trade, p.250 and idem. Reality and Rhetoric: 
Studies in the Economics of Development. (London 1984), p.96.
67. PRO: CO 852, file 256/2. Colonial Empire Cocoa Control, ’Minutes 
of Meeting’, 7 Nov. 1939.
68. D. Meredith, ’The Colonial Office’, p.298.
69. PRO: CO 852, file 319/3. Minute by G.L.M. Clauson, 11 Sept. 1939, 
cited (partially) by Meredith, op.cit.. It is not immediately clear, 
what Clauson could have meant by the phrase ’being blackmailed’. One 
could argue that it was just a ’’Freudian slip", but since the phrase 
was used more than once it probably was an expression of a feeling of 
being pressurised by political means (press campaigns and such like) 
into making "undue" concessions supposedly to sectional interests. 
This quotation from G.L.M. Clauson could easily be dismissed as being 
unrepresentative and historically absurd, were it not for the fact 
that it reveals a frightening degree of ignorance of a high-ranking 
Colonial Office official about the social and political dynamics of 
society in Nigeria, let alone societies of other countries.
70. PRO: 00 852, file 319/3. Minute by O.G.R. Williams, 19 June 1940.
71. Ibid., Minute by E. Melville, 16 June 1940.
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72. In a recent article, A.I. Nwabughuogu maintained that Nigerian 
traders were shown in a bad light in, for example, official reports 
since at least 1900. This might have been the case, but the fierce 
dislike for Nigerian traders displayed at the beginning of the war 
seems rather to have been a result of the events of 1937/38. As has 
been argued in the previous chapter, Colonial Office officials were 
taken by complete surprise by the strength of the anti-pool movements 
in the Gold Coast and in Nigeria, and their attitude towards produce 
traders was more likely an expression of the sense of insecurity 
which seems to have emerged at the time within the Colonial Office 
than being caused by any long cultivated antagonism. Cf. A.I. 
Nwabughuogu, ’From Wealthy Entrepreneurs to Petty Traders: The 
Decline of the African Middlemen in Eastern Nigeria, 1900-1950’, 
Journal of African History. XXIII(1982)3, p.366.
73. NAI: Oyo Prof 2/1, file C 234 Vol.I. Telegram from the Seer, of 
State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of 
Nigeria, 22 Nov. 1939. The strength of this argument is difficult to 
assess. The Colonial Office seems to have used it only in the discus­
sions with the Nigerian government in order to convince the latter of 
the reasonableness of the quota system. There is therefore the strong 
possibility that this argument was a latter day rationalisation of 
the actions of the Colonial Office rather than a profound conviction. 
Moreover, the argument appears to be strikingly implausible, given 
the extent the member firms of the Association of West African 
Merchants were to profit from the elimination of enemy firms from the 
Nigerian market. For this reason it seems to be justified not to 
attach too much weight to this argument.
74. The Nigerian government also took a very critical view of other 
aspects of the purchase scheme, such as the effect it would have on 
the development of co-operative societies and the amount of remunera­
tion the European firms would receive for their services from the 
Ministry of Food. For more details see further down.
75. PRO: 00 852, file 256/3. Telegram from the Governor of Nigeria to 
the Seer, of State for the Colonies, 25 Nov. 1939. This quotation was 
reproduced here in full length in order to show tho way in which the 
Governor of Nigeria step by step argued his case. The quotation is 
also a particularly good example foi the "political economy approach" 
of the Governor to the who]e issue. For a very similar argument from 
the Governor of the Gold Coast, see NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S 57. 
Telegram from the Governor of the Gold Coast to the Seer, of State 
for the Colonies, 8 March 1940.
293
76. NAI: Oyo Prof 2/1, file C 234 Vol. I. Telegram from the Governor 
of Nigeria to the Seer, of State for the Colonies, 23 Nov. 1939.
77. PRO: 00 852, file 256/3. Telegram from the Governor of Nigeria to 
the Seer, of State for the Colonies, 28 Nov. 1939.
78. PRO: CO 852, file 256/2. Telegram from the Governor of Nigeria to 
the Seer, of State for the Colonies, 5 Oct. 1939.
79. PRO: CO 852, file 256/3. Telegram from the Governor of Nigeria to 
the Seer, of State for the Colonies, 25 Nov. 1939.
80. The demand of the Nigerian Governor for the authority to dis­
tribute part of the export licences at his own discretion was only 
given up in July 1940. See NAI: lb MinAgric, file 17980 Vol. I. 
Memorandum by the Governor of Nigeria, ’Cocoa’, 30 July 1940. For the 
discussion itself see PRO: 00 852, file 318/2. Minute by E. Melville, 
21 Feb. 1940. Cf. NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S 28. Letter from E. 
Melville to C.C. Wooley, 25 April 1939. In this letter E. Melville 
stated, that ’Central Control would have been only too happy to leave 
the whole sharing arrangements to the discretion of the local 
controller....’ This sentence contradicts other statements from E. 
Melville and was arguably only written to placate the irate Governor 
rather than an accurate description of the position of the Colonial 
Office at the time. For the point of view of the Governor of Nigeria, 
see PRO: CO 852, file 318/2. Memorandum ’Cocoa Control Scheme’ by the 
Governor of Nigeria, n.d. (May 1940).
81. This episode seems to be another example for how the balance of 
power between colonial governments and the authorities in London 
changed at the beginning of the war in favour of the latter. In this 
connection it is interesting to note that a number of important 
decisions were, in effect, not made by the imperial government or the 
Colonial Office, but by a handful of British firms and their trade 
associations, such as the Association of West African Merchants to 
which some of these powers had apparently been delegated. See N.J. 
Westcott, ’The Impact of the Second World War on Tanganyika, 1939- 
49’, in: D. Killingray and R.J.A.R. Rathbone, (eds.), Africa in the 
Second World War, (Basingstoke 1986), p.156.
82. NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S 4 Vol.I. Confidential despatch from the 
Governor of Nigeria to the Seer, of State for the Colonies, 15 Feb.
1940. It seems very likely that when the Governor of Nigeria wrote 
this despatch he was also thinking of the way in which British firms 
had been allowed to share out the distribution of exports other than 
cocoa (palm oil, palm kernels, groundnuts and cotton) and the
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merchandise import trade among themselves.
83. In fact, the Ministry of Food set up four schedules, one for each 
of the "A" and ”B" Shippers exporting their own purchases and another 
2 schedules for "A" and "B" Shippers in the event "B" Shippers would 
sell part of their quota purchases directly to the firms. Since the 
latter hardly ever happened, an omission of a detailed discussion of 
the value of the various items in these schedules seems to be 
justified. For the schedules itself see FRO: MAF 75/31. Ministry of 
Food, ’Colonial Empire Cocoa: Scheme of Control, 3rd Revise’, 16 Feb. 
1940, appendix N1-N4.
84. PRO: CO 852, file 256/2. Colonial Empire Cocoa Control: Minutes 
of Meeting, 7 Nov. 1939. The accounts of the firms were audited by 
the Colonial Office on an annual basis. This was not an easy task 
since the firms did ’ . . .not keep any reliable accounts on the 
coast. . . ’ as the Secretary of the West African Cocoa Control Board, 
G.W. Henlen put. See NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S63A. Letter from G.W. 
Henlen to G.F.T. Colby, 31 Oct. 1941. Moreover, the firms apparently 
used different costing systems. On the considerable differences 
between the systems which the firms of John Holt & Co. and the United 
Africa Company used, see PRO: 00 852, file 533/16. Letter from J. 
Holt to Seer. of the West African Produce Control Board, 27 Jan. 
1942. According to J. Holt, the United Africa costing system con­
sisted of fixing charges ’according to informed opinion’.
85. The item ’interest’ in the schedule was a considerable cost 
factor. Thus in the 1939/40 season "A" and "B" Shippers together 
(presumably overwhelmingly the European firms) received £97,692 as 
interest payments on the capital they had made available to the 
Ministry of Food during the season. From 1939/40 these payments 
steadily declined (1940/41: £42,971; 1941/42: £22,305; 1942/43:
£15,098). After that season, the system was changed. For these 
figures, see the Statement on the Future Marketing of West African 
Cocoa. Qnd.6950 of November 1946, (London 1946), appendix II D, p.11.
86. PRO: CO 852, file 256/2. Colonial Empire Cocoa Control: Minutes 
of meeting, 7 Nov. 1939, appendix B.3 and B.4. These figures show 
very clearly why at the end of the 1930s the European firms faced 
increasing competition from Nigerian-based competitors. As their 
managerial skills certainly would have improved in the future (and 
there are examples which indeed show that this was already happening 
in the 1930s), it seems not unreasonable to assume that in the long 
term, without the control scheme, some of the European firms would 
have found it increasingly difficult to stay in the Nigerian cocoa 
export trade.
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87. The initial calculation of the marketing costs schedule of the 
Association of West African Merchants was based on an estimated 
selling price in Britain and overseas countries of £25 per ton. Thus 
the expected theoretical remuneration (4.5 %) for services rendered 
in Africa and elsewhere was 22s 6d per ton. These calculations are 
rather speculative since at the time it was not known how much cocoa 
would eventually be sold at what price. It appears that the original 
account of the transactions between the Ministry of Food and the 
European firms have not been kept and it is therefore impossible to 
find out what precise remuneration the firms received. But there is 
some evidence which suggests that the actual figures were probably 
higher than 22s 6d per ton. In a letter from the Managing Director of 
the United Africa Company, F. Samuel, to E.C. Tansley the former 
stated that until the 1942/43 season remuneration for the services of 
his firm had worked out to be around 24s per ton. See PRO: 00 852, 
file 446/7. Letter from F. Samuel to E.C. Tansley, 15 Sept. 1942. See 
also PRO: 00 852, file 512/10. Letter from the Cocoa Sub-Committee of 
the Association of West African Merchants (F. Samuel) to the West
African Produce Control Board, 8 Sept. 1943. In this letter F. Samuel 
admitted that the item ’Head Office Expenses’ in the 1940/41 and 
1941/42 buying schedules actually represented remuneration. Since the 
precise internal cost schedules of the firms are not known, it is 
almost impossible to find out how much net profit the firms really 
made in the cocoa trade under war-time conditions. For a different 
view see Fieldhouse, ’War and the Origins’, pp. 19-20.
88. PRO: MAF 75/31. ’Colonial Empire Cocoa: Scheme of Control, 3rd 
Revise’, 16 Feb. 1940, appendix N1 and N2.
89. PRO: 00 852, file 318/2. Memorandum ’Cocoa Control Scheme’ by the 
Governor of Nigeria, n.d. (May 1940) and PRO: CO 852, file 317/10. 
Letter from the Chief Seer, to the Seer, of State for the Colonies, 
24 April 1940.
90. Bauer, West African Trade. p.256 and Mars, Extra-territorial
Enterprises, p.92.
91. For the 1937 Agreement schedule, see Holt Papers. Mss. Afr. s825, 
file 535(1). Letter from Administrative Department of John Holt & Co, 
to DA Lagos, 2 Nov. 1937. See also Holt Papers, Mss. Afr. s825, file 
535(11). Memorandum ’Cocoa’ by Administrative Department, n.d. 
(1945). For the 1939/40 schedule see PRO: MAF 75/31. Ministry of 
Food, ’Colonial Empire Cocoa: Scheme of Control, 3rd Revise’, 16 Feb.
1940. The 1937/38 and 1939/40 schedules are in a strict sense
incompatible, since the former contains certain items which the
latter lacks and vice versa. However, in as much as single items in
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the schedules are concerned, especially the items ’coast establish­
ment charges’ and ’remuneration’, such a comparison seems to be 
justified.
92. The figure 5s Id is taken from an internal memorandum which the 
Administrative Department of John Holt & Co. had produced in 1945 in 
order to show the development of the value of the items 'coast 
establishment charges’, 'head office expenses’ and ’remuneration’ in 
Nigeria and the Gold Coast during the war. This memorandum used the 
1937 Buying Agreement schedule as its point of reference. See also 
Nowell Report, para. 451. The Commission reported that in the 1937/38 
cocoa season the profit margin of the agreement firms on their buying 
operations in Nigeria had amounted to about 5s per ton.
93. This is probably a conservative estimate, since the actual rate 
of remuneration on cocoa purchase in Nigeria seems to have increased 
from 5s Id per ton to 24s per ton or by 472% (!). For the figure of 
24s per ton remuneration see PRO: 00 852, file 446/7. Letter from F. 
Samuel to E.C. Tansley, 15 Sept. 1942.
94. In 1937/38 the pool firms exported some 97,500 tons of cocoa. In 
1939/40 the "A" Shippers purchased about 80,000 tons of cocoa, of 
which some 10,000 tons were eventually destroyed. Note that the firms 
received a remuneration of 1% on the purchase price of cocoa, which 
could not be exported. For figures on total seasonal exports, 
including exports from ”B" Shippers, from Nigeria see Colonial 
Office, Colonial Annual Reports: Nigeria, no.1904 for 1938 (London 
1940), p.38 and Report on Cocoa Control in West Africa. 1939-1943. 
and Statement of Future Policy, Cmd.6554 of Sept. 1944, (London 
1944), p.15, appendix II. From these totals one has to subtract the 
amount of cocoa which was shipped by non-members of the 1937 Cocoa 
Agreement of about 1,000 tons and the 1939/40 "B" Shipper quota of 
about 2,000 tons.
This calculation does not take into account undisclosed profits which 
were hidden in some items of the marketing schedule, for example, in 
the items ’coast establishment charges’, ’head office expenses’ and 
'loss in weight’. See NAI: lb MinAgric I, file 17980 Vol.IV. Memoran­
dum ’Recommendation in Connection with Continuance of Cocoa Control 
in 1940/41’ by Cocoa Controller, 30 July 1940 and PRO: CO 852, file 
444/11. Letter from the Governor of Nigeria to the Seer. of the West 
African Cocoa Control Board, 7 March 1941. There is also some 
evidence in the Holt Papers, which suggests that the firms con­
siderably inflated their profits by overcharging the Ministry of 
Food. For example, the firm of John Holt & Co. received in 1943 24s 
7d per ton as reimbursement for their hypothetical coast establish­
ment expenses. According to Holt’s own accounts, however, these
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actual expenses came to only 17s 2d. Undisclosed profits on this item 
alone (7s 6d per ton) in 1943 were thus nearly as high as the then 
current official rate of remuneration of 10s 6d per ton. For these 
figures see Holt Papers. Mss. Afr. s825, file 535(11). Memorandum 
’Cocoa’ by Administrative Department of John Holt & Co., n.d. (1945). 
Note that in the discussion above the term ’’profit” is always used to 
describe pre-tax profits. On the exceptionally high rate of taxation 
levied on trading firms during the war, see Mars, Extra-territorial 
Enterprises, p.68. Could it be, that one reason why the Ministry of 
Food treated the firms so generously was the knowledge that part of 
their inflated profits would anyway end up in the Treasury?
95. Thus, for example, the rate of remuneration for ”A" Shippers was 
fixed between 1940 and 1942 at 17s 6d per ton cocoa shipped. Then the 
control system was reorganised, and from 1943 until the end of the 
war the rate of remuneration came to about 10s per ton cocoa pur­
chased. For these figures see Holt Papers. Mss. Afr. s825, file 
535(11). Memorandum ’Cocoa’ by Administrative Department of John Holt 
& Co., n.d. (1945). The reduction in the rate of remuneration did not 
necessarily mean reduced profits. When the system was changed in 
1943, the West African Produce Control Board dispensed with the 
services of the shippers beyond the f.o.b. point. Thus the remu­
neration the firms received concerned different types of services. 
The firms also needed much less capital to conduct their buying 
operations after the 1943 season. Thus, in relation to the working 
capital used profits, seem to have actually increased. See Southall, 
'Cadbury on the Gold Coast’, p.525, appendix table VII(A). On the 
change in the buying system see chapter 7.
96. Nigerian Gazette Extra-ordinary. Public Notice No.73 of 28th 
November, 1939. ’Cocoa Control (Cocoa prices and Brokerage Rates) 
Order’, 1939. See also NAI: lb MinAgric I, file 17980 Vol.I. Telegram 
from the Seer, of State for the Colonies to the Governor of Nigeria 
14 Nov. 1939.
97. PRO: CO 852, file 318/2. Memorandum ’Cocoa Control Scheme’ by the 
Governor of Nigeria, n.d. (May 1940). For a similar argument from the 
Governor of the Gold Coast, see PRO: CO 852, file 256/4. Telegram 
from the Governor of the Gold Coast to the Seer, of State for the 
Colonies, 7 Dec. 1939 and ibid.. file 317/11. Telegram from the 
Governor of the Gold Coast to the Seer, of State for the Colonies, 1 
April 1940.
98. NAI: lb MinAgric I, file 17980 Vol.II. Letter from the Seer. 
Western Provinces to the CS, 5 Feb. 1940.
298
99. Holt Papers. Mss. Afr. s825, file 535(11). Circular to all 
Ventures, Lagos District, John Holt & Co., 23 Nov. 1939.
100. NAI: lb MinAgric I, file 17980 Vol.II. Letter from the Seer. 
Western Provinces to the CS, 5 Feb. 1940.
101. NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 Sll Vol.I. Telegram from the Governor of 
Nigeria to the Seer. of State for the Colonies, 15 Feb. 1939. The 
control scheme thus changed the status of the independent producer 
traders, since they became more and more indistinguishable from the 
larger commission buyers. For more details see further down in this 
chapter the section on the effects of the purchase scheme on the 
position of produce traders in Nigeria.
102. There is some evidence which suggests that the Nigerian govern­
ment decided for political reasons not to control prices in outlying 
villages. See NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S10. Minute by G.F.T. Colby, 23 
April 1940.
103. NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 Sll Vol.I. Letter from the Governor of 
Nigeria to the Seer, of State for the Colonies, 15 Feb. 1940.
104. PRO: CO 852, file 318/2. Memorandum ’Cocoa Control Scheme’ by 
the Governor of Nigeria, n.d. (May 1940). See also PRO: CO 852, file 
256/3. Telegrams from the Governor of Nigeria to the Seer, of State 
for the Colonies, 25 Nov. 1939 and 12 Dec. 1939.
105. PRO: CO 852, file 256/3. Colonial Empire Cocoa Control: Minutes 
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304
1940. He applied for a quota which was promptly refused, but it is 
interesting to record why he thought he merited a quota. He wrote: ’I
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loyally and unreserved to His Majesty’s Government in Nigeria....’. 
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Telegram from the Seer, of State for the Colonies to the Governor of 
Nigeria, 5 Jan. 1940 and PRO: CO 852, file 317/10. Memorandum ’Empire 
Cocoa Control Scheme’ by S.W. Hood (Ministry of Food), 29 Jan. 1940.
309
171. NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S33. Notes on Interdepartmental Meeting 
held at the Ministry of Food, 28 March 1940. See al so Wickizer, 
Coffee, Tea and Cocoa, p.345.
172. NAI: CSO 26, 36148 S39. Ministry of Food: Meeting to consider
’Cocoa Control’, 29 May 1940.
173. NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S33 Vol.I. Notes on Interdepartmental
Meeting held at the Ministry of Food, 28 March 1940.
174. NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S39. Ministry of Food: Meeting to
consider ’cocoa Control’, 29 May 1940.
175. Nigerian Gazette Extra-ordinary, Government Notice No. 557, 30 
May 1940. The Cocoa Controller prepared two special marketing cost 
schedules for the purchase of cocoa for destruction. As in the case 
of ordinary purchases of Nigerian cocoa, the Cocoa Controller found 
it necessary to set up one schedule for European firms and one 
schedule for Nigerian-based firms, although the services they 
rendered were exactly the same. The difference between the two 
schedules amounted to 5s 9d per ton. The rate of brokerage for 
produce traders and commission buyers remained unchanged.
176. NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S33 Vol.II. Notes on a Meeting at the
Secretariat, 22 May 1940.
177. Ibid. Letter from E. Melville to C.C. Wooley (CS), 25 April 1940.
178. NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S12 Vol.III. Memorandum ’Cocoa Pur­
chases’ by Cocoa Controller, 18 Aug. 1942. See also Wickizer, Coffee, 
Tea and Cocoa, p.334 and Report on Cocoa Control in West Africa. 
1939-1943, and Statement of Future Policy, Cmd.6554 of Sept. 1944, 
(London 1944), p.3 and p.15 appendix II. According to the figures 
given by Wickizer all in all some 40,000 tons of West African cocoa 
were destroyed in the second half of the 1939/40 cocoa season.
179. Report on Cocoa Control in West Africa, 1939-1943, and Statement 
of Future Policy. Cmd.6554 of Sept. 1944, (London 1944), p.16
appendix V and NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S12 Vol.III. Memorandum 'Cocoa 
Purchases’ by Cocoa Controller, 18 Aug. 1942.
180. PRO: CO 852, file 319/11. Minute by E. Melville, 27 April 1940.
181. Nigerian Gazette Extra-ordinary. Government Notice No.557, 30 
May 1940.
310
182. PRO: CO 852, file 318/2. Memorandum ’Cocoa Control Scheme’ by
the Governor of Nigeria, n.d. (May 1940).
183. PRO: CO 26, file 36148 Sll Vol,I. Letter from the Governor of 
Nigeria to the Seer, of State for the Colonies, 15 Feb. 1940. See
also Beer, The Politics of Peasant Groups, p.20 and R. Galletti,
K.D.S. Baldwin, 1.0. Dina, Nigerian Cocoa Farmers, (Oxford 1956),
p . 4.
184. West African Pilot. 31 May 1940.
185. NAI: Oyo Prof 2/1, file C 234 Vol.I. Extract from the Minutes of 
the Ife Native Administration Council Meeting, 8 Aug. 1940. The Qni 
was reported to have said this after the announcement of the prohi­
bition of palm kernel purchases in Western Nigeria. Thus he probably 
thought that the purchase of cocoa would have been similarly prohibi­
ted without the cocoa control scheme.
186. NAI: Oyo Prof 2/3, file C234 Vol.II. Report ’Palm Kernel Survey’ 
by the SDO Ibadan Division T.M. Shankland, 12 March 1941.
187. NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S12 Vol.II. Letter from the Ibadan
Council to the SDO Ibadan, 3 Oct. 1940. This letter contains the
resolution from 30th Sept., 1940. The resolution itself reads:
...that this council learnt with feelings of joy and gratitude the 
announcement that His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom had 
again condescended to extend its helping hand to the Nigerian cocoa 
growers by making provisions to buy their cocoa crop for 1940/41, and 
resolved that His Excellency the Governor of Nigeria be graciously 
asked to communicate the appreciation and thanks of Ibadan cocoa 
producers to His Majesty’s Government and people of the United 
Kingdom whose generosity and self-sacrifice made the purchase 
arrangements possible.’ R. Pearce noted that many of the declarations 
of loyalty which Native Authorities, Obas and Emirs sent to the Seer, 
of State for the Colonies at the beginning of the war, were in fact 
prompted by local district officers. Judged from the wording of the 
resolution of the Ibadan Council from 30 Sept. 1940 this might be 
true for the text of the resolution which was subsequently passed on 
to the authorities in London. Yet, it appears that the covering 
letter which is cited above was genuine. See Pearce, Sir Bernard 
Bourdillon, pp.253-255. The resolution was signed by 11 Ibadan 
Chiefs, including the Olubadan, and two non-titled councilors, one of 
whom was the aforementioned A. Obisesan.
311
188. See, for example, NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S12 Vol.II. Letter
from the Ibadan Co-operative Cocoa Marketing Union to the Governor of 
Nigeria, 3 Oct. 1940.
189.NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 Sll Vol.I. Letter from the Governor of 
Nigeria to the Seer, of State for the Colonies, 15 Feb. 1940.
190. Cited in J. Wheare, The Nigerian Legislative Council, (London 
1950), p.119.
191. PRO: 00 852, file 317/8. Letter from A. Ogden to the Seer, of
State for the Colonies, 18 Jan. 1940. A. Ogden asked the Seer, of
State to be included in the list of "B" Shippers, which of course was 
refused since he had not exported cocoa previously.
192. NAI: lb MinAgric 1, file 17980 Vol.III. Resolution by the Ibadan 
Co-operative Cocoa Marketing Union, 13 April 1940.
193. There was one other group which voiced some criticism of the 
purchase scheme. This was the Agege Planters’ Union, which in
December 1939 sent a resolution to the Seer. of State for the
Colonies in order to protest against the low 1939/40 cocoa purchase 
prices. The resolution was signed by J(onathan) K. Coker. He was a 
rich Agege farmei— trader and a leading executive in the Nigerian 
Produce Farmers’ Association, who in 1939/40 had obtained a small 
export quota (28 tons). He was also probably involved in the founda­
tion of the Nigerian Farmers’ Union in April 1940. For this informa­
tion see NAI: CSO 26, 36148 S12 Vol.I. Resolution from Agege Farmers 
Union, 16 Nov. 1939; NAI: CSO 26, 36148 S26. Letter from the Nigerian 
Produce Farmers Association to the Cocoa Controller, 2 Feb. and 15 
March 1940; West Africa, 25 May 1940, p.511. For more details on J.K. 
Coker, see chapter 7.
194. PRO: CO 852, file 318/2. Memorandum ’Cocoa Control Scheme’ by 
the Governor of Nigeria, n.d. (May 1940).
195. G.O. Olusanya, The West African Students’ Union and the Politics 
of Decolonisation. 1925-1958. (Ibadan 1982), p.101.
196. PRO: CO 852, file 349/1. Memorandum by the West African Stu­
dents’ Union, ’Price Control and Living Standards in West Africa’, 1 
March 1940 and ’Address Presented to the Seer. of State for the 
Colonies’, by the President (L. Solanke) of the West African Stu­
dents’ Union, 29 August 1940, printed in West Africa, 7 Sept. 1940, 
p.920.
312
197. The first memorandum was published in West Africa. 6 April 1940, 
p.323.
198. West Africa, 11 May 1940, p.453 and 18 May 1940, p.479.
199. PRO: CO 852, file 349/1. Memorandum ’Price 
Standards in West Africa’, 1 March 1940.
Control and Living
200. Ibid.
201. Ibid. See also West African Pilot, 18 March 1940.
202. NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S57. Letter from E. 
don, 22 May 1940.
Melville to E . Lon-
203. Bauer, West African Trade, p.153.
204. Meredith, ’The Colonial Office’, p.294.
205. ’Address presented to the Secretary of State for the Colonies’,
by the President of the West African Student’s Union (L. Solanke) on
the 29 August 1940, reprinted in West Africa. 7 Sept. 1940, p.920.
206. ’Economic Programme Submitted to the Nigerian Youth Movement, 
Ibadan Branch, 18 June 1940’, by 0. Awolowo, cited in P. Zachernuk, 
'The Economic Programme of the Southern Nigerian Intelligentsia, 
1920-1960’, paper presented at the Canadian Association of African 
Studies Annual Meeting, Kingston, Ontario, 11-14 May 1988, pp.3-4.
207. J.S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, (Berkeley
1958), p.227 and G.O. Olusanya, ’The Nationalist Movement in Nige­
ria’, in: 0. Ikime, (ed.), Groundworks of Nigerian History. (Ibadan 
1980), p.559. Many leading figures, such as N. Azikiwe and S.
Akinsanya, left the Movement, while the remaining members split up
into local branches. Until 1944 the Ibadan branch was headed by O. 
Awolowo. In that year he went to London to study law and the Ibadan 
branch became defunct. While in London, 0. Awolowo founded the ’Egbe 
Omo Oduduwa’ and many former members of the Nigerian Youth Movement
joined this supposedly cultural organisation. Part of the Egbe later 
(1951) re-emerged in the Action Group, the leading nationalist poli­
tical party in Western Nigeria. For the history of the transformation 
of the Nigerian Youth Movement into the Action Group see F.A. Bap­
tiste, ’The Relations between the Western Region and the Federal 
Government of Nigeria: A Study of the 1962 Emergency’, University of 
Manchester M.A. Thesis (Manchester 1965), pp.20-38.
313
208. NAI: CSO 26, file 30055 Vol.II. Nigerian Youth Movement, ’Repre­
sentative Council Meeting’, 6-9 Sept. 1940.
209. See, for example, Manchester Guardian, 13 Dec. 1939.
210. In the House of Commons during 1940 the Seer, of State for the 
Colonies was asked almost ten times by members of the Labour Party 
(A. Creech-Jones and S. Sorensen) and a member of the Communist Party 
(R. Gallacher) about the finer details of the cocoa control scheme. 
These questions considerably irritated Colonial Officials, as a 
minute by the Assistant Under-Secretary, G.L.M. Clauson, reveals. On 
one particular detailed question in the House of Commons on 3 April 
1940 from the Labour M.P. and later Seer, of State for the Colonies, 
A. Creech-Jones, he felt it necessary to comment that ’This is a 
silly question, so silly that I doubt whether the questioner will 
fully understand the reply. We can but do our best’. The question 
concerned the difference in the remuneration and export shares of 
European trading firms and Nigerian based firms. See PRO: 00 852, 
file 317/11. Minute by G.L.M. Clauson, 2 April 1949.
211. See, for example, the minute by F. Stockdale on a discussion he 
had with the Labour M.P. A. Haden-Guest. See PRO: 00 852, file 256/3. 
Minute by F. Stockdale, 24 Nov. 1939.
212. See chapter 6, table 7.
213. The Foreign Office, for example, regarded ’the destruction of 
any food with extreme misgivings....’ See NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 
S39. Ministry of Food. Minutes of 'Meeting to consider Cocoa Con­
trol’ , 29 May 1940.
214. NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S33 Vol.I. Letter from E. Melville to 
C.C. Wooley, 25 April 1940. See also PRO: 00 852, file 319/11. Minute 
by E. Melville, 27 April 1940.
215. Nigeria Gazette Extra-ordinary, Government Notice No.557, 30 May
1940.
216. This was probably a result of strong representations from the 
Governor of Nigeria, who wrote that ’the inability to sell the crop 
would cause grave hardship and want in the Western Provinces. The 
reactions to such a state of affairs [the abolition of the scheme] 
are unpredictable, but the risk of disorder would be serious and 
cannot be overstressed’. See PRO: CO 852, file 318/2. Memorandum
’Cocoa Control Scheme’ by the Governor of Nigeria, n.d. (May 1940).
314
217. NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S39. Ministry of Food. Minutes of
Meeting to consider Cocoa Control, 29 May 1940.
218. Later, in 1942, it was stated in an internal discussion paper 
that ’The Ministry of Food were unwilling to continue a commitment 
which involved them in financial loss and also the political odium of 
the destruction of foodstuff, for whatever reasons. It was therefore 
decided to establish the WACCB.’ See PRO: CO 852, file 413/2. West 
African Produce Control Board, ’Policy Paper No.7: Sales Prices to 
the Ministry of Food’, 26 Nov. 1942. The whole affair was apparently 
kept secret from the West African governments. In late 1941 the 
Nigerian Cocoa Controller G.F.T. Colby wrote a minute which reveals 
that he had no knowledge of the discussions in London. He wrote: 
’During my leave I obtained a good deal of information about Cocoa 
Control and the activities of the Cocoa Control Boards.... The 
Colonial Office for some reason were more interested in cocoa than in 
other West African produce - presumably owing to the serious troubles 
in the Gold Coast in 1937 - and it was recognised that direct
dealings by the firms with the Ministry of Food were not satisfac­
tory. It was accordingly decided to set up the West African Cocoa 
Control Board.’ For the quote see NAI: CSO 26, file 38300 S4. Minute
by G.F.T. Colby, 13 Dec. 1941.
315 
Chapter 6
War-time Controls and the Cocoa Economy
This chapter is divided into four parts. In the first part I 
will briefly outline the main policy strands of the war effort. After 
that I will examine the way in which cocoa marketing was organised 
during the war. In the third part of the chapter I will look at the 
reasons for the extremely restrictive price policy of the war-time 
cocoa control boards and in the final part of the chapter I will try 
to assess what the war effort meant for the Nigerian cocoa producers 
and how they reacted to it.
The War Effort: An Overview
The central aim of the war effort in the colonies was to
manipulate the volume, composition and the prices of the goods (raw 
materials, consumer and capital goods) which the colonies exchanged 
with the United Kingdom in order to mobilise Imperial resources in 
support of the latter in her fight against the Axis Powers.1 As far 
as trade was concerned, the principal means by which this aim was 
achieved in the colonies were foreign exchange regulations, import 
and export controls in the colonies, as well as in the United
Kingdom, and shipping regulations.
The way in which all these controls were administered depended 
on the fortunes of war, allied co-operation and the state of the 
British economy, particularly its balance of payments position. Thus, 
for example, the deteriorating balance of payments position of
Britain vis-a-vis the United States in the first two years of the war 
and again immediately after the war led to the application of
stringent exchange controls in the colonies, which lasted throughout 
the war and for a considerable period afterwards.2 The successive 
transformation of the British civil economy into a fully fledged war 
economy led, moreover, to a tightening of import controls in the
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colonies and export controls in the United Kingdom, which resulted in 
frequent shortages and sometimes even complete lack of a whole range 
of goods, in particular consumer goods, in the colonies.3 As far as 
the fortunes of war were concerned, the fall of France in 1940, the 
entry of the United States into the war in late 1941, the Japanese 
conquest of British colonies in the Far East and South East Asia in 
early 1942, the Battle of the Atlantic in late 1942 and the North 
African campaign in 1943 and 1944 proved to be important military 
events which had a direct bearing on how the war effort was conducted 
in the African colonies and in Nigeria in particular.
Apart from the continuous shipping shortage between 1940 and 
early 1943, the loss of the Far Eastern and South East Asian colonies 
was perhaps the most important single event in the war, since it 
dramatically increased the importance of many Nigerian raw materials, 
which those colonies had previously supplied, such as rubber, tin 
and, above all, vegetable oils and oilseeds.4
War— time controls operated well into the post-war period. In 
the economic field there was little difference between the system 
which operated during the war and the system which came into being 
after the war. The imperative to economise on foreign exchange 
expenditure, to maximise the production and export of raw materials, 
and to minimise imports from the United Kingdom remained one of the 
main pillars of colonial economic policy in the immediate post-war 
years.5 Exchange controls and restrictions, for example, were only 
lifted in 1952,® while import controls from the United States and 
Japan were only finally scrapped as late as 1958.7
The Administrative Machinery
Cocoa control was maintained by a host of governmental depart­
ments, committees and boards. The allied war effort as regards the 
foodstuffs trade was co-ordinated from June 1942 onwards by the 
Combined Food Board. Its main purpose was to allocate foodstuffs
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supplies between the United Kingdom, the United States and other 
Allied Nations.® However, it was only in 1944 that cocoa became 
subject to Combined Food Board allocation. After the war the func­
tions of the Combined Food Board were to some extent taken over by 
International Emergency Food Council under the auspices of the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNERA). The 
international allocation of cocoa was finally disbanded in June 
1949.9 The British side in the negotiations with United States 
departments was represented from 1941 onwards by Colonial Office 
officials, specifically by the Colonial Supply Mission in Washington. 
There were also, if limited, consultations with representatives of 
the Free French colonial governments in West Africa.
The Colonial Office itself underwent major changes during the 
war and different departments within the Colonial Office dealt at 
various times with cocoa marketing. At the beginning of the war, the 
Economic Department was primarily responsible for all questions 
regarding cocoa. During the war Colonial Office staff was increased 
and new departments and committees were set up.10 Thus in 1942 the 
Economic Department was split into Production and Supplies Branches. 
In 1943 the Economic Department was again re-organised into a 
Economic Division with three sub-branches, a Supplies Branch, a 
Development Branch and a Production Branch. Within the last named a 
separate Marketing Department was created which dealt solely with 
marketing of colonial produce, including cocoa. The former head of 
the Economic Department, G.H. Creasy, was appointed Under-Secretary 
of State for the Colonies and put in charge of the Production and 
Supplies Branches. Apart from S. Caine and probably E.C. Tansley, he 
was the most influential civil servant within the Colonial Office who 
dealt with cocoa matters. These arrangements lasted until 1947. 
During the war a number of new departments within other already 
existing Government Departments and even new Ministries were set up 
to administer the war machinery and organise the war effort, inclu­
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ding cocoa control: notably the Raw Cocoa Section within the Ministry 
of Food, and the Ministries of Supply, War Transport and Economic 
Warfare.
In West Africa and in Nigeria trade matters were initially co­
ordinated by the West African Governors Conference. ’Wagon’, as it 
was called, had come into being just before the war as a forum for 
discussion and initially had no executive functions. However, in 1940 
a permanent Secretariat was added under the Chairmanship of the 
Governor of Nigeria, Sir Bernard Bourdillon, in order to co-ordinate 
shipping which after the Fall of France had become scarce. One year 
later, the West African Supply Centre under the direction of the 
Secretariat was set up in order to regulate the distribution of the 
supplies of consumer goods between the West African colonies, which 
at that time were becoming increasingly scarce while at the same time 
the demand was growing.11 In early 1942 the Nigerian Supply Board was 
established in order to administer the food, import, transport, and 
price controls, and to provide a link with the West African Supply 
Centre.12 The Nigerian Supply Board operated until 1946, when its 
functions were taken over by the newly-established Department of 
Commerce and Industry.
The 1942 arrangement was not working very successfully. The 
West African Supply Centre met only once in March 1942 and the 
military authorities, in particular the British Chief of Staff, were 
dissatisfied with its performance.13 Since the Japanese occupation of 
the Far Eastern and South East Asian colonies had heightened the 
importance of supplies of raw materials from West Africa, the War 
Cabinet decided in May 1942 to appoint a civilian Resident Minister 
for West Africa on lines already established in the Middle East. His 
main task was to co-ordinate the war effort, especially the produc­
tion drive in the West African colonies, and to ensure proper liaison 
between military and civilian authorities in West Africa.14
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The arrival of Lord Swinton in West Africa (the actual
organisation was sited in the Gold Coast) in July 1942 led to a 
complete overhaul of the system.15 The Resident Minister presided
over the newly-established West African War Council which, apart from 
Lord Swinton, consisted of the Governors of Nigeria, the Gold Coast, 
Sierra Leone and the Gambia, and the Commanders of the three Fighting 
Services in West Africa. The Resident Minister had extraordinary 
powers and could act without the consent of the Governors or the 
Military, though in fact he never used these powers.16 The actual 
work of the West African War Council was done in three sub-commit­
tees, the Service Committee (responsible for military matters), the
Production and Supply Committee (responsible for the coordination of 
supply matters and production programming17) and the Civil Members 
Committee. This last named consisted of the four Governors and the 
Resident Minister and was the most important committee in which 
matters, such as the price which cocoa producers were to receive for 
their produce and the future shape of post-war marketing arrange­
ments , were discussed. The West African Supply Centre was absorbed 
into the Resident Ministers organisation and was developed into the 
executive organisation of the West African War Council.18 After the 
war the Civil Members Committee of the West African War Council was 
replaced by the West African Council. However, this body held only 
minor importance.
The Policies of the War Effort
One can distinguish between two different types of policies 
which the Colonial Office and the colonial governments pursued as 
regards the war effort. One led to the establishment of new forms of 
regulation, such as the enactment of new legislation, while the other 
led to the tightening of already existing forms of control.
In the early months of the war, the Nigerian government passed 
a number of new regulations, including currency regulations and
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import and export controls, many of which had been prepared well in 
advance of the outbreak of war.19 The regulations concerning imports 
were fairly liberally drafted, whereas export and currency regula­
tions allowed for very tight control.20. Thus from December 1939 all 
exports from Nigeria were prohibited except under licence in order to 
deny supplies to the Axis Powers, while imports of goods from the 
Sterling Area, with few exceptions, were unrestricted. Imports from 
the United States, however, were from the beginning of the war
subject to licensing and subject to currency regulations. But until 
mid-1940 it was still possible to obtain goods from the United States 
or from the area which was later called the Western Hemisphere, i.e. 
North and South America (excluding Canada) and Liberia. Public 
announcements at the time, like Governor Bourdillon’s address to the 
Legislative Council in December 1939, were aimed at arousing patrio­
tic feelings, rather than exhortations to do the utmost in the
interest of the war effort.21 This phase came to an end with the
occupation of France. In June 1940 the Secretary of the State for the
Colonies sent a circular telegram to all colonies, in which he 
pointed out that
the deepening gravity of the situation with which the whole Empire is faced today
calls for the greatest possible effort frow all its people  The development of
the German Blitzkrieg has now transformed the perspective in which matters must
be regarded He must now envisage a supreme effort in the next few months, and
we must therefore concentrate more exclusively than hitherto on whatever will
contribute to our effective war strength in the immediate future In the
economic sphere the general aim of our policy should be to bring to the maximum 
the positive contribution of the Colonies to the immediate war effort in the ways 
of supplies; and reduce to the minimum their demands on the resources of men, 
material and money which are or ought to be made available to this country at 
home or overseas.22
The Secretary of State for the Colonies asked the colonial 
governments specifically to refrain from making demands for non- 
essential imports of any kind from Sterling or non-Sterling sources, 
especially for those imports which involved the use of iron and 
steel, to increase the production of raw materials for export
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’including of course those sold for "hard” currencies’, and, finally, 
to maximise the development of the production of local foodstuffs in 
order to meet local demand.28
Thus in 1940 all the major elements in the war effort were 
already established: The drive to increase production for export of 
required raw materials, to decrease consumption of imported goods, 
and, in particular, to discriminate against all imports from non- 
Sterling (United States) sources. However, controls, and in par­
ticular import controls, were at this time still comparatively
! liberally handled. This situation lasted until 1941. Prompted by the 
deteriorating state of the United Kingdom economy and in view of the 
rapidly decreasing Empire currency reserves, the Secretary of State
f
felt it necessary to send a despatch to all colonial governments in
j  which he addressed the question of what he called ’the right use of
i
resources’24. In the despatch he made clear that the war effort and 
the ensuing austerity which it had imposed on United Kingdom people 
would be extended to the colonies.2B One of the main features of the 
United Kingdom war effort was to limit civilian consumption drasti­
cally, thereby freeing resources for military purposes. The same 
policy was now to be applied in the colonies.2® Although the Secre­
tary of State made clear that such a policy should be limited to the 
strata of colonial people who had a similar standard of living as the 
British people27, the principal means by which he proposed to limit 
personal consumption, the curtailment of imports, hardly discrimi­
nated between income groups in the colonies. As regards the limita­
tion of imports, he wrote that
... Import licensing should in general be sore strictly administered, and imports 
most drastically curtailed, as this is the most effective means of directly cur­
tailing consumption in Colonial conditions There are a number of articles of
an unessential nature the import of which ought in every Colonial Dependency to 
be prohibited entirely from all sources. Sterling or non-Sterling. The impor­
tation of many, perhaps one should say most, other articles should be cut down to 
a small percentage of normal imports both from Sterling and non-Sterling sources, 
especially of course from the latter 28
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This despatch was a turning point in economic policy in West 
Africa. Until then, controls had not really bitten. Imports from 
Sterling sources, for example, were until 1941 still relatively 
freely available, since merchants were allowed to import goods under 
General Open Licence. There were shortages of some goods, but these 
were slight compared with those which were to come. After having 
received the despatch the Nigerian government considerably tightened 
all forms of control, but particularly import controls. From 1941 all 
imports were prohibited except under a specific licence. Apart from 
the fact that many goods, like, for example, sewing machines, could 
often not be obtained even with import licences, the more and more 
restrictive handling of Nigerian import controls after 1941 led to 
increasing shortages of consumer goods in local markets.29
The Secretary of State also indicated what should be done with 
the excess purchasing power which such a policy of import restric­
tions would necessarily create. He proposed that purchasing power in 
the colonies should be reduced by a number of means, such as saving 
campaigns or by encouraging people to make interest free loans to the 
government. He also suggested that another way of removing money from 
circulation would be to increase all forms of taxation. The balances 
derived by such means were to be invested in United Kingdom securi­
ties. They would be repaid after the war and then used for develop­
mental purposes. As the Secretary of State pointed out
... I think that local Governments should regard as a first call upon any surplus 
which may be realised the building up of reserves adequate to meet any demands 
which might reasonably expected in the period of post-war reconstruction. It 
seems to me definitely preferable that Colonial Governments, if they are able to 
do so, should accumulate surplus balances now which they can use for purposes of 
reconstruction and development after the war without having recourse to assis­
tance under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, rather than such balances 
should be surrendered now and applications for assistance be made at a later 
date.30
Finally, the Secretary of State urged the colonial governments 
to make plans for the post-war period. Although under current cir—
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cumstances it was impossible to consider plans under the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act, unless they could be carried out solely 
with local resources and would not interfere with the war effort, 
colonial governments were advised to make departmental plans for the 
expansion of social services after the war.31
The idea of limiting consumption by increased taxation and 
using the accumulating balances at a later date for developmental 
purposes, had a high strategic value for the future (as it will be 
shown in the next chapter) in the discussion of the origins of post­
war marketing schemes. At this point it is enough to emphasise that 
from mid-1941 onwards import controls in Nigeria began increasingly 
to stifle the supply of consumer and also capital goods while other 
controls were also tightened. As Governor Bourdillon told his 
Nigerian audience in a broadcast in June 1941: ’In brief the Ad­
ministrative machine is now being converted into a war effort 
machine .3 2
The importance of the Nigerian war effort was heightened by the 
Japanese conquest of early 1942. The United Kingdom was cut off from 
various vital supplies, most importantly tin, rubber and oilseeds.33 
Since Nigeria produced all three of these products, the Nigerian 
government was urged to increase their production as quickly as 
possible. But, this was not a departure from existing policies. The 
Nigerian government had been urged to maximise its contribution to 
the war effort by increasing production on a number of previous 
occasions. However, after 1942 the Nigerian government considerably 
increased its commitment to this policy.
The Local War Effort
The direct mobilisation of men and materials during the war 
consisted broadly of four different elements. Import, export and 
currency controls have been already mentioned. A number of imported 
merchandise goods, such as petrol, bicycles, cement and gunpowder
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were allocated to specific areas within Nigeria as an inducement to 
increase production of particular raw materials. Thus, for example, 
in the rubber-producing areas in the south gunpowder was relatively 
freely available, while in other areas gunpowder had completely 
vanished from the markets. These controls were effected through the 
Association of West African Merchants.34 In addition there was a 
recruitment drive for the army and for military works. It has been 
estimated that about 100,000 men served for various lengths of time 
in different capacities in the army during the war.36 During the 
early years of the war the military authorities together with the 
Nigerian government also embarked on a vast service construction 
programme in order to improve communication lines to North Africa and 
the Middle East. This involved the building of airfields and military 
camps, and the improvement of harbour and other facilities, including 
the building of roads and bridges. Finally, the Nigerian government 
initiated a whole variety of production programmes for various crops 
(especially palm products, groundnuts, rubber, cotton, cocoa and 
timber) and minerals ( mainly tin, wolfram and coal) which were 
partly fulfilled with conscript labour, as in the case of tin produc­
tion on the Jos Plateau30 or through the application of compulsory 
measures, as in the case of palm kernel production in the south­
east37 and groundnut production in the north.38 So far as agricul­
tural production was concerned, the campaign for increased volumes of 
exports of palm kernels was probably the most important. Palm kernels 
had not always been in such demand. When the United Kingdom was 
receiving adequate supplies from the Eastern colonies and American 
sources, West African palm kernels were regarded as a surplus 
commodity. Thus on 24th August, 1940 a ’palm kernel ban’ was promul­
gated which prohibited the harvesting and movement of palm kernels 
from certain areas in the Western Provinces.39 The ’palm kernel ban’ 
was extremely unpopular and prompted a number of adverse political 
reactions, including petitions by the Ibadan Native Authority and
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local traders’ unions,40 and critical articles in the nationalist 
press. The ban was effectively removed on 8th May, 1941 and finally 
withdrawn on 24th July, 1941. The fortunes of war changed this 
situation. The rapid conquest of the Japanese forces in late 1941 and 
early 1942 caused the government to initiate a palm kernel production 
drive in raid-1942, which comprised the employment of special ’palm 
kernel spotters’, the printing of leaflets in local vernaculars, 
addresses to public meetings by Chiefs and District Officers and 
radio broadcasts.41 In 1943 a special officer was appointed to 
supervise the campaign, whose task it was to set monthly production 
targets (quotas) for producing areas in southern Nigeria. The Resi­
dents of the Provinces within these areas were asked to fulfil these 
quotas. The production drive for palm kernels lasted well into the 
late 1940s.4 2
Finally, one development not directly related to the war 
effort, should be mentioned. The war effort could have not been 
executed without the employment of a large number of African 
labourers by, for example, the Public Works Department or the 
Railway Department. The government considered that ’labour unrest’, 
if possible, had to be avoided during the war and workers had thus a 
comparatively strong bargaining position in pay negotiations. 
Demands for better pay emerged in 1941. In 1942 a massive pay rise 
was granted, which cost the government over £1 million per year.43 In 
the following years European civil servants received pay increases 
each year in the form of higher allowances such as increased separ­
ation allowances and increased cost of living allowances (they became 
universally known as COLA). African government employees, especially 
manual workers, however did not receive such allowances, let alone 
increased allowances. This was one of the reasons for the 1945 
General Strike, which after 37 days ended with a victory for the 
workers and their unions.44 Again massive pay rises were granted.
326
The increases in pay for African and European workers and
employees during the war were not sufficient to compensate for the
massive increase in the cost of living during the same period and
thus real incomes of manual workers and other government employees
certainly declined. However, their treatment was much more favourable 
than that which other groups received, whose income depended on 
government decisions. For example, the producers of scheduled crops 
like cocoa farmers46 whose incomes declined much faster during the 
war. In addition, the increases in the nominal pay of government 
employees added to the inflationary pressures which had been already 
built up in the Nigerian economy.
The Attempts to Limit the Effects of the War Effort
The simultaneous reduction in imports and the increased 
military and civilian expenditure led inevitably to severe shortages 
of certain imported consumer goods.46 Some articles which before the 
war had been consumed in large quantities, virtually vanished from 
the markets, for example stockfish, rice and to some extent certain 
lines of cotton piece goods. There were also acute shortages of salt, 
matches and enamel-ware and all forms of more sophisticated consumer 
goods (like bicycles, sewing machines, corrugated iron sheets and 
cement) and capital goods (such as cars, lorries and many kinds of 
spare parts, especially tires and tubes).47 It was estimated at the 
time that in 1942 the purchasing power of the African population in 
West Africa exceeded the value of the maximum volume of goods obtain­
able by more than a quarter.48 Another sign of this development was 
the rapid increase in the Sterling Balances of the West African 
Currency Board and in the amount of money in circulation in Nigeria 
itself during the war.40
The imbalance between purchasing power and available supplies 
of imported and locally produced goods necessarily caused prices to 
rise very rapidly. Here one has to distinguish between the import
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prices of imported goods and the prices which such goods fetched in 
the local markets. Import prices increased during the war by a factor 
of about two to three.50 Since there was such a large overhang of 
purchasing power over available goods, local market prices increased 
much further.51 Unfortunately, detailed statistics on local market 
prices of imported goods are not available for this period.52
Prices of locally produced goods, especially food, also in­
creased very rapidly. There are some price series for food items, 
which indicate that their increases were at least as large as the 
increases in the price of imported goods.53
The government undertook various attempts to control inflation 
and alleviate the shortage of goods. Since these developments 
themselves were at least partly the result of government policies, 
this type of government intervention could be seen as some form of 
’secondary’ war effort. The principal means by which government tried 
to control inflation and alleviate the shortage of goods, apart from 
manipulating purchase prices of scheduled crops, were price controls, 
higher taxation, saving campaigns and subsidisation of some consumer 
goods. The savings and loans campaigns lasted throughout the war and 
on the whole were not particularly successful. By 1946 just over £0.5 
million were invested in saving certificates or lent to government 
f ree of i ntei'est. 5 4
Comprehensive price controls were introduced in May 1941 in 
order to check the developing black market in scarce goods. Govern­
ment , in collaboration with the large importing firms represented by 
the Association of West African Merchants, fixed the wholesale prices 
for a whole range of imported goods like cotton piece goods, matches, 
tyres and tubes. At the same time, import quotas were fixed for these 
goods and allocated to the participating firms on the basis of ’past 
performance’.56 These controls were not effective and even in Lagos 
they were more often broken than observed.56 They certainly did not 
reduce the scope for profiteering in the growing black market.
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Partly in response to the failure to curb the black market and 
partly in order to reduce the prices of a number of consumer items, 
in particular food items, in 1941 the government introduced the 
Pullen Marketing Scheme ( Capt. A.P. Pullen was the name of the 
organising officer). This comprised the bulk purchase of various 
foodstuffs and the release of a number of imported goods for sale at 
selected markets in Lagos at or below cost price.67 Again, this 
scheme was only partly successful, since foodstuffs marketed through 
the Pullen Marketing Scheme were sold outside Lagos at considerably
i
i
j  higher prices and this naturally widened the scope of the black
; market rather than containing it. Moreover, Lagos market women did
not co-operate with the officer administering the scheme.6® In 1944 
i  the government also introduced a rationing scheme for some consumer 
| items such as wheat flour, condensed milk and gin (!). These rations
| were handed out to African consumers based on proof of ’past perfor-
I!
j  mance’. European consumers were not subject to such a requirement.60 
| Increased taxation was another means designed to ’mop up
surplus money’.00 Initially, this consisted of increased efforts 
being put into the collection of taxes. The amount collected in the 
Western Provinces, for example, increased during the war on the basis 
of existing legislation by almost a third.01 Then in 1941 higher 
income taxes were introduced for companies and the export duty on 
cocoa was raised from £1 3s 4d to £2 2s per ton.02 Two years later a
whole range of consumer goods (cement, tobacco, cigarettes, matches,
perfumery, wines and certain lines of cotton piece goods) became 
subject to higher import duties.03 It is interesting to note in this 
connection that from the financial year 1941/42 Nigerian government 
revenue continuously exceeded government expenditure despite the 
large increase in war-related expenditure, presumably in order to
build funds for post-war development projects.04
Though the proceeding paragraphs are only a rough sketch of the 
| major economic policies the Imperial and the Nigerian government
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pursued during the war, they provide the background for an evaluation 
of the specific policies government applied to the cocoa trade. These 
policies are the subject of the last two sections of this chapter.
U.S. Cocoa Controls
As already mentioned, the international allocation of cocoa 
supplies was from 1944 until 1948 effected through the Combined Food 
Board and International Emergency Food Council. However, between 1941 
and 1946 the actual contracts for delivery of West African cocoa to 
the United States were made between the British control boards (West 
African Cocoa Control Board and West African Produce Control Board) 
and the foreign purchasing department of the U.S. Commodity Credit 
Corporation.66 (Until 1941 cocoa had been sold directly to U.S. 
manufacturers and cocoa merchants.)86 During the larger part of the 
war the British control boards were thus selling cocoa to one single 
buyer in the U.S. As will be shown in the next chapter, this consi­
derably influenced the evolution of statutory marketing boards in 
Britain and West Africa during the war.
After their entry into the war, the U.S. authorities almost 
immediately imposed a price ceiling (maximum purchase price) of just 
under £50 per ton c.i.f. on the U.S. American cocoa trade. This 
ceiling price was removed on 30th June, 1946 while all import con­
trols, including those controls regarding cocoa, were finally 
abandoned in early 1947.67
U.K. Cocoa Controls
In the previous chapter it was shown how in 1939 the Ministry 
of Food assumed control of the West African and United Kingdom cocoa 
trade. It was mainly a book-keeping exercise, since the firms were 
still purchasing cocoa in West Africa and delivering it to their 
customers in the United Kingdom, the United States and elsewhere. 
Cocoa control outside Nigeria at that time consisted only of the
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control of the destination of cocoa exports and of the profits made 
in the trade. With the establishment of the West African Cocoa
Control Board in 1940, the Ministry of Food was divested of its
responsibility for the control of overseas sales. At the same time 
controls in the United Kingdom were enlarged. In August 1940 a
ceiling price for West African cocoa beans was imposed in the United 
Kingdom in order to prevent extreme price rises as a result of 
shipping difficulties.68 From October 1940 to October 1941 the
Ministry of Food bought the U.K. requirements of West African cocoa
i
i
| from the West African Cocoa Control Board and distributed the
supplies between the manufacturers according to their cocoa con­
sumption between July 1938 and July 1939. Sales were at this time 
also partly effected through cocoa brokers. In 1940/41 cocoa demand 
from manufacturers outstripped supplies. Since cocoa supplies from 
| countries other than those in West Africa were not controlled and 
also because the Ministry of Food sold part of the West African crop 
i  through cocoa brokers, a black market in cocoa beans soon developed.
| This prompted the Ministry in 1941 to extend its control over the!
j  United Kingdom cocoa market. From 1941 all cocoa imports into the
i
United Kingdom had to be sold to the Ministry of Food. The Ministry 
also started increasingly to sell cocoa directly to manufacturers and 
dispensed with the services of the United Kingdom intermediaries. By 
1942 the Ministry had assumed complete control of the procurement and 
distribution of cocoa beans in the United Kingdom, including their 
purchase and selling prices.09 The Ministry relinquished its control 
of the United Kingdom market in November 1950 after the international 
allocation of cocoa through the International Emergency Food Council 
had ceased in 1949.70
The Ministry of Food Buying Policies
At the beginning of the war, the Ministry of Food fixed a price 
for United Kingdom purchases which was very close to the commercial
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free market price of West African cocoa beans at the time. The estab­
lishment of the West African Cocoa Control Board did not change that 
policy and the Ministry of Food purchased its requirements from the 
Board at the current market prices at the time, which was equivalent 
to £24 2s lOd per ton f.o.b. Lagos or Accra for grade II cocoa.71 
After a deduction of some minor marketing expenses this price yielded 
a margin of about £6 per ton to the West African Cocoa Control Board.
The 1940/41 cocoa season ended with an overall profit of over 
£2 million to the Board.72 This prompted the Treasury to ask the 
Board to agree to a lower Ministry of Food purchase price in the 
approaching 1941/42 season.73 The Board was able to resist this 
pressure. However, on the other hand it unable to extract higher 
prices from the Ministry of Food although commercial prices, par­
ticularly those in the United States had increased since the last 
season.74 Accordingly in the 1941/42 season the Ministry paid exactly 
the same prices as it had paid in the previous season of 1940/1941. 
Since produce prices in West Africa were increased in 1941/42, the 
margin of the West African Cocoa Control Board decreased to about £4 
per ton. At the same time however, the margin between the sale price 
to the Ministry of Food and the sales price to customers elsewhere 
considerably widened. At the end of the season it emerged that the
average price of all sales of grade I and grade II cocoa to the
Ministry of Food had amounted to only £25 7s whereas other customers 
of the board had paid £33 5s 8d.
The 1941/42 season ended with a loss to the West African Cocoa 
Control Board, partly because the Ministry had paid a low price, but 
also because some cocoa had to be destroyed in West Africa for lack 
of shipping (see table 7). It is noteworthy that if the Ministry of 
Food had paid the same price like other customers for its purchases, 
the loss in the 1941/42 season would have turned into a profit.76
This fact was also noted by the West African Produce Control 
Board which argued that ’the present arrangement is open to the
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criticism that His Majesty’s Government, having undertaken to refund 
a profit, has fixed a price for sale of West African cocoa to the 
Ministry of Food, which, in the present circumstances, can only 
result in a deficit, and is consequently open to the charge of bad 
faith with the producers.’70 In other words, the initial promise, 
given in 1939 at the inauguration of produce control, that eventual 
profits would be returned to the colonies and the cocoa producers, 
was in effect broken by ensuring that there was were little or no 
profit to retux'n. However, this internal criticism apparently had
I
| very little impact, since the purchase price policy of the Ministry 
of Food, with backing of the Treasury remained unchanged.
The high differential between the United Kingdom and the United
I States selling prices became known to the American government.
|
! Through the Combined Food Board they proposed that the United States’
iI
j authorities should, in the approaching 1942/43 cocoa season, not payi
I higher prices for its cocoa purchases than the relevant United King-
!
! dom authorities on the grounds that this unequal treatment would
violate the Mutual Aid Agreement of 1942.77 A price formula thus had 
to be worked out which would placate the Americans, as well as 
satisfy the Treasury. From the 1942/43 season to the 1944/45 season a 
calculation was applied by which ’the price received by the [West 
African Produce Control Board] from the Ministry in any one season 
was to be the average price received by the Board in the previous 
season for all sales, including those to the Ministry of Food.’78 In 
effect this formula meant that the price paid by the Ministry would
be fixed below the prices other customers of the Board paid, but
that, in due time, the margin between these two prices would narrow. 
Negotiations over the price to be paid by the Ministry of Food for 
their purchases in the 1942/43 season started in May 1943, when the
final results of the 1941/42 season were known. In that season the
West African Cocoa Control Board had sold 170,886 tons of cocoa to
the Ministry of Food at a price of £25 7s per ton and sold elsewhere
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32,126 tons at a price of £33 5s 8d per ton79. The average sales 
price of the West African Cocoa Control Board in the 1941/42 cocoa 
season was thus £26 12s 2d per ton.60 This was the price the Ministry 
of Food was charged in the season of 1942/43.81 The same method of 
calculation was applied in the two following seasons.82
In the 1945/46 cocoa season the system was again changed. It
had become all too apparent that, despite the application of the
price formula, the purchase prices paid by the Ministry of Food were
too low in comparison with the prices paid by other customers of the
Board. Moreover, it was expected that the American price ceiling 
would soon be either substantially increased or even completely re-
I
| moved.83 After lengthy negotiations the Ministry agreed that the 
| price paid in 1945/46 would be directly related to the United States 
ceiling price at the time of purchase.84
The United States ceiling price was removed in June 1946 and 
again negotiations started. Though the Ministry was very reluctant to 
accept the new solution, it was agreed that the Board’s selling price 
to the Ministry of Food in the 1946/47 cocoa season should be solely 
based on commercial considerations.86
The Ministry of Food Selling Policy
The Ministry of Food was not the ultimate consumer of the cocoa 
which it purchased from the boards. It resold it to the biscuit and 
cocoa manufacturers in the United Kingdom. In August 1940 the price 
at which manufacturers bought cocoa from the Ministry of Food was 
fixed at £35 per ton.86 This gave the Minister of Food a margin 
between its buying and selling prices of £3 10s per ton which pre­
sumably covered United Kingdom handling charges and perhaps allowed 
for a small profit. At the instigation of the Treasury the Ministry 
of Food selling price to United Kingdom manufacturers was increased 
in March 1941 to £45 per ton.87 Thus the margin between the Ministry 
of Food’s buying and selling prices rose to £13 10s per ton.88 It was
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made clear from the beginning that these ’profits’ were not to be 
included in the surplus the marketing boards would eventually hand 
over to the colonies.
The real, though not publicly declared, purpose of the £10 
’levy’ (as it was called) was to ’secure by means of revenue from a 
semi-luxury commodity some offset for the heavy losses which were... 
being incurred by the Ministry of Food through subsidisation of the 
price of certain foodstuffs [bread], which by entering into the cost 
of living index directly effects the wage rates under wage agreements 
in a wide range of industries.’80 This surcharge remained in place 
until 1946.90
A rough calculation shows that between 1941 and 1946 the 
Ministry of Food made a ’profit’ of probably as much as £7.8m on its 
West African cocoa sales and about £2.4m on the Nigerian cocoa sales 
to the United Kingdom manufacturers.91 This latter sum represents 
about one-quarter of the profits the British government handed over 
to the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board after the war.92
The Ministry of Food surcharge attracted a number of critical 
comments from some Colonial Office officials, as well as criticism 
from the liberal public. As has been mentioned earlier, the West 
African Cocoa Control Board made an overall loss in the 1941/42 
season. This was partly due to the comparatively low price it had 
received from the Ministry of Food. But at the same time the Ministry 
itself had made a profit on its sales. This anomaly prompted, for 
example, the then Assistant Secretary and Head of the West Africa 
Department, O.G.R Williams, to minute that ’it is difficult to escape 
the implication that His Majesty’s Government are more concerned 
about keeping prices down in the United Kingdom than about ensuring 
that the African producer gets an adequate return for his produce.’93 
Criticism also emerged from outside the Colonial Office. The Anti- 
Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society94 and the Fabian Colonial 
Bureau95 were particularly active in this question and forced the
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Colonial Office, despite their own misgivings about the levy, to at 
least publicly rally behind the Ministry of Food policy.86 However, 
this criticism was unable to effect any change in policy.87
The Producer Price Policy: An Introduction
The determination of the producer price08 was in the public eye 
one of the main responsibilities of the marketing boards (i.e. of the 
West African Cocoa Control Board and, from 1942, of the West African 
Produce Control Board). But, since these were in effect Colonial 
Office executive agencies, the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
was legally and politically responsible for any decision the boards 
took. But the Secretary of State for the Colonies himself was not 
independent in his decision-making. He had to consult the colonial 
governments concerned and all the other Government Departments and 
Ministries, who dealt with the allocation, distribution and overseas 
disposal of cocoa beans, such as the Ministry of Food and the 
Colonial Supply Mission in Washington. On certain occasions, but not 
on a regular basis, the Foreign Office, the Board of Trade, the 
Dominions Office and the Ministry of Supply were also consulted. 
After 1942 the Resident Minister in West Africa had also an important 
say in the fixing of the producer price. Finally, because the Board 
operated with funds provided by the Exchequer, approval also had to 
be obtained from the Treasury." The actual determination of the 
producer price in each season was therefore a somewhat lengthy 
process, at the end of which the responsibility for the decision was 
a collective one rather than one that could be attributed to a single 
government department or even an individual.100 This often tended to 
obscure where the real responsibility lay for the determination of 
the producer price.
Secondly, it is noteworthy that the government departments 
which dealt with the question of producer prices always felt that the 
government purchase scheme was to some extent a charitable under-
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taking. It was repeatedly stated that whatever price the cocoa
farmers received for their produce it was ’a far better price than he 
would have been obtained under a free market.’101 There is, of 
course, no proof for such an assertion.
Finally, decisions regarding the producer price always entailed 
an element of speculation, since future developments during the war 
were particularly unpredictable. This uncertainty revolved mainly 
around the problem of shipping, at least in the early war years. The 
major questions were to what extent shipping facilities would be 
available for cocoa and if it would be possible to profitably dispose 
of the crop.
The Producer Price Folicy
There were two different producer prices to be fixed each
season. In August and September the West African Cocoa Control Board 
(and later the West African Produce Control Board) had to decide 
which price would be paid in the main season which usually opened on 
first October each year. In the following' April or early May the 
boards again had to make a decision about the price in the light crop 
season, which usually started in late May or June.
In the previous chapter it was argued that the price fixed by 
government in November 1939 (£16 10s pei' ton for grade II cocoa102) 
was pegged just above the price cocoa producers had received in the 
early months of the 1939/40 season. It was not a high price, since 
farmers had been paid considerably higher prices just two seasons 
before, but it was also not a particularly low price compared with 
other prices paid in the 1930s.103 Almost immediately after its 
introduction the purchase scheme ran into difficulties. Shipping 
space for cocoa was scarce and only some profitable sales to the 
United States kept the resulting overall deficit of the season within 
limits. As a result of the scarcity of shipping during the main
harvest, the light crop purchase price was reduced to £10 per ton.
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All in all some 10,000 tons of cocoa were destroyed in Nigeria during 
the season, including all light crop cocoa (5,700 tons) and the 
season ended with a loss to the Treasury of £208,548, of which some 
£61,800 were due to losses made on Nigerian cocoa sales.
Shipping was very scarce throughout 1940 and thus the outlook 
for the 1940/41 cocoa season was not a promising one. There was the 
strong possibility that the Treasury, which had funded the deficit, 
would disown the scheme.104 In order to prevent this happening, the 
Colonial Office, as well as the Nigerian government, presumably with 
the concurrence with the Gold Coast government, embarked on a new 
policy. The aim of this was to limit government’s liability as far as 
possible and fix a price which would ’provide the Board with a profit 
to meet the expected loss of that part on the crop which was then 
anticipated would not find a market or would be sold at a loss. ’1C5 
Hie new price had thus to be low, but not so low as to provoke 
’social trouble’ and high enough to maintain the producers’ loyalty 
to the Allied cause.’ 108 In addition it was hoped that the new low 
price would prompt farmers to sell less cocoa to the board, since it 
was thought that a reduction in the boards’ cocoa purchases would 
reduce the amount of cocoa which had to be destroyed and thus the 
financial loss which the destruction of cocoa entailed.107 This was a 
major departure from the existing policy which aimed at giving the 
producer an adequate or fair return for his labour, as the partici­
pants in the negotiations over the producer price in the 1940/41 
cocoa season clearly recognised.108
The main crop cocoa price paid to producers was thus lowered to 
£13 10s per ton. The light crop price, however, remained unchanged at 
£10 per ton. Comparatively little cocoa had to be destroyed. The 
season closed with a large surplus to the West African Cocoa Control 
Board amounting to £2,040,473 of which about £570,100 represented the 
Nigerian crop. This surplus was largely due to the ingenious selling 
policy of the West African Produce Control Board which had shipped,
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before the imposition of the American shipping ban in May 1941, large 
quantities of cocoa to the United States, without having a firm buyer 
at the time. It was stored at considerable cost and then, later, 
resold, when the supplies of cocoa dried up and prices soared.
According to Residents’ reports from the Western Provinces of 
Nigeria, there was no protest from cocoa farmers against the lowering 
of the price.100 As has been argued in the previous chapter, this was 
probably largely due to the public burning of cocoa and intense 
government propaganda.110
The following season of 1941/42 started with a considerable 
surplus. There was also, at least in the middle of 1941, the prospect 
that it would be possible to ship almost all of the 1941/42 crop. 
This strongly influenced the ensuing discussions about the price 
which producers would receive in the coming season.
Just as the deficit at the beginning of the previous season had 
prompted the government to change policies, the surplus at the 
beginning of the new season again forced the government to rethink 
its position. The basic question apparently was: Should the price be 
restored to its previous level or not? The discussions which this 
question prompted had extremely fax— reaching consequences.
In Nigeria and West Africa as a whole the supply of consumer 
goods had become more and more difficult. There were many alarming 
reports on the scarcity of goods.111 In the light of these reports 
and on advice from the governments of the Gold Coast and Nigeria, the 
decision was taken not to substantially increase the price to be paid 
to the cocoa farmers in the forthcoming 1941/42 season.112 It was 
thought that a large increase in the price to the producers and the 
ensuing increase in their purchasing power would be ’undesirable in 
view of the severely restricted range and quantity of imported goods 
available for purchase by them....’113 Thus the fixing of the 
producer' price was no longer' determined by either the ’fair return' 
principle nor by tlie state of the finances of the West African Cocoa
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Control Board, but by the volume of imports of consumer goods 
available at the time. Since it was clear that there would be a 
shortage of consumer goods for the foreseeable future, this policy 
actually entailed the deliberate creation of a surplus on the cocoa 
trading account of the West African Cocoa Control Board by lowering 
producer prices.
The main architect of this policy was S. Caine, the Financial
Adviser to the Colonial Office. In a crucial minute from May 1941 he
spelled out the origins and main features of the new policy:
...Owing to the offer of an substantially increased quantity of freight for 
shipment to this country...it appears possible that practically the whole of this 
year’s crop will be disposed. If this does happen there is little doubt that the 
financial operations of the West African Cocoa Control Board will show a substan­
tial profit this year which is likely to be considerably wore than sufficient to 
wipe out last year’s deficit. Ke shall therefore have to consider whether the 
regaining balance should be devoted to increasing the price to the cocoa farwer 
or how it should be used. For reasons which have been discussed elsewhere there 
are considerable dangers in putting wore woney into the hands of Kest African 
natives at the wowent as it is difficult to find goods which they could buy with 
that woney. It way be therefore that sowe systew by which we would pay the saae 
price in cash as in the present year but would give thew a bonus credited to thew 
in a Savings Bank account withdrawable after the war wight be the solution.’114
It was this reasoning which prompted the West African Cocoa 
Control Board not to substantially increase the producer price. Not 
all Colonial Officials were satisfied with the decision like the then 
Chairman of the West African Cocoa Control Board, G.H. Hall,115 but 
in the end the views of the colonial governments and of the Financial 
Adviser to the Colonial Office prevailed. As will be shown in the 
next chapter, this policy had important long-term effects, since it 
made it necessary to develop a policy which would define the purpose 
for which the accumulated profits would eventually be used. After a 
somewhat lengthy discussion it was decided to increase the Nigerian 
producer price by only 20s from £13 10s per ton to £14 10s per ton.
At the same time the Nigerian export duty on cocoa was increased by 
18s 8d from £1 3s 4d per ton to £2 2s per ton.
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The seasons’ results seemed to have justified a cautious price 
policy. With the American shipping ban still in place it was impos­
sible to dispose of the crop in the United States (the ban was only 
lifted in August 1942) and a large proportion of the 1941/42 crop 
remained unsold. It was this situation which prompted the West 
African Cocoa Control Board to approach the Ministry of Food at the 
end of 1941 with the suggestion that cocoa should be bought as an 
oilseed, since it was cheaper for the Board to sell the crop even at 
a reduced price to the Ministry than to destroy the crop in West 
Africa.116 The Ministry agreed to this proposal, not least because 
the occupation of the Far Eastern and South East Asian colonies made 
increased imports of fats and oil from other sources a dire neces­
sity. However, despite these sales, some 17,000 tons of Nigerian main 
crop cocoa and all light crop cocoa (7,500 tons) had to be destroyed.
In early 1942 the West African Control Board had to decide what 
price should be paid for light crop cocoa. In the light of shipping 
difficulties and the knowledge that such cocoa was very likely to 
have to be destroyed, the price in the light crop season was lowered 
to £5 per ton. Another reason for this reduction was the desire to
encourage the production of palm kernels. It was estimated at the
time that this price constituted about half the cost it took to 
produce a ton of cocoa.117 The season closed with an overall deficit 
of £314,051 of which the Nigerian part amounted to about £82,000.
In the 1942/43 season a further constraint against increasing 
the producer price developed. As already mentioned above the price of 
light crop cocoa had been reduced to £5 per ton on the reasoning that 
such a decrease would encourage cocoa farmers to collect more palm 
kernels in the Western Provinces.118 Now this argument reemerged with 
even more force.
The heightened demand for vegetable oils and oilseeds from
Nigeria posed the problem of how to achieve maximum production of
these commodities without generating so much purchasing power as to
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create hyper-inflation. As early as December 1941, the Cocoa Con­
troller of Nigeria, G.F.T. Colby argued that increased production of 
palm kernels and other oilseeds could probably only be achieved by 
offering relatively higher producer prices than for other com­
modities. If the prices of other commodities remained as they were, 
an increase in the price for palm kernels119 and palm oil would lead 
to increases in the purchasing power. Since the amount of imported 
goods was limited, inflationary pressures would become even stronger. 
Thus the general policy of the Nigerian government, he argued, should 
be 1 to limit the increases in the amount paid for produce to the
i
minimum which is compatible with satisfying the essential produce 
needs of His Majesty’s Government.’120 The production of cocoa was 
not regarded as an essential need.
j
1 The three main arguments in favour of low prices were asI
! follows: first, it was thought that low produce prices for cocoa
II would directly stimulate the production of other, more obviously
i
I vital crops, notably palm kernels, rubber and local foodstuffs.
!
Second, it was assumed that low prices would help to combat infla­
tion, part of which was caused by increased prices for and larger 
purchases of other, more crucial, commodities. Finally, it was argued 
that if the volume of imports was limited, relative produce prices of 
agricultural commodities would decide which group of the producers, 
cocoa farmers or the producers of crops which were more in demand by 
Ilis Majesty’s Government, would be able to obtain the limited 
supplies. Thus even if there was no direct connection between cocoa 
farming in western Nigeria and palm oil production in eastern 
Nigeria, the lowering of cocoa prices would assure that more consumer 
goods would be available to the producers of palm oil.121
There were also, however, a number of other arguments which 
were advanced in favour of low produce prices in general and low 
cocoa price in particular, such as that increased purchasing power in 
the hands of producers would not only increase the price level of
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goods in Nigeria, but also increase the consumption of imported 
goods. The production of such goods involved manufacturing capacity 
and labour in the United Kingdom which could be better used for the 
war effort.122 Finally, it was also argued that an increase in the 
cocoa price would lead to an increase in the price of foodstuffs in 
the urban areas of Lagos and Ibadan which, for political reasons, had 
to be avoided, or would make employment of labour on the cocoa farms 
more attractive.123
In 1942/43 the arguments concerning the cocoa purchase price 
therefore seemed to have changed again. Whereas in the previous 
season, the general combat of inflation in Nigeria had been the main 
argument, now the stimulation of relative production through the 
manipulation of the relative prices of crops seemed to have been the 
most influential reason for fixing the cocoa price at a particular 
level . The discussion about the price which cocoa farmers would be 
paid for their produce became interlocked with the discussion of how 
the Nigerian government could make the most efficient use of Nigerian 
resources for the prosecution of war. This reasoning, as will be 
shown, prevailed well into the post-war period.
The determination of the producer price in the 1942/43 season 
was a prol onged process.12 4 There were very heavy stocks at the 
beginning of the season and the shipping situation was not at all 
clear. It seems that the Nigerian Secretariat and especially G.F.T. 
Colby were very much in favour of a reduction of the price to £10 per 
ton.125 Such a large decrease was ruled out, not least because the 
Residents in the producing areas indicated that it would be too 
harmful to the long-term development of the cocoa industry.126 The 
discussion then largely centred on the question of whether the price 
should be reduced to £12 10s per ton or to £13 10s. The Chief Commis­
sioner of the Western Provinces favoured a reduction to £13 10s per 
ton while the Secretariat preferred a reduction to £12 10s.127 In the 
end the Governor decided to agree with his immediate advisers and
343
recommended a price reduction to £12 10s.128 This was the price which 
producers would eventually receive.120
Despite large sales to the United States at a considerable 
profit, it was again necessary to destroy a substantial proportion of 
the 1942/43 main crop (27,800 tons) and the whole of the 1943 light 
crop (3,900 tons).130 The latter was again purchased at a price of 
£5 per ton. The destruction of cocoa was partly due to shipping dif­
ficulties as in previous seasons, but the main problem appears to 
have been the lack of internal transport. There was a general 
shortage of lorries, petrol and tyres; it was decided, in order to 
conserve motor transport for more vital crops for which shipping was 
almost always available, to destroy considerable quantities of cocoa 
up-country131 despite a large increase in storage capacity. The 
1942/43 main crop was a very large one compared to previous seasons,
i though it is noteworthy that light crop purchases fell to about half 
of their former level. This decline was probably due to the extremely 
lowr purchase price in the crop season.132 The season of 1942/43 ended 
with a profit of £2,158,379 of which £747,800 represented the
I Nigerian part.
The war effort reached its peak in 1943. As pointed out above, 
in early 1943 Nigeria was asked with some urgency to increase the
! production of a whole range of commodities, including rubber, timber,
|
I tin and coal, but above all palm products and groundnuts.133 At the|
I same time inflation was still on the increase. The situation was 
perceived as so extremely pressing that Governor Bourdillon felt it 
necessary to admonish the Director of Agriculture J.R. Mackie with 
the words: ’...remember, we must have immediate results, and that
long range considerations must give way to immediate needs.’134 In 
this situation any price increase for cocoa was ruled out from the 
beginning. Instead discussions ensued concerning the advisability or 
non-advisability of a further reduction in price. The outcome of 
these discussions was the decision not to reduce the cocoa price on
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these grounds: that a further reduction would not increase palm 
kernel production in the Western Provinces; that such a reduction 
would be probably harmful for ’post-war economics’ in that cocoa 
would be very likely in heavy demand after the war; and that such a 
reduction would probably also do very little to lower inflation.135 
The Governor of Nigeria was still convinced, however, that ’pui—  
chasing power in the hands of cocoa growers must diminish the amount 
of consumer goods that can be dangled before the nose of the poten­
tial palm kernel producer. . . ’138 The price therefore remained 
unchanged. Thus the main crop price for cocoa was fixed at £12 10s.
In December 1943 euid January 1944 the Marketing Director of the 
West African Produce Control Board, E.C. Tansley, and the Assistant 
Under-Secretary of State, G.H. Creasy, visited West Africa and found 
the cocoa industry in a very critical condition.137 Diseases were 
rampant and it was feared that production would seriously decline.136 
After the discussion which they had with the West African War 
Council, it was agreed that cocoa prices in West Africa should be 
increased in the forthcoming light crop season to £10 per ton and not 
fixed at the same price (£5 per ton), which was paid in the 1942/43 
light crop season, as originally intended.
The 1943/44 season finished with a surplus of £2,969,190. The 
profit on Nigerian cocoa sales amounted to about £857,000. There was 
no need to destroy cocoa. Internal transport, as well as the shipping 
situation, had considerably improved, which enabled the marketing 
board to dispose of the crop in the United States and elsewhere very 
profitably. However, there was a sharp decline in the volume of 
purchases to about 70,000 tons. This was a very low figure and one 
not experienced since the early 1930s.
The following main crop season of 1944/45 opened with a price 
of £21 10s per ton. This increase was probably due to the interven­
tions from E.C. Tansley (WTest African Produce Control Board) and G.H. 
Creasy (Colonial Office) who after their visit to West Africa in
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December 1943 and January 1944, had strongly advocated price in­
creases for the following light and main crop seasons.139 Their 
demands were supported by the Ministry of Food and the Resident 
Minister, West Africa.140
The main crop price had been negotiated with the new Governor 
of Nigeria, A. Richards, who had replaced Bourdillon in late 1943. 
The impact of this change was immediately felt in the price nego­
tiations. While the former Governor had to some extent changed his 
views on the connection between cocoa prices and the prices of other 
commodities in mid-1943, the new Governor reaffirmed the old view, 
that cocoa prices should not or should only be increased marginally 
on the grounds that such increases would harm the production of palm 
kernels and foodstuffs and increase inflationary pressures.141 After 
some discussion he agreed only reluctantly to a price increase for 
the main crop season to £17 per ton. This proposal was accepted in 
February 1944 by the West African War Council,142 but the Governor of 
Nigeria changed his view. In May 1944 he suggested a price increase 
to £21 per ton to the West African War Council. Such an increase 
would help, he argued, to diffuse criticism of the government which 
would inevitably emerge after the publication of the 1944 White Paper 
on cocoa marketing in West Africa, the United Kingdom and the United 
States.143 The 1944 White Paper contained detailed information, 
including figures of the profits so far accumulated by the marketing 
boards, and it was thought that if the profit became publicly known, 
the demand for substantial price increases would grow louder. In 
addition he reasoned that, without such an increase, a large 
disparity would develop between the price paid in the Gold Coast144 
and that paid in Nigeria which would be very difficult to justify on 
economic grounds.14 5
The producer prices for 1944/45 were finally fixed at £21 10s 
per ton for the main crop cocoa and at £18 10s per ton for light
crop, which represented an increase of almost 50 per cent. Without
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political pressure the price would have been much lower. However the 
price was not much higher because of continuing fears of inflation, 
the policy of supporting the war effort by manipulating relative 
produce prices, and the reasoning that higher cocoa prices might lead 
to higher urban food prices which would in turn increase the cost of 
living and prompt demands for wage increases. A new argument was also 
introduced into the discussion. It was suggested that the West 
African Produce Control Board should build up large financial 
reserves in order to finance the post-war marketing schemes.146 This 
implied that producer prices in the next two or three cocoa seasons 
should be fixed at a comparatively low level so as to enable the 
Board to make a sizeable profit on its trading operations.
But the political difficulties mentioned above were not the 
only reason why the governments of the Gold Coast and Nigeria began 
to favour increases in the producer price. From as early as 1941 
onwards, the Ministry of Food and, in particular, J. Cadbury, the 
United Kingdom Cocoa Controller, had advocated price rises in order 
to induce farmers to plant more cocoa.147 It was thought that an 
increased acreage of cocoa would be necessary to meet the expected 
world demand in the post-war period. These pleas were to a large 
extent unsuccessful. By 1944/45 at least some officials within the 
Nigerian government and within the Gold Coast government, probably 
also influenced by the rapid spread of cocoa diseases, recognised the 
merits of such a policy.148
The West African Produce Control Board added some £2,093,328 to 
its funds after the season closed, of which about £673,000 repre­
sented the Nigerian proportion. Despite the higher price offered in 
the light crop season of 1944/45, actual purchases amounted only to 
about 700 tons. This was the third consecutive season in which light 
crop purchases had been much lower than in previous seasons.
The 1945/46 season was almost a replay of the previous season. 
There was still urgent demand from the United Kingdom authorities to
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expand the production of oilseeds in Nigeria and again demands for a 
substantial increase in the purchase price of cocoa were countered by 
the argument that such an increase would only lead to inflation and 
divert effort from the production of more vital crops.149 Initially, 
the governments of the Gold Coast and Nigeria had planned to pay the 
same price in the 1945/46 season like in the previous season.150 but 
increasing dissatisfaction of cocoa farmers in the Gold Coast, as 
well as reports from the Gold Coast that the current price would be 
insufficient to ...encourage the intensified care of farms which 
would be a necessary part of the measures contemplated to control
i
pests...’, prompted the authorities to change their mind.151 Prices 
in the Gold Coast were therefore substantially increased. This again 
necessitated similar price rises in Nigeria and the price for main 
j crop cocoa was thus increased to £26 per ton and for light crop cocoa
J to £23 per ton.152 Purchases of light crop cocoa returned to normal.
i
| The season of 1945/46 ended with a profit of £1,675,000 (Nigeria’s
| contribution to these profits came to about £717,700).
The 1946/47 season was the last season in which the West
African Produce Control Board was responsible for the marketing of 
Nigerian (West African) cocoa. The fixing of the producer price 
turned out to be very difficult. It was clear that prices in the 
international markets would rise very rapidly as soon as the American 
ceiling price was removed. This was scheduled for June 1946. The main 
problem proved to be as follows: if local producer prices were fixed
at a low level, the likely emergence of an enormous disparity between
the international price and the local price would cause acute
political embarrassment in the Gold Coast and Nigeria. Thus the 
actual fixing of the price was delayed until after the removal of the 
American ceiling price. Again there was a repetition of the 1944 and 
1945 events. The Nigerian government was very reluctant to concede 
any major price increase on the grounds that such an increase would 
only result in further inflation and would disturb the balance of
348
production in the Western Provinces, and again political developments 
in the Gold Coast and Nigeria made a larger increase than originally 
intended necessary.163
In the Gold Coast it was thought that a higher price in 1946/47 
would ’...inspire or restore local confidence in controlled marketing 
and create a favourable atmosphere for the reception of the White 
Paper scheme, which we want to present as a producers’ scheme and 
must therefore get through the unofficial majority of our Legislative 
Council with their support.’154 In Nigeria the problem was rather 
different. Here the Governor feared that the National Council of 
Nigeria and the Cameroons, the leading nationalist party at the time, 
would take up the issue of cocoa producer prices and demand price in­
creases and would initiate a press campaign if the price in Nigeria 
was fixed far below the price in the Gold Coast.156 However, the 
Nigerian government was equally convinced that a very high produce 
price would also have politically undesirable consequences. It was 
argued that:
High cocoa prices will cause food prices to rise ...and thus provide justifi­
cation for deiands for increased COLA [sic] with consequent labour trouble at a 
tiwe when the situation is causing considerable anxiety.155
Thus there were again conflicting interests and the price 
eventually fixed was very much a compromise between these interests. 
In Nigeria the price was fixed at £47 10s per ton for main crop cocoa 
and £45 for light crop cocoa. This was a considerable advance in 
comparison with the price paid in the previous season (£26 per ton), 
but it was far below the price which the cocoa would eventually fetch 
in the international markets. It was also a very low price in real 
terms compared with the prices farmers had received just before the 
war.157 The New York spot price for cocoa rose immediately in the 
1946/47 season, after the removal of the ceiling on 30th June, 1946, 
from just under £50 to over £150.158 There was a similar price rise 
in the United Kingdom. The season closed therefore with a profit of
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£16,035,000, of which £5,759,900 was attributable to Nigerian cocoa 
sales. The profits made in this season alone represented about two 
thirds of all profits made under statutory control between 1939 and
1947.
Before reviewing the impact of the war effort on the cocoa 
economy in the final section of this chapter, one further aspect 
merits attention, since it had extremely important long-term effects 
for both the Gold Coast and Nigeria. This was the breach of the 
promise, stated repeatedly by various Secretaries of State for the 
Colonies, that profits made during the war should only be spent for 
the direct benefit of cocoa producers.
The background to this decision was as follows: At the begin­
ning of the negotiations over the Gold Coast cocoa price, the 
Governor of the Gold Coast had suggested that a price of 30s per load 
(about £56 per ton) should be paid in the forthcoming 1946/47 season. 
This price was considered too high by the authorities in London. 
However, the Governor of the Gold Coast was not prepared to accept a 
lower price, since he thought that a hold-up would immediately ensue 
if he could not announce a substantial increase in the buying 
price.159. The solution eventually found was meant to satisfy all 
parties, though perhaps not the cocoa farmers. The price to be paid 
in the forthcoming 1946/47 season would be fixed at 30s per load but 
only 27s 6d per load would actually be paid over to the cocoa farmer. 
The remaining 2s d6 per load would be paid into a special fund which 
would be made available at a later date to the Legislative Council 
for expenditures on higher education.190
It was argued at the time that only a very liberal interpreta­
tion of what constituted expenditure for the ’direct’ benefit of 
cocoa farmers could justify this policy.191 In retrospect, however, 
it is clear that this decision paved the way for massive expro­
priation of the cocoa farmers’ income by government through statutory 
marketing control in the following forty years.
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Table 7: Cocoa Control Statistics, Nigeria 1939/40 - 1946/47
(in £/s/d and tons)
Main Crop
price: 
purchases: 
destruction:
Light Crop 
price: 
purchases: 
destruction:
Season 
total pur.: 
destruction: 
profit/loss: 
(Nigeria) 
profit/loss: 
(West Africa)
1939/40
16 10 0
76,200
4,300
10 0 0
5.700
5.700
81,900 
10,000 
(-61,800)
1940/41
13 10 0
94,000
1.300
10 0 0 
6,600
2.300
106,600
3,600
570,100
(-208,548) 2,040,473
1941/42
14 10 0
91,900
17,100
5 0 0
7.500
7.500
99,400
24,600 
(-82,400)
(-314,051)
1942/43
12 10 0
107,300 
27,800
5 0 0
3.900
3.900
111,200
31,700
747,800
2,158,379
Main Crop 
price: 
purchases: 
destruction:
Light Crop 
price: 
purchases: 
destruction:
Season 
total pur.: 
destruction: 
profit/loss: 
(Nigeria) 
profit/loss: 
(West Africa)
1943/44
12 10 0
70,200
10 0 0 
700
70,900
857,000
2,969,190
1944/45
21 10 0
84,800
18 10 0 
700
85,500
673,000
2,093,328
1945/46
26 0 0
94,700
23 0 0
8,200
102,900
717,700
1946/47
47 10 0
104,000
45 0 0
5,400
109,400
5,759,900
1,675,000 16,035,000
Sources: E. Melville, ’The Marketing of West African Cocoa’, in:
Cocoa, Chocolate and Confectionery Alliance Ltd., (ed.) , 
InternationalCocoa Conference 1948. (London 1949), p.97. 
Report on Cocoa Control in West Africa. 1939-1943. and 
Statement of Future Policy. Gnd.6554, (London 1944), p.14. 
Statement on the Future Marketing of West African Cocoa, 
Cmd.6950, (London 1946), pp.10-12. PRO: CO 852, file 904/1. 
Memorandum ’Disposal of Trading Profits from British West 
African Cocoa’, April 1948.
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The War Effort and the Cocoa Marketing Scheme: A Summary
The cocoa marketing scheme became slowly incorporated into the 
war effort. What started as a control scheme for the cocoa trade in 
1939 developed in a short period of time into an agency of the war 
effort, the application of which was to some extent only mitigated by 
political considerations and fear that diseases might permanently 
damage the cocoa industry. When these considerations became more 
important in the immediate post-war years, concessions were made but 
no fundamental change in the underlying policy occurred.
The war effort concerned mainly the prices at which cocoa was 
bought and sold. Other aspects of the scheme, such as the distri­
bution of the trade between pre-war participants, remained largely 
untouched.
It was thought that low cocoa purchase prices during the war 
would meet three ends.162 The first was to protect the British 
taxpayer from paying for the cost of the scheme. The second was to 
retrain the rise of the monetary income of cocoa farmers in order to 
limit their demand for imported goods, especially those which 
involved the expenditure of hard, foreign exchange, and for local 
foodstuffs, either because these were in short supply or because it 
was desired that groups other than cocoa farmers in the economy, such 
as the producers of palm kernels and wage earners,163 should be able 
consume these goods. The third aim was to induce cocoa farmers and 
the labourers they employed to switch from cocoa farming to other 
economic activities which were more desired,184 notably to the 
production of palm kernels and rubber, or to seek employment in 
mi1i tary works.16 6
The single most important argument for low cocoa purchase 
prices during the war was the argument that this would somehow 
increase the production of palm kernels. It is ironic that precisely 
this policy failed to achieve its objectives.166 This was due to the
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fact that palm kernels are produced by women and especially by older 
women in Yorubaland, who were not directly involved in cocoa farming. 
Though the palm fruit was gathered by professional male reapers, the 
actual cracking was exclusively the customary realm of women. As one 
observer wrote, ’Even if he [the cocoa farmer] was willing to crack 
kernels his womenfolk would most certainly not permit this invasion 
of their field.’167 Cocoa farmers usually had no direct financial 
interests in palm kernel production while conversely cocoa farming 
was considered by the women as men's work. The idea that government 
could manipulate production through prices was therefore in the case 
of cocoa and palm kernels misconceived. This argument was repeatedly 
put to the authorities in Lagos, but for no apparent reason they 
chose not to listen.108
The Impact of the War Effort on the Cocoa Economy
The first and foremost impact of the war effort was a con­
tinuous drain of resources out of the cocoa economy. Between 1939 and
1947 the marketing boards in West Africa accumulated a surplus on
their trading operations of £26,448,771 of which £9,420,048 origina­
ted from Nigerian cocoa sales,109 But these figures and the figures 
on seasonal produce prices are only a poor indicator of what happened
to the cocoa farmer during the war.
Hie Nigerian cocoa farmer's experienced a tremendous decline in 
their real incomes during the war. As table 8 indicates, due to price 
inflation, the real, income of cocoa farmers in terms of what amount 
of imported piece cotton goods they could buy with their money in the 
second half of the war was only between one third and one fifth of 
the real income they had enjoyed in the late 1930s. But even these 
figures are very likely to understate the real loss cocoa farmers had 
suffered during the war, since they do not take into account the rise 
in the price of local foodstuffs, some items of which appear to have
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risen even faster than the price of imported goods, and the increase 
in production costs, such as the increase in wage rates, cost of farm 
tools and the cost of transport. The impact of rising food prices was
mitigated by the fact that most cocoa farm households also grew food
crops which even in small amounts were sold in local markets. How­
ever, since many cocoa farm households bought more foodstuffs than 
they sold food crops in local markets, the rise in local foodstuff 
prices negatively effected the real income of cocoa farmers.
According to one set of official figures, the price of food­
stuffs in Ibadan had risen at least two to three times during the
war170 while agricultural wages probably doubled during the same
period (see table nine). Wage labour rates in general increased 
during the war because of government demand for unskilled labour for 
civilian and military purposes in the Western Provinces and also 
because government awarded comparatively high wage increases.171 
These wage increases never exceeded the rate of inflation, but they 
seem to have caused a shortage of labour in the Western Provinces in 
the final two war years and cocoa farmers had probably to pay similar 
wage increases to their labourers.172 The first reports on the 
increase of agricultural wage rates appeared by 1942 and then re­
appeared frequently throughout the war years.178
The rise in the prices of locally-grown foodstuffs and the rise 
in the price of export commodities (other than palm kernels) induced 
cocoa farmers to divert their energies increasingly to the production 
of other crops than cocoa, particularly in the second part of the 
war. They largely moved into the production of rubber and kola, but 
also to the production of maize, rice, yams, timber and probably 
cotton.174
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Table 8
Season
Evolution of Real Producer Prices and Real Incomes Derived 
from Cocoa Sales, 1937/38 - 1947/48
Grade II Purchases Aprox, Deflator Producer Incomes
£ s d tons Incomes index Price index index
1934/35 15 0 0 82,300 1,234,500
1935/36 17 0 0 93,400 1,587,800
1936/37 38 0 0 101,700 3,864,600
seasonal averages:
1934/35 -
1936/37 24 0 0 2,229,000 100 100 100
1937/38 17 0 0 98,700 1,677,900 102 69 74
1938/39 14 0 0 113,900 1,594,600 101 58 71
1939/40 16 10 0 81,900 1,351,400 126 55 48
1940/41 13 10 0 100,600 1,358,100 160 35 38
1941/42 14 10 0 99,400 1,441,300 174 35 37
1942/43 12 10 0 111,200 1,390,000 247 21 25
1943/44 12 10 0 70,900 886,250 226 23 18
1944/45 21 10 0 85,500 1,838,300 258 35 32
1945/46 26 0 0 102,900 2,675,400 268 40 45
1946/47 47 10 0 109,400 5,196,500 345 57 68
1947/48 47 10 0 74,000 3,515,000 390 51 40
Sources: As in table 1 and table 7. The deflator index (index of real 
prices of cotton piece goods at landed costs) is taken from 
P.T. Bauer, West African Trade, p.421.
Table 9: Agricultural Wage Rates and Food Prices at Moor Plantation
(Ibadan), 1934 - 1943
Year
Labour Rates 
(per diem)
Yams
(per cwt.)
Beef
(per lb.)
Cocoa 
(per ton)
1934 2d - lOd 2s 6d 7d £14 11s lOd
1935 3d - Is 2s 6d 7d £16 9s 7d
1936 3d - Is 2s 6d 7d £22 17s 8d
1937 4d - 9d 2s 6d 4 1/4d £22 2s 9d
1938 4d - 9d 3s 9d 4 l/4d £14 8s 9d
1939 5d - 9d - - - - £13 15s lOd
1940 5d - 9d - - - - £15 2s lOd
1941 5d - 10 l/2d 4s 7d 8 l/2d £14 0s Od
1942 9d - Is 2d 6s 10 l/2d 9d £13 6s 3d
1943 Is 2d 10s 3d 9d £12 6s 3d
Source: NAI: lb MinAgric 1, file 17980 Vol .VI, Memorandum "Notes c
the Cocoa Industry” by Director of Agriculture, J.R. Mackie, 
27 Jan. 1944.
Note: Cocoa prices are annual customs values.
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During the last years of the war farmers thus increasingly 
reduced the amount of labour they invested in cocoa farming. This 
meant that they put less effort into the weeding and general 
maintenance of the farms, and, to some extent, also reduced their 
efforts to harvest cocoa pods. According to a report made in early 
1945 ’approximately 50 percent of the farms ...[were] either 
completely neglected or improperly cleaned’.176 The neglect of cocoa 
farms as a result of the low price paid by the marketing board was 
officially acknowledged as early as 1943, but no major policy shift 
occurred.17 0
This neglect would probably not have mattered much were it not 
for the fact that the control of cocoa diseases, in particular black 
pod, depends to a large extent on the amount of labour spent on the 
farms and especially on the thorough harvesting of the crop.177 If 
diseased pods are left on the tree the infection could spread more 
easily to other pods with the danger of causing permanent damage to 
the tree. Diseases had been observed even before the war, but low 
produce prices paid during the war considerably quickened the spread 
of disease. This was particularly noticeable in the light crop 
seasons of 1943 to 1945. Produce prices (£5 per ton) in these seasons 
were so low that farmers hardly bothered to harvest as the purchase 
figures of the West African Produce show.178 Acute observers like the 
Director of Agriculture attributed the increased incidence of 
diseases during the following years directly to the fact that a large 
part of the light season cocoa crop had been left hanging in the 
trees.17 0
The war effort had therefore very mixed results. Low cocoa 
purchase prices certainly did not all accomplish what they were 
supposed to accomplish, as the palm kernel discussion above shows. 
Produce control was effective as far as it retrained the monetary 
income of cocoa farmers and thus their demand for foreign exchange, 
but at the very high price of supporting the spread of the diseases
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and probably indebtedness among cocoa farmers180. It is also clear, 
that even from the Imperial point of view this policy was rather 
shortsighted, since it negatively effected the supply of cocoa in the 
post-war period when hard, foreign currency earnings assumed such an 
importance. It is one of the ironies of the cocoa marketing scheme 
that part of the profits made by the West African Produce Control 
Board were later spent to combat the spread of cocoa diseases partly 
caused by the incidence of those profits. But it is certainly an 
exaggeration to conclude - as one observer did at the time - that 
’All that five years of produce control has achieved, is to burn the 
cocoa and to kill the trees.’181
This chapter concentrated almost exclusively on the economic 
aspects of statutory cocoa marketing during the war. In the next 
chapter political aspects of the cocoa control scheme will receive 
considerably more attention, including the reaction of cocoa farmers 
and of political movements in Nigeria to the decline of the cocoa 
industry and the more general genesis of the post-war marketing 
scheme.
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00 852, file 445/5. Letter from C.Y. Carstairs to G.F. Peaker, 14 
Apr. 1942.
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93. PRO: 00 852, file 446/6. Minute by O.G.R. Williams, 2 Oct 1941.
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in support of the levy. He argued that: ’If the United Kingdom
consumer is now bled a little further for the benefit of the Ex­
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regards the equity of the levy. He said that the ’ . . .profit was made 
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West African Cocoa Control Board, 8 Sept. 1941 and also the argument 
he put forward in a letter to E. Melville: ’The increase in price is
a matter between the Ministry of Food and the United Kingdom manu­
facturers and consumers. It does not effect the price paid by the
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94. PRO: 00 852, file 445/6. Letter by C.W.W. Greenidge, Seer, of the 
Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, to the Under-Seer. of 
State for the Colonies, 3 July 1941. It is interesting to note that 
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cocoa growers by reason of the fact that they are the electors of His 
Majesty's Government, while the growers of raw cocoa in the Colonies 
are not receiving due considerations by reason of the fact that they 
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95. Manchester Guardian. Letter to the Editor by Rita Hinden, Seer, 
of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, 25 Sept. 1941 and 1 Oct. 1941.
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; 97. An assessment of the character of the Ministry of Food levy
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j  that the Ministry of Food was just another intermediary between the 
' producer and the final consumer, one cannot but conclude that the 
j introduction of the Ministry of Food’s levy constituted indeed a 
| breach of the promise that the profits derived from statutory
| marketing would be returned to the Colonies.
i
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98. The ’producer price’ was the price which farmers and producei
traders received in Lagos naked ex-scale. It was usually the price 
j  for grade II cocoa, because most cocoa purchased in Nigeria consisted 
I of that grade. The price for grade I cocoa was usually determined by 
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and Statement on Future Policy’, Cmd. 6554 of Sept. 1944, p. 16. For 
the item ’interest’ in the marketing schedule, see PRO: MAF 75/31. 
Ministry of Food memorandum ’Colonial Empire Cocoa: Scheme of
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101. See, for example, PRO: 00 852, file 533/8. West African Produce 
Control Board, Policy Paper No.2, 30 May 1942.
102. All figures in this chapter regarding the purchase price of main 
crop cocoa refer to the Lagos naked ex-scale price for grade II 
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Colonies G.H. Hall and attended by O.G.R Williams (Head of the West 
Africa Department of the Colonial Office), J. Cadbury (West African 
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113. NAI: lb MinAgric 1, file 17980 Vol.V. Letter from A.F. Stoddard
for the CS to the SWP, 6 Sept. 1941.
114. PRO: 00 852, file 445/8. Minute by S. Caine, 15 May 1941. After 
reading this minute the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the 
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’ . . .might well start an inflationary boom in the Gold Coast. . . ’ and 
asked them how they would view ’ . . .the fixing of the price paid to
the growers at the present level for next year with an additional
payment of say 1/- a load to a special reserve account to be liqui­
dated after the war. In other words, a scheme of forced saving on the
lines adopted in the 1941 Budget...’ See PRO: CO 852, file 445/1.
Letter from E.Melville to G.N. Farquhar and G.F.T. Colby, 14 May
1941. This quote suggests that the creation of a surplus fund to be 
used for some undefined benefit of the producer at some distant date 
in the future was directly related to the war effort. For more 
details, see chapter 7.
115. See NAI: CSO 26 36148, file S63A. Draft-minutes of a meeting of 
the West African Produce Control held in the Colonial Office, 14 
Oct. 1941.
116. PRO: CO 852, file 445/5. Letter from E.C. Tansley to G.W. 
Henlen, 26 Mar. 1942.
117. NAI: CSO 26 36148, file S84. Letter from the Chief Commissioner 
Western Provinces to the CS, 23 Sept. 1942. As will be shown, the 
decision to lower the price of light crop cocoa to such a low level 
had disastrous consequences for the Nigerian cocoa industry.
118. NAI: CSO 26 36148, file S33 Vol.II. Telegram from the Governor
of Nigeria to the Seer, of State for the Colonies, 2 May 1942.
119. It would be interesting to study the discussions regarding palm 
kernel prices in more depth. The Nigerian government and the Colonial 
Office were convinced that the palm kernel producers would decrease 
their efforts to produce oilseeds if produce prices were too high. It 
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it is worthwhile to harvest all available supplies, but not high 
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only part of the crop.’ See PRO: CO 852, file 502/12. Letter from
| G.L.M. Clauson to F. Leith-Ross, 8 Dec. 1942. For a similar view of 
1 the Nigerian government see PRO: 00 852, file 630/11. West African
i  Produce Control Board, Minutes of the 19th Meeting, Oct. 1945. It is
noteworthy that such arguments were never applied to the production 
of cocoa which was always assumed to decline when produce prices 
were fixed at a lower level, though it was never made clear why 
cocoa producers should react differently to the same economic 
incentives than would palm kernel producers.
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1941.
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Cocoa Controller. See NAI: lb MinAgric 1, file 17980 Vol.VI. Minute 
by G.F.T. Colby, 20 July 1942. See also FRO: CO 852, file 525/6. 
Colonial Office memorandum ’Palm Kernel Production in Nigeria’,
1 July 1943 and NAI: CSO 26 36148, file S84. Letter from the Governor 
of Nigeria to the Resident Minister West Africa, 1 May 1943.
122. NAI: CSO 36148, file S84. Minute by G.F.T. Colby, 20 July 1942. 
Another version of this type of argument was that inflation in the 
Colonies would lead to inflation in the United Kingdom. See FRO: CO 
852, file 650/5. Letter from G.F. Peaker to W.L.B. Monson,
8 Mar. 1945.
123. PRO: CO 852, file 514/1. Extract from Conclusions of the West 
African War Council, 28 Jem. 1943. This argument was more often used 
towards the end of the war and in the immediate post-war years and 
reflected the emergence of severe labour problems in towns, which 
came to a head in the 1945 Strike.
124. Many government departments were involved in these discussions,
such as the Treasury, which indicated that after the deficit of the
1941/42 season, it would not be prepared to pay similar ’high’ prices 
in the 1942/43 season as in the 1941/42 season. See PRO: 00 852, file 
446/7. Letter from G.F. Peaker to G.W. Henlen, 7 Aug. 1941. He 
suggested that a price of £10 per ton would be ’appropriate’.
125. NAI: CSO 26 36148, file S84. Minute by G.F.T. Colby, 20 July
1942.
126. NAI: lb MinAgric 1, file 17980 Vol.VI. Letter from the SWP to 
the CS, 29 July 1942.
127. See NAI: lb MinAgric I, file 17980 Vol.VI. Letter from the SWP
to the CS 29 July 1942. The Chief Commissioner of the Western Pro­
vinces had also previously argued against the reduction of the light 
crop season cocoa price to £5, which he regarded as ’excessive’ and 
'causing real hardship among the producers’. See NAI: lb MinAgric 1,
file 17980/2 Vol.II. Letter from the SWP to the CS, 16 June 1942.
128. NAI: CSO 26 36148, file S 84. Minute by G.F.T. Colby, 10 Aug.
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based on the advice of the Director of Agriculture. He had suggested 
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lowest price ever paid in the 1930s was £10 12s per ton (December
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the industry. Since then the cost of living had increased so that he 
personally would favour a price of £13 per ton.
129. The Chief Commissioner of the Western Provinces had recommended 
a price of £13 10s because his advisers believed that this was about 
the price it would cost to produce a ton of cocoa. He was apparently 
quite dissatisfied with the decision of the Governor and used the 
next occasion to make his point. On 19th Sept. 1942 a mass meeting of 
cocoa farmers was held in Ibadan to demand higher produce prices. 
This meeting was largely organised by the Ibadan Co-operative Cocoa 
Marketing Union (for more details on that meeting see chapter 7). The 
Secretary Western Provinces, Sir Gerald Whitely, immediately seized 
the opportunity and drafted a resolution for the meeting. He then 
forwarded the draft resolution to the Registrar of Co-operative 
Societies and suggested that he would be prepared to receive a 
delegation from the Union. He met the delegation on 21st Sept. 1942.
After that meeting a letter was sent to the Chief Secretary in
Lagos, reporting at some length what had supposedly been said in 
this meeting by the co-operative leaders. These citations and the 
original draft from the Chief Commissioner were almost identical. See 
! NAI: lb MinAgric 1, file 17980 Vol.VI. Minute by Chief Commissioner,
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12 Sept. 1939. A report on the mass meeting can be found in NAI: Qyo 
Prof 2/3, file C219. Extract from the A.S.P. Ibadan’s (sic) letter
i No.1.C.27/II1/235 of 22 Sept. 1942.
i 130. The destruction of cocoa became more and more politically 
unacceptable in Britain. Plans were therefore developed to start the 
j local manufacturing of cocoa butter which could be stored more easily 
than cocoa beans. These were quickly abandoned however when the 
shipping and transport situation eased in late 1943. See NAI: CSO 26 
36148, file S12 Vol.III. Extract from Official Report, 1 Dec. 1943. 
j There were also plans to substitute cocoa for tea in British fac­
tories. These prompted one official to minute that: ’Tea ration is a
| political matter ...importance is attached to its maintenance. I can 
| only say that I personally would very much loath to exchange my 4.15 
i  cup of tea for even the best cocoa, and I understand that this 
applies even more forcibly in munition factories etc.’ See PRO: 00 
852, file 444/1. Minute by C.Y. Carstairs, 30 Nov. 1942. Cocoa as a 
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From January 1943 miners received free cocoa drinks. Considering the 
number of drinks they consumed (up to September 1943 some 64.040 
drinks), cocoa cannot have been very popular nor is it likely that 
these drinks helped in any significant way to ease the surplus 
problem. For information on the consumption of cocoa in the col­
lieries, see Holt Papers, Mss. Afr. s825, file 535 (II). Memorandum 
’Hot Cocoa Drinks in the Colliery’ by G.N. Farquar, 26 Oct. 1943.
376
131. NAI: CSO 26 36148, file S33. Letter to all Residents, to the 
Secretary Western Provinces, to the Secretary Eastern Provinces and 
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149. PRO: 00 852, file 630/11. West African Produce Control Board,
Minutes of Meeting, 13 June 1945.
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Coast, 20 Sept. 1946. The money which was made available to the Gold 
Coast Legislative Council for educational expenditure amounted to 
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379
from the nationalist movement and Members of the Gold Coast Legis­
lative Council of the proposed establishment of the Gold Coast Cocoa 
Marketing Board.
161. PRO: CO 852, file 596/5. Letter from S. Caine to G.H. Creasy, 21 
Oct. 1946. He wrote that ’This is by no means an ideal solution; for 
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165. This section of the chapter has much profited from the writings 
of N. Westcott, for example his contribution ’Stabilising Commodity 
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Galletti et al., Nigerian Cocoa Farmers, (Oxford 1956), appendix 
table XIII, p. 634. There was no overall increase in the volume of
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167. PRO: 00 852, file 512/8. ’Report on Cocoa and Palm Kernel 
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1943. See also NAI: CSO 26 36148, file S84. Letter from the Deputy 
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Chapter 7
The Establishment of the Post-war Marketing Board
Discussions about post-war marketing policy began almost 
immediately after the establishment of the West African Cocoa Control 
Board in 1940 and reached an interim conclusion in 1944 with the 
publication of a White Paper Report on Cocoa Control in West Afri­
ca .1939-1943. end Statement of Future Policy. Gmd. 6554 of Sept.
1944. Popular reaction to the proposed establishment of the marketing 
organisations, notably from the merchant firms, cocoa manufacturers 
and African traders and farmers, delayed the introduction of the 
scheme for two years and it became necessary to publish another White 
Paper (Statement on the Future Marketing of West African Cocoa. Cmd. 
6950 of Nov. 1946). The Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board finally took 
over the responsibility for Nigerian cocoa marketing from the West 
African Produce Control Board in October 1947.1
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section 
will review the evolution of what was to be the post-war marketing 
policy between 1940 and 1944. The second section will mainly deal 
with public reaction to the proposed scheme in the period between the 
publication of the 1944 White Paper and the establishment of the 
Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board in 1947. In the final section, I will 
look more closely at how the proposed scheme was received by trading 
firms and cocoa manufacturers, and how the Colonial Office reacted to 
the criticism the scheme attracted.
Post-War Planning: Some Basic Features
The institutional origin of the post-war marketing scheme was 
the West African Cocoa Control Board which the Colonial Office set up 
in October 1940. It had six members: the Parliamentary Under-Secre­
tary of State for the Colonies G. H. Hall (Chairman)2, the Assistant 
Secretary and head of the West Africa area department of the Colonial
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Office O.G.R. Williams (Vice-Chairman), the Financial Adviser to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies and head of the Economic Depart­
ment of the Colonial Office S. Caine (replaced by G.H. Creasy and 
later by C.Y. Carstairs). the Director of Cadbury Brothers Ltd. and 
Cocoa Controller in the Ministry of Food J.Cadbury (in private 
capacity)3 , the former head of the Cocoa Department of the United 
Africa Company and designated Marketing Director of the scheme E.C. 
Tans ley and the Assistant Cocoa Controller in the Ministry of Food 
and designated Secretary to the board E. Melville (replaced in August 
1941 by G.W. Henlen).4 Two additional members were later appointed to 
the board in 1940 and 1941. The choice fell on G.H. Findlay, a former 
Resident in Southern Nigeria, and Capt. C.C. Lilley, who had pre­
viously held the post of District Commissioner in the Gold Coast.
The West African Cocoa Control Board was reconstituted in 1942 
as the West African Produce Control Board and its membership enlarged 
to include two commercial representatives and a further Nigerian 
government representative: G .B. Spry of Frank Fehr & Company, H.B. 
Balmfourth of the Co-operative Wholesale Society and A.J. Findlay, a 
former Deputy Director of Agriculture in Nigeria, all of whom had 
special experience in the oilseeds trade. In addition, a second 
Secretary, W.L. Bloomfield, was appointed to the board.
The definition of a post-war policy largely fell to the 
permanent official members of the board (in particular on J. Cadbury, 
S. Caine, G.H. Creasy, C.Y. Carstairs, E.C. Tansley, G.W. Henlen and 
W.L. Bloomfield). They collaborated with other Colonial Office of­
ficials like G.L.M. Clauson and had also to consult other government 
departments (for example the Treasury), government ministers (in 
particular the Resident Minister), and the colonial governments in 
West Africa.
The European firms did not directly participate in the policy 
making process. This is somewhat surprising, since in 1940 the 
influence of the firms seemed to have reached its peak. All important
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decisions regarding the forthcoming 1940/41 season were made in 
informal meetings between representatives of the Ministry of Food, 
the Colonial Office and the Cocoa Sub-Committee of the Association of 
West African Merchants, which included such items as the deter­
mination of the producer price, the distribution of the trade between 
exporters and the fixing of the buying schedule.6 Since all important 
issues were discussed with the Association, and also with two leading 
representatives of the Association in commanding positions in the 
control scheme {J. Cadbury and E.C. Tansley) , the future seemed to be 
rosy for the firms.
But in many respects the Association lost its influence after 
the 1940/41 season: the Marketing Director of the West African Cocoa 
Control Board, E.C. Tansley, was no longer a United Africa Company 
employee. At the beginning of the 1940/41 season he was directly 
employed by the West African Cocoa Control Board and, subsequently, 
seemed to have regarded himself primarily as a public servant.® The 
same appears to be true for J. Cadbury.7 There is no direct evidence 
in archival files that Tansley or Cadbury were more predisposed in 
discussions about the future shape of the marketing scheme towards 
European firms or the United Africa Company them other colonial 
officials.
Both E.C. Tansley eind J. Cadbury were extremely knowledgeable 
as regards the cocoa trade in general and the trading practices of 
the firms in particular, emd made this knowledge available to the 
Colonial Office. The firms therefore lost one of their structural 
advantages, technical expertise, vis-a-vis the government. Moreover, 
since the marketing scheme generated a large surplus in the 1940/41 
cocoa season, the dependence on the firms’ capital declined and 
increasingly a larger proportion of the working capital of the 
marketing scheme was provided by the Board itself, rather them 
borrowed from the firms. Finally, the policies which later became
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known as the "war effort" strengthened the role of government in 
colonial economies.
In the 1930s, colonial governments in West Africa had by and 
large favoured a "laissez-faire" attitude towards the economy. But 
during the war, under the pressure of the war effort, the sphere of 
government activity became increasingly enlarged, particularly in the 
field of colonial trade. The partial control of the economy allowed 
government to become more active and interventionist and opened up 
the opportunity to initiate policies.
The new approach towards the economy inevitably changed the 
relationship between the colonial authorities and the European 
trading firms. This is clearly shown by the fact that European 
trading firms were no longer regarded as appropriate partners for 
consultation. They were still involved in the day-to-day running of 
the war-time control scheme (and were therefore able to successfully 
promote their own immediate interests), but were largely excluded 
from the making of post-war marketing policies. This, with the 
notable exception of J. Cadbury, was even true for the commercial 
members of the Control Board. When, after three years of internal 
discussions, the post-war marketing scheme was presented to the 
public, the European firms were in effect faced with a "fait ac­
compli". The development of the post-war marketing policy was thus 
primarily a government affair.
The participants in the planning process of the future mar­
keting scheme believed that they should address two problems at the 
same time: one was to solve some of the problems which had emerged in 
the cocoa trade in the recent past; the other was to solve some of 
the economic problems which were expected to develop after the war, 
including those problems which might appear in the cocoa trade or in 
colonial trade in general. Thus the shape of the future marketing 
scheme depended to a considerable extent on how those government
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officials who were engaged in the planning of the scheme viewed the 
recent past and what kind of post-war world they envisaged.
The Origins of the Discussion about Post-War Control
In the previous chapter it was shown that the 1940/41 cocoa 
season had ended with a large profit to the West African Cocoa 
Control Board and that the price in the subsequent season was not 
restored to its 1939/40 level in order to reduce the consumption of 
imported goods and to combat inflation. This policy meant that the 
Board’s surplus would inevitably increase over time. This prompted 
the officials involved in the cocoa marketing scheme to reassess the 
position and function of the Board and to address the question of 
what should eventually be done with these profits.
The discussion about post-war implications of the producer 
price policy was initiated in May 1941.® According to a memorandum by
E.C. Tansley, the fundamental decision which members of the Board had 
to make was either to increase the buying price or to increase the 
reserves of the Board.9 It was in this connection that on 12th June, 
1941 another member of the Board, Cadbury, produced another memoran­
dum in which the functions of the Board and its long-term policy were 
re-appraised.
In order to avoid repetition, J. Cadbury’s arguments will be 
reviewed later in more detail. At this point it is sufficient to 
emphasise that his memorandum contained most of the crucial arguments 
which seemed to have convinced the colonial governments in West 
Africa and the Colonial Office to adopt the war-time marketing scheme 
as a post-war development scheme.
After an analysis of the pre-war marketing situation and the 
war-time operations of the scheme in the Gold Coast and in Nigeria up 
to the date when the memorandum was written, J. Cadbury came to the 
conclusion that the scheme had worked extremely satisfactorily and
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that, if desired, it could be used as the basis for a permanent post­
war scheme.10
On 5th August, 1941, these two memoranda were sent together 
with a despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the 
colonial governments in West Africa with the request for comment. The 
despatch informed the colonial governments that major changes in the 
control scheme were being considered by the Colonial Office and asked 
them for their views on the questions of the desirability of in­
creased produce prices and of enhanced flexibility in the administra­
tion of the quota system. The Secretary of State for the Colonies 
also indicated that the answers to both questions would have an 
important impact on post-war policies.11
After having received the despatch, the Nigerian Secretariat 
forwarded the despatch and the accompanying memoranda to the Resi­
dents in the cocoa producing areas, to the Registrar of Co-operative 
Societies and to the Director of Agriculture. There was an almost 
unanimously positive response to the question of the desirability of 
the adoption of cocoa control as a permanent scheme, though there was 
some disagreement about the future pricing policy and the question of 
introducing some degree of flexibility into the quota system.12
The responses of the Residents were reaffirmed in memoranda 
which the Chief Commissioners of the Western and Eastern Provinces 
and the Chief Commissioner of the Colony subsequently produced, all 
of which strongly emphasised the advantages of permanent produce 
control. With regard to the question of increasing the reserves of 
the West African Cocoa Control Board or increasing the producer 
price, however, the Chief Commissioners argued that the profits of 
the Board should be used for developmental purposes, such as cocoa 
research and for combatting diseases after the war.13
The Nigerian government responded to the despatch from the 
Secretary of State from 5th October, 1941 only on 13th April, 1942. 
This delay was probably due to the absence of Governor Bourdillon
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from Nigeria in early 1942. The responding memorandum was actually 
written by the ’Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria’ at 
the time, the Governor of the Gold Coast, Sir Alan Burns.14
The memorandum strongly supported the idea of a permanent 
control scheme buying cocoa at fixed seasonal prices. Here for the 
first time one finds the proposal that local control boards, under 
the direction of the colonial governments, should be responsible for 
the administration of the scheme, emd in particular, for the licen­
sing of the agents of the Board and fixing of the producer price. It 
is noteworthy that these proposals later reappeared in the memorandum 
which the Acting Governor of the Gold Coast wrote in response to the 
despatch of 5th August, 1941. This suggests that the Nigerian memo­
randum was probably not written solely with the Nigerian situation in 
mind. 1 6
However, it is likely that the memorandum of 13th April, 1941 
represented the opinion of the majority of the administrative 
officers in the Nigerian service at the time. Although discussion 
about the shape of the future marketing scheme continued until the 
actual establishment of the post-war marketing board in 1947, it 
appears that the desirability of produce control as such was never 
seriously questioned after 1941. The discussions revealed a virtual 
consensus about marketing policy; it can be argued that they repre­
sented one of the cornerstones in the development of post-war 
marketing policy.
The Establishment of the West African Produce Control Board
While the future marketing arrangements were debated, another 
discussion was held within the Colonial Office about the extension of 
the war-time cocoa control scheme to other crops, notably palm oil 
and palm kernels. This discussion was again influenced by short- and 
long-term considerations, since some Colonial Office officials
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thought that the decisions resulting from this discussion might 
prejudice the debate about the future marketing arrangements for 
cocoa.
The discussion about palm produce control started in late 
September or early October 1941, well before the entry of the United 
States into the war and the occupation of British Eastern colonies by 
the Japanese. Its immediate cause was that the Ministry of Food had 
allowed the United Africa Company to sell some quantities of palm oil 
and kernels to the United States and to Spain. The company had made 
an additional profit of about £80,000 on these sales, since oilseed 
prices in those countries were much higher than in the United Kingdom 
- in the case of the United States, prices were in fact more than 
twice as high.16 The financial results of these sales were known to 
the Ministry of Food, but it was apparently only due to an unusual 
intervention of one of its officials (the Financial Director of the 
Oils and Fats Division, J.C. Gardiner) that the Colonial Office 
learnt about these profits.17
The Colonial Office reacted swiftly with the proposal to extend 
the cocoa control system to oilseeds (palm oil and kernels, ground­
nuts, benniseeds). The Ministry of Food had previously purchased all 
its oilseeds requirements from the Association of West African Mer­
chants, which shared out the trade between its members. The Colonial 
Office had little influence over either the level of producer prices 
or over the terms by which members of the Association bought such 
produce, for instance the rate of remuneration which the firms 
received for their services. Contracts for the delivery of certain 
quantities of oilseeds to the Ministry of Food were negotiated 
between the Ministry’s Oilseeds Controller, J. Knight (a Director of 
the United Africa Company) and the representatives of the Association 
of West African Merchants, N.V. Deane and F. Samuel (both Directors 
of the United Africa Company). This arrangement was in the view of 
the Colonial Office and the Nigerian government highly questionable,
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not least because of the apparently incestuous relationship between 
the negotiators.18
The Colonial Office believed that the firms had no right to the
extra profits made on outside sales. In addition, it was argued that
the deteriorating shipping situation might create a bottleneck in 
West Africa, in which part of the oilseeds crop would not be bought 
while very high profits were obtainable on the sale of those quan­
tities for which freight space had been found.1® These arguments were 
very similar to those previously advanced in order to justify the 
introduction of the cocoa control scheme in 1939.20
The proposal to extend produce control was thus primarily aimed
at controlling the local purchase price of oilseeds and at control­
ling sales and especially profits on sales in outside markets. But 
the proposal to extend produce control was also made to control the 
buying and selling activities of the Association of West African 
Merchants, in particular those of the United Africa Company, and to 
gain influence over the terms of the contracts between the As­
sociation and the Ministry of Food.21 The Colonial Office argued that 
an oilseeds board
...being for practical purposes under the control of the Secretary of State,
would able to pursue vis a vis the Merchants and the shippers that policy that
the Secretary of State desires to folloM, uithout having to atteipt this task 
through the possibly disturbing Mediui of the Ministry [of Food] Nith its strong 
U. A. C. eleient.22
It appears therefore that one aspect of the Colonial Office proposal
to extend cocoa control system to other crops was the intention to
achieve some measure of control over the activities of Ministry of 
Food and the United Africa Company.
The Colonial Office approached the Ministry of Food and the 
Treasury with the proposal to extend the cocoa control system to 
oilseeds in late October 1941. The Ministry accepted the proposal 
with considerable reluctance in December 1941.23 However, it was only
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in mid-February 1942 that the Nigerian government was formally 
notified about the impending creation of the West African Produce 
Control Board, as the combined cocoa and oilseeds board was called. 
The Nigerian government strongly welcomed the proposal.24
The occupation of the Eastern colonies by Japanese forces had 
meanwhile drastically changed the supply situation for oilseeds. In 
addition, consumer goods had become increasingly scarce in West 
Africa. These developments had an immediate impact on the arguments 
advanced in favour of oilseeds control. The establishment of a 
control board was no longer justified merely with the argument that 
it would be desirable to control outside sales. It was now asserted 
that an oilseed board would help to alleviate the problem of the 
shortage of consumer goods in West Africa and that it would provide 
adequate machinery for the handling of inter-allied supplies. In 
addition it was maintained that the new board could be instrumental 
in expanding West African export of oilseeds.25
It therefore appears that arguments for an oilseed control 
board, the future West African Produce Control Board, shifted when 
the changing war situation made this necessary.20 It was argued that 
the establishment of an oilseed board would be necessary for the war 
effort, but it is clear that the evidence suggests that this was not 
the original intention when the discussion about the future oilseeds 
board started.
The establishment of the West African Produce Control Board 
was, however, not just an extension of the principles of cocoa 
control to other crops, since at the same time the system itself was 
reformed. These changes had important long-term implications. In a 
crucial memorandum of 20 Nov. 1941 E.C. Tansley argued for reform of 
the marketing system by asserting that
The longer the war lasts and the further it spreads the wore inconceivable a 
return to the pre-war for* of free trade becomes... If Government decides that 
conplete control is to continue after the war, there are good reasons for Making 
changes in the present scheme...27
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Thus, the importance of these changes lies in the fact that 
those Colonial Office officials who were involved in the discussions 
believed that these changes only made sense if produce control was 
continued after the war. In other words, the fact that these changes 
were introduced indicates that as early as 1942 some officials were 
convinced that produce control had come to stay.
The reform of the trading system largely concerned the position 
of the merchant firms. In 1939 the firms were employed as agents of 
the Ministry of Food. They purchased, shipped, and sold cocoa on 
their own account, but had to hand over any profits made on their 
sales to the controlling authority which was initially the Ministry 
of Food and then the West African Cocoa Control Board. In the early 
war years the firms had also provided a large part of the finance for 
the scheme. In return they received reimbursement of their costs and 
a profit margin.
The service which the trading firms provided did not involve 
much work, because since the beiginning of the war the United Kingdom 
oilseed requirements were exclusively purchased by the Ministry of 
Food. As far as United Kingdom cocoa sales were concerned, the work 
of the merchants was also considerably simplified as in 1941 the 
Ministry of Food became the sole buyer of cocoa in Britain. With the 
entry of the United States into the war in late 1942, a similar 
development occurred in the North American market, with only the 
Commercial Credit Corporation allowed to purchase the United States’ 
main raw material requirements, including cocoa and oilseeds. Thus 
one of the main functions of the merchants - finding a market for 
produce - almost vanished, as most of the world’s production of cocoa 
and oilseeds was now sold at fixed prices to only two large buyers.28 
Moreover, the deteriorating shipping situation in 1941 had prompted 
the authorities to introduce bulk shipment and a central system for 
the allocation of freight space for all major West African com­
modities.20 Thus, in the words of one official, a state of affairs
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developed in which the merchants were doing ’very little for the 
money they receive’.30
It was this situation which prompted the proposal to dispense 
with their services beyond the port of shipment or f.o.b. point: The 
firms would continue to purchase produce in West Africa, but the sale 
and transport of such produce would be exclusively effected through 
the produce board.31 It was thought that such a reform could achieve 
considerable savings in manpower and finance in marketing. The 
proposal of May 1942 was quickly accepted and put into effect. On 
24th June, 1942 the reconstitution of the West African Cocoa Control 
Board as the West African Produce Control Board was publicly an­
nounced.32 Without much debate the former selling agents of the board 
were thus reduced to the status of licensed buying agents.33
It was assumed that the establishment of the West African 
Produce Control Board would irreversibly change the pre-war market 
structure. It was felt that after the war British firms would find it 
exceedingly difficult to rebuilt their businesses against competition 
from foreign firms once international trade had returned to normal. 
Because of this, Colonial Office officials argued that the establish­
ment of the West African Produce Control Board was, indirectly, a 
decision about the permanency of statutory produce control in the 
post-war period.34 The decision to dispense with the services of the 
trading firms beyond the f.o.b. point further indicates that some 
consensus had developed in the Colonial Office about the permanence 
of the control scheme. The establishment of the West African Produce 
Control Board therefore represents another cornerstone in the 
development of post-war cocoa marketing policy.
The war therefore strongly influenced post-war marketing 
policy. But this does not explain why the Colonial Office, as well as 
the West African governments, were so firmly convinced of the merits 
of produce control in general and cocoa control in particular. This 
question will be addressed in the next section of this chapter.
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The Argument for Post-War Control
The Colonial Office favoured produce control because it thought 
that statutory marketing would help to solve problems which had 
emerged in the pre-war West African cocoa trade or which were 
expected to develop in the West African cocoa trade in the post-war 
period. These problems concerned producers and intermediaries alike, 
but it is noticeable that the difficulties of the latter were 
considered as more important than those of cocoa farmers.
As regards cocoa farmers, it was argued that certain features 
of the war— time control system, like the fixed price, the certainty 
of crop disposal and the more ’orderly’ marketing system, would 
afford producers a form of economic security which they had lacked 
under the pre-war market system.86 It was also claimed that war-time 
control would enable farmers to receive a "fair price", since produce 
prices were known in advance.38
Another argument put forward was that produce control was 
necessary in order to protect producers from the ’evil’ effects of 
the predicted post-war boom.87 The basic idea was that acute shorta­
ges of all kinds of goods were likely to occur after the war, not 
least because the long pent-up demand for raw materials and manufac­
tured goods would be finally unleashed onto the markets. Without 
produce control, the excess demand over supply would cause prices to 
rise very rapidly, including the prices of West African raw mate­
rials, like cocoa and palm products. The incomes of African farmers 
would therefore also rise very sharply, if production remained at the 
same level. But this boom would not last: ’The inevitable nemesis of
sharply rising prices is falling prices as soon as the excess demand 
disappears.’3 8
It was thought that the effects of sharply rising and falling 
incomes in West Africa were socially, as well as politically, highly 
undesirable.80 This idea was supported by reference to events after 
the previous war. The Colonial Office believed that:
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The consequences [of sharply rising produce prices], so far as Host Colonial 
producers at any rate were concerned. Mere alaost wholly evil. In the first stage 
they received aore aoney than they IcneN what to do with; auch of it Mas Masted; 
and exaggerated ideas of the values of their products and nuaerous expensive 
tastes Mere acquired. The high prices of raM Materials led to high prices for the 
articles Manufactured for thea, Mhich naturally persisted long after the prices 
of raM Materials had fallen. Thus after a brief period of prosperity. Colonial 
producers entered the ensuing sluap Mith exaggerated ideas of the aarket value of 
their own products, expensive tastes of various kinds, and high prices still to 
be paid... for Mhat they Nanted to buy. 9.) There can be no doubt that if there 
was any certainty that the result of preventing prices froa rising sharply 
iiaediately after the Mar Mould be to Maintain then in the period after the 
return to noraality at a level higher then aight be expected if econoaic forces 
were left unchecked, a rigid control of prices during the period iaaediately 
after the Mar Mould be an unaixed blessing. 10) The situation Mould of course be 
greatly eased if the Governaents holding stocks of priaary products Mere prepared 
to set aside any profits gained in the boon and use then to suppleaent the prices 
paid to producers in the ensuing sluap. Indeed it aight be Mell thought uise for 
the Governaent to Maintain its control of all sales of Colonial produce...until 
noraality is restored, by buying all such produce itself and reselling it in the 
saae May that all Nest African cocoa is noM bought and resold by the Governaent.
Soae rise of price to the producers Mould of course have to be alloNed in order 
to coapensate thea for the higher prices Mhich they Mould have to pay for their 
requireaents; but if any additional profits Mere earned it Mould, at any rate in 
backward places like Nest Africa, be better to keep then under control and dole 
thea out in the ensuing sluap than to let thea get preaaturely into the hands of 
the producers.40
The crucial argument put forward by the Nigerian government and 
Colonial Office regarding the intermediaries was that the war-time 
history of the marketing scheme had shown that the activities of 
Syrian,41 African and European trading firms alike could be success­
fully controlled. For this reason, produce control should be con­
tinued in the immediate post-war period.42
Some Colonial Office officials, like, for example, O.R.G. 
Williams even believed that the produce control scheme should be used 
to achieve more far-reaching aims.43 They acknowledged that the 
trading firms and the produce traders would be essential to the 
scheme in the immediate post-war period, but they thought that after 
this period it would be possible to dispense completely with their 
services. The elimination (as opposed to the control) of the trading
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firms was suggested by Nigerian officials as early as 1941 and by 
Colonial Office officials as early as 1942.44 Though it was never 
publicly admitted, it appears that the complete removal of the 
intermediaries from the cocoa trade was at one point considered.46 
The Governor of Nigeria, for example, wrote in November 1944 that 
with produce control properly set up it would be possible after some 
time to
...gradually eliainate all trading interests and to replace thea by co-operative 
societies thereby securing all profits froa the produce trade to the faraers who 
grows thea.46
These plans came to nothing, but it is important to realise 
that they were in the back of some officials’ minds while planning 
the post-war scheme. It shows their determination to find a lasting 
solution to the problems which in the opinion of these officials had 
beset West African trade in the 1930s. What then, one might legitima­
tely ask, were the problems which prompted the Nigerian government 
and the Colonial Office even to consider such a radical policy ?
The Nigerian government and Colonial Office officials were 
arguably most concerned with problems which were deeply-rooted in the 
social, economic and political fabric of pre-war West African 
societies. As regards the social position of the African traders, for 
example, the Chief Commissioner of the Colony wrote:
Hy experience of the African exporter and aiddleaen aay have been unfortunate, 
but such as it is,it has not encouraged the opinion that the general welfare of 
the producer is encouraged by their existence. They are often wealthy aen but one 
has yet to hear of any of thea using their wealth for the good of the coaau- 
nity...A further objection to thea is the influence they obtain by this wealth 
and the hidden, and soaetiaes subversive, uses to which they can put that 
influence. It would be unwise to eliainate thea suddenly but I do not think 
anything should be done to encourage their continued existence.47
It appears therefore that the establishment of the post-war 
marketing scheme was to some extent a reaction to the emergence of a 
new type of politically influential and wealthy local trader. The
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1930s cocoa trade had offered commission buyers and a small number of 
African exporters the opportunity to accumulate and to gain a higher 
status within their communities, both of which they had used exten­
sively to advance their political and economic interests. The planned 
marketing scheme now promised to arrest and perhaps even reverse this 
development and thus contained an element of social engineering by 
attempting to manipulate the material foundations on which some 
avenues to wealth emd status were based.
The second problem of the late 1930s which the marketing scheme 
might solve was the hostile commercial relationship between the 
European firms emd the African traders.48 This idea was based on the 
analysis that the market system of the 1930s was characterised by the 
dominance of a small number of large European firms, by violent price 
fluctuations and intensive competition between Africem traders and 
the European firms, as well as competition between the European firms 
themselves. Price fluctuations and the "abuses" by African traders 
had prompted the firms to "combine" in order to preserve their in­
dividual, as well as their shared position in the trade. This in turn
had created a general atmosphere of deep distrust and hostility 
towards the European firms emd the government which had most clearly 
emerged in the 1937/38 cocoa hold-up movement in the Gold Coast and 
in Nigeria.
The alternative to the creation of a marketing scheme was not 
seen as the resuscitation of a free market system, but as a return to 
the 1930s trade system and its political difficulties. The choice was 
- as the Colonial Office argued:
... most probably, not between a board and complete freedom of trading, but 
between control under Government auspices and private arrangements between the 
merchants themselves.49
Since it was thought that buying agreements between the European 
firms were likely to attract even more political opposition after the
war than they had done before the war, there was
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...no question after the uar of an early reversion to the coaiercial organisation 
prevailing in the years preceding it. [because] That systea [had] led to the 
serious cocoa hold-up of 1937---50
These quotes show that the discussions about the marketing
scheme had a strong political aspect. The scheme was later mainly 
justified by the argument that its aim was to prevent the reap­
pearance of excessive fluctuations in producer prices and ’other 
undesirable features’ in the West African cocoa trade.51 From the
records, however, it is clear that the introduction of the post-war 
scheme was also meant to prevent the reappearance of political 
unrest. The planning process thus contained apart from anything else 
a strong element of political engineering by attempting to manipulate 
expected fields of conflict.62
Another set of arguments in favour of post-war control was 
related to difficulties which had emerged in the British economy
during the war. The context of these discussions was that some 
problems, like the shortage of oilseeds, would certainly not end with 
the cessation of hostilities and that, moreover, their importance
would increase, rather than diminish after the war.63 Wai— time
policies would therefore last well into the post-war period. It was 
felt that a marketing scheme would help to regulate the supply of 
various raw materials64 and would help to ’maintain some equilibrium 
between supply and demand’.66 It was also believed that a control
scheme could be used to reduce inflationary pressures on the prices
of manufactured goods in the United Kingdom which were certain to
increase rapidly after the war.60
A further argument was that a marketing scheme might help 
British firms to adjust to the post-war world. British manufacturing
firms had changed their production lines during the war and it was
thus very unlikely that they would be able to respond swiftly and 
adequately to the expected post-war demand for consumer goods from 
West Africa and elsewhere. In this situation foreign firms would be
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able to break into markets which had been habitually supplied by 
British firms before the war. A marketing scheme would delay demand 
for consumer goods until such time as British firms were in a 
position to supply them.67 Finally, the Ministry of Food had a strong 
interest in the continuance of the war-time marketing scheme, since 
it believed that negotiations of bulk purchase agreements and the 
administration of control schemes in the United Kingdom would be 
considerably eased if a West African control scheme was set up after 
the war.6® In this context it is noteworthy that the Colonial Office 
strongly favoured international commodity control schemes. Though no 
definite plans existed at the time, it was argued that marketing 
boards in West Africa could be used as a basis for such schemes in 
the future.60
The review of the reasons why the Nigerian government and 
Colonial Office favoured a cocoa marketing scheme suggests that the 
future statutory bodies were truly multi-purpose boards. Yet, one 
important reason why there was such an interest in setting up these 
boards has not been mentioned: the surplus generating capacity of the 
Board. From the beginning of the discussion about the shape of the 
future marketing scheme it was obvious that such a scheme had the 
potential of raising money for developmental undertakings, even if 
confined to the cocoa industry.80 It was also expected that the 
boards would accumulate large balances in the immediate post-war 
years which would be invested in government stocks.81 It was thus 
possible to make money available for the finance of much desired 
research on cocoa production and marketing in West Africa and, even 
more importantly, to provide the large working capital for the future 
Gold Coast and Nigerian marketing boards themselves.82 In chapter 
four it was argued that the Nowell Commission had failed to achieve a 
reform of the marketing of cocoa largely because neither the Treasu­
ry, the Colonial governments nor the representatives of cocoa farmers 
in the Gold Coast had shown any inclination to come up with the money
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to finance the Nowell scheme.®3 The availability of the balances of 
the wai— time marketing scheme now made the finance of any future mar­
keting board feasible since the British taxpayer and the Treasury 
would not have to pay for the establishment of such boards. From this 
point of view it is quite understandable why Cabinet approval of the 
post-war marketing scheme was easily obtained. It was obviously one 
of the quite rare cases in which a development scheme would be able 
to completely finance itself.®4
This section of the chapter showed the diversity of reasons why 
the British and the Nigerian governments favoured a post-war mar­
keting scheme. The main discussions about the post-war scheme were 
held between 1941 and 1944, and it could be argued that by 1943 a 
firm consensus between Colonial Office officials and West African 
governments was reached on the desirability of produce control as a 
feature of post-war policy.86 However, it was not clear at the time 
what precise shape the future marketing organisation would have. The 
debate turned towards this issue when the publication of a White 
Paper on cocoa control became politically opportune in 1944.
The Publication of the 1944 White Paper on Cocoa Control
The proposal to publish a White Paper emerged as a result of a 
visit by E.C. Tansley and G.H. Creasy to West Africa in December 1943 
and January 1944. 88 Asked by the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
to go to Nigeria and the Gold Coast in order to ’clear up misundei—  
standings regarding the Board’s work that may exist’,87 they found 
that this task was much more difficult than originally expected.88 It 
was in this connection that they came up with the idea that the 
publication of a report on cocoa control would help to allay suspi­
cion surrounding the Board’s working in West Africa and the United 
Kingdom.8 0
The proposal was strongly supported by the governments of the 
Gold Coast and Nigeria, which on a number of previous occasions had
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asked the West African Produce Control Board and the Colonial Office, 
to publish the accounts of the Board.70 There were also a number of 
press articles at the time which denounced the secrecy of the Board’s 
financial activities.71
Though the draft report was ready in early 1944, it took 
another six months until the White Paper was presented to the pub­
lic.72 There was a long discussion within the Colonial Office and 
between the Colonial Office and the West African governments and the 
Resident Minister as to whether the Board’s accounts in their present 
form should be published at all.73 The Colonial Office argued that it 
was not advisable to publish the profits of the West African Produce 
Control Board without giving any indication of what eventually would 
be done with those profits, because otherwise demands for substantial 
price increases in the forthcoming 1944/45 cocoa season could only be 
resisted with great difficulty.74 It was thought that a detailed 
statement on future marketing policy was necessary. Thus the issue of 
the publication of the accounts of the West African Produce Control 
Board was linked to the question of the precise shape of the future 
marketing board. For this reason the publication of the Report on 
Cocoa Control, 1939-1943 was delayed until a detailed policy was 
worked out.
The publication of the White Paper was subsequently prompted by 
two events which had little to do with the White Paper itself. First, 
a Member of Parliament, John Dugdale (Labour), put forward some 
detailed questions regarding the scheme and the Colonial Office felt 
that ’ . . .Parliament would [not] willingly accept a temporising 
reply. ... 175 Second, the Governor strongly urged the Colonial Office 
that a reform of the marketing system in the 1945/46 cocoa season was 
required.78 Since it was thought that a reform of the marketing 
scheme in the Gold Coast could not be made without previous publica­
tion of the White Paper, the demand for reform considerably speeded 
up the proceedings.
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There were broadly two questions which had to be decided in 
mid-1944: which responsibilities, if any, should be taken over by the 
local West African governments and which role should representatives 
of producers and traders play in the administration of the future 
boards?
In 1941 and again in 1943 the governments of the Gold Coast and 
Nigeria had asked for a transfer to them of part of the respon­
sibility for the administration of the scheme.77 Both governments 
were particularly interested in gaining control of the purchasing 
side of the marketing scheme, which essentially was the power to fix 
producer prices, quotas and buying schedules for the participants in 
the trade. There were even demands for a complete transfer of all 
functions of the West African Produce Control Board to the future 
local boards.78
; They justified their demands by arguing that without the
transfer of some responsibility from the West African Produce Control 
Board to the local governments it was unlikely that farmers and 
traders would co-operate in a future scheme and that local control 
would avert criticism of the Imperial government. Moreover, it was 
argued that local control would be able to support the co-operative 
movement and African traders more effectively than any scheme run by 
authorities based in the United Kingdom.79 In addition, the Gold 
Coast government supported its demand with the argument that the es­
tablishment of a local marketing board was necessary in order to 
prevent a hold-up in the forthcoming 1944/45 cocoa season.80
Despite strong opposition from the Resident Minister in West 
Africa and members of the West African Produce Control Board,81 the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies decided that local boards under 
the control of the Gold Coast and Nigerian governments should assume 
the responsibility for the purchasing operations of the West African 
Produce Control Board. The control of selling, however, would remain 
with an agency whose ’executive staff would be similar or even
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identical’ to the executive staff of the West African Produce Control 
Board in London.8 2
It is noteworthy that this decision was taken largely for 
political reasons. In the words of the Permanent Under-Secretary of 
State, Sir George Gater, the Secretary of State for the Colonies
...could not accept any proposal that the responsibility for the Marketing 
arrangements... should continue to rest in the future with a body in London such 
as the present Control Board, which is, as it were an organ or projection of the 
Secretary of State. This would wean siwply that the odiuw and suspicion which 
have been hitherto attached to the big European firws as buyers of cocoa would be 
transferred to the Seer, of State and the Colonial Office 83
The second question which had to be decided in mid-1944 was to 
what extent local interests should be represented on future boards. 
There was a marked difference between the Gold Coast and the Nigerian 
government policy in this question. The Gold Coast government felt 
that, for political reasons, it should be ’outwardly’ disassociated 
from the future board and that its governing body should include a 
substantial number of representatives of farmers and traders in order 
’to ensure it a measure of local popularity and forestall cri­
ticism.’84 The Governor of the Gold Coast also suggested that 
American manufacturing interests should be represented, but subse­
quently was talked out of that by the Governor of Nigeria and the 
Resident Minister in West Africa.85
The Nigerian government had different ideas. It argued that the 
cocoa marketing scheme was not a political issue in Nigeria and that 
thus the establishment of a board separate from government was hardly 
necessary. Instead, the Nigerian government proposed that the func­
tions of the West African Produce Board could be equally well 
performed by the Supply Branch of the Nigerian Secretariat or by 
whatever organisation replacing the Supply Branch after the war.88
The Resident Minister in West Africa and the Governors of the 
Gold Coast and Nigeria were informed of the decision of the Secretary 
of State on the future marketing scheme on 6th June, 1944.87 There
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was a last minute attempt by the Resident Minister to prevent the 
establishment of local boards in West Africa. On the grounds that a 
local board with substantial representation of producer and trader 
interests would be no real reform of the marketing system, but would 
just give a different set of vested interests the opportunity to 
influence the policy of the marketing board, the Minister emphati­
cally put forward the idea that instead a ’genuine Producer’s 
Association’ on the lines of the 1938 Nowell plan should be set up to 
take over the functions of the West African Produce Control Board.89 
This idea met heavy opposition from the Governors of Nigeria and the 
Gold Coast and was finally withdrawn.80
The West African Produce Control Board met on 13th September, 
1944 to formally endorse the White Paper proposal on the future cocoa 
control scheme.00 The White Paper itself ( Report on Cocoa Control in 
West Africa. 1939-1943. and Statement of Future Policy, Cmd. 6554) 
was published later in the month. It contained the proposals already 
mentioned: cocoa marketing would remain under government control, 
controls would be administered by local marketing boards in the Gold 
Coast and Nigeria (financed by the surplus of the war-time marketing 
scheme), producers’ and traders' interests would be directly repre­
sented on the Gold Coast board, whereas in Nigeria only an Advisory 
Committee to the board (without executive functions) would represent 
such interests. Finally, the boards would come into operation on 1st 
October, 1945.01
It is apparent that the participants in the planning process 
had very different ideas about the advantages of the future marketing 
scheme, but could easily agree on the principle that such a scheme 
was highly desirable. The publication of the 1944 White Paper 
represents in this restricted sense the end of the consensus building 
process. But the Colonial Office and the West African governments 
still had to convince the West African produce traders and cocoa 
farmers, and the United Kingdom and United States merchant and
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manufacturing firms, of the advantages of the future control scheme. 
The last sections of this chapter will discuss to what extent they 
succeeded in this undertaking.
The Position of the African Intermediaries
Arguably, the reaction of African produce traders and buyers 
did not count for much. The post-war marketing board was eventually 
set up in 1947 and their objections or their agreement to the boards 
bore little influence on the course of events. The reaction to the 
establishment of the post-war marketing scheme however arguably 
contained a strategic decision of far-reaching relevance since 
produce control proved to be one of the most enduring legacies of the 
colonial period and it was only in 1986 that the Nigerian Copoa 
Marketing Board was finally abolished.02 It is for this reason that a 
closer look at the reaction of African produce traders and buyers to 
the announcement of the post-war scheme is justified.
The Nigerian Based "Exporters"
When the scheme was set up in 1939, nine African and Syrian 
trading firms were entitled to an export quota, since they could 
prove that they had exported cocoa in the immediate pre-war years.0 3 
Two of them did not survive the first year, while another three firms 
had their export licences revoked in the following year.04 The demise 
of these firms was not exclusively due to the operation of the war­
time marketing scheme. Some of these firms decided to branch out into 
other, more lucrative, activities or went bankrupt for reasons which 
were unconnected with the produce control scheme. However, there is 
evidence which shows that at least one firm, Flionis Brothers, left 
the cocoa trade because produce control had made cocoa buying 
unremunerative.95
Thus, by October 1941 there were only four Nigerian-based firms 
left in the trade. The individual quotas of these firms, however,
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increased, since the export quotas of the failed firms were dis­
tributed among the remaining survivors: S. Thomopulos (940 tons), 
United Development Trading Company (730 tons), Flionis Brothers (500 
tons) and Odutola Brothers (330 tons).08
The status of these firms remained unchanged until 1943/44. In 
the previous season the West African Produce Control Board had 
dispensed with the services of the European shippers beyond the 
f.o.b. point and all export quotas automatically became buying 
quotas. Since there was no longer any need to distinguish between "A" 
shippers (the European firms) and "B" shippers (the Nigerian-based 
firms), all former exporters were turned into licensed buying agents 
of the Board. In the 1942/43 cocoa season the Nigerian based firms 
were paid as if there were still "B" shippers, but in the 1943/44 
season they received, for the first time, the same amount of remu­
neration for their services as the former "A" shippers. In the 
following season of 1944/45, the fixed tonnage quotas were also 
turned into percentage quotas.9 7
During the war the question as to whether buying quotas should 
be removed was hotly disputed.08 However, it was decided to retain 
them for a variety of reasons: that the system was instrumental in
the war effort and that without such a system the firms would not 
continue to co-operate with the government in the running of the 
scheme and pre-war "abuses” would reappear in the trade.90 The main 
argument for the retention of the quota system was, however, that the 
Association of West African Merchants had indicated that if the 
Colonial Office abandoned the quota system they would immediately 
resuscitate the pre-war Buying Agreement and use their financial 
muscle to oust smaller firms from the trade.100 Such a policy would 
almost inevitably create political difficulties for the colonial 
governments since African traders were expected to react very 
strongly to attempts to exclude them from the cocoa trade. Political 
difficulties had to be avoided during the sensitive period of the war
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and thus the quota system and its administration by the war-time 
control board was kept in place until 1947. 1 0 1
The quota system restricted the growth of the Nigerian-based 
firms which probably helped to bring about the demise of a number of 
Nigerian-based firms in the early war years. Yet, the survivors also 
gained through the system. They no longer faced stiff competition 
from smaller traders or European firms, and they were thus in a far 
more secure position than they had been before the war.102 They also 
became temporary war-time members of the Nigerian branch of the 
Association of West African Merchants, which elevated their sta­
tus.103 The fact that they received - at least from the 1943/44 cocoa 
season - the same buying allowance as the European firms was probably 
even more important. This allowance had considerably increased during 
the war and as they operated with much lower overhead costs it is 
likely that their net profits were very high.104
Moreover, it appears that a different relationship developed 
between the European firms and the few African firms still in the 
trade. The erstwhile keen competitor of the European firms, Odutola 
Brothers, abandoned its former European selling agent (the London 
independent broker firm of Daarnhower & Co. Ltd.) in late 1943 and 
instead appointed John Holt & Co. Ltd. as its representative for the 
forthcoming season. Odutola Brothers subsequently became the premier 
buying agent of John Holt & Co in Nigeria. The new business relation­
ship between the two firms was commented on by Holt’s local District 
Agent (Lagos) with the memorable words:
I aa quite satisfied that handled properly, Odutola can be of iaaense use to us 
without jeopardising the interests of our other custoaers. It has been taken a 
long tiae for ae to really induce hia to develop confidence in us, because for 
aany years, he was iabued with the idea that the big firas were out to saash the 
African and drive hia out of business here, or, if he becaae too powerful, offer 
to buy hia out first. He does today realise that for the European firas to be 
prosperous, the African aust be prosperous and that we can help to aake hia
that.105 [eaphasis added]
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For the remaining firms the experience of war-time trade 
controls was thus not a complete disaster. They adapted to the 
changing economic situation and might even have found the new system 
far more profitable than they initially expected. The biggest change 
which they experienced was perhaps that their profits no longer 
depended on the market, but on the marketing board and that these 
profits, as argued above, were probably higher in the later part of 
the war than those they had made in the immediate pre-war years 
(1937-1939). These firms had therefore something to lose if marketing 
control was terminated at the end of the war which they had to weigh- 
up against any advantages such de-control could offer.
The African Cocoa Traders and Commission Buyers
The larger African cocoa traders (and to a lesser extent the 
commission buyers) were apart from the cocoa farmers perhaps the true 
’victims’ of the control scheme. Most of the larger independent cocoa 
traders had not exported cocoa on their own account before the war, 
but their command of transport facilities and their ability to 
extract higher commission rates from the firms by selling cocoa to 
the highest bidder had enabled them to gain a profitable foothold in 
the trade. The cocoa control system with its fixed buying station 
prices and low commission rates offered smaller profits than other 
activities during the war in, for instance, transport and the 
foodstuffs trade, and there is some evidence that some left the cocoa 
trade altogether in the early war years, while others reorganised 
their firms to become large commission buyers.100
The main competitors of the African traders and commission 
buyers were not the few large produce stores which the firms operated 
in the cocoa belt, but the smaller, far more numerous, depots 
situated in minor towns and outlying larger markets. These depots 
were maintained by produce clerks who received, in addition to their 
salary, a commission for the amount of cocoa they purchased at their
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depots.107 They often used the depots’ cash reserves alongside the 
little capital they possessed for trading transactions. They fre­
quently acted as small cocoa buyers and were extremely tightly 
controlled by the firms.
The competitiveness of the depot clerks increased during the 
war because of the peculiar method of price fixing which the mar—  
keting board employed. Cocoa prices were fixed at buying stations 
throughout the cocoa belt. These buying station prices included the 
remuneration which commission buyers were supposed to receive from 
the firms. Commission buyers and farmers therefore received exactly 
the same cocoa price from the firms and no extra payments were made 
for whatever services commission buyers might have performed. Commis­
sion buyers were therefore forced to recover their remuneration from 
farmers (or smaller traders). However, this was exceedingly difficult 
in the vicinity of the firms' buying stations and the firms’ depots 
since farmers would sell their produce to the firms at a higher 
price, rather than sell it to a commission buyer at a lower price.108 
In addition, the firms massively withdrew the credit from commission 
buyers which they had so liberally disbursed in the pre-war years. It 
was estimated that by 1943 the total debt owed by produce and 
merchandise traders to the firms had decreased by about £1 million 
which, given the relatively small size of the Nigerian economy at the 
time, was an enormous sum.109
Thus many larger commission buyers (and produce traders) were 
driven out of the market or left the bigger markets and towns and 
tried to purchase cocoa at more remunerative prices further afield in 
smaller markets and on farms.110 At the same time, however, the 
number of smaller buyers active in the towns seems to have increased. 
These buyers were attracted to the trade by the security of a 
guaranteed price and a predictable market.111 ’It is surprising’ 
wrote one observer, ’how in places like Ibadan one sees more and more
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sellers (women and youngsters) come in with small headloads of 
produce which they sell to the depot buyers.’112
Thus a noticeable change happened in the internal cocoa trade 
system during the war. Commission buyers and, in particular the 
larger commission buyers, experienced a sharp cut in their earnings 
and their credit status. Consequently their numbers decreased while 
smaller buyers, such as depot clerks, scalemen and itinerant traders 
seemed to have found their position strengthened and their numbers 
consequently increased.113 It is noteworthy that Nigerian government 
officials believed that this development represented one of the long­
term aims of the business policy of the European trading firms.114
Yet commission buyers were not completely driven out of the 
market during the war. This was probably due to the fact that many 
commission buyers and traders were able to exploit the loop-holes 
which the system offered, but probably also to the fact that the 
remuneration system was changed in mid-1943 which assured their 
subsequent survival.115 Between the 1939/40 season and the 1942/43 
season commission buyers were supposed to receive a commission of 7s 
6d from the firms but had to give up part of their remuneration in 
order to compete with the firms depot clerks. The new system was 
introduced in the 1943 light crop season and restored and then 
increased the competitiveness of commission buyers by adding a third 
pricing schedule to the existing two pricing schedules for graded and 
ungraded produce.110 The difference between the latter two schedules 
amounted to 2s 6d per ton. The new third schedule described the 
prices which farmers were to receive when they delivered ungraded 
cocoa to the firms’ depot clerk in the same locality. This price was 
5s lower than the price farmers received at the firms’ main buying 
stations and the difference was calculated so as to enable commission 
buyers to earn their "official" remuneration.117
The new system assured the commission buyer a minimum remu­
neration of 5s per ton since, from the farmers’ point of view, it
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made no difference if they sold ungraded cocoa to a commission buyer 
or a depot clerk, though they would earn 5s per ton for themselves if 
they took the trouble to deliver their cocoa to the main buying 
station. Since most of these buyers graded, bagged and sealed the 
cocoa which they had bought from the farmers, their total ’official’ 
gross earnings from their commercial activities came to 7s 6d per 
ton.
In the 1943/44 main crop season the allowance for grading was 
increased to 4s per ton. A further increase of 2s was granted in the 
1946/47 season after the labourers employed in the grading of produce 
had successfully organised a two day strike in the Western Provinces 
and in the Colony of Lagos from 18th to 20th November, 1946, and 
ended with a 100 percent increase in their rates of their pay.118 
Thus the ’official’ total gross earnings from cocoa buying came to 
11s per ton. When the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board was set up in 
1947 the remuneration element was increased for the first time since 
1939 from 5s per ton to 8s per ton. The grading allowance was also 
marked up to 9s per ton. The ’official’ remuneration of commission 
buyers in the 1947/48 cocoa season therefore increased to a total of 
17s per ton.119
Though profit opportunities were severely curtailed, it seems 
that the post-1943 system offered participants in the trade, in 
particular commission buyers, a niche in which their further exis­
tence was assured. This argument is supported by the fact that cocoa 
buying became increasingly attractive to smaller buyers, who probably 
treasured the security which this activity offered. Commission buyers 
had therefore also something to lose, as well as something to gain, 
if the cocoa buying system reverted to its pre-war form.
Co-operative Societies and Unions
Co-operative cocoa marketing societies were so badly hit by the 
introduction of produce control in 1939 that a special subsidy of 10s
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per ton on co-operative cocoa purchases was introduced in order to 
secure their survival.120 This subsidy was paid by the Association of 
West African Merchants and the United Africa Company and amounted to 
£3,161 in the 1939/40 season, £3,500 in 1940/41 and £4,000 in 
1941/42.121
It can be safely assumed that the Association of West African 
Merchants and the United Africa Company made these payments not 
merely because they were convinced of the advantages of co-operative 
marketing, but also because they were interested in preventing the 
co-operatives from applying for an export quota.122
In 1942/43 the Association of West African Merchants and the 
United Africa Company refused to provide further funds. They argued 
that the subsidy had enabled the co-operative societies to expand the 
volume of their sales and that a further increase would make cocoa 
buying unremunerative for firms in Nigeria.123 However, it is 
interesting to note that the decision to suspend these payments was 
taken when it became apparent that government would take over the 
functions of the merchant firms beyond the f.o.b. point and, conse­
quently, that it was very unlikely that the co-operatives would 
become real exporters.
The loss of the 10s per ton subsidy again threatened the 
existence of the co-operative cocoa marketing societies and after 
much discussion government decided to step in and foot the bill.124 
From 1942/43 to 1946/47 the purchases of co-operative societies were 
directly subsidised from Nigerian government funds.126 Thereafter co­
operative cocoa purchases were subsidised by the Nigerian Cocoa 
Marketing Board.
In the 1942/43 season the co-operative societies received a 
subsidy of about £5,000. It is not known how much the Nigerian 
government paid in the following season of 1943/44, but from then on 
the total amount of the subsidy must have steeply declined, since in 
1944 the largest two federations of co-operative marketing societies
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(the Ibadan Co-operative Cocoa Marketing Union and the Ife Co­
operative Cocoa Marketing Union) were appointed as licensed buying 
agents of the West African Produce Control Board and received an 
’export’ quota of 8,000 tons. Though this quota disqualified the 
unions from obtaining a subsidy, their new status as licensed buying 
agents entitled them to the same remuneration and reimbursements of 
costs as the other agents of the board received and these payments 
more than equalled the subsidy.12®
The co-operative quota remained unchanged in the 1945/46 season 
but two further unions (the Ilesha and Ijebu Co-operative Marketing 
Unions) became licensed buying agents. With government support, the 
four ’exporting’ co-operative unions subsequently established a 
combined selling agency, the Association of Nigerian Co-operative 
Exporters.12 7
In the following season of 1946/47 two more unions, the Ilaro 
and the Abeokuta Cocoa Marketing Unions, were appointed as licensed 
buying agents. In the same season the Association of Nigerian Co­
operative Exporters was granted, against much opposition from the 
European firms, an additional quota of 3,500 tons, so that the 
combined quota of all six marketing unions reached 11,500 tons by 
then.12 8
After the removal of the quota restrictions in 1947 about 11.5% 
of the Nigerian cocoa crop, approximately 8,500 tons of cocoa, was 
marketed through the Association of Nigerian Co-operative Expor­
ters.120 This was a remarkable achievement. But it could be argued 
that this position was only achieved because the co-operative cocoa 
marketing societies and unions received direct financial support from 
the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board.
Apparently, the co-operative societies had very little to gain 
from a return to the pre-war marketing conditions. The co-operative 
cocoa marketing societies and unions and the Association of Nigerian 
Co-operative Exporters received direct financial support from the
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statutory cocoa marketing board. It could not have been in the 
interests of its officials and representatives to demand its abo­
lition since the board guaranteed the existence of their insti­
tutions .
This brief review of the economic interests of the groups which 
were likely to support a protest movement against the continuation of 
wai— time controls suggests that opposition to the new marketing board 
was ambivalent. At the time all groups, with the notable exception of 
cocoa farmers involved in the marketing of cocoa, had probably as 
much to lose as to gain from a reversion to its pre-war structure. 
Arguably, the African intermediaries had become clients of the mar­
keting board during the war and this partly explains why the movement 
against the introduction of the post-war scheme lacked the kind of 
support needed to be effective.
Finally, one should mention how remarkably quickly some leading 
cocoa traders took up the opportunities which the new marketing 
system offered. After the quota restrictions were removed in 1947, a 
number of new African and Syrian firms became licensed buying agents 
of the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board.130 Their owners had survived 
the war in most cases as commission buyers and were now in a position 
to qualify as licensed buying agents. The first two African firms ap­
pointed by the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board were the Ibadan Traders 
Association Ltd. and Kajola Kawusi Stores. The former was owned by 
leading Ibadan traders at the time, including S. Agbaje, S.A. Akin- 
fenwa, Chief Y. Adewumi and Alhaji Y. Ladipo, while the latter was 
allegedly owned by G.A. Babatunde. It is telling that the Ibadan 
Traders Association was managed by one of the three newly appointed 
African members of the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board, E.A. Sanda, 
who, moreover, had a small interest in the firm,131 while Kajola 
Kawusi Stores was owned by another prominent African member of the 
Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board, the Gni of Ife, who had not wished 
his name to appear publicly in connection with the firm.132
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The Reactions of the African Intermediaries
It took almost three years of produce control before the first 
opposition against the low price policy and the cocoa marketing 
scheme emerged.133 There was some dissatisfaction from commission 
buyers in 1940 and 1941, but they did not win the support of politi­
cal groups like the Nigerian Youth Movement and the nationalist press 
at the time.13 4
The attitude towards produce control changed in 1942 when the 
marketing board fixed the light crop cocoa price at £5 per ton and 
the following main crop cocoa price at £12 10s per ton. Cocoa farmers 
and co-operative cocoa marketing societies considered this far too 
low. Protest started in May 1942 with a petition signed by the 
Ibadan, Ife and Ilesha Co-operative Cocoa Marketing Unions and by a 
number of cocoa sales societies from smaller towns in western 
Nigeria, like Akure and Ikare.135 The petitioners asked for a higher 
cocoa price (£10 per ton) and argued that the current cocoa price of 
£5 per ton would allow cocoa farmers only to live on ’starvation 
wages’.13 e
Four months later, on 19th September, 1942, this petition was 
followed by a mass meeting in Ibadan, which according to an official 
report, was attended by over four thousand cocoa farmers from Oyo, 
Ijebu and Abeokuta Provinces. The main speaker was a member of the 
Ibadan Council and President of the Ibadan Co-operative Cocoa Marke­
ting Union, A. Obisesan.137 This meeting resolved ’to endorse the 
Ibadan Co-operative Cocoa Marketing Union to make representations to 
the Government for an increase in the cocoa price on behalf of co­
operative and non-co-operative cocoa producers.’138 The importance of 
this meeting lies in that it was the only occasion during the war and 
in the immediate post-war years when farmers directly articulated 
their interests. The meeting had no impact on official policy.139
The issue of low cocoa prices and the treatment which commis­
sion buyers received from the marketing board was taken up by the
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Nigerian Youth Movement for the first time in November 1942. 140 In 
that month, the Governor of Nigeria received a delegation which, 
among other topics, put forward the plight of commission buyers under 
the control scheme.141 From then on the Nigerian Youth Movement was 
firmly committed to the intermediaries’ case, demonstrated shortly 
afterwards by the appearance of critical articles in the nationalist 
press142 and by critical questions by the Movement’s President, E. 
Ikoli, in the Legislative Council.143 Although these articles and 
questions primarily aimed at obtaining more information about the 
operation of the marketing board, it is apparent from their wording 
that they were meant to be the beginning of a longer campaign.
On the occasion of the Secretary of State for the Colonies’s 
visit to Nigeria in September 1943, the Youth Movement published a 
memorandum, part of which dealt exclusively with trade questions. The 
memorandum also included two annexes, one of which had been prepared 
by the Nigerian Association of African Importers and Exporters, while 
the other was written by the Nigerian Produce Traders’ Associa­
tion.144 It is noteworthy that the interests of African traders were 
apparently divided into the interests of potential “exporters" (in 
effect the former African "B" shippers) and those of produce traders 
(the commission buyers) since both groups found it necessary to state 
their demands separately. Contrary to apparent unity this suggests 
that the relationship between these groups of African traders was 
problematic.
The main memorandum dealt with topics like the importance of 
the Atlantic Charter for the colonies, ’Racial Co-operation’, consti­
tutional reform, education, and industrialisation. In paragraph 
thirteen, under the heading ’Local Produce Brokers and Middlemen’, 
many of the arguments can be found which were later used against the 
introduction of the post-war marketing scheme.145 It appears that the 
1944 White Paper proposals on the future marketing scheme only
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reinforced and accentuated criticism which had been already voiced 
against the war— time scheme.
The main criticism in the memorandum and in the annexes was 
that the African traders were squeezed out of the trade by the 
European firms (or pre-war "combines") and that the latter were 
supported in their efforts by the authorities administering the 
produce control scheme. Moreover, it was argued that the European 
firms would receive much more favourable treatment in terms of 
remuneration and quotas from the marketing board than the African 
firms would. Consequently, the memorandum demanded more protection 
and support for African traders. As regards the commission buyers, it 
specifically asked for the curtailment of the activities of the 
firms’ depot clerks and the granting of higher remuneration rates. In 
respect to the "B" shippers, the memorandum demanded that the 
marketing boards should employ more African firms in the purchase of 
produce in Nigeria and increase the quotas of the African firms which 
were already established in the trade.
The Nigerian Youth Movement, the Association of African Ex­
porters and Importers and the Nigerian Produce Traders’ Association 
put forward a strong demand to improve the conditions of African 
traders under the control scheme. It is noteworthy that neither of 
these groups demanded the immediate abolition of the war-time control
scheme. It is also telling that the plight of cocoa farmers was not
mentioned at all.
After the preparation of the 1943 memorandum, public interest 
or the interest of political groupings, like the Nigerian Youth 
Movement, in cocoa control matters subsided. Instead, attention 
focused on the role of the European business firms in the Nigerian
economy and especially on that of the Association of West African
Merchants in the administration of import and export wai— time 
controls. There had been criticism of the firms and their policies
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throughout the war, but in 1944 the nationalist press started a 
vigorous campaign aimed at the dissolution of the Association.146
In May 1944, for example, three articles were published by the 
Nigerian Youth Movement in the Daily Service under the heading ’The 
AWAM must Go’.147 The article extolled the advantages of free trade 
and accused the Association of manipulating wai— time controls with a 
view to excluding the majority of African firms from the import and 
export trade. The article justified the demand to disband the Asso­
ciation by arguing that there was not much difference between the 
activities of the Association and the 1937 "Pool"; since this pool 
had been dissolved in 1938 the Association should now be dissolved as 
well.148 Though this argument had obvious flaws, it is interesting to 
note that as early as May 1944 a section of the Nigerian Youth 
Movement favoured a post-war trade regime without controls and, 
moreover, found it politically opportune to remind the readers of the 
Daily Service of the allegedly successful 1937/38 campaign. There was 
thus already a press campaign against the European firms under way 
when the first news appeared in Nigeria about the post-war cocoa 
marketing plan in October 1944.
The first reaction to the 1944 White Paper proposals in the 
nationalist press was an article published in the Daily Service on 
26th October, 1944, informing its readers about the essential 
features of the post-war marketing scheme. One day later a further 
article appeared in the same newspaper. It read:
There is no doubt the sufferings and privations inseparable froa war conditions 
have rendered aany people poor, but, at the saae tiae, there are others who have 
taken advantage of the aar to built colossal fortune. To the latter category 
belong the vested interest in Hest Africa. European firas occupy today a position
no organisation had ever dreaat of before The control systea has placed
African traders under the economic dictatorship of European firas. the country 
can bear this as long as the war lasts but not one ainute longer. He do not join 
Britain in the aar against Hazisa aith a viea to strengthening the econoaic hold 
of her trading organisations on this country While the existing control scheae
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paapers European firas it iapoverishes African producers Mhat are we really
fighting for? Is it to aake ourselves econoaic slaves in perpetuity to British 
and Aaerican capitalists? Far froa it. Me have not said the last word about this 
intriguing subject.1<s
This is a typical example of many articles published later. 
Their tone and themes were obviously inspired by the expectation that 
the end of the war would open up new opportunities in the political 
and economic field, including in the cocoa trade.160 High prices in 
the United States and elsewhere, as well as the disclosure of the 
profits of the wai— time control board, probably induced traders to 
believe that the cocoa trade would offer very high returns at the 
time. It is understandable that under these circumstances cocoa 
control was seen as particularly frustrating and that strong demands 
for complete de-control or free trade emerged.161 Such a demand, for 
example, appeared in an article in the Daily Service on 6th December, 
1944:
This is nefarious trading contrary to natural justice, equity and fairplay. Away 
with control board and quotas! They are the schewe of diabolical brains behind 
sowe of the world’s greatest eneaies - the super-capitalists who foraulate 
scheaes and, like the proverbial sugar-coated pills, pass thea on to gullible 
politicians, soae of whoa are honest enough to dissociate theaselves froa the 
profit aotive, but others who are not so honest help to force these pills down 
the African throat.152
Both articles show that there was a distinctly political aspect 
to the criticism of the post-war control scheme. This political 
criticism was of course part of a much wider political dissatis­
faction which was developing at the time. This became most apparent 
in the nationwide strike and in the campaigns against the intro­
duction of the ’Richards Constitution’ in 1946 and the enactment of 
the so-called four ’’obnoxious ordinances”.163
Cocoa control was directly linked with wider political ques­
tions by the way in which the post-war scheme was introduced, as well 
as by the way in which the Nigerian government had decided about the
422
disposal of the profits of the war-time marketing board. It was 
thought that both most clearly showed the paternalistic, if not 
authoritarian character of the political regime of the time.154 The 
main complaint was that nobody in Nigeria was consulted in these 
matters and that government therefore had no legitimacy to pursue 
such policies.166
Criticism of the future marketing scheme appeared in the 
Nigerian press between 1944 and 1947, but reached its peak in 1945 
and early 1946. In the same period the opponents of the post-war 
marketing scheme used two other means to make their view felt. One 
was to despatch a delegation to London to lobby Parliament and the 
Secretai'3  ^of State for the Colonies on behalf of produce traders’ 
interests. The other means consisted in the writing of letters and 
petitions which, though ambivalent in their actual demands, were 
worded in the same way as the aforementioned press articles.
As has been mentioned earlier, the Nigerian Produce Traders’ 
Union went into decline in the early war years. In 1941, its function 
was taken over by the newly-established Nigerian Association of 
African Exporters and Importers and to some extent by the Ibadan 
Produce Traders’ Union, which was founded in the same year. Its first 
Secretary was S.A. Akinpelu.160 In 1943 the Union called itself 
Ibadan Produce Buyers’ and Scalers’ Union and was represented by S.A. 
Akinpelu and the Ibadan Councillor and later member of the Nigerian 
Cocoa Marketing Board, E.A. Sanda.
In May 1945 the Union (under the name Produce Buyers' Union of 
Ibadan and the Western Pi'ovinces) wrote a long petition to the 
Governor of Nigeria asking for the complete de-control of the cocoa 
trade after the war. Yet when it came to positive proposals, it put 
forward demands which could not be realised under free market 
conditions, but depended on the very existence of a marketing board. 
These proposals included the demand for higher commission rates, the
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demand for increased representation on the future marketing board 
and, finally, that government should pay higher cocoa prices.157
This petition was followed up by a rapid succession of peti­
tions in the second half of 1946, all of which were signed by either 
S.A. Akinpelu or S.A. Sanda.168 These showed the same ambivalence. 
Though the petitioners were highly critical of the post-war marketing 
board, their actual proposals went no further than demanding higher 
remuneration for commission buyers, the regulation of the activities 
of all participants in the trade, and higher cocoa prices.
The other means by which producer traders tried to prevent the 
establishment of the post-war marketing board was to support a 
delegation of the so-called "Farmers’ Committee of British West 
Africa" which stayed in London between September and December
1945.160 The members of the delegation (A. Nikoi, W.K. Mould and F.O.
Blaize) came from the Gold Coast, as well as from Nigeria.100 They 
presented the Secretary of State for the Colonies with a memorandum 
containing a variety of demands, such as for higher cocoa prices (25s
per load or just under £47 per ton), for the complete removal of all
trade restrictions (including the demand for the dissolution of the 
West African Produce Control Board) and the demand that all profits 
of the war-time marketing board should be handed over to producers’ 
organisations in the Gold Coast and Nigeria.101
The London delegates failed to achieve their stated objective- 
to prevent the establishment of the post-war marketing scheme. They 
were not even granted an interview with the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, and were largely ignored on advice from the governments 
of the Gold Coast and Nigeria.102 This suggests that the delegation 
had negligible importance as a political pressure group. Yet the 
Farmers’ Committee received considerable support from various politi­
cal groups and trade associations in Nigeria. It is for this reason 
that it is important to review their local background in some detail.
424
The origins of the Farmers’ Committee of British West Africa go 
back to the Nigerian Farmers’ Protection Society and attempts to 
organise farmers and traders during the war years.1®3 The Protection 
Society was very closely connected with one particular family (Coker) 
whose farms were located in the Agege area north of Lagos and whose 
members were prominently involved in the foundation of various 
farmers’ and traders’ organisations, such as in the establishment of 
the Federation of Nigerian Farmers in 1943 (J.M. Coker),164 and the 
setting up of the Association of Merchants and Industrialists (J.K. 
Coker and A .S .0. Coker).16 6
P.T. Coker was the Secretary of the Farmers’ Protection Society 
in 1943. In November of that year he approached the Emir of Zaria 
twice with the proposal to discuss and probably organise protest 
against low produce prices.186 The first letter was headed ’Farmers’ 
Protection Society’, yet the second was written on behalf of a 
commercial firm, the ’Farmers’ Committee of British West Africa 
Ltd.’. One year later the Farmers’ Committee of British West Africa 
and the Association of Merchants and Industrialists became affiliated 
to the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, the leading 
nationalist organisation at the time.187 This suggests that even 
before its main campaign in 1945 the ’Farmers’ Committee of British 
West Africa’ was active either in the form of a business venture or 
as a political pressure group or both.
According to a report in the Daily Service of 19th September, 
1945, the Farmers’ Committee of British West Africa Ltd. was founded 
in March 1943 in London as a trade association for the four British 
West African colonies (the Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast and 
Nigeria).108 It subsequently built up two branches: one in the Gold 
Coast (the Farmers’ Committee of British West Africa, Gold Coast 
Branch) and one in Nigeria (the Farmers’ Committee of British West 
Africa, Nigeria Branch). The Vice-President of the Farmers’ Committee
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of British West Africa was P.T. Coker, while A.S.O. Coker held the 
post of Secretary of the Nigerian branch. 109
The Farmers’ Committee became active in Nigeria in the early 
months of 1945. A. Nikoi170, W.K. Mould and an ’American representa­
tive’ (probably K.O. Mbadiwe) visited Nigeria and had talks with 
Herbert Macaulay, Dr. A. Maya and N. Azikiwe in Lagos, and with S. 
Agbaje and M. Agbaje in Ibadan, presumably in order to prepare the 
ground for the following campaign.171 In August 1945 the Farmers’ 
Committee of British West Africa Ltd. applied for an export quota of 
6,000 tons of cocoa to the United Kingdom. This application was 
rejected on the ground that the Committee had not previously shipped 
cocoa.172 One month later, F.O. Blaize, who was at the time in the 
United Kingdom studying law, was officially appointed to represent 
the Nigerian branch of the Farmers’ Committee in London.173
The Farmers’ Committee of British West Africa (Nigeria Branch)
was a rallying point for many nationalists like D.T. Sasegbon, S.L. 
Akintola and Dr. A. Maya.174 Together with A.S.O. Coker they or—  
ganised various ’’mass" meetings in Lagos and Ibadan between September 
and November 1945. This was done in order to drum up support for the 
London delegation and included a joint meeting with the Ibadan 
Produce Traders’ Association175 (16 September 1945) and a joint
meeting with the Ibadan Co-operative Cocoa Marketing Union (27
October 1945). 170 In addition, the Farmers’ Committee published a
special pamphlet and held fund-raising events.177 The Committee was 
publicly supported by the Nigerian Youth Movement and the National 
Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons.17 8
The height of the activities was reached with a meeting of a 
"Farmers’ Council" in Ibadan on 21st November, 1945, attended by 
about forty people representing about fifteen farmers’ unions from 
the Western Provinces and from the Colony.179 The main speakers, 
apart from D.T. Sasegbon and Dr. A. Maja, were farmers’ union members 
from Shagamu, Ede and Ilepeju.180 The meeting agreed on a resolution
426
which demanded higher cocoa prices, as well as the official recogni­
tion of the London delegation by the Secretary of State for the Colo­
nies .
Despite all their efforts and their, albeit limited, support, 
the Nigerian branch of the Farmers’ Committee seemed to have gained 
from farmers’ organisations, such as the Ibadan Co-operative Marke­
ting Union, the impact of the activities of the local Farmers’ 
Committee on cocoa farmers in general was not very deep. When in 
October 1945 the London delegation issued an "order" for the hold-up 
of cocoa to strengthen its position vis-a-vis the Colonial Office 
and put pressure behind its demand for an increase in the cocoa 
price to £50 per ton, almost nobody obeyed, though according to one 
official report there was a ’go slow’ campaign in the early part of 
the month.181
The activities of the Farmers’ Committee of British West Africa 
subsided when it became clear that the Colonial Office would not 
recognise them as representatives of West African farmers. The 
Nigerian delegate F.O. Blaize returned to Nigeria in January 1946, 
and after a meeting in which he gave an account of his work in 
London, there seem to have been no further public meetings of the 
Farmers’ Committee of British West Africa (Nigeria Branch).182 
Subsequently, and perhaps consequently, criticism of the future 
marketing scheme seems to have somewhat shifted from the scheme 
itself to criticism of the its workings.183
However, it is noteworthy that the Nigerian Farmers’ Union was 
involved in the activities of the Farmers’ Committee of British West 
Africa. In December 1945 the Nigerian Farmers’ Union decided to send 
another delegate to London.184 Though some money was collected, it 
seems that the project was soon abandoned.186 The delegate supposed 
to travel to London was 0. Akeredolu-Ale, who later became the 
General Secretary and principal organiser of the Nigerian Farmers’ 
Union.188
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The press campaigns, the petitions and finally the activities 
of the Farmers’ Committee of British West Africa could not prevent 
the establishment of the post-war marketing scheme. Yet, the op­
ponents of the post-war marketing scheme were not completely unsuc­
cessful. In the previous chapter it was argued that the West African 
Produce Control Board raised the producer price from £26 per ton in 
the 1945/46 cocoa season to £47 10s per ton in the following season, 
partly in order to make the future marketing scheme more acceptable 
in the Gold Coast and Nigeria and to appease the widespread dis­
satisfaction which had emerged. It is probably also not a coin­
cidence, that in January 1946 the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
strongly argued for increased producer representation on the Nigerian 
cocoa marketing board. Since this decision was at least partly due to 
the activities of the opponents of produce control, it appears that 
the campaign against the post-war control scheme had shown some 
results, though perhaps not those hoped for.
It might be argued that in any event colonial governments in
West Africa at the time hardly responded to demands from political
movements, but it seems that the striking immobility of the Nigerian 
government on this particular occasion was also due to the fact that 
the introduction of the post-war control scheme enjoyed strong local 
support and that a large section of the nationalist movement had 
serious doubts about the advantages of a return to the free trade 
regime of the 1930s.
Local support was probably forthcoming as a result of govern­
ment action itself, which included such measures as the printing of
pamphlets in the local vernaculars, the publication of articles in 
nationalist newspapers and public lectures by District Officers in 
the cocoa producing areas.167 But it appears that such support also 
reflected the serious conviction, which was held by some farmer 
representatives, chiefs and nationalists, that produce control was a 
favourable option for Nigerian cocoa farmers and traders. Support for
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the cocoa marketing scheme was, for example, forthcoming from the 
President of the Ibadan Co-operative Marketing Union, A. Obisesan, 
and one of the highest ranking Chiefs of Ibadan, I.B. Akinyele.188 
More important, however, was the fact that the nationalist camp was 
divided over the issue of produce control. 0. Awolowo, for example, 
wrote in the Daily Service on 9th January, 1945, that post-war 
control of the cocoa market would be preferable because ’no one 
would desire a return to the pre-war vagaries of the cocoa market, if 
a practical alternative could be provided’ and added that ’unrestric­
ted competition in all departments of commerce must be one of the
casualties of war.’1?0
There seem to be two main reasons for the striking similarity 
between the government view and the view held by a section of the
nationalist movement. As has been argued above, the return to the
pre-war marketing system would not necessarily benefit the economic 
interests of the groups whom the protest movement was supposed to 
represent. Though the cocoa control scheme had severely limited the 
profits which African traders could make in the cocoa trade, a 
complete return to a free trade regime would threaten the economic 
niches which the control system had offered. In that sense the 
marketing board was instrumental in creating a new category of vested 
interest in the West African cocoa trade. This was arguably the main 
reason why the demands for a return to the pre-war marketing system 
lacked widespread support even among African traders and why many 
newspaper articles, political pamphlets and petitions published at 
the time showed a marked ambivalence towards the control board.190
The other main reason why an important section of the natio­
nalist movement in Nigeria declined to join the anti-control board 
and free trade movement, was probably due to its more general view 
that African firms were not served by a free trade regime. On a 
number of occasions many nationalists had argued that the development 
of the cocoa trade in the 1930s had offered much evidence for the
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theory that a free trade system would subject smaller African firms 
merely to the machinations of the "combines" of the European firms 
and stifle their growth.101
It is noteworthy that, based on this reasoning, as early as the 
mid- and late-1930s proposals had emerged to restrict the activities 
of the European firms by setting up cocoa control boards under the 
direction of producer and trader organisations.102 During the war, 
arguments in favour of government intervention gained more widespread 
support as the following quote from a memorandum of the Association 
of African Exporters and Importers from 1943 shows
The African Trader is a late arrival in the field of private enterprise, is 
handicapped by want of financial resources and organisation and if his right to a 
decent livelihood in his own territory is recognised, he seeks protection against 
combinations of powerful rivals who can easily oust hiw out of the field of 
private enterprise. It is to the Government that he looks for protection.1,3 
[emphasis added]
Such reasoning also appeared, though in a less sophisticated 
manner, in a number of newspaper articles and petitions at the end of 
the war. In May 1945, for example, a petition of the Produce Buyers’ 
Union of Ibadan and Western Provinces was published in the Daily 
Comet whi ch reads:
He are respectfully craving that the trade of this country will be allowed to
remain free [and] that legislation should be introduced to protect the
producer and the small native traders against unfair competition of the capi­
talist firms.194
As argued above, part of the nationalist movement opposed a 
return to the free trade marketing system of the 1930s. They also 
severely criticised the way in which the marketing board operated 
during the war. But they were at the same time convinced that the 
marketing board system could be adapted to serve the needs of African 
traders or, as O. Awolowo put it, ’no one would desire a return to 
the pre-war vagaries of the cocoa market, if a practical alternative
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could be provided’ [emphasis added].196 For this section of the 
nationalist movement, the main question was thus not whether a
statutory marketing scheme should be established after the war, but
rather who would be represented on this board and in whose interest
it would operate.
Thus, there was a rift within the nationalist movement. One
part favoured a free trade system while the other believed that such
an option would only help to perpetuate the dominance by European 
firms. The fact that part of the movement decided to campaign for 
control of the marketing board, rather than for abolition seems to 
have great significance in retrospect. It was arguably the moment
when part of the nationalist movement made up its mind not only about 
the future cocoa marketing scheme, but also about the role government 
and, in the widest sense, the state should play in the economy. So
far as trade matters were concerned, this role was perceived as
basically interventionist with a view to fostering the growth of 
indigenous entrepreneurs. From the 1950s, the state interventionist 
faction within the nationalist movement dominated the regional and 
federal governments in Nigeria, and it has been argued that this 
fundamental orientation has had a great impact on the subsequent 
Nigerian political and economic history.108
This section of the chapter reviewed in some detail the 
reaction of African intermediaries, their trade associations, and of 
the nationalist movement to the publication of the 1944 White Paper. 
However, their reaction seems to have only marginally influenced the 
course of events. In the last part of this chapter it will be shown 
how other, more influential, pressure groups almost succeeded in 
preventing the establishment of the post-war marketing scheme.
The Reactions of the European and American Trading Firms and Cocoa 
Manufacturers
The United Kingdom intermediaries and most of the cocoa 
manufacturers did not take part in discussions over the post-war
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marketing scheme and it was only in early September 1944 that they 
were informed about the basic features of the proposed scheme.197 
Their immediate reaction was one of deep suspicion. The firms 
criticised the White Paper as lacking any definition of the future 
role which the trading firms would play in the proposed scheme and 
for not spelling out in any detail what powers the new local boards 
would have.198 The United Africa Company in particular seems to have 
been extremely worried by the prospect of sooner or later being 
driven out of the trade and was concerned that their interests would 
not be taken into account when the finer details of the scheme were 
settled.100 On both issues the Company was officially assured that 
the Colonial Office had no intention to pursue such policies.200 
These assurances seemed not, however, to have had a major impact, 
since the European trading firms, led by the United Africa Company, 
started a powerful campaign against the continuation of the war— time 
control scheme which included newspaper articles and intensive 
lobbying of Members of Parliament and the Colonial Office.201 The 
opponents of the proposed scheme were organised in two trade as­
sociations: the Cocoa Association of London and the British Federa­
tion of Commodity and Allied Trade Association. The Colonial Office 
regarded the latter as a mouthpiece for the United Africa Company.202
Both associations produced lengthy memoranda on alternative 
control schemes, whose main feature was to allow the firms the export 
of cocoa on their own account, while the role of government would be 
restricted to fixing of minimum prices and stock-piling of cocoa 
which the firms refused to purchase.203 After long internal discus­
sions within the Colonial Office and between the Colonial Office and 
the West African governments, it was decided to reject these propo­
sals . 2 0 4
Despite their generally considerable influence, the trading 
firms’ opposition was relatively easy to overcome. This was probably 
due to the fact that the firms themselves were divided over the
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issue. The opposition against the introduction of the future marke­
ting scheme was spearheaded by the United Africa Company and it seems 
that smaller companies, for example, John Holt & Co. Ltd., only 
reluctantly supported the campaign. There is even some evidence that 
the local representatives of John Holt & Co. actually welcomed the 
scheme.206 This attitude was probably the result of the re-appearance 
of competitive practices in the cocoa trade, such as the payment of 
overriding commissions to African commission buyers.200 Since 1943 
the United Africa Company embarked on an aggressive buying policy and 
this probably made the smaller European firms aware of the fact that 
a "free for all" system would not only drive a number of African 
firms to the wall, but a number of smaller European firms as well.207
Moreover, there is also some evidence which suggests that the 
trading firms fundamentally differed over their future business 
strategies.208 Since 1943, representatives of John Holt & Co., for 
example, emphatically argued that the European firms should encourage 
African traders to become active members of the Association of West 
African Merchants.200 There is no indication that the United Africa 
Company shared this view at the time.210 The distinct lack of 
cohesion between the trading firms in their approach to African 
traders and statutory marketing arguably weakened their position vis- 
a-vis the Colonial Office.
Furthermore, the Association of West African Merchants and its 
Cocoa Sub-Committee, was sharply divided over the issue of produce 
control. Its cocoa manufacturing members, especially the firm of 
Cadbury Brothers Ltd., strongly supported the scheme, which, given 
that John Cadbury was a member of the West African Produce Control 
Board, is hardly surprising.211 The cocoa manufacturers counter­
weighted to some extent the protest campaign of the trading asso­
ciations by preparing memoranda and publishing newspaper articles in 
favour of the proposed scheme.212 It appears that the long-term 
interests of cocoa manufacturers were different from those of the
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trading firms and that, for this reason, the Association of West 
African Merchants was unable to present a common counter-proposal.213 
The division between cocoa manufacturers and trading firms naturally- 
helped the Colonial Office to defend the scheme against public 
criticism.
However, the Colonial Office was also faced with strong 
American criticism.214 For political and economic reasons it had to 
be extremely cautious in dealing with American opinion at the time. 
American criticism of the proposed scheme such as, for example, the 
criticim which had appeared in a memorandum published by the 
President of New York cocoa exchange had to be taken very seriously 
indeed.215
American opposition was in the end overcome by postponing the 
introduction of the scheme for one year, when American opinion was 
expected to be less vital to British economic interests. It is note­
worthy that some American manufacturers had indicated that they would 
be prepared to accept produce control though they were very critical 
of various aspects of the proposed scheme.21e
Finally, one should mention that the influential Fabian 
Colonial Bureau strongly favoured the idea of produce control.217 In 
1945 the Bureau wrote a letter to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies and published a number of articles in support of the scheme, 
for example, those in the Manchester Guardian on 9th and 19th March, 
1945.218
The Colonial Office Debate
When in September 1944 the Colonial Office presented the 
outline of the new scheme to the public it was quite surprised by the 
strength of the opposition aroused. Though some opposition had been 
expected, the Colonial Office had believed that the firms would 
reluctantly accept the scheme as in their long-term interest. Thus, 
for example, the Secretary of State for the Colonies had argued that:
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These proposals have not repeat not as yet been discussed with the firis, as I 
consider that what is involved at this stage is decision of principle and policy 
which wust be taken by governaent... Firws cannot be expected to welcoae pro­
posals... [but] I do not expect any serious repercussions partly because soae 
firas, particularly aanufacturing interests and saaller shippers are not happy in 
aeabership of association with A.M.A.M. and night be expected to co-operate in 
new arrangeaents and partly because nany of the reaainder depends for their 
profits on nerchandise rather than produce and so nay be expected to go at 
considerable length to be allowed to aaintain buying stations to attract cus- 
toaers. 219
The above mentioned principle was, however, soon abandoned. 
Although the Colonial Office stood solidly behind the 1944 White 
Paper proposals,220 the Secretary of State decided to retreat from 
the position, when faced with stiff criticism from the trading 
firms.221 On 16th November, 1944, the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies declared that the 1944 White Paper would not be the last 
word on the subject and announced in a meeting with representatives 
of the trading firms that another White Paper would be published in 
due course which would take into account the criticism the scheme had 
met from various sides.222
In addition, the Colonial Office tried in vain to make the 
scheme more acceptable to the firms. For example, the firms were 
repeatedly assured that there was no intention of driving them out of 
the trade. They were also assured that the board would only allow 
African traders to become licensed buying agents of the future 
marketing board on condition that they fulfilled certain minimum 
requirements. These would guarantee that only a limited number of 
firms would participate in the trade.223
The firms’ reaction to these proposals was not encouraging. 
They continued to press for a change in the marketing system and, 
consequently, the Secretary of State decided to ask the colonial 
governments in early February 1945 if they were prepared to re­
consider the scheme.224 He also made clear that he personally would 
now favour a minimum price scheme on the lines the firms had pre­
viously proposed.226
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The Nigerian government reacted with considerable anger to the 
news that the Secretary of State was effectively abandoning the 1944 
White Paper proposal.226 This anger seems to have also inspired the 
official letter which the Governor of Nigeria, A. Richards, wrote in 
response to the February despatch.227 The Governor strongly advised 
the Secretary of State not to deviate from the original proposal. A 
statement to the same effect was also received from the Governor of 
the Gold Coast, who added that any retreat on the 1944 proposal would 
be interpreted as giving in to the demands of the trading firms and 
might lead to a hold-up of cocoa after the war.228
The Secretary of State was thus confronted with strong pressure 
from the firms to abandon the proposed scheme, while at the same time 
the colonial governments in West Africa pressed for its retention. 
Faced with this situation, he decided in February 1945 to follow the 
advice given by the Governor of Nigeria and postpone the decision on 
the future marketing scheme until further notice.220 Meanwhile the 
West African Produce Control Board would be asked to purchase and 
sell the West African cocoa crop for another season (i.e. in the 
1945/46 cocoa season).
It appears therefore that in February 1945 the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies might have been abandoned the 1944 White Paper 
proposals, if the West African Governments had not so forcefully 
supported the original scheme. It is noteworthy that at the time the 
campaigns against the introduction of the scheme in West Africa had 
hardly started. The postponement of the decision about the future 
marketing scheme was thus not the direct result of political pressure 
from West African nationalist groups.
The Establishment of the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board
The British general election of 1945 brought the Labour Party 
to power. Among the many changes this brought about was the replace­
ment of the former Secretary of State, Oliver Stanley, by G.H. Hall.
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His Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the time was Arthur Creech Jones 
who only one year later was appointed as Secretary of State for the 
Colonies. Creech Jones had on many occasions publicly expressed his 
preference for a statutory marketing scheme230 and as Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary immediately reaffirmed the government’s commitment to 
the 1944 White Paper proposals.231
In October 1945 the colonial governments were informed that the 
1944 White Paper proposals would not be changed or amended and that 
the 1946 White Paper would not contain any surprises.232 This news 
was received by the Nigerian government with considerable satis­
faction.233 In the following four months the Colonial Office prepared 
an outline draft for the White Paper which included negotiations with 
other government departments and detailed discussions with West 
African governments.234 This outline draft was ready by 12th January, 
1946.
The draft reaffirmed the 1944 goal of bringing stability to the 
cocoa industry by establishing marketing boards in the Gold Coast and 
Nigeria whose purpose was to purchase all cocoa offered at fixed 
seasonal prices. It also defined the role of the intermediaries. It 
was stated that, though there was no intention to exclude efficient 
trading firms, their number and scope would be severely restric­
ted.235 As regards the future composition of the Nigerian marketing 
board the draft proposed that
...the functions of the Board will be entrusted in the first place to the 
Departaent of Coaaerce and Industry, in association with the Supply Board of the 
Nigerian Secretariat and assisted by an advisory Coaaittee, representative of the 
producers and trade interests under the chairaanship of a senior Governaent 
official.236
As regards the Gold Coast board, the draft just stated that a board 
would be set up on the lines of the 1944 proposal, which included 
representation of producer and trader interests on the board itself.
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As mentioned above, the decision to establish dissimilar boards 
in Nigeria and the Gold Coast directly resulted from the different 
political pressures which African traders and producers had exerted 
on the respective colonial governments. In May 1944 the Nigerian
government had argued that an advisory committee would be sufficient 
to satisfy local demands for increased influence in the adminis­
tration of the local boards. Since then, its position had not 
changed.237 Meanwhile however, the political situation in the United 
Kingdom had changed. The new Secretary of State for the Colonies G.H. 
Hall visited Nigeria in January 1946. In a meeting with the Governor
of Nigeria he proposed that the composition of the Nigerian board
should also allow the direct representation of producer and trader 
interests. Governor Richards strongly objected and only after some 
considerable pressure from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
in the end it was agreed that
...the Board would consist of three officials at first and that the regaining two 
vacancies would be filled by persons representing producers interests as soon as 
suitable persons could be found.238
It seems likely that the Secretary of State for the Colonies’ 
intervention was partly the result of the activities of the Farmers’ 
Committee of British West Africa, whose campaign had just come to an 
end.239 However, it is noteworthy that the final version of the 1946 
White Paper was less specific on producer representation on the 
marketing board. It is only stated that the board ’would consist of 
not less than three nor more than five members to be appointed by the 
Governor’ and that the board ’would be assisted by an Advisory 
Committee consisting of a Chairman and not more than six members to 
be appointed by the Governor’, whereby the latter would include 
representatives of producer and commercial interests.240
The discussions over the final version of the 1944 White Paper 
were completed in February 1946. Yet, on the advice of the U.S. State 
Department it was decided to postpone publication until the United
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States Congress had concluded its debate about the 1946 British- 
American loan agreement on the grounds that this debate could be 
negatively influenced by the publication of a White Paper whose 
contents was likely to cause strong American criticism.241 The 
publication of the 1946 White Paper was therefore delayed until 
November 1946. It was then, however, too late to introduce the 
proposed cocoa marketing scheme for the 1946/47 cocoa season, which 
started in October 1946. The introduction of the scheme was therefore 
postponed for another season.
The wording of the 1946 White Paper suggests that it was 
largely written with a view to answering the criticism which the 
previous 1944 White Paper had attracted from British and American 
trading firms. Some sections dealt exclusively with the minimum price 
scheme which the trading firms had put forward as an alternative 
proposal (paragraphs 2, 8, and 9) as well as a section which tries to 
address an American audience (paragraph 11). The White Paper also 
provided an analysis of the cocoa industry and its main problems 
(paragraphs 4 and 7). However, in substance there is no change 
between the argument advanced in favour of produce control in the 
1944 and the 1946 White Paper. Since these arguments have been 
already discussed in some detail, it is necessary to highlight only 
two further points.
The 1946 VTiite Paper defines the activities of intermediaries 
in very narrow terms (paragraphs 16-20). It makes clear that the 
future board would only emploj7- a limited number of licensed buying 
agents whose activities would be moreover tightly controlled. But the 
White Paper also contains the assurance that the authorities had no 
intention to exclude any European trading firms or any African 
trader, from participating in the cocoa trade in the near future. 
These paragraphs were probably written in order to allay the trading 
firms’ apprehensions that the marketing board would drive them out of 
the trade in the future.
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Finally, the White Paper strongly emphasises that the board was 
not supposed to make any profit at the expense of the West African 
cocoa producer (paragraph 23) and explicitly states that any surplus 
made in the past would be returned in full to the producers (para­
graphs 14 and 15) and would be handed over to the future marketing 
board. This surplus would only be used either to even out price 
fluctuation or on expenditure from which cocoa producers were likely 
to directly benefit, such as research on cocoa diseases and cocoa 
rehabilitation. It also states that any eventual surplus in the 
future would be exclusively used for similar purposes (paragraph 23). 
But the White Paper also mentions that a considerable sum of money 
had been made available to the Gold Coast Legislative Council for 
expenditure on higher education (paragraph 14), which seems to con­
tradict the statement that there was no question of making a profit 
at the expense of cocoa farmers.
The publication of the 1946 White Paper was received in Nigeria 
with far less criticism than the publication of the White Paper of 
1944. The main reasons were that the erstwhile opponents of produce 
control had abandoned their campaign, that other political issues 
occupied the nationalist groups at the time and that the Nigerian 
government took great care to inform influential African leaders of 
opinion about the main contents of the White Paper.242
There was also a noticeable shift in the focus of criticism 
prior to the publication of the White Paper. Whereas in 1945 demands 
appealed for the complete removal of produce control, in 1946 such 
demands became increasingly rare as the year progressed. Instead 
criticism of the future scheme was mainly directed against the 
working of the scheme. There was considerable apprehension that 
producer and trader representatives would be excluded from membership 
of the board and that the future control scheme might prevent African 
traders from participating in the trade. There was also the fear that 
the profits of the war-time control board would not be returned to
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Nigeria.243 The White Paper assured African traders and producers 
that their interests would be taken into account in the future 
administration of the marketing board and that the profits of the 
wai— time control scheme would be returned to the producers. Because 
of this, public reaction to the publication of the 1946 White Paper 
was rather subdued.
In 1947, the central political problem for the colonial govern­
ment in connection with the proposed future marketing scheme was to 
find "suitable" persons to represent producer and trader interests on 
the board. The task to make recommendations fell on the Acting 
Resident Oyo Province, R.L.V. Wilkes. In May 1947 he held meetings 
with the Ilesha Native Authority and with the Ibadan Inner Council, 
in which he asked the councilors and chiefs to make nominations.244 
Both the Ilesha Native Authority and the Ibadan Native Authority 
came forward with a list of names, which included produce traders, 
like T.A. Odutola, S. Agbaje, A.O. Makanjuola, J.O. Fadahunsi and 
E.A. Sanda, as well as local notables like the Oni of Ife, D.T. 
Sasegbon, A. Obisesan and H.O. Davies, all of whom had been involved 
in cocoa politics since at least 1937/38.245
On the occasion of the meeting with the Ibadan Inner Council 
the Secretary of the Produce Traders Union, E.A. Sanda, was full of 
praise for the future marketing scheme. This probably explains why he 
was subsequently strongly recommended by the Acting Resident as a 
suitable member for the board.24® Hie other nominee was the Oni of 
Ife.247 Though the Resident gave no explanation for this particular 
nomination, it is very likely that he recommended the Oni of Ife 
because of his important political and religious position in Yoruba- 
land. As regards the future Advisory Committee, the Acting Resident 
also suggested the leading Ijebu-Ode businessmen T.A. Odutola and, 
somewhat reluctantly, the President of the Ibadan Co-operative 
Marketing Union, A. Obisesan.248 Alternatively he put forward the 
names of S. Agbaje (a prominent Ibadan trader) and H.O. Davies ( a
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leading member of the Nigerian Youth Movement) as candidates for 
either the Marketing Board or the Advisory Committee. The Oni of Ife 
and E.A. Sanda were chosen by the Nigerian Government to represent 
African (trading) interests on the Board, whereas T.A. Odutola and
J.O. Fadahunsi were invited to become members of the Advisory
Committee.
The appointment of prominent African traders to the Board and 
its Advisory Committee made certain that the future administration 
and policy of the Board would be strongly influenced by Nigerian
commercial interests. It is interesting that this development was
precisely what the Governor of Nigeria, Richards, had hoped to 
prevent when he had tried to resist the establishment of local 
marketing boards with substantial African representation (see above). 
He had argued that,
...to constitute a local Control Board, for aewbership of which selected in­
dividual Africans would be eligible, wight only result in replacewent of foreign 
capitalists by local capitalists, thereby perpetuating the systew of vested 
interests, 249
It might be argued that Richards used this argument only to prevent a 
development which he resented for other reasons250 but, as far as the 
quote above is concerned, his prediction seems to have been by and 
large correct. In July and August 1947 the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing 
Board Bill was debated in the newly established Western House of 
Assembly and in the Legislative Council. On both occasions the Bill 
received wholesale support from all sides including the Oni of Ife, 
E.A. Sanda, the Alake of Abeokuta and Chief R. Turton of Ilesha, 
though some criticism was raised by Chief I.B. Akinyele of Ibadan and 
T.A. Odutola.251 On the initiative of Chief Akinyele, the proposed 
composition of the marketing board was changed in order to increase 
prodicer representation. Instead of having only five nominated 
members as the 1946 White paper had envisaged, the proposed Marketing 
Board Bill was amended to allow for the appointment of seven members
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to the Board. These changes were accepted by the Nigerian government 
and the enabling Bill which established the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing 
Board as a legal entity was finally published as Sessional Paper 
No.3 3 of 6th September, 1947.
The West African Produce Control Board was relieved of the 
responsibility for the marketing of cocoa in October 1947. As far as 
the local purchase of cocoa was concerned, its functions were taken 
over by the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board, while the responsibility 
for cocoa sales in the international markets was taken over by the 
Nigerian Produce Marketing Company Ltd., a subsidiary of the Board. 
The new managing director of this company was the former managing 
director of the West African Produce Control Board, E.C. Tansley. He 
held a similar post in the Gold Coast Produce Marketing Company Ltd. 
which was the selling agency of the Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing Board. 
This arrangement necessarily meant that the Gold Coast and Nigerian 
marketing companies acted as one body when it came to selling cocoa 
in the international markets.
Hie Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board began its work on 2nd June, 
1947.252 It was then called ’Shadow Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board’
because the enabling Bill had not yet been enacted by the Nigerian
Legislative Council. However, these legal complications did not
effect the work of the Board, since all decisions of the shadow board 
were later accepted as binding decisions by the Nigerian Cocoa 
Marketing Board, such as the fixing of producer prices for the
forthcoming 1947/48 cocoa season and the minimum requirements which
buying agents had to fulfil in order to obtain a licence from the
boa rd.253
The Shadow Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board consisted initially 
of three official members (the Financial Secretary, the Director of 
Agriculture and the Director of the Department of Commerce and In­
dustry) and two unofficial members (E.A. Sanda and the Oni of
Ife).254 The Oni of Ife was also appointed Director of the Nigerian
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Produce Marketing Company Ltd. The Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board was 
subsequently enlarged as a result of a campaign initiated by the 
Daily Service to include a representative for producer interests.266 
The person appointed was A. Obisesan, the President of the Ibadan Co­
operative Cocoa Marketing Union.266
The Advisory Committee consisted of four official members (the 
Secretary for Finance and Development, the Deputy Director of 
Agriculture, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies and the Assis­
tant Director of Agriculture), and eight unofficial members of whom 
two were appointed to represent European trading and shipping 
interests (E.D. Lucas of Elder Dempster Lines and A.G. Marshall of 
the Lagos Chamber of Commerce), another two to represent African 
trading interests (T.A. Odutola and J.O. Fadahunsi), and one to 
represent cocoa co-operatives (S.O. Babalola). The remaining three 
members of the Advisory Committee were political appointees (the Oni 
of Ife, F.B. Arifalo and Chief I.B. Akinyele).257
In the following years the Marketing Board was embroiled in a 
number of political conflicts, but it appears that these only 
concerned specific decisions of the Board and not the principle of 
produce control itself. The fact that the principle of produce 
control as such was not seriously questioned was arguably due to the 
policy of the Nigerian Government to appoint only members to the 
Board who were accepted by farmers and traders as representatives of 
their interests or because of their distinguished political position 
in their communities. The introduction of the *>ost-war marketing 
scheme was in this limited sense a highly successful operation, given 
the fact that the issue of produce control had raised so much 
controversy in the past.
The policy of the Nigerian government as regards the com- 
position of the marketing board was described in the 1946 White Paper 
as an attempt to ’facilitate the association of direct represen­
tatives of the producers in the control of marketing’. The subsequent
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history of the Board raises considerable doubts as to what extent 
this goal was achieved, since the marketing board heavily taxed cocoa 
farmers in the years up to independence and beyond.2 5 8
However, there can be no doubt that African trading interests 
became fully associated in the control of marketing. A minor aspect 
of this association was that the first two African firms which the 
Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board appointed as licensed buying agents 
were partly owned by the newly appointed members of the Board, the 
Oni of Ife and E.A. Sanda.269 But, more important perhaps was the 
fact that the interests of all classes of European, Syrian, Nigerian 
and co-operative traders seem to have been subsequently well served 
by the Board, as, for example, the remarkable increase in commission 
rates and buying allowances in the year 1947 shows.260
It is even arguable that the European trading firms profited 
from the continuance of the war-time control scheme, since it removed 
much of the political odium which was previously attached to them 
like, for instance, the accusation that they would conclude buying 
agreements among themselves in order to manipulate produce purchase 
prices. In addition, the trading and manufacturing firms retained a 
measure of influence either through their direct membership of the 
marketing boards in West Africa or through their trade associations 
in London, particularly through the newly established Consumers’ 
Consultative Committee.261
Finally, one should mention that the establishment of the 
Nigerian Marketing Board was probably also welcomed by Syrian 
traders. Very little is actually known about Syrian cocoa traders in 
Nigeria, but they seem to have kept a very low profile in the whole 
debate about the future marketing arrangements because their inter­
ests were arguably to a large extent identical with those of the 
larger African traders. It is in any case quite remarkable that six 
of the nine firms which the Marketing Board newly appointed in the
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1947/48 cocoa season were owned by persons of Syrian or Lebanese 
origin.262
The history of the introduction of the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing 
Board fits well into the political trend at the time. The Colonial 
Office, for example, argued in 1947 that constitutional development 
in West Africa should be geared 'to meet the administrative need 
created by increased business and the expanding sphere of government 
activity on the one hand and the political need to associate the 
people of the territory more closely with Government on the 
other. ’ 263 The history of the establishment of the Nigerian Cocoa 
Marketing Board in Nigeria seems to provide a fine example of how 
this policy worked in practice.
The term ’association with government’ should, however, not be 
confused with the notion of democratic development. The introduction 
of local marketing boards contained no intention to relinquish 
control of the boards to local interests.264 It has been already 
pointed out that one of the main reasons why local marketing boards 
were set up in the Gold Coast and in Nigeria, as opposed to a central 
marketing board in London, was that political discontent in West 
Africa had turned the marketing scheme into a political liability in 
West Africa, as well as the United Kingdom. It was thought that the 
incorporation of local interests would help to allay suspicion of the 
Board and prevent further criticism. Yet, the fact that the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies was relieved from responsibility for the 
scheme did not mean that the Colonial Office intended to lose its 
influence over the administration of the scheme.265 At the intro­
duction of the scheme in 1947, the Colonial Office considered how to 
keep an option open in the event of the unofficial majority of the 
Gold Coasl Cocoa Marketing Board taking decisions which it thought 
would infringe vital British interests. Such decisions could be over­
turned in the last instance by invoking the special reserve powers of 
the Governor of the colony concerned.266
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The use of these powers, as well as the use of formal govern­
ment direction, was considered as politically extremely inopportune 
at the time.267 Instead, the Colonial Office hoped to exercise 
informal control trough the Chairmen of the marketing boards and the 
careful handling of its African members, as well as through co­
operation between British government departments and the London 
selling agencies of the Board.266 Later, such interventions occurred 
on a number of occasions, but these events belong to a different 
period in the history of statutory marketing in West Africa.269
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Endnotes: Chapter 7
1. See further down.
2. The ex officio chairman of the board was the Parliamentary Under-
Secr. of State for the Colonies. This post was occupied by a rapid
succession of various Members of Parliament during the war. G.H. Hall 
was replaced in 1942 by H. Macmillan, who was followed by the Duke of 
Devonshire in 1943. A. Creech Jones was appointed to the post in 1945 
but already handed over to I. Thomas in 1946. He was replaced by D. 
Rees-Williams in 1947. The West African Cocoa Control Board and its 
successor, the West African Produce Control Board, were thus presided 
over by six different Under-Secretaries of State between 1940 and 
1947 which probably increased the importance and influence of its 
official permanent members, notably S. Caine and E.C. Tansley.
3. The Minister of Food had insisted that J. Cadbury could only
become a member of the Board as a private person, and not as a
Ministry of Food representative, in order to completely disassociate 
his Ministry from the scheme. This arrangement appears in retrospect 
as somewhat odd. J. Cadbury left the Board in 1943.
4. In August 1941 E. Melville was sent to Washington, where he was
put in charge of the Colonial Supply Mission in 1942.
5. PRO: CO 852, file 319/7. Minutes of Meeting held at the Colonial 
Office, 11 Sept. 1940. The first meeting of the West African Produce 
Control Board was actually held on 1st Nov., 1940. See ibid. Minutes 
of the 1st Meeting of the West African Cocoa Control Board, 1 Nov.
1940.
6. E.C. Tansley was directly employed by the West African Cocoa 
Control Board from 1st October, 1940 and subsequently received a 
salary of £ 2,000 p.a.
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appointment as Managing Director to relinquish his post as a coun­
cillor. His interest in the firms allegedly amounted to only £30. See 
NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S217 Vol. I. Minutes of the 3rd Meeting of the 
Shadow Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board, 4 Sept. 1947. Sanda became 
later a supporter of the Action Group and, in addition to his 
appointment as a member of the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board, a 
member of the Western Region Production Development Board. See R.L. 
Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties. Power in an Emergent African 
Nation , (Princeton 1963), p.450 note 29.
132. NAI: Qyo Prof 2/3, file C.107. Letter from the Qni of Ife to the 
Resident Qyo Province, 24 July 1947. G.A. Babatunde claimed to have 
£10,000 available for produce buying. He also wrote in his appli­
cation letter that Kajola Kawusi Stores owned four stores and a 
number of lorries in Ife and pointed out that he had bought cocoa 
(654 tons) for the United Africa Company and John Holt & Co. Ltd. in 
the preceding season.
133. See chapter 5.
134. The Nigerian Youth Movement, for example, held a large con­
ference in September 1941 which was attended by the Governor of 
Nigeria, B. Bourdillon, and other Nigerian government officials. None 
of the 17 separate items discussed touched upon the issue of produce 
control. See NAI: CSO 26, file 30055 Vol. II. Proceedings of the 
Nigerian Youth Movement ’Representative Council Meeting’, 6 to 9 
September, 1940. For a report on dissatisfaction among commission 
buyers see NAI: lb MinAgric 1, file 17980 Vol.V. Letter from the 
Resident Ijebu Province to the SWP, 24 Nov. 1941. The Ibadan Produce 
Traders’ Union was founded on 1st April, 1941 in order to represent 
the interests of commission buyers vis-a-vis the government. The 
Union’s first secretary was S.A. Akinpelu who held this post until 
1945, or maybe 1946. A leading member of this Union was E.A. Sanda, 
who later became its Secretary. As already mentioned, E.A. Sanda was 
one of the three African members of the newly established Nigerian 
Cocoa Marketing Board. On the foundation of the Union see NAI: Oyo 
Prof 1, file 3909. Ibadan Produce Traders’ Union, booklet ’Rules and 
Regulations’, 1 April 1941.
135. NAI: lb MinAgric 1, file 17980/2 Vol. II. Petition from the
Ibadan Co-operative Marketing Union, 19 May 1942.
136. Ibid. The petitioners also pointed out that the cost of living 
and the cost of farm inputs, especially the cost of farm labour, had 
steeply risen since the beginning of the war. They even indicated
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that the current cocoa price would not enable them to pay for the 
education of their children, which was usually treasured very highly. 
The petitioners argued that farmers would suffer most from the 
effects of the war and stated that it would be ’easy for the Govern­
ment to see the plight of the wage earners, but the farmers’ case is 
one which is not easy to be seen, because the Government has not as 
much direct contact with the farmers as they have with the wage 
earners’. It is interesting to note that cocoa traders apparently 
compared their standard of living with that of wage earners, most of 
whom were employed by government. The latter had received substantial 
pay increases in the early war years. The petitioners’ view why 
government treated wage earners and cocoa farmers differently 
appeared later in a much more sophisticated version in M. Lipton, Why 
People Stay Poor: A Study of Urban Bias in World Development.
(London 1977).
137. NAI: Qyo Prof 2/3, file C219. ’Extract from A.S.P. Letter 
No.1.C.37/111. 235 of 22 Sept. 1942. The acronym ’A.S.P.’ most likely 
meant Assistant Superintendent Police.
138. NAI: lb MinAgric 1, file 17980 Vol.VI. Resolution by ’Ibadan 
District Farmers’, 19 Sept. 1942. In the previous chapter it has been 
mentioned that the Chief Commissioner of the Western Provinces 
invited a delegation from the Ibadan Co-operative Cocoa Marketing 
Union to meet him and discuss the matter. The subsequent meeting 
between the Chief Commissioner and three delegates from the Ibadan 
Co-operative Cocoa Marketing Union was held two days later on 21st 
September, 1942 and resulted in a petition which in effect was 
written by the Chief Commissioner of the Western Provinces himself 
and then forwarded to the Chief Secretary in Lagos. For this letter 
see NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S84. Letter from the Chief Commissioner 
of the Western Provinces to the CS, 23 Sept. 1942.
139. This is particularly sad, since higher produce prices would 
probably have curbed the spread of diseases.
140. Individual members of the Nigerian Youth Movement, such as 0. 
Awolowo had been active before, but the movement as such did not 
voice any criticism of the scheme until 1942. See chapter 5, endnote
203.
141. NAI: CSO 26, file 30055 Vol.II. Letter from the President of the 
Nigerian Youth Movement E. Ikoli to the CS, Memorandum covering 
subjects discussed with the Governor of Nigeria, [?] December 1942.
142. See, Daily Service. 6 Feb. 1943.
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143. NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S30. Question No. 92 by the Hon. E. 
Ikoli, 3rd Lagos Member of the Nigerian Legislative Council, 14 
March 1943.
144. FRO: CO 583, file 263. ’Memorandum submitted by the Nigerian 
Youth Movement to the Rt. Hon. Colonel Stanley on the occasion of his 
visit to Nigeria in September, 1943.’ Before that visit neither the 
Nigerian Association of African Importers and Exporters nor the 
Nigerian Produce Traders Association had appeared in the public. It 
also appears that the name ’Nigerian Produce Traders Association’ has 
been used only on that occasion. For details on the Nigerian As­
sociation of African Importers and Exporters see chapter 3, especial­
ly endnotes 100-103.
145. This is of some importance since this criticism influenced the 
planning of the post-war scheme, whose features - as I have argued 
above - were partly designed in order to forestall political dif­
ficulties. See endnote 81 in this chapter.
146. For an example from 1939 see, PRO: CO 657, file 47. Adminis­
trative Reports. Annual Report of the Western Provinces, 1939, p.78 
and ibid. Administrative Reports, Annual Report of the Eastern 
Provinces, 1939, p.67.
147. Daily Service. 11, 12 and 15 May, 1944. The campaign against the 
Association of West African Merchants was to a large extent directed 
against the activities of the United Africa Company. The accusation 
that the activities of the United Africa Company were detrimental to 
African interests was made as late as 1977! In 1977 a little booklet 
appeared which could have easily been written in the mid-1940s. See 
Committee against Nigeria’s Exploitation, ’VICIUM OF UAC (sic)’, 
(Lagos 1977), pamphlet deposited at the Institute of Commonwealth 
Studies, London.
148. This theme later reappeared in a speech which E. Ikoli held at 
the meeting of the Nigerian Legislative Council on the 8th March,
1945. See NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S73A Vol. I. Copy of a speech in the 
Nigerian Legislative Council by the Hon. E. Ikoli, 8 March 1945.
149.Daily Service. ’Post-War Cocoa Control’, 27 Oct. 1944. This 
article together with similar critical reports in other Nigerian 
newspapers, like the West African Pilot, prompted the Director of 
Supply to compose a very carefully written article which appeared in 
all Nigerian newspapers at the time. The article did not contain any 
obvious misinterpretations of facts, but was a very effective piece 
of government propaganda. See Nigerian Daily Times. ’Regulation of 
Cocoa Trade after the War by the Director of Supplies’, 30 Nov. 1944. 
On the subject of war-time propaganda and its political ramifi­
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cations, see C. Thomas, ’Colonial Government Propaganda, Public 
Relations and the Administration in Nigeria, 1939-1951’, University 
of Cambridge Ph.D. thesis, (Cambridge 1986).
150. The hope that the end of the war might bring changes in the 
narrow field of cocoa control was part of the general expectation 
that great political and material changes would occur immediately 
after the war, such as a general improvement in the standard of
living, greater welfare and constitutional reform. On such post-war 
expectations, see PRO: CO 657, file 56. Administrative Reports,
Annual Report for the Northern, Western, Eastern Provinces and the 
Colony 1945, p. 15.See also A. Hinds, ’British Imperial Policy and the 
Development of the Nigerian Economy, 1939-1951’, Dalhousie University 
Ph.D. thesis, (Dalhousie 1985), 374. See also A.G. Hopkins, An
Economic History of West Africa. (London 1973), p.268.
151. See the articles in the Daily Service from the 27 Oct. 1944, 6 
Dec. 1944, 7 Aug. 1945 and 20 Sept. 1945. See also West African
Pilot, 16 Aug. 1946 and 12 Sept. 1946. There were also demands for
de-control of the import trade and for de-control of the export trade 
for other crops than cocoa. See also A. Olorunfemi, ’Effects of War- 
Time Trade Controls on Nigerian Cocoa Traders and Producers, 1939-45: 
A Case Study of the Hazards of a Dependent Economy’ , International 
Journal of African Historical Studies. XIII(1980)4, p.686.
152. Daily Service. ’Cocoa Jigsaw Puzzle’, 6 Dec. 1944.
153. R.L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties. (Princeton/New York 
1963),pp.58-60. See also J.S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Natio­
nalism. (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1958), pp.271-284.
154. For an example of how political demands were directly tight up 
with cocoa control matters, see NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S73A Vol. I. 
Copy of a speech in the Nigerian Legislative Council by the Hon. E. 
Ikoli, 8 March 1945. Incidentally, in this meeting E. Ikoli moved a 
resolution which asked the Seer. of State for the Colonies to 
reconsider the post-war marketing scheme. The resolution was seconded 
by the member for Oyo Province and president of the Ibadan Co­
operative Marketing Union, A. Obisesan and supported by the Com­
mercial Member for Lagos, the District Agent of John Holt & Co. , J.F. 
Winter. The resolution was withdrawn after an intervention from the 
Chief Secretary. For further criticism of the government’s policy of 
non-consultation, see Daily Service, 2 Jan. 1945, 8 March 1945 and 13 
and 14 Sept. 1946; and West African Pilot. 31 Oct. 1944. The last 
named article was written by George Padmore, the ’London Corres­
pondent’ (sic) of the West African Pilot. The article was censored by 
the Ministry of Information.
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155. NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S73A Vol. I. Copy of a speech in the 
Nigerian Legislative Council by the Hon. E. Ikoli, 8 March 1945. See 
also the quote from a speech by E. Ikoli in the Legislative Council 
Meeting on the 22nd March, 1945, in J. Wheare, The Nigerian Legis­
lative Council. (London 1949), p.70. See also 0. Awolowo, Path to 
Nigerian Freedom. (London 1947), p.125. The fact that there were no 
consultations between the government and cocoa farmers, African 
traders or politicians was even lamented by the weekly journal West 
Africa. 3 Feb. 1945, p.121. It is noteworthy that the Nigerian 
government replied to demands from the Seer, of State for the 
Colonies to consult producers on the White Paper proposals that 
nothing ’would be gained by consultation with producers at this 
stage’ and that anyway ’it would be difficult to find...the proper 
person to consult.’ See NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S73A Vol.I. Letter 
from the Governor of Nigeria to the Seer, of State for the Colonies, 
22 Nov. 1945. Earlier G.H. Creasy had written to Governor Richards 
that ’It is, of course, most unfortunate that we are unable to
produce any definite evidence that the White Paper proposals are
welcomed by the producers themselves, and it is difficult to carry
conviction in saying that the producer want the scheme but that they 
are not vocal enough to say so.’ See ibid. Letter from G.H. Creasy to 
A. Richards, 14 March 1945.
156. See endnote 126 in this chapter.
157. I have not found a trace of this petition in the Nigerian
archive, but it was fully reproduced in the Daily Comet. ’Petition to
His Excellency, the Governor, by the Produce Buyers’ Union of Ibadan 
and the Western Provinces’ , 2 , 3  and 4 May 1945. The union com­
plained that the West African cocoa trade was controlled by the
European trading firms and demanded that trade pools, and associa­
tions and agreements between vested interests, whether African or 
European, should be outlawed. Moreover, the petitioners put forward 
the proposal that agricultural banks and a 'Department of Trade’
should be set up in order to support African Traders. Apart from 
these demands which were obviously shared by many political groups at 
the time - it is interesting to note that the Union also made the 
point that there was not much difference between its members and the 
ordinary cocoa farmer, since many of the latter were engaged in cocoa 
trading themselves. In addition, the union warned the Government that 
current cocoa prices were too low and that consequently cocoa farmers 
were leaving their farms in great numbers.
158. NAI: Oyo Prof 1, file 3909. Petition by the Nigerian Produce
Buyers’ Union, 3 Sept. 1946; ibid. Petition by the Nigerian Produce
Buyers’ Union, 4 Nov. 1946 (both petitions were signed by S.A. 
Akinpelu); NAI: CSO 26, file 38300 S122. Letter from the Nigerian
Produce Buyers’ Union, 3 Dec. 1946 (this letter was signed by E.A.
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Sarnda). After E.A. Sanda became a member of the marketing board, the 
union seems to have virtually abandoned its activities.
159. It is not completely clear, when the delegation actually went to 
the United Kingdom. The first report on the delegation appeared in 
the Nigerian press on the 12th September, 1945. It stated that the 
delegation had just arrived in London. See Daily Service. 12 Sept.
1945. The Nigerian delegate F.O. Blaize returned to Nigeria at the 
end of January 1946. See West African Pilot. 29 Jan. 1946. This 
section of the chapter owes much to C.E.F. Beer, The Politics of 
Peasant Groups in Western Nigeria. (Ibadan 1976), appendix II, pp. 
233-237.
160. The Nigerian representative was F.O. Blaize, who was in London 
at the time in order to study law.
161. Rhodes House Library Oxford, Fabian Colonial Bureau Papers, Mss. 
Brit. Emp. s365, box 52/4. ‘Memorandum of Protest' by the Farmers’ 
Committee of British West Africa, Sept. 1945. While in London, the 
delegation received support from the Labour Party (R.W. Sorensen 
M.P. ) , the West African Students Union and the Fabian Colonial Bureau 
(Rita Hinden). For a reprint of the memorandum, see Daily Service. 11 
Oct. 1945.
162. C.E.F. Beer, The Politics of Peasant Groups in Western Nigeria. 
(Ibadan 1976), pp.234-236.
163. The Farmers’ Protection Society started to protest against low 
cocoa prices as early as October 1941. See NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 
S12 Vol.II. Petition from the Farmers’ Protection Society to the 
Seer, of State for the Colonies, 13 Oct. 1941. The petition was 
signed by P.T. Coker.
164. C.E.F. Beer, The Politics of Peasant Groups in Western Nigeria. 
(Ibadan 1976), pp.42-43. C.E.F. Beer reports that since 1942 A. 
Obisesan and the Ibadan Co-operative Cocoa Marketing Union were 
affiliated to the Federation of Nigeria Farmers through the Federal 
Union of Nigerian Farmers Western Provinces. He seems to mix up two 
different events, since the Federal Union of Nigerian Farmers Western 
Provinces, of which A. Obisesan was President, was only established 
in October 1943 after a "big meeting of farmers’ representatives" in 
Ibadan. See NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S116 Vol. I. Letter from the 
Registrar of Co-operative Societies to the CS, 21 Oct. 1943. For the 
1942 meeting in which A. Obisesan was involved, see endnotes 129 and 
130 in this chapter.
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165. C.E.F. Beer, op.cit.. p.42 note 8 and p.43 note 14. See also 
NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S167. Minute by A.Y. Cann, Aug. 1945. In 1943 
J.M. Coker and the Federation of Nigerian Farmers established the 
’Nigerian Penny Bank’. It went rather soon out of business. See NAI: 
CSO 26, file 40734. Letter from the Federation of Nigeria Farmers to 
the CS, 1 March 1943. A.S.O. Coker was later the moving spirit behind 
the establishment of another bank, called Nigerian Farmers’ and Com­
mercial Bank Ltd. See PRO: CO 852, file 803/6. Nigerian Farmers’ and 
Commercial Bank Ltd. , Annual Report for the Year ending 31 March 
1950. The bank was registered on 7th January, 1947.
166. NAI: CSO 26, file 40734. Letters from P.T. Coker to the Emir of 
Zaria, 8 Nov. 1943 and 19 Nov. 1943. The later letter contained the 
phrase: ’Please consult no Government official as the meeting is for 
Blackman and not for Whiteman. ’ P.T. Coker was also the organiser of 
a ’Congress of Nigerian Farmers’ in Lagos on 16th November, 1943.
167. Anonymous, ’Two Nigerian Lists (Trade Unions, National Coun­
cil)’, African Affairs. XXXXIV(1945)174, p.165. The National Council 
of Nigeria and the Cameroons was founded in mid-1944 as a federation 
of ethnic (mainly Ibo) groups and improvement societies. Its first 
president was the owner of the West African Pilot. N. Azikiwe. As 
mentioned in chapter 5, the Nigerian Youth Movement’s influence had 
declined in the early war years due to internal rivalries of its 
leadership and a split between its Lagos and Ibadan (Western Provin­
ces) branch. The Ibadan branch became defunct after 1944, but the 
Lagos branch under the leadership of Dr. A. Maya and E. Ikoli was
active throughout the war; it was not absorbed into the National
Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons. Many members joined the Yoruba
cultural organisation Egbe Omo Oduduwa, which later developed into 
the Action Group, the main political rival of the Nigerian Council of 
Nigeria and the Cameroons in southern Nigeria. See Coleman, Nigeria: 
Background to Nationalism, pp.260-267. Despite the rivalry between 
the Lagos branch of the Nigerian Youth Movement and the National
Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, the coverage of the campaigns
in their affiliated newspapers was very similar.
168. Daily Service, 19 Sept. 1945. The article is paraphrasing a 
speech by A.S.O. Coker on a “mass” meeting in Ibadan on 17th Septem­
ber, 1945. In his speech he also revealed that 6 months earlier (in 
September 1942) the same people involved in the establishment of the 
Farmers’ Committee of British West Africa Ltd. had set up a regis­
tered a bank in London which was called the ’Gold Coast and Nigerian 
Farmers’ Bank’. In 1945 the official address of the Farmers’ Commit­
tee of British West Africa was the Association of Merchants and In­
dustrialist and the Farmers’ Protection Society.
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169. The Farmers’ Committee of British West Africa (Gold Coast 
branch) consisted of two organisations. One was the West African 
Cocoa Producers’ Agency Ltd, headed by J.B. Danquah and the second 
was ’em organisation comprising of all constitutional elected Farmer 
Chiefs (Akuafohenfo) ’ in the Gold Coast. The latter was lead by J.K. 
Ayew. The quotation is taken from NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S167.
Letter from the Governor of the Gold Coast to the Seer, of State for 
the Colonies, 15 Oct. 1945. There is a fascinating story yet to be 
told about the local activities of the Farmers’ Committee of British 
West Africa in the Gold Coast. J.B. Danquah and K. Ayew played an 
important role in the emerging nationalist movement in the Gold Coast 
and their activities were conflicting with the Standing Committee of 
Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs.
170. The Gold Coast delegates in London, A. Nikoi and J.B. Danquah 
later became not only leading figures in the United Gold Coast 
Convention Party and the Conventions’ People’s Party, but also 
members of the Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing Board. See B. Beckman,
Organizing the Farmers. Cocoa Politics and National Development in 
Ghana. (Uppsala 1976), p.53. B. Beckman states that the Farmers’
Committee of British West Africa was founded in 1939.
171. Daily Service, 19 Sept. 1945. The Committee’s first public
statement opposing the introduction of the post-war control scheme 
appeared in the West African Pilot, 8 March 1945. C.E.F. Beer states 
that in March 1945 the Committee had contacts with American cocoa 
brokers and financiers. See Beer, The Politics of Peasant Groups in 
Western Nigeria, pp.234-235.
172. NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S167. Letter from the Farmers’ Committee 
of British West Africa to the Director of Supplies, 7 Aug. 1945. For 
the refusal of the application see, ibid. Letter from the Director of 
Supplies to the Secretary of the Farmers’ Committee of British West 
Africa, 15 August 1945. There is no space to make the full argument, 
but it appears that the activities of the Farmers’ Committee are an 
excellent example for the mixing of political and commercial ventures 
on which nationalist groups embarked in the 1930s and 1940s.
173. See ibid. F.O. Blaize held the power of attorney of the As­
sociation of Merchants and Industrialists, the Farmers’ Committee of 
British West Africa (Nigeria Branch) and of the Farmers’ Committee of 
British West Africa Ltd. See NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S167. Letter
from A.S.O. Coker to the Seer. of State for the Colonies, 20 Sept.
1945.
174. According to newspaper reports, Dr. A. Maya was the recipient of 
the telegrams, as well as letters which the London delegation sent 
to Nigeria. It was reported that he had joined the Farmers’ Committee
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while he was in London. See Daily Times. 19 Sept. 1945.
175. Daily Service. 18 Sept. 1945. The principal speakers on this 
meeting were A.S.O. Coker, S.A. Akinfenwa and E.A. Sanda.
176. Daily Service, 31 Oct. 1945. The principal speakers on this 
meeting were, apart from the President of the Ibadan Co-operative 
Marketing Union, A.Obisesan, Comrade (sic) Dr. M. Agbaje, Comrade 
(sic) Dr. A. Maya and Comrade (sic) S.L. Akintola. Other meetings 
were held in Lagos on 19th September, 1945 (Daily Service 20 Sept.
1945), 11th October, 1945 (Daily Service. 13 Oct. 1945), and in 
Abeokuta on 22nd October, 1945 (Daily Service. 23 Oct. 1945). On this 
meeting see also, G. Williams, ’J. Akinpelu Obisesan: A Biographical 
Essay’, paper presented at St. Peter’s College seminar, Oxford Nov. 
1988.
177. Holt Papers. Mss. Afr. S825, file 535 (III). ’The AWAM or the 
British Government’ by Cocoa Control Delegation Committee (Nigeria 
Branch), 6 Nov. 1945. A support fund for the London delegation was 
set up in October 1945. Subscription was paid by various well known 
nationalist activists and companies, such as Dr. A. Maja, the Ikorodu 
Trading Company (respectively S.O. Gbadamosi), A.S.O. Coker, D.T. 
Sasegbon, J.K. Ladipo, E.A. Pearce, the National Bank of Nigeria 
Ltd., W.A. Balogun, R. Williams, S.L. Akintola, and L. Solanke. See 
Daily Times. 13 Oct. 1945.
178. Daily Service. 4 Oct. 1945. This article mentions that support 
would be forthcoming from the Sierra Leone Youth League and the 
American Council of African Affairs. See also West African Pilot. 17
Oct. 1945 and 23 Nov. 1945. There one finds a report on a meeting
between the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons and the 
Ibibio Farmers’ Association. The meeting was addressed by "Prince” 
Eket Inyang Udo, who demanded that the Association should become 
affiliated to the Farmers’ Committee of British West Africa.
179. NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S167 Vol.I. Letter from the Act. Seer.
Western Provinces to the CS, 20 Dec. 1945.
180. Daily Service, 27, 28 and 29 Nov., 1945.
181. For the "order", see Daily Service. 9 and 16 Oct. 1945, and West 
African Pilot. 9 Oct. 1945. For the report on the "go slow campaign" 
see NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S167 Vol.1. Letter from the Act. Seer, of 
the Western Provinces to the CS, 20 Dec. 1945. For a general assess­
ment of the activities of the Farmers’ Committee see ibid. Letter 
from the Director of Agriculture to the CS, 11 Oct. 1945 and NAI: Qyo 
Prof 2/3, file C219. Letter from the SWP to the CS, 13 Oct. 1945. 
They reported that the Farmers’ Committee had no widespread support
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among cocoa farmers. See also the report on the unsuccessful attempt 
to organise a cocoa hold-up in West African Pilot. 16 Oct. 1945.
182. West African Pilot. 21 Jan. 1946. There was some further
activity in the Gold Coast. See PRO: 00 852, file 903/2. Cable
telegram from the Farmers’ Committee of West Africa, Oman Chambers, 
17 Sept. 1947.
183. See further down.
184. West African Pilot. 20 Dec. 1945. The origins of the Nigerian 
Farmers’ Union are obscure. The Union was mentioned for the first 
time in October 1944 in an article in the Daily Service. 31 Oct.
1944. There it was announced that a ’’mass meeting” to discuss the
future cocoa marketing scheme was to be held on 27th January, 1945 
under the auspices of the Union.
185. West African Pilot, 7 Feb. 1946.
186. 0. Akeredolu-Ale was a prominent member of the Nigerian Youth 
Movement, of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa and later of the Action Group. He 
owned a 12 acres farm in the Agege area, north of Lagos and at one 
point he also was running a transport business. In 1943 he was 
involved in the Federation of Nigerian Farmers but after being 
expelled from the Federation seems to have put his energies into the 
organisation of the Nigerian Farmers’ Union which later, in 1947 and 
1948, played an important role in the agitation of farmers’ groups 
against the swollen shoot (cutting out) campaigns of the Nigerian 
Cocoa Marketing Boards. In 1952 he became member of the Nigerian 
Cocoa Marketing Board. On the activities and the career of 0. 
Akeredolu-Ale, see Beer, The Politics of Peasant Groups, pp.42-43. 
See also PRO: 00 852, file 904/4. Extract from Nigerian Political
Summary, 47272/3c/48, n.d. [1948].
187. The 1946 White Paper on Cocoa Control was distributed well in 
advance of the actual publication in order to ’exercise influence on 
the formation of public opinion’. See NAI: CSO 26, file 36313. ’List 
of Persons to whom Distribution of the White Paper is Suggested’ , 
n.d. [March 1946?]. This list contained 14 categories of recipients. 
The 14th category reads almost as a who’s of the Nigerian political 
scene at the time. An abridged version of the 1946 White Paper was 
also published in Yoruba. See, Government of Nigeria, Public 
Relations Department, ’Statement on the Future Marketing of West 
African Cocoa’ [in Yoruba: ’Iwe Ijoba Pataki Lori Oran Oja Koko’], 
(Lagos Dec. 1946). A copy of this pamphlet can be found in NAI: CSO 
26, file 36148 S137A. For an example of very effective presentation 
of the government’s point of view, see Nigerian Daily Times. 
’Regulation of Cocoa Trade after the War’ by the Director of Sup­
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plies’, 30 Nov. 1944. This article was also published in the West 
African Pilot (29 Nov. 1944) and in the Daily Service (30 Nov. 1944). 
For an example of the activities of District Officers, see NAI: Qyo 
Prof 2/3, file C.107. Minutes of the Ibadan Native Authority Special 
Inner Council Meeting, 8 May 1947.
188. NAI: Qyo Prof 1, file 3905. ’Report on Visit to Ede’ by A.
Obisesan, [?] November 1944. For the support from A. Obisesan and the 
Ibadan Chief I.B. Akinyele see, Williams, ’J. Akinpelu Obisesan’ . At 
the meeting with the Ede Farmers’ Union and the Ede Council, A. 
Obisesan argued that ’he had made inquiries about the matter and was
told the reason for the proposed control was to protect producers
from unscrupulous financiers in Europe, who might create a temporary 
boom after the war for their own benefit only to drop prices to the 
ruin of producers’. This was, of course, the simplified government
line at the time.
189. Daily Service. 9 Jan. 1945, ’Post-war Cocoa Control’ by ’Comrade 
0. Awolowo (Now Studying Law and Commerce in England).’ 0. Awolowo
probably was influenced in his opinion by the West African Students’ 
Union in London whose member he was while he studied in London. The 
West African Students’ Union had been a strong supporter of a 
statutory cocoa control scheme since at least 1941. See the report on 
a W.A.S.U. conference in 1941 in West Africa. 11 Oct. 1941, p.982. 
See also G.O. Olusanya, The West African Students* Union and the 
Politics of Decolonisation. 1925-1958. (Ibadan 1982), pp. 52-60. The 
West African Students’ Union was in regular contact with the Fabian 
Colonial Bureau, whom it seems to have asked for advice on several 
occasions, one of which was the issue of government control of 
produce markets. On 20th October 1944, the Fabian Colonial Bureau (A. 
Creech Jones ?) wrote to H.O. Davies and the West African Students* 
Union that ’We all feel that, though there might be doubts about 
certain aspects of the government proposals [the 1944 White Paper 
proposals], in essentials we ought not to oppose them. They represent 
an enormous advance on almost everything there has been before, and 
cover exactly the criticism we have been making for years. It is true 
that it is not clear what exactly will be the part played under the 
new scheme by the merchant firms....But, as a socialist body, the 
last thing we can do is to oppose what is really an instalment of 
socialist planning just because it happens to be introduced by a
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Conclusion
This thesis analyses the evolution of an important aspect of 
Nigeria’s recent political and economic history: The involvement of
government agencies in the export trade of agricultural commodities. 
Before the Second World War, the Nigerian export trade was conducted 
by European trading firms and a small number of African and Libano- 
Syrian traders and the period was marked by severe political conflict 
between the trading firms and their African buying agents (sometimes 
also called brokers or middlemen). In the 1950s, however, all major 
agricultural export commodities were marketed by statutory government 
agencies and political conflicts in the internal and external trade 
of those commodities were conspicuous by their absence. One of the 
most important government agencies in the export trade of agri­
cultural commodities was the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board, whose 
genesis is described in this thesis.
Based on evidence from Nigerian and British government, as well 
as private, archives it appears that the establishment of the post­
war cocoa marketing board was a reaction to two separate develop­
ments: The evolution of the relationship between European trading
firms and African traders in the 1930s and the repercussions of the 
British war effort.
The relationship between European trading firms and African 
traders became increasingly strained in the 1930s. This was due to 
the increasing ability of the African traders to successfully 
challenge the dominant position of the European trading firms in the 
cocoa trade. The outward sign of this development was increasing 
competition amongst the European firms for the services of African 
traders by offering them higher commission rates and better credit 
terms.
Competition in the 1936/37 cocoa season was particularly 
fierce. When the cocoa price fell in the latter part of the season,
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the firms suffered from heavy financial losses which had been partly 
caused by the activities of their African buying agents. In September 
1937, the European trading firms, with the notable exception of one 
smaller firm, the English and Scottish Co-operative Wholesale 
Society, concluded a buying agreement which severely restricted 
competition between the firms. One of the primary objectives of the 
agreement was to regain control over the African buying agents and, 
as a local representative of one of the European firms put it, to 
’educate’ African buyers in business methods.
The introduction of the buying agreements occurred alongside a 
severe fall in the cocoa price in the international markets. In this 
particular situation, Nigerian traders and nationalist groupings, 
like the Nigerian Youth Movement, were able to organise a powerful 
protest movement against the firms which comprised of the farmers’ 
organisations (Ibadan Co-operative Cocoa Marketing Union), trade 
associations (Nigerian Produce Traders’ Union) and the emerging 
nationalist press. A similar development occurred in the Gold Coast, 
where the protest movement even included many of the southern Gold 
Coast Chiefs.
The climax of the West African anti-agreement movement was a 
hold-up of cocoa and a boycott of imported goods in the Gold Coast, 
which lasted from November 1937 to April 1938. A corresponding move 
in Nigeria, however, failed due to the lack of public and especially 
farmers’ support.
At this point the West African colonial governments as well as 
the Colonial Office became involved in the dispute. The cocoa hold-up 
in the Gold Coast had precipitated a political and economic crisis of 
the first order, since the protest movement threatened to cut off the 
mainstay of the Gold Coast economy - cocoa exports. Moreover, the 
protest movement sharply criticised the colonial authorities for 
their stance in the dispute, especially for their refusal to protect
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the interests of African traders and cocoa farmers against the 
machinations of the European trading firms.
In order to pacify the protest movement, the Colonial Office 
appointed a commission of inquiry under the chairmanship of W. 
Nowell. In April 1938, a truce was concluded between the protest 
movement and the European firms. The firms promised to suspend the 
agreement until the publication of the Report of the commission of 
enquiry on the condition that the Gold Coast and the Nigerian 
governments introduced legislation which would prevent the reap­
pearance of competitive practices in the trade. The leaders of the 
protest movement in turn promised to lift the ban on cocoa sales to 
the European firms and the boycott of imported goods. Cocoa sales 
subsequently returned to normal.
The Report of the Commission was published after the beginning 
of the 1938/39 cocoa season. Its recommendations failed to receive 
support from the West African governments, farmers’ organisations and 
from the Colonial Office, since they were not prepared to finance the 
scheme. Meanwhile the firms continued to purchase cocoa as if the 
buying agreement had never been suspended.
The outbreak of the Second World War caught the European firms 
unprepared. The 1937/38 buying agreement contained no provisions for 
the sudden loss of a major market and the firms were faced with the 
unappealing prospect of buying substantial stocks of cocoa for which 
there were no customers. They consequently approached the Colonial 
Office to bail them out and suggested that the British government 
should purchase the entire West African cocoa crop and employ the 
trading firms as its buying agents.
The Colonial Office readily adopted this plan for its own 
reasons: It believed that without government intervention there was 
a danger of a repetition of the 1937/38 events and that, moreover, 
the firms would profit unduly from the war-time trade situation. How­
ever, lack of finance and expertise forced the British government to
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seek the co-operation from the firms, which was readily forthcoming, 
albeit at a price. The firms were virtually given carte blanche as 
regards the determination of the finer details of the scheme, while 
the relevant government authority responsible for the scheme, the 
Ministry of Food, restricted itself to the fixing of the producer 
price. The marketing system which came into being in November 1939 
was thus a government purchase scheme whose salient features 
effectively reinforced the 1937/38 buying agreement with statutory 
powers.
Despite its objectionable features, Nigerian farmers and even 
traders, as well as political organisations, approved of the es­
tablishment of a government purchase scheme. There was some criticism 
of the scheme but such criticism was quickly silenced by the public 
burning of cocoa, which convinced the Nigerian public that statutory 
marketing would serve the interests of Nigerian cocoa farmers. This 
conviction was so strong that it was not until the latter part of the 
war that widespread criticism of the marketing scheme emerged.
In 1940, the responsibility for the scheme was transferred from 
the Ministry of Food to the newly established West African Cocoa 
Control Board (later West African Produce Control Board) under the 
direction of the Colonial Office. At the same time, the marketing 
scheme was increasingly turned into an instrument for the prosecution 
of the British war effort, which in practical terms meant exceedingly 
low cocoa purchase prices. Cocoa farmers experienced a serious de­
cline in their incomes from cocoa sales and consequently either left 
or neglected their farms. This had almost ruinous consequences for 
the cocoa industry. Meanwhile, however, the statutory marketing 
board made a substantial profit on its cocoa buying operations.
The execution of the war effort changed the relationship 
between the European trading firms and the colonial authorities. 
Statutory control of the cocoa trade had motivated the Colonial 
Office and the West African colonial governments to prepare definite
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plans for the post-war period as well as enabled the authorities to 
acquire the means to finance post-war schemes. The outward sign of 
the new relationship between the colonial authorities and the trading 
firms was that the latter were not consulted about the shape of the 
future marketing scheme.
From as early as 1941 discussions were held about the post­
war marketing arrangements. The Colonial Office and the West African 
governments soon came to the conclusion that a return to the pre-war 
free trade regime with its inevitable conflicts was undesirable and 
that, for political reasons, the responsibility for the future 
marketing scheme should rest with local marketing boards administered 
by the West African colonial governments. In addition, it was 
believed that statutory marketing had an important role to play in 
the post-war recovery of the British economy. The acquisition of the 
control of the oilseeds trade from the Ministry of Food and subse­
quent establishment of the West African Produce Control Board in 1942 
proved to be the decisive step towards the continuation of produce 
control after the war.
The 1944 White Paper proposal to establish marketing boards in 
the Gold Coast and Nigeria was initially met with severe criticism 
from all sides. The anti-marketing board alliance included such 
unlikely partners as British and American trading firms, African 
traders and farmers’ organisations and parts of the nationalist 
movements in the Gold Coast and Nigeria.
In the following three years, this formidable opposition was 
partly overcome by adjusting the proposed scheme to the criticism it 
had met. The composition of the future marketing board, for instance, 
was changed to allow for the representation of farmers’ and traders’ 
interests as well as for the representation of local political 
interests. The realisation of the 1944 plan was considerably helped 
by the distinct lack of cohesion within each section of the oppo­
sition movement. This was particularly noticeable within the
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nationalist camp, an important part of which had actually declined to 
join the opposition movement against the proposed post-war marketing 
scheme on the grounds that the only alternative, the return to the 
pre-war free trade regime would merely help to perpetuate the 
hegemony of the European firms in the cocoa trade. It appears that 
African traders had learnt the lessons of the 1930s, though perhaps 
not those which the European trading firms had hoped for. When the 
Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board was finally set up in October 1947, it 
met widespread approval.
The main conclusion of this thesis is that the decision to 
establish the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board was largely taken 
because the Colonial Office and the West African governments believed 
that statutory marketing provided a convenient administrative 
solution for the recurrent political conflicts in the 1930s cocoa 
trade. The establishment of the marketing boards was arguably a
preemptive strategy which aimed at the subtle manipulation of 
expected fields of conflict. The success of this strategy depended to 
some extent on local support for the scheme, which due to the
incorporation of local political leaders as well as of representa­
tives of local economic interest groups was eventually forthcoming.
But it should not be forgotten that the price for the political 
pacification of the cocoa trade was paid by the cocoa farmers.
Statutory marketing had allowed the colonial authorities to ap­
propriate a substantial part of the farmers’ income through the
accumulation of marketing board surpluses. These profits were 
initially solely used to finance the post-war marketing scheme and a 
number of smaller developmental undertakings, but this policy opened 
the door for the massive exploitation of cocoa farmers by statutory 
marketing boards in subsequent years.
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Appendix Tables
Table A: Producer and Government Share in the Price Paid by
United Kingdom Manufacturers for Cocoa, in 1940/41.
(Gold Coast Cocoa grade I and II, in £/s/d)
£ s d £ s d
Producer price: 13 1 4 23%
Marketing expenses:
Charges to f.o.b . 2 19 6
Charges from f.o.b. to c.i.f. 7 7 2
Charges by Ministry of Food 3 10 0
13 16 8
Government receipts:
Gold Coast export tax 2 2 0
Marketing Board profit 6 0 0
United Kingdom import duty 11 13 4
Ministry of Food surcharge 10 0 0
29 15 4
Price to manufacturers 56 13 4 100%
Source: PRO: 00 852, file 431/2. West African Produce Control Board 
memorandum ’Sale Prices to the Ministry of Food’, annexure 
II, 26 Nov. 1942.
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Table B: The Licensed Buying Agents of the Nigerian
Cocoa Marketing Board and their Purchases in the 
1947/1948 Cocoa Season (in percent)
European: Compagnie Frangaise de l’Afrique Occidentale, Lagos (4.45%)
Co-operative Wholesale Society Limited, Lagos (0.85%)
John Holt & Company (Liverpool) Limited, Lagos (10.26%)
G.B. Ollivant Limited, Lagos (7.67%)
Paterson Zochonis & Company Limited., Lagos (6.77%)
Rowntree-Fry-Cadbury (Nigeria) Limited, Lagos (13.79%)
Societe Commerciale de l’Ouest Africain, Lagos (3.96%)
Union Trading Company, Lagos (3.05%)
United Africa Company, Lagos (24.54%)
C. Zard & Company, Lagos (5.48%)
London Africa & Overseas Limited, Lagos (1.55%)
Witt & Busch. Lagos (0.48%)
(82.85%)
"Syrian": Flionis Brothers, Qndo (0.64%)
S. Thomopulos & Company Limited, Lagos (0.47%)
A.G. Leventis & Company Limited. Lagos (0.31%)
Mandilas & Karaberis, Lagos (0.95%)
Cristos S. Mandrides. Benin Cit.v (0.06%)
A. K. Zard, Ibadan (0,50%)
N. K. Zard. Ibadan (0.77%)
N. Abizakhem, Ibadan (0.64%)
(4.34%)
(11.43%) 
(0.23%) 
(0.11%) 
(0.74%) 
(0.30%) 
(12.81%)
Source: NAI: CSO 26, file 36148 S 217 Vol.I. Minutes of the Sixth
Meeting of the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board, 16 Aug.
1948, appendix XXXIV, p.3.
African: Ass. of Nigerian Co-operative Exporters, Ibadan
United Development Trading Company, Ibadan 
Odutola Brothers, Ijebu-Ode 
Ibadan Traders Association Limited. Ibadan 
Ka.iola Kawusi Stores, Ife
Note: The firms, which are emphasised, were newly appointed 
by the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board in September 1947.
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Table C: Agricultural Wage Rates and Food Prices at Moor
Plantation (Ibadan), 1919 - 1943
Labour rates Yams Beef Cocoa
Year (per diem) (per cwt.) (per lb.) (per ton)
1919 Is 30s Is 9d £47 12s Od
1920 6d - Is 8s Is 3s £47 9s 4d
1921 6d - Is 15s Is 6d £15 8s 7d
1922 6d - Is 18s Is 3d £20 3s 2d
1923 6d - Is 35s 2s 6d £18 13s lOd
1924 6d - Is 25s Is £19 3s 9d
1925 6d - Is 5s 2s £25 13s Id
1926 6d - 9d 6s Is 10 l/2d £33 9s Id
1927 7 l/2d - Is lOd 7s 3d 2s 1 l/2d £55 8s 9d
1928 7 l/2d - Is lOd 10s Is 1 l/2d £44 Is Id
1929 5d - lid 10s Is 1 l/2d £33 5s Od
1930 5d - lid 8s 6d Is l/2d £24 8s lOd
1931 9 l/2d 8s 6d Is l/2d £14 Is 8d
1932 6 l/2d 3s Is l/2d £15 Is 2d
1933 6 l/4d 2s 2d 9d £14 4s lid
1934 2d - lOd 2s 6d 7d £14 11s lOd
1935 3d - Is 2s 6d 7d £16 9s 7d
1936 3d - Is 2s 6d 7d £22 17s 8d
1937 4d - 9d 2s 6d 4 l/4d £22 2s 9d
1938 4d - 9d 3s 9d 4 l/4d £14 8s 9d
1939 5d - 9d —  — —  — £13 15s lOd
1940 5d - 9d - - - - £15 2s lOd
1941 5d - 10 l/2d 4s 7d 8 l/2d £14 0s Od
1942 9d - Is 2d 6s 10 l/2d 9d £13 6s 3d
1943 Is 2d 10s 3d 9d £12 6s 3d
Source: NAI: IB MinAgric 1, file 17980 Vol • VI, Memorandum ’Notes on
the Cocoa Industry’ by Director of Agriculture, J. R. Mackie, 
27 Jan 1944.
Note: Cocoa prices are annual customs values and therefore differ
widely from seasonal values listed in tables 1, 3, 6, and 7.
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Table D: Approximate Nigerian Government Revenue and Marketing Board
Surplus in Relation to Producer Incomes, 1936/37 - 1946/47
Producer Export Import Marketing Government
Income
(A)
Duty
(B)
Duty
(C)
Surplus
(D)
Appropriat ion 
(B+C+D) (B+C+D/A)
1936/37 3,864 119 645 — 764 20%
1937/38 1,677 115 357 - 472 28%
1938/39 1,594 133 336 - 469 29%
1939/40 1,351 96 297 (61) 332 25%
1940/41 1,358 117 276 570 963 71%
1941/42 1,441 209 210 (82) 337 23%
1942/43 1,390 234 350 747 1,331 96%
1943/44 886 149 311 857 1,317 149%
1944/45 1,838 180 460 673 1,313 71%
1945/46 2,675 216 828 717 1,761 66%
1946/47 5,196 230 1,713 5,759 7,702 148%
Source: G. K. Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture, Government and Economic 
Growth,(Homewood/Illinois 1966), tables IV-A-1,IV-A-7,V-E-4 
E. Melville, ’The Marketing of West African Cocoa’, in:
Cocoa, Chocolate and Confectionery Alliance Ltd., (ed.), 
International Cocoa Conference 1948, (London 1949), p.76.
Note: The import duty which cocoa farmers paid on their purchases
ofimported goods is actually unknown. In the calculation 
above, it was therefore assumed that in the same period the 
relation between cocoa export and total exports was ap- 
proximatly equal to the relation between the import duty paid 
by cocoa farmers and the total amount of import duty col­
lected by the Nigerian government. In October 1941 export 
duty on cocoa was increased from £1 3s 4d to £2 2s per ton. 
United Kingdom import duties and the levies imposed on cocoa 
sales by the Ministry of Food during the war were not taken 
into account.
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